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HOW THE WAR WAS LOST AND WON

EDITED BY
PETER H. RAVENHILL

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HOW THE WAR WAS LOST AND WON

**The Grand Strategy of
The High Commands**



A Chasseur Alpin

By Georges Scott

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VOLUME II

How the War was Lost and Won

*The Grand Strategy of the
High Commands*

INTRODUCTION BY GENERAL SIR FREDERICK MAURICE

Edited by

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A-V

CONTENTS OF VOLUME II

	PAGE		PAGE
<i>Introduction—East or West?</i>		<i>Haig's Own Story of the War</i>	
by Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice	vii	I. The Wearing Down Process . . .	112
II. The Defense of Paris and Calais . . .	xii	II. Governing Factors in the War . . .	113
III. The Gallipoli Expedition	xv	III. Big Losses of All Belligerents . . .	116
IV. Gloom on the Western Front—The Submarine Menace	xvii	IV. The Value of a Vigorous Offensive . .	118
V. Bagdad Captured; Egypt Safe	xviii	V. Cavalry in War Not a Back Number .	120
VI. The Salonika Expedition	xix	VI. "A Man's a Man for A' That" . . .	123
VII. The Italian Disaster	xx	VII. The Army's Debt to Science	124
VIII. Holding on until America Arrived .	xxi	VIII. Tremendous Growth of Artillery . .	126
IX. The Situation in Europe in 1918 . .	xxii	IX. The Army Behind the Lines	131
X. The West the Vital Point	xxiii	X. Ideas Not Antiquated Because Old . .	133
		XI. England's Citizen Soldiers	135
 <i>The Strategy of the War</i> . . J. B. W. Gardiner		 <i>Foch's Part in the War</i>	137
I. Europe in 1914	1	<i>Viscount French's 1914</i> T. R. Ybarra	159
II. Germany Strikes	8	I. Opening of the War	161
III. The British Blockade	16	II. French's Quarrel with Kitchener . .	164
IV. First Russian Campaigns	22	III. The Disagreement with Joffre . . .	166
V. The Gallipoli Campaigns	27	IV. Criticism of Von Kluck	168
VI. Campaigns in Serbia	32	V. The First Battle of Ypres	170
VII. The Verdun Campaign	39	VI. French Was Always a "Westerner" .	171
VIII. Campaigns of 1916	40	VII. Another Difference with Joffre . .	172
IX. Italy in 1915 and 1916	48	VIII. The Munitions Scandal.	173
X. European Campaigns of 1917	53	 <i>Smith-Dorrien's Battle</i>	174
XI. The Rumanian Campaign, 1916 . . .	59	<i>The Marne and Verdun</i>	182
XII. The Problem of 1918	63	 <i>The Gough Controversy</i>	
XIII. Germany's Last Offensive	70	I. In Defense of General Gough	190
XIV. Last German Attacks	76	II. Why General Gough Retired	194
XV. The Last Campaign	80	 <i>The Dardanelles Controversy</i>	
XVI. At Pan-Germany's Back Door . . .	87	I. Who Was to Blame	197
XVII. Final Italian Campaign	94	II. Summary of the Findings	200
XVIII. "German Efficiency"	99	III. Kitchener Severely Criticised . . .	202
 <i>Foch's Principles of War</i> T. R. Ybarra		IV. Lord Fisher's Position	203
I. Victory in Attack	103	V. Churchill's Vigorous Rejoinder . . .	205
II. Battle the True Goal of Warfare . .	107	 <i>How the War Was Won</i> . . General Malletterre	206
III. A Defensive Cannot Create Victory, Says Marshal Foch	108	<i>German Blunders in the War</i>	221
IV. The Reserve as a Sledge-Hammer in Attack	110	<i>Russia in the War</i>	225

CONTENTS OF VOLUME II

	PAGE		PAGE
Italy in the War		Von Ludendorff's Own Story	298
I. The "Days of May"	236	I. Where Hindenburg Got His Ideas	300
II. The Capture of Gorizia	242	II. Peace Feelers and Submarine Warfare	303
III. The Carso Desert	244	III. 1918—The Great Task Before the Ger-	
IV. The Caporetto Disaster	246	mans	308
V. The Stand on the Piave	250	IV. The Defeats of June and July, 1918	320
VI. Austria's Last Attack	250	V. August 8th—When Despair Set In	331
VII. Italy's Final Triumph	252	VI. The Russian Collapse—1917	340
A German General's View	254	VII. The War's Beginning	343
The Zeppelin's Failure	262	Ancient Rome and Modern Prussia,	
"America Did It"	270	Guglielmo Ferrero	365
Did the Tank Win the War?	273	War Achievements of French Labor	
Open Warfare from 1914 to 1918	285	Albert Thomas	373
The Bagdad Railway	290	The War Spirit of France	
		William Morton Fullerton	383

ILLUSTRATIONS IN COLOR

A Chasseur Alpin	<i>Frontispiece</i>
On Guard in Alsace	<i>Facing page 136</i>
Wounded British in France	" 190
The Star of Bethlehem	" 220
An English Tank in the Streets of Jerusalem	" 280
English Troops Descending the Mount of Olives	" 332
The Walls of Jerusalem	" 370

MAPS IN COLOR

Perspective Map of Europe Showing the War Zones and Armistice Lines	<i>Facing page xxiv</i>
Perspective Map of the Western Front	" 86

INTRODUCTION

EAST OR WEST?

England's Puzzling Strategic Problem—Could Germany Be Defeated in Northern France, or Was It Wiser to Cripple Her by Crushing Turkey at the Dardanelles, or by a Mighty Effort Through Italy?—An Illuminating Discussion of a Bitter Controversy

BY MAJOR GENERAL SIR FREDERICK MAURICE

I

GREAT BRITAIN entered the war with no conception of what lay in front of her. Both the French and British General Staffs believed that the prompt intervention of the British fleet and of a British Expeditionary Force of six divisions and a cavalry division would suffice to turn the scale against Germany. Germany upset their calculations by invading Belgium and France with at least twelve more divisions than Great Britain or France had supposed she could bring to the West. Fortunately, the German calculations also proved to be incorrect. The delay caused by the resistance of Belgium, the dogged valor in adversity of the French and British troops, Joffre's cool handling of a great crisis, and the blundering of the German generals in the field, just sufficed to prevent Germany beating France to her knees in the first rush. By the end of November, 1914, the Germans, defeated in the first battle of Ypres, had played the last card of their first hand and had failed to win. Thanks to Kitchener's energy, the British Army in France had been increased to ten infantry and three cavalry divisions, and measures for creating a national army were in full swing. Thanks to Winston Churchill's foresight in sending to their war stations the British fleet, in anticipation of the decision of the British cabinet to declare war, the German High Seas Fleet had been bottled up and the command of the seas was so far assured as to enable Great Britain to land

the military forces of the Empire almost anywhere except upon the strongly defended coasts of Germany. The first crisis of the war was past and there was time to look round and take stock of the situation.

SIEGE WARFARE

By the end of the year 1914 the British Government had begun to see that Kitchener was right and that we were in for a world war and for a long war. We had large armies in the making which could be placed in the field in the course of 1915 and the question was how and where these armies would be best employed. The position in Europe was that on the Western front continuous trench lines had been established between the North Sea and Switzerland, maneuver in the old sense of the term had become impossible, and the enemy could only be attacked by direct attack upon defenses which were rapidly growing daily more and more formidable. We were engaged in a form of warfare for which we lacked the necessary equipment and it had already become evident that in order to cut the enemy's barbed wire and break his trenches, we should need guns and ammunition on a scale which before the war would have been held to be fantastic. It was quite clear that it would be months before our arsenals could be expanded, new munition factories be organized and the flow of equip-



ment of the right kind and in anything approaching the right quantity could begin. Other great powers of Europe had great fortresses and the attack and defense of fortresses had been studied by their staffs and provision had been made for such operations. Therefore when the warfare on the Western front took on the form of a great siege, both France and Germany, who were as much surprised by this development as we were, had some nucleus of experience and of material upon which to work.

It had been held by our military authorities before the war that our little expeditionary force would never be employed in a great siege and therefore our preparations for that kind of warfare had been less than rudimentary.

We had to begin at the very beginning. We had to make ourselves or obtain from abroad the tools and machinery needed for the manufacture of the new weapons and to train workmen to use them. We might enlist, organize, and dispatch to the Western front our new levies, but could we provide them with the means of engaging the enemy on equal terms?

It had long been a tradition that the power of the British Empire was amphibious and could best be exercised where navy and army could work together. British strategists had for years argued that the effect of a small army such as we possessed would be multiplied many fold if by using the resources of our fleet and of our mercantile marine we kept our enemy in anticipation of attack at many points upon his seaboard and then struck swiftly at one of them. Such a maneuver skilfully carried through would give us the advantage of surprise and allow us to choose our own battlefield. There could be no question of surprise in any large sense if we slowly piled up men and munitions on the Western front. There we should be attacking our strongest enemy when he was fully prepared for us. The Germans after their first failures to reach Paris and the Channel ports had sent off every man who could be spared from the trenches in France and Belgium to the Eastern front for the great campaign against Russia, and had clearly no immediate intention of trying to win the war by an offensive campaign in the West.

A PERPLEXING EASTERN SITUATION

All these considerations moved the British Government to review carefully the military policy which should govern the campaign of 1915. Kitchener had taught them to broaden their views of what the war meant and involved, and even if he had not succeeded in this the Germans would have done it for him. The Germans had persuaded themselves, with that characteristic obtuseness which throughout the war prevented them from understanding those whose customs of life and methods of thought were different to their own, that the British were a decadent race, that the British Empire was a ramshackle building on a rotten foundation and that it would crumble to pieces under the first ill wind. They believed that South Africa, India and Egypt were seething with discontent and were only waiting for a favorable opportunity to throw off the British yoke. They had established an elaborate network of intrigue and had agents ready in all parts of the world to foment risings. Stupid and harmful to themselves as was the diplomacy of the Germans it achieved one clever stroke in bringing Turkey into the war on their side. Not only did this complete the isolation of Russia from her Western Allies, but it at once menaced Egypt and the Suez Canal, which the Germans not inaptly termed the jugular vein of the British Empire; it gave our enemies an excellent base from which to work in stirring up trouble for us in Persia and on the frontiers of India, while the fact that the head of the Mohammedan religion had taken sides with our enemies could not but be a cause of grave anxiety to us and to the French, for we both had large numbers of Mohammedan subjects whose fanaticism could be easily aroused. Therefore, though the Germans were absurdly out in their count of the stability of the British Empire, the measures which they succeeded in taking during the early months of the war constituted a danger, more particularly to our Eastern Dominions, which could not be disregarded. The Dominion of South Africa promptly put down the rebellion in the Colony which was fostered by German agents and later completed the conquest of German West Africa, thus effectively removing the source of trouble, but the pro-



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Major General Sir Frederick B. Maurice

Chief of the British War Office and Director of Military Operations, who achieved an international reputation as a military critic. In the latter part of 1918 his charges that Premier Lloyd George and Mr. Bonar Law had made misleading statements regarding the military situation led to a Parliamentary inquiry.

tection of India and of Egypt fell mainly upon Great Britain and upon the Government of India. There perplexing problems caused the British Government to cast frequent and anxious glances towards the East.

Such were the questions which were being discussed in the British Cabinet as the year 1914 came to a close and out of these discussions arose that controversy as to whether we should seek to win in the east or in the west, which lasted almost as long as the war, a controversy which undoubtedly hampered our efforts, for it ended as do most controversies, if the disputants are at all equally matched, in compromise. It was essentially a British controversy, for, of all the Allies, Great Britain alone had the sea power which made great overseas expeditions possible, and her interests in the East were predominant.

SEEKING "A WAY ROUND"

The protagonists of the Eastern policy were mainly members of the government, while the soldiers were almost unanimously Westerners. Ministers unaccustomed to war on a grand scale were very naturally obsessed with its horrors, and were appalled at its cost in life. The soldiers were continually demanding men and more men, and ministers had to meet not only the demands of the Army but to provide labor for an immense expansion of war industries, for an ever-growing fleet, and to maintain the national industries in a manner which would make the financing of the war possible. They were therefore always on the search for some means of winning the war less costly than assaulting German trenches. They wanted to discover some means of turning the barrier which the Germans had built up in the West, to find a way round. At first the Easterners were not united in their views as to the best way round, though all of them were agreed that it would be much less costly to attack either Austria or Turkey, in fields where there was at least a prospect of avoiding the deadlock of trench-warfare, than to hammer at the defenses of the strongest member of the opposing Alliance.

Mr. Lloyd George wanted to support Serbia in an attack upon Austria, who was being hard pressed by Russia. A successful campaign against Austria across the middle Danube

would, he argued, bring Italy, who was still hesitating, into the war on the side of the Allies, make their influence in the Balkans supreme, would decide Bulgaria to remain neutral and would quite probably cause both Rumania and Greece to throw in their lot with us. Thus Germany's road to the East would be closed, Turkey would be isolated, direct communication would be opened with Russia and the Central Powers would be completely encircled.

THE DARDANELLES PLAN

Mr. Churchill's plan was to force a way through the Dardanelles to Constantinople. This there was good reason to believe would result in a revolution in Turkey and the overthrow of Enver and of the Young Turks party. The effect of this in Italy, in the Balkans and in Asia would be at least as great as a successful invasion of Austria; and it would be far easier to deliver the munitions which Russia needed by way of the Black Sea, and bring back the corn and oil which the Western Allies wanted, than to attempt to open a road for this purpose from a Mediterranean base through the Balkans and Rumania. Both schemes, provided they could be carried through, opened up a dazzling prospect.

It was already clear that there was no chance of any brilliant coup in the West and thus early there was talk of a war of exhaustion. The very idea of this made the financiers turn green with apprehension, but the one hope of avoiding a process which would bleed Europe white lay in the millions of soldiers whom Russia could put in the field. Great Britain and France could hold on in the west while the steam-roller crushed the life out of Germany and Austria, but the steam-roller began to run out of steam in the first months of the war. Russia was no more prepared than we were with the stocks of munitions which are necessary for the waging of modern war, but she was in far worse plight than her Allies in that she was not an industrial country and had not conceived that she would be shut off from direct communication with the factories of the Western world. She had not even the material to replace the losses in her first disaster at Tannenburg, nor



Boundaries of Countries in Europe in 1914

rifles enough to arm her reservists, and until she obtained munitions in great quantities her vast man-power was useless. It did not require a trained imagination to see that the chances of an early victory for the Entente Powers depended upon the equipment of Russia, and that if Russia were to be equipped in reasonable time direct communication must be opened up with her. This was the main objective at which both plans aimed, though both held out promises of certain other great advantages.

As between the two plans, the arguments were altogether in favor of the attack upon the Dardanelles. The one base which could be used for an expedition into Serbia was Salonika, a very inadequate and ill-equipped port. The railways running thence towards the Danube were wholly inadequate for the maintenance of an army, and it would take many months to prepare a base and establish a line of communications, and while we were engaged in this work the line of communications would be exposed throughout its length to attack by Bulgaria, whose attitude was more than doubtful, and in part to attack by Turkey, a certain foe. Behind us would be Greece, governed by an intimate friend of the Kaiser's and with a General Staff wholly under German influence. The least we could expect in these circumstances would be that every detail of our preparations would be immediately reported to Berlin.

On the other hand for an attack upon the

Dardanelles we had in Egypt a central and convenient base at which the resources of Australasia and India could meet those of Great Britain. Our communications would be by sea, and in the winter of 1914, when Germany had not begun to develop U-boat warfare, there was little doubt but that we should be able to protect them adequately. While we were engaged in the lengthy preparations necessary before we could support Serbia, we should have to provide for the security of Egypt and of India, but a blow at the heart of Turkey would effectively put a stop to any serious enterprise against either. Above all, Turkey had a coast liable to attack and we should be able to use naval and military force in coöperation. For these reasons those of the Easterners who insisted that the best way round lay through Turkey carried the day against those who desired to help Serbia to invade Austria.

There was some discussion as to whether it would be better to attack Turkey by landing in the gulf of Iskanderum on the northern coast of Syria and by occupying the junction of the Bagdad and Syrian railways, which ran near the coast, cut communications between Turkey proper and both Palestine and Mesopotamia, or by forcing the Dardanelles; but the former plan would not achieve the main purpose of opening communications with Russia. It was at best a means of protecting our Eastern interests, which would be even better attained by reaching Constantinople.

II

THE DEFENSE OF PARIS AND CALAIS

THE Easterners decided to play for the biggest stakes and the discussion turned on the respective advantages and disadvantages of concentrating our military resources on the Western front, after providing garrisons for India and Egypt, or of attacking the Dardanelles. This brought the Easterners and the Westerners face to face.

The problem was as are nearly all military problems one of ways and means. The advantages which Germany had already obtained were incontestable, and therefore there

could be no question but that the Entente Powers would gain enormously by eliminating Turkey from the struggle. But it was equally incontestable that the first consideration in any military plan must be the safety of Great Britain and France. Even before the U-boats, Gothas and Zeppelins became as dangerous as they subsequently were, it was clear that, if the Germans reached Calais and Boulogne, Great Britain would be in danger of starvation and of invasion, and that her army in France would have a very precarious line

of communications with the Motherland. The importance of protecting Paris needed no discussion. In September, 1914, Joffre, backed by the French Government, had made all possible preparations for continuing the war even if the capital fell to the enemy, but the moral effect which the success of a second German attack upon Paris might have had was incalculable and the safety of Paris ought not in any circumstances to be risked.

It is an old and well-established maxim of strategy that before launching out upon an offensive enterprise a general must look to the safety of the vitals of his army, the base and the communications by which it is fed. Paris and the Channel ports were the vitals of the British and French Armies, and the Germans at Noyon were within 60 miles of Paris, while in Flanders they were a little more than 40 miles from Calais and Boulogne. The British Army was wearied with its efforts in the retreat from Mons and the first battle of Ypres. It had few reserves, it had lost a very high proportion of its trained regular officers and had no one ready to take their places, it had none of the appliances which later made life in the trenches at all endurable, and worst of all it was so short of artillery ammunition that its guns were limited to firing two rounds each per day except in an emergency, while the Germans pounded us freely with guns and trench-mortars. It was true that the Germans were concentrating their forces against Russia and appeared to have decided to act defensively in the West, but it was quite possible for them at any time to bring back to France and Belgium the troops they had sent to Poland. They had surprised us and the French in August, 1914, by bringing much larger forces against us than we had thought they would be able to do, and they had surprised us again at the first battle of Ypres by attacking us with new levies created since the outbreak of the war. It was certain at the beginning of 1915 that the expansion of their armies was not at an end, and it was at least possible that they had another surprise in store for us. The dominating factor in the strategy of the war was that we were fighting the Central Powers, enemies so placed that they occupied the inside of the circle of which the Entente Powers held the circumference. Within this

circle the Germans and Austrians controlled an admirable system of railways, so that they could move troops far more quickly to any part of the circumference than either the British or the French could. If we sent off a large army to Turkey it would be out of the question to bring it back again in time to save Calais or Paris should the Germans decide to try for either. It is only necessary to imagine what would have happened had the Germans in 1915 been able to attack us in the West on anything approaching the scale on which they did in March, 1918, to see that by no stretch of optimism could Calais and Paris have been considered safe at the end of 1914.

THE WESTERN FRONT MUST BE KEPT STRONG

There was therefore no doubt in any one's mind that the Western front must be strengthened; the only question was what proportion of the reinforcements which we were preparing should be sent to France. If we had sufficient force to make Calais and Paris safe against any combination which the enemy might bring against them, and then had a sufficient surplus to have enabled us to get round the barrier which the enemy had built up between the North Sea and Switzerland, it would certainly have been right to seek for the way round. If we had not an assured surplus of strength then the only prudent course was to provide just enough troops to protect the outer parts of the Empire, to keep a central reserve ready for emergencies, and to concentrate all else on the Western front.

The problem was very similar to that which confronted the Federal Government in the Civil War. They were then faced by an active and skillful enemy centrally placed. The nature of the country between the Potomac and Richmond provided the Confederacy with a succession of strong natural defensive lines and very early in the war it became evident that direct attack upon Richmond would be a slow and costly business. McClellan therefore sought to take advantage of the Federal sea power to find a way round by landing in the Yorktown peninsula. He failed because he had not sufficient force to fight his way along the peninsula to Richmond and at the


same time to place the safety of Washington beyond question.

Grant when he assumed command became a Westerner for the same reasons which made the majority of soldiers in the great war Westerners. He decided to force the barriers by direct attack because only in that way could he protect Washington and prevent Lee from

gers of detaching large forces from France and by promising prematurely victory in the West, if only their demands were met.

COULD THE STRAITS BE FORCED?

At first, however, there was no question of attacking Turkey with a large military force. Winston Churchill won his case for the at-



The Rock of Gibraltar

Since 1704 in possession of Great Britain, this bold promontory is situated on the south coast of Andalusia, Spain, at the eastern edge of the Strait of Gibraltar, the "Pillars of Hercules." Owing to its strategical situation, it has long been regarded as the "Key to the Mediterranean." There is a strong fortress on the rock.

doing mischief elsewhere. When he had Lee pinned to Virginia he used his surplus strength to press in elsewhere, just as Diaz in Italy, Allenby in Palestine, and Franchet d'Esperey in Macedonia pressed in when the Germans began to give way in France. Such in brief was the Western case. Unfortunately the soldiers, unskilled in presenting arguments, often injured the cause for which they were pleading by not stressing sufficiently the dan-

tempt upon the Dardanelles by persuading the Cabinet that it would be possible to force the Straits by naval action. He argued that the experience of Liège and Namur showed that gunnery had mastered fortification. It had been an established naval axiom that the guns of ships, being mounted on an unstable and moving platform and having a limited store of ammunition, were no match for guns of coast forts if these were served with reasonable

efficiency and were comparatively up to date in type. Mr. Churchill's view was that the ease with which the German heavy howitzers had flattened out the Belgian fortresses showed that the maxim required modification.

He had at his disposal a surplus of battleships, not sufficiently modern to take their place in the Grand Fleet, but armed with far heavier guns than any which the Turks possessed, and he believed that he could keep them well supplied with shell. In particular he pinned his faith to one new battleship, the *Queen Elizabeth*, which was just ready and was armed with 15 inch guns, that is to say heavier ordnance than the 13.5 inch Austrian howitzers which had proved so amazingly successful at Namur. In view of the narrow margin of superiority of the Grand Fleet over the High Seas Fleet at this time, it is not easy to understand why the sailors agreed to the *Queen Elizabeth* being sent to the East, but Mr. Churchill did obtain their acquiescence and Kitchener on behalf of the soldiers apparently felt that he could not but agree to a purely naval enterprise, which he hoped could be discontinued if it did not seem likely to prove successful. Mr. Churchill's hand was strengthened at a critical moment in the discussion by an appeal from the Grand Duke Nicholas, whose forces in the Caucasus were in difficulties, for a demonstration against Turkey which would draw off some of the Turkish forces from that part of the world. So the naval attack upon the Dardanelles was decided upon.

The impression has been conveyed by Mr.

Morgenthau and some Turkish authorities that the naval attack had almost succeeded at the time when it was broken off. There is as yet no evidence that the Turkish guns had been sufficiently destroyed to make it possible for the fleet to steam through the Straits, but it does appear that the Turks had neglected one of the elements which gave land guns an advantage over the guns of ships. Provided ordinary precautions are taken it is much easier to keep forts stocked with ammunition than ships at sea; but the Turks had not taken ordinary precautions and at the time when the fleet withdrew, the Dardanelles forts had very nearly run out of ammunition. But the fleet had found a more serious obstacle than the guns. It required very little skill to mine the narrow straits and the work of the mine-sweepers could easily be impeded by the Turkish field guns, for which there was ammunition and which were easily concealed so that the ships' guns could not find them. If the Turks had no heavy shell they had mines and the mines barred the way to Constantinople. It is just possible that the knowledge that the forts were running out of ammunition might have caused the Turks to abandon the Straits in a panic if the attack had been renewed, but the resolute way in which they fought on the defensive during the early years of the war is against this supposition and we have as yet no assurance that a renewed attempt would have succeeded. In any case this does not affect the question of military policy which I am discussing. The fact is that the naval enterprise failed.

III

THE GALLIPOLI EXPEDITION

THEN there followed the usual experience of war when a subsidiary operation has just failed of success. The Easterners pointed to the disastrous consequences to our prestige in the East if we turned back after setting our hands to the plough. German and Turkish agents had found their way into Persia, there were rumbles of unrest in India, in Egypt and in the Soudan, while Bulgaria was hesitating whether to take the

plunge and join our enemies. They argued that the effect of the naval bombardment of the forts had been such that with very little assistance from the soldiers the fleet would be able to win its way through; that Germany was definitely committed to a great campaign against Russia, that the Western front was in no danger, that Joffre, so far from being in any apprehension of a German attack, was himself preparing to take the of-



fensive, and that the absence of the few divisions required to make a success certain in the Dardanelles would never be felt in France. It requires extraordinary courage and determination to stop what soldiers term a "side show" when it has not at once achieved the results expected of it. The temptation to try just one more effort is usually irresistible, and it was so in this case.

The military expedition followed, after the naval attack had given the Turks full warning of our intentions, with the results which are known. At a time when we were struggling to make up for past neglect of preparation for war and were turning ourselves into a great military power, we undertook what was in effect a second great war against a formidable enemy and we had not yet the resources to conduct one war efficiently. We had not the trained men to replace losses, nor the equipment for them; we had not guns or ammunition in anything approaching the quantities required. So the history of the year 1915 is for us one of weak compromise between the demands of the Dardanelles Expedition and of our army in France.

There are many Easterners who maintain that their plans were ruined by Joffre's great offensive in the autumn of that year, and that if the Allies had remained on the defensive on the Western front and had sent to Suvla Bay the troops who were wasted at Loos we should have gained the Gallipoli peninsula. Human nature being what it is we could never have persuaded the French to remain passive while they believed that there was a prospect of driving the enemy from their territory, and therefore we should have had to provide the additional men for the Dardanelles, and at that time we had no troops with sufficient experience to fit them for that most complicated and difficult operation of war, the landing on an open beach in the presence of an enemy, and even if we had driven the Turks from the peninsula, there was no guarantee that this would have been decisive. In the summer of 1915 the prestige of Germany stood very high, the Young Turks party was supreme in Turkey and the chances of a revolution were no longer what they had been in 1914. If the fleet had got through into the Sea of Marmora, the chances were that the seat of government would have been removed

to Asia Minor and that we should have been left with the prospect of having to fight our way in the open to Constantinople against the greater part of the Turkish army. We could not have bombarded Constantinople from the sea without lowering ourselves to the level of the Huns, and convulsing the whole Mohammedan world. Success depended upon starting the Expedition with a skillfully planned surprise attack by naval and military forces working in close coöperation. After the naval attack failed there was never at any time any prospect of victory.

THE KUT-EL-AMARA INCIDENT

While our men were holding on to a narrow strip of the Gallipoli coast, tenable only because of their grit and gallantry, another subsidiary enterprise had developed against Turkey. In November, 1914, the Government of India had landed a small force at the head of the Persian Gulf to prevent the Turks and Germans from establishing themselves there, to influence the Arab tribes in that neighborhood in our favor and to protect the pipe line which carried down the oil from the fields of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to the Gulf, an assured supply of oil from this source being of great importance to our Navy as we were cut off from the Rumanian and Russian oil fields. The Turkish troops in southern Mesopotamia were not numerous, were ill-trained and badly equipped and at first success was easily won. Appetite grew with eating and the scope of the expedition was gradually extended, until at the very time when it had become patent that the Dardanelles Expedition was a disastrous failure and the Germans had opened up direct communication with Constantinople by overrunning Serbia with the assistance of Bulgaria, there appeared to be a chance of retrieving our position in the East by occupying Bagdad.

The Turks sent reinforcements of good troops from Europe and these arrived in time to drive Townshend's little force back from Ctesiphon and invest it at Kut-el-Amara. Once things began to go wrong the narrow margin upon which the expedition had to depend became horribly evident. There were no roads or railways in Mesopotamia and the

troops had to depend upon the river traffic for their needs. The Tigris could only be navigated by boats of special type and even with these navigation was by no means easy. River boats of the right kind were not to be had in the numbers necessary for supplying an army strong enough to drive the Turks from Kut-el-Amara, which lies 300 miles up the river, and though reinforcements were available they could not be got to the front in time to save Townshend, who was starved out and forced to surrender in April, 1916, after a fine defence which lasted 137 days.

At this time Eastern stock had fallen very low. By a wonderful combination of skill and daring, the wreck of the Dardanelles expedition was re-embarked under the very noses of the Turks almost without loss, the greater part being sent to Egypt to rest and refit and to provide for the defense of that country, which the Turks were menacing. But the unexpected success of this retreat could not alter the fact that we had failed disastrously and our enemies naturally shouted victory.

So far from securing our interests in Asia our Eastern enterprises had imperilled our whole position in the East and the prophets of woe anticipated that the consequences of our double failure would be to shake our position in India and in Egypt to its foundations. The least that was expected was that Persia and Afghanistan would join the Turks, that there would be risings all along the Indian frontier and disorder in the interior of that country, while it was believed that with the Turks attacking Egypt from the East and the tribes of the Sahara from the West, with rebellion fomented by the Egyptian Nationalists and troubles in the Soudan, we should be put to it to defend the Suez Canal. Early in the war a small expedition sent from India to German East Africa had been defeated and forced to re-embark, and under the leadership of a particularly able and energetic commander, von Lettow Vorbeck, the Germans had by the autumn of 1915 raised considerable native forces in that colony and were threatening British East Africa.

IV

GLOOM ON THE WESTERN FRONT—THE SUBMARINE MENACE

ON the Western front the situation was equally gloomy, for the German Crown Prince had made a great attack upon Verdun and captured two of the outlying forts and in April, 1916, was still gaining ground. The risk of weakening the Western front was now obvious, for if Sir Douglas Haig had not been able when the battle of Verdun began to carry out at once a great extension of the British front and provide Joffre with reinforcements by relieving a large number of French troops, Verdun must have fallen. In the Balkans the Serbian Army had been driven completely out of its country, a remnant with little or no equipment reaching the Adriatic coast after a terrible retreat, whence it was transferred to the island of Corfu. A French expedition with some of the first British troops withdrawn from the Dardanelles had been landed at Salonika in the hope of saving some part of Serbia, but the sorry facilities

for disembarkation at that harbor had prevented this force from being in time, and it had been compelled to entrench itself in a none too secure position on the heights surrounding the post.

Worst of all the numbers, radius of action, and the skill of the German U-boats were increasing fast. They had appeared in numbers in the Mediterranean; they infested the trade-routes converging on Great Britain and if the German Government committed the greatest of their many blunders in decreeing unlimited U-boat warfare and ordering that unarmed merchantmen should be sunk, the consequences of that blunder were not immediately clear while the dangers to which this policy exposed us were only too apparent. The losses of British tonnage amounted to colossal figures, the food supply of Great Britain was endangered and our power of moving troops by sea except across the nar-

row waters of the English Channel, which the Navy kept clear, was steadily diminishing. The strategical position had altered very materially to our disadvantage, for whereas at the beginning of the war the enemy's shorter communications had enabled him to transfer troops from one front to another more quickly

than could the Allies with their longer communications, there had been no question of the safety of the latter. From the beginning of 1916, however, long and precarious communications by sea had to compete with short land communications which were immune from attack.

V

BAGDAD CAPTURED; EGYPT SAFE

SHORTLY before these crises developed Sir William Robertson was brought home from France. He was made Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and thanks to him for the first time in the war Great Britain had a settled military policy. He was reputed to be a bigoted Westerner but his first care was to make our position in the East safe. Sir Charles Monro, who had carried out the evacuation of the Gallipoli peninsula with such supreme success, was sent to India to develop the military resources of that country, which had been neglected. The conduct of the campaign in Mesopotamia, which was more than India could deal with, was taken out of the hands of the Indian Government. Railways were constructed, the channel of the Tigris was dredged and buoyed, and a well equipped harbor was constructed near the river's mouth. Maude was thus provided with the means of maintaining an efficient army in front of Kut-el-Amara, and with this during the winter of 1916-17 he gradually wore down the Turkish forces in front of that place. Then forcing his way across the Tigris above Kut-el-Amara he all but annihilated his enemy and in a vigorous pursuit drove him well beyond Bagdad.

In Egypt the troubles on the Sahara frontier and in the Soudan were quelled and the Dardanelles army was rested, reorganized and re-equipped. The Turks with the help of German officers and troops were, however, preparing to cross the Sinai desert and attack the Suez Canal again systematically after the failure of their second attempt. It was found that the defense of the long line of the canal would lock up a very large number of troops and that the enemy could only cross the desert

in any considerable force by the coast route, which was the historic avenue of invasion of Egypt from Syria or of Syria from Egypt, because there alone was there a sufficient supply of water. It was also found that by going out into the Sinai desert and gaining control of the wells along the Mediterranean coast, Egypt could be defended with many fewer troops than would be required if our defences were to be extended from Port Said to Suez.

Therefore during 1916 the conquest of the Sinai desert was gradually accomplished. It was a laborious business because the brackish water of the wells, while suitable for Eastern stomachs, affected the health of European troops, and it was necessary to lay a pipe line across the desert and pump the drinking water for the Army from Egypt. At the same time a broad gauge railway was constructed from the canal opposite Port Said towards Gaza on the frontier of Palestine. By these means control of the coast route was gained and it became possible to transfer troops from Egypt to France. The famous 29th Division, which had made the heroic landing at Cape Hellas, and the no less famous Anzac Corps were amongst the troops sent to reinforce Haig. About the time when Maude was driving the Turks through Bagdad the Egyptian expedition was established on the Eastern fringe of the Sinai desert opposite Gaza and Beersheba. The Turkish forces holding these places were not strong and the reinforcements which might have strengthened them had been diverted to Mesopotamia. There therefore seemed to be a favorable opportunity for relieving our troops of the discomforts of life in the desert and of enabling

them to pass the hot weather in the pleasanter land of Palestine. For this reason in April, 1917, an attempt was made to capture Gaza. Though our troops succeeded in entering the town the attack was disorganized by a dense sea fog and failed.

Despite this reverse the situation in the secondary theaters of war had been completely changed in little more than a year. The safety of Egypt had been placed beyond ques-

tion, the capture of Bagdad had more than obliterated the memory of Kut-el-Amara, we were able to curb the activities of German agents in Persia and on the Eastern frontier, in East Africa our expedition under the leadership of General Smuts had conquered a great part of the German colony, and though all this had been accomplished elsewhere, it had been possible to strengthen our forces in France very considerably.

VI

THE SALONIKA EXPEDITION

IN one part of the world only was the policy of compromise which had proved so disastrous in 1915 continued. There had always been an Eastern party in France, though as long as Paris was in danger its members had been forced to keep silence. During 1916 the growing belief that the situation on the Western front was one of stalemate, and the initiation of the Salonika expedition gave them their opportunity, and throughout that year there were prolonged discussions between the British and French advocates of a Balkan expedition on the one side, and on the other those in both countries who desired to keep the Allied forces there down to the bare minimum which would ensure safety. The position was greatly complicated by the attitude of Greece, where the people were pro-Ally, and the King and his military friends were pro-German. This unquestionably added to the risks to which the expedition was exposed, while the Germans made skillful use of their central position to keep us under continual threat of attack. The U-boat danger, and the very serious shortage of shipping from which we suffered as a consequence of the activities of these pests, made it quite certain that the Germans would be able to concentrate troops in Macedonia much quicker than we could send reinforcements there, and partly to provide against this danger, partly in the hope of overawing Greece, the Salonika expedition was gradually increased. In France throughout 1916 there had been a prolonged and costly struggle, for the battle of Verdun had merged in the first battle of the Somme, fought by us primarily to relieve the French

fortress, and it was out of the question for us or for the French to meet the strain of this fighting, and at the same time strengthen the Salonika army sufficiently to enable it to force its way through the very strong mountain positions in which the Bulgars and Germans were established. So when Rumania came into the war just too late to take advantage of Brusiloff's successful campaign in the Bukovina, the Salonika expedition was despite its increase unable to give her any effective assistance, however necessary it was for her at the moment.



The Mailed Fist: "Our blow will settle their hash."

VII

THE ITALIAN DISASTER

IN the winter of 1916 Mr. Lloyd George became Prime Minister of Great Britain and the Easterners thereby received a great accession of strength. When he became head of the government he was obsessed with the losses of the battle of the Somme, for he believed that the barrier in the West was impenetrable alike by us and by the Germans, and that the only way to win the war was, as he termed it, to knock down Germany's props, Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Our critical shipping position, which was already imperilling our food system, and the difficulties of a Balkan campaign induced him to abandon his advocacy of an offensive campaign in that theater of war, and his first proposal was to reinforce the Italian army and attack Austria from the Isonzo. But the dangers of seeking a way round through Italy were even greater than by any other route. The Germans had five good lines of railway connecting them with the Austrian Western front, while only two lines ran from France into Italy and these trains carrying full loads could not be run through the mountains of the Italian frontier. So the Germans could anticipate the Allied movement to Italy with the greatest ease and the conformation of the Italian front made it possible for them to checkmate an attack eastwards from the Isonzo by an advance southwards through the Alps into the plains of Venetia. If they were successful in this the Armies of the Isonzo would be completely cut off and they would then be in a desperate plight.

Before discussion of this plan had got very far the French Government had discovered a new commander in General Nivelle, who had greatly distinguished himself at Verdun, and he was appointed to succeed Joffre, who was feeling the strain of two and a half years of war. General Nivelle planned a great offensive campaign on the Western front, and for a time all else was subordinated to this. The failure of Nivelle's campaign in the spring

of 1917 more than ever convinced Mr. Lloyd George that he was right in his opinion that the war could not be won in the West, and that offensive operations in France and Belgium were a useless sacrifice of life. He therefore reverted to his Austrian plan, but the risks of that were so obvious that he was unable to win his case and in the late summer of 1917 we attacked in Flanders and the battle of Flanders dragged on into November. Before it ended the Italian defeat at Caporetto had brought the Allies face to face with a fresh crisis. The Germans had quietly transferred eight divisions to the Isonzo front, and with these they had broken through the Italian lines and turned the positions of our Allies on both flanks of the break, and forced them to a disastrous retreat.

What followed is a striking example of the difficulties of armies on the outside of the circle. The Germans by reinforcing the Austrians with eight divisions induced the Allies to send eleven British and French divisions to Italy; and though every possible preparation was made beforehand to transfer troops from France to Italy and the troops began to move from France at the first alarm, not a single French or British soldier reached the front in Italy before the Italians had checked the enemy on the Piave, while Haig was so weakened that he was unable to take advantage of the success he won in the first great tank attack at Cambrai in November, 1917.

ALLENBY ROUTS THE TURKS

While these events were taking place in Italy there had been important events in the East. The Young Turks party had been much shaken by the loss of Bagdad and determined on a great effort to recover the place. They induced the Germans to give them troops, and von Falkenhayn, who had by his successes in Rumania retrieved his failure at Verdun, was sent to Syria to superintend the preparations.

The Turkish troops intended for Mesopotamia were assembled about Aleppo near the junction of the Bagdad and Syrian railways. Mesopotamia was our most distant theater of war and our communications in that country were more than five hundred miles long, therefore it would be a very slow process to strengthen our forces at Bagdad, and the long sea journey would put an almost intolerable strain upon our dwindling shipping. For these reasons it was decided to defend Bagdad by attacking the Turks on the frontier of Pales-

tine, in the hope that this would divert the Turkish reserves at Aleppo. Allenby had been sent from France to take command of our army in front of Gaza and Beersheba, and he was reinforced by two British divisions from Salonika. In a brilliant campaign he broke up the Turkish army opposed to him, captured Jerusalem and Jaffa and forced Falkenhayn to send his Aleppo troops southwards to defend northern Palestine. The Turkish preparations for a Mesopotamian campaign thereupon collapsed.

VIII

HOLDING ON UNTIL AMERICA ARRIVED

LONG before the Caporetto disaster or Allenby's victory, even before the Battle of Passchendaele began, the cloud which portended another great storm had appeared. As early as May, 1917, it was evident that Russia must collapse and that the German Armies on the Eastern European front would then be free to move elsewhere. America's entry into the war made it practically certain that they would come to the West, for Germany's chances of winning the war depended on her being able to gain a decisive victory before the United States could develop their immense power, and she could only get such a victory in France.

The military councils of the Allies were therefore occupied during the summer of 1917 with the problem of protecting Calais and Paris until America could redress the balance of strength. It was calculated that the world shortage of shipping and the huge task of raising, equipping, and training large armies from military establishments far inferior even to what our own had been in August, 1914, would make it impossible for America to do this before September, 1918, and that the Allied position on the Western front would be critical during the first eight months of that year. France could do nothing to strengthen her forces during that period; in fact, owing to the exhaustion of her manpower it was certain that they would diminish. Our losses during the three and a half years had been enormous, but it was still possible for

us, if energetic measures were taken in time, to keep our existing forces in France up to full strength, to increase the number of our guns, tanks and aeroplanes, and to transfer troops from Palestine to France as soon as Allenby had completed his campaign. Our lines north of Jerusalem were far stronger than those we had held on the eastern edge of the Sinai desert. Allenby had on one flank the Mediterranean and on the other the Dead Sea, while east of the Dead Sea lay the desert which was controlled by our Arab friends. Therefore he could give up without the least risk the two divisions which had been sent him from Salonika and a few more troops, while as Sir Charles Monro's expansion of the Indian army had now matured, it would be possible during 1918 to bring Indian troops to Palestine and gradually to release more British troops for France. This was the policy which commended itself to the soldiers.

LLOYD GEORGE'S DECISION

Mr. Lloyd George was, however, convinced by the result of the Battle of Passchendaele that he had been right in considering that the position on the Western front was one of stalemate. We and the French had made attempt after attempt to break through the German trenches when our numerical superiority over the Germans had been at least as great as theirs would be over us when they had brought over their troops from Russia.

He doubted if the Germans would make the attempt, but was quite certain that the Allied forces in France and Belgium were strong enough to stop them if they did and he believed that victory could only be found by taking the way round, by knocking down Germany's props. Attacks through Italy or in Macedonia were now out of the question, for the Allied armies in these theaters could only be reinforced to the necessary extent at the expense of the Western front, and if he did not think it necessary to strengthen that front he was not rash enough to weaken it; but by leaving Allenby the troops he had in Palestine and reinforcing him from India he believed that it would be possible to defeat Turkey, who was very shaky. Victories in Asia Minor would, he hoped, encourage the Allied peoples to hold on during 1918 while America

was preparing her armies and shipping them to France, and it would be time enough to consider in 1919 whether it was worth attempting to defeat the Germans in the West. He could only obtain the men necessary to keep our troops in France up to strength by raising the age limit for the draft, and he dreaded the political effect of doing this if he left Ireland exempt, while the problem of forcing conscription in Ireland was one which he did not care to face. He considered that by instituting the Versailles Council and its later development, the Executive military committee of the Council, he had counterbalanced the advantage which the Germans had in the west in a single homogeneous army under one commander, and he refused to meet the demands of the soldiers for more men or to transfer troops from Palestine to France.

IX

THE SITUATION IN EUROPE IN 1918

THE consequence of these decisions and of the diminishing strength of the French army was that in the early months of 1918 it was necessary for us to increase the length of our front in France and at the same time reduce our infantry by twenty-five per cent. This reduction was to some extent counterbalanced by increases in artillery, tanks and aeroplanes. This was how matters stood when the campaign of 1918 opened.

The successes won by the Germans in the spring of 1918 came as a rude shock to the Allies. Lines which had been deemed impenetrable were overrun, and the enemy made enormous captures of prisoners and guns. Those who had maintained that a military decision in the West was impossible suddenly awoke to the fact that not only was it possible, but there was grave danger that it would be against us. The vital character of the Western front was at once apparent, and every possible measure was taken to strengthen it. Of these measures the chief was America's response to the Allies' appeal to her, and the rapid transportation of American troops to France, largely in British bottoms, the provision of which involved a wholesale reduction

of British imports. This greatly increased the cost of living in Great Britain and caused very real hardship, which was met with admirable cheerfulness. Next in importance came the belated dispatch of reinforcements from England, and the equally belated transfer of troops from the Eastern theaters of war to the Western front. By these means Haig's army was reconstituted while the growth of the American armies gave Foch by September, 1918, a definite preponderance of strength.

Professional soldiers had almost unanimously maintained that the decisive defeat of Germany on the Western front was possible, and that the trench lines could be penetrated. Before 1918 they had been unable to prove the truth of their assertions. They had made repeated attempts to break through the enemy's front and had tried a variety of methods which had met with a varying degree of success; but the enemy had always managed to check their attempts before any advantage which materially affected the situation on the front as a whole had been won. German Great Headquarters had warning of our intentions, and kept a finger on the pulse of

the Western front. Making use of their admirable system of railway communications they brought up a division or two from the Russian front to restore the situation whenever they found themselves hard pressed in France. The extreme Easterner could not or would not see that the German forces on

the Eastern front were a potential reserve to their armies in the West, but the disaster of March 21st convinced even him for a time. It was then that Ludendorff found one method of breaking through the impenetrable barrier, and Marshal Foch later discovered a better one.

X

THE WEST THE VITAL POINT

THE campaign of 1918 clearly established the following facts: First, that the Western front was *the* vital front, and could not be weakened with impunity. Secondly, that given the right methods of attack the enemy's barrier in the West was penetrable. That being so, it follows that the gaining of complete victory over the Germans in the West was a question of building up a sufficient superiority of force. It is now obvious to everyone that it was necessary to avoid any chance of failure to protect the vitals of the Allies in France, and that there is no defence for the policy which maintained in the East after the break-up of Russia, larger forces than were required for defence.

One of the principal arguments of the Easterner broke down as soon as it was established that his theory of stalemate in the West was untenable. Equally one of the arguments of the Westerner no longer held, when the enemy was so hard pressed in France that he could no longer detach troops to the secondary theaters, when, in fact, he could no longer make use of his central position. By the middle of August, Ludendorff, unable in consequence of his defeats to hold his own in France and Belgium, was compelled to ask for Austrian help on the Western front, and the whole strategical situation was fundamentally changed. There was no longer any chance of the Germans getting to the circumference first. That change was brought about by victory in the West.

As is the case in most controversies, there is in this of Easterners and Westerners truth in the arguments of both sides. The extreme Westerner, who would have neglected the rest of the world and put every man into France,

and the extreme Easterner, who would have reduced the forces on the Western front to a bare minimum and expected to win the war elsewhere, were both wrong. The Allies in general, and Great Britain in particular, had interests outside the Western front which had to be protected and military force was required for their protection. It was, therefore, only common sense that the fullest possible use should in the general interest be made of all Allied troops whom it was necessary to detach from the main theater. Further, the Allies possessed large military and naval resources which could not, for climatic and geographical reasons, be employed on the Western front. For example, Great Britain in 1914 tried the experiment of using Indian troops in the West, but it was found that the cold damp winter of Flanders affected the health of these troops to an extent which interfered with their military efficiency. It was not only justifiable but necessary to use the military power of India where it could be employed. By the summer of 1918 Sir Charles Monro's expansion of the Indian Army had so far matured that it was possible to replace with Indian troops the white troops withdrawn from Palestine and Salonika. Similarly the armies of Greece and Serbia could not be used on the Western front, and it was in the common interest that they should make their weight felt in the Macedonian theater. The campaigns in which Franchet d'Esperey overthrew the Bulgars, Allenby the Turks, and Diaz the Austrians were undertaken at the right time.


The essential principle is that once it had been established that the Western front was the main front, and that the complete defeat

of Germany by direct attack was certain, only such forces should be maintained elsewhere as for one cause or another could not be employed in the main theater, or as must be used to protect interests which could not be neglected, or as contributed directly to the success of the main operations. In almost every great war there has been the same conflict between the demands for the concentration of force and the demands for its dissipation, and the teaching of history is that success in war depends largely upon balancing these conflicting demands correctly.

Had it been evident when once American troops had reached France in sufficient numbers to place the safety of the Western front beyond question, that the German barrier was, in very truth, impenetrable, then it would have been right to seek victory by the way round. Fortunately this was not necessary, for such a course would have greatly prolonged the war.

It has been maintained that the controversy

was in the main one between the statesman with vision and the narrow-minded soldier, who, unable to look beyond the Western front, shut his eyes to the glorious possibilities which victory in the east would have opened up. My own experience has been to the contrary. The imagination of the soldier was sufficient to enable him to grasp what Germany had gained by bringing Turkey into the war on her side, and the advantage to her of opening a road through the Balkans and Constantinople to the east, but it required not only imagination but knowledge and training to see what the defeat of Turkey and of Bulgaria involved. There was no difficulty in seeing the end, but there was difficulty in arriving at the means to obtain the end. The amateur strategist usually approaches a military problem from his own side only, the professional looks at it also from the enemy's point of view. That is a task which requires trained vision and imagination in a high degree.



American Troops marching in Paris, July 4, 1917.

How the War Was Lost and Won

THE STRATEGY OF THE WAR

BY J. B. W. GARDINER

Military Expert of the *New York Times* during the World War

I—EUROPE IN 1914

Germany's Deep-laid Plot to Obtain a "Place in the Sun" by an Aggressive War—Calculations of Allies and Teutons

A STUDY of the strategy of any military campaign is but an effort to answer two questions: what was the objective? how was it proposed to attain it? These are the questions which must be studied, therefore, in analyzing the strategy of the great war.

There are two phases of these questions to be considered. The German strategy must be looked at with a view to its offensive value, since Germany was the aggressor and initiated the war for definite gain; and success in war can come about only through offensive action. The Allies, on the other hand, were in a defensive war. It was theirs to hold what they had against German aggression. We must view their strategy, therefore, from its defensive side. It must be borne in mind, however, that, although Germany was on the offensive as the aggressor and the Allies were on the defensive, both were intent on being the victor, a fact which would bring about an apparent interchange of rôles. At the same time, except in the latter stages of the war, when Germany assumed during the war a defensive attitude, it was but part of an offensive scheme, while the converse is true of the Allies.

The Germans, then, being on the offensive from the outset, we should begin our study

of the strategy of the World War with an examination of Germany's object in launching it upon the world. What was her objective, her ultimate goal? A reversion to a half century ago will give us our first clue.

RISE OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE*

The development of the recent German Empire into the great but unscrupulous power which planned and initiated the World War began with the Austro-Prussian war of 1866. This was the beginning of the Prussian lust for power and conquest, the beginning of the policy of aggression which found its crystallization in 1914.

Immediately after defeating Austria, Prussia formed the North German Confederation, a loose and unstable combination of the German states, merely as a necessary step in the development of German power in Europe. This combination was not intended to be permanent; it had none of the characteristics of a permanent organization. But it was necessary, as a preparatory measure, to make the German mind ready for a more closely-knit union of states which was to follow.

* This and part of the following sections of this article are condensed from the author's work, *German Plans for the Next War* (Doubleday).

The plan was Prussia's and Prussia meant to assume the lead, meant to be the dominating element in all Germany. The other states needed to become accustomed to Prussia's leading strings before the eventual permanent state was formed.

The final step was soon taken. Gathering clouds of war with France furnished both the reason and the excuse, and, under the guidance of Prussia, the North German Confederation was turned into the German Empire. The war with France taught the new German Empire that war could be an extremely profitable enterprise.

The taste of power and of the fruits of victory which Germany obtained in 1871 soon developed into gluttonous desire. Under the guidance of Bismarck, the first to dream of Pan-Germany, the campaign for universal empire began.

The first step in the campaign was to educate the German people to the idea. This was done by intensive propaganda, which was launched by a school of philosophy headed by Nietzsche, a school which preached incessantly the righteousness of war for the sake of war, and the duty of a nation to wage war lest, in addition to the arts of peace, a people should become weak and effeminate, and its progress retarded. "Ye shall love peace," said Nietzsche, "as a means to new wars: and the short peace rather than the long." And this summed up the dogma of the entire school of which he was such a powerful exponent.

This idea took root and soon there were hundreds of men in Germany expounding the same doctrine in the name of the Fatherland. Not a single avenue which might lead to the extension of the idea of the righteousness of brute force, of the duty of might to overrule right, was neglected. In almost every leading university, in almost every school and from almost every pulpit these ideas were taught and disseminated, until all of Germany was rotten with their insidious poison. The Pan-German party, therefore, lived and thrived, and, with widely-extended membership, spread over the entire empire, taking supremacy in all matters of state, in spite of the growth of socialism.

Under the late Kaiser, the Pan-German dream was reduced to a definite form and definite steps were taken to turn this dream


into a reality. These steps consisted in secret preparations for war, a war which Germany proposed to launch as soon as she felt that the chances for success were most favorable. The time was ripe in 1914 and the murder of the Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand by a crazed Bosnian student furnished the excuse.

The Pan-German theories which produced the war originally aimed at an expansion of Germany only toward the East, the Hamburg-Persian Gulf lines, the line of the Oriental Railroad and its bordering lands being the limit of Pan-German ambitions. This was the Pan-German plan of 1895; it was not the ambition of 1913, the ambition which led Bernhardt, the disciple of Nietzsche, to plead for world-power or downfall. The latter dream extended westward as well as eastward, to the coast of France and Belgium as well as to the shores of the Persian Gulf. The German objective then was to stretch the German Empire from Calais and Verdun, enclosing the iron fields of Longwy and of Briey, to Persia.

GERMAN CALCULATIONS

In seeking this great object, Germany had calculated well, had acted with almost certain knowledge of the forces against her. She was not surprised in spite of all protestations to the contrary, at the coalition of England, France and Russia against her.

France and Russia were in a complete military alliance. Their opposition was inevitable. Nor was England really a doubtful factor. The German plans, made long before with full knowledge and appreciation of the consequences, involved the invasion of Belgium and a threat against the French and Belgian Channel ports. Not for a moment did Germany reckon that this plan, which, if successful, would make the step across the Channel a start and possibly a none too difficult one, would not alarm England, arouse her to a sense of her own danger, and force her to declare war in her own defense. German plans, then, did involve war against the Triple Entente. Belgium was doubtful. Soulless herself, it is entirely possible, if indeed it is not probable, that Germany calculated either on buying or bullying her way across Belgium; and even if unsuccessful in securing



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Three Generations of the Royal House of England

King Edward VII and his son, the present George V, and his grandson, the present Prince of Wales. King Edward in his later years took an active part in international politics, and it was he who brought about the *rapprochement* with France which led to the Triple Entente.

Belgian neutrality by either of these methods, she considered the strength of Belgian defense negligible. Italy, it was considered, would either act with Germany or declare neutrality, at least for some time, and, as the war would be a short one, Italy's status as a neutral would remain unchanged until its end. Thus briefly had Germany analyzed the situation and on these premises as a foundation her war plans had been erected.

Nor was France unenlightened as to the combination of the Central Powers. The Triple Alliance, between Germany, Austria and Italy, was common knowledge. Although this alliance was declared to be defensive in name, France held no illusions, no doubts as to Austria's position. Austria would act with Germany in any plan and for any purpose Germany might dictate. Italy alone was the uncertain factor, should Germany provoke an aggressive war, but the dictates of caution compelled the French to assume that the Triple Alliance would be maintained intact.

These, then, were the groupings of the nations of Europe which the leaders on all sides anticipated and provided for in their plans; these were the military alliances which the leaders of the European countries foresaw, and which formed the basis for the strategical conceptions of the first year of the war.

THE GERMAN PLAN OF CONQUEST

The German plan, which, since Germany was the aggressor, will be discussed first, was simple in its essential elements. It is to be noted, however, that it was a plan which was not hastily adopted out of conditions as they actually existed at the outbreak of war. Indeed, it took no cognizance of such conditions. On the contrary, it had been formulated years before and was based on an assumed state of facts. These assumptions may be stated thus:

1. Russia was slow and, by reason of the paucity of her railroad lines, the scarcity of good highways, and her great population, ponderous. Her mobilization could be effected only with great delay and, by reason of the Austrian threat on her southern border, her movements would be so diverted as to make impossible for some time offensive action. Austria being much more compact, her transportation system much more highly developed,

her army much more thoroughly equipped, would be aggressively in the field long before Russia would be able to act. Russia's attention would, therefore, perforce, be centered on Austria's moves with the result that her forces would be completely immobilized. Serbia was naturally not considered, as it was calculated that but a small fraction of Austria's army would be sufficient to defeat Serbia and drive her troops back from the Danube.

2. Belgium, when faced with the alternative of either granting free passage for German troops through her territory, or suffering the ravages of a military invasion, would accept, with what grace she could, the former way out of the difficulty. The German army was invincible, it possessed great numbers of fully-trained men, it was the best-equipped army in Europe. The army of Belgium could not contend against it for twenty-four hours, and, when the Belgian leaders found that the Germans were going through by force if need be, rather than sacrifice both their army and their country, they would yield.

3. Italy would either at once join the Central Powers, or, even if she remained neutral for the moment, would, nevertheless, constitute a continuing threat against the right flank of the French army and thus neutralize a not inconsiderable part of that army by pinning it down to the southern frontier.

These three were the main considerations of the German plan. It involved, then, remaining strictly on the defensive on the eastern frontier, using as few troops as possible for this purpose, and placing almost complete reliance upon Austria to hold Russia in check and prevent a rear attack. The great bulk of the German army was then to be turned against the western Allies—France was, of course, the only one of the western powers who was, in any sense, formidable. England was not a military nation and had available for continental use not more than 100,000 men, a force so insignificant in size as to be negligible. "England's contemptible little army" the Germans themselves had designated it. Many months must pass before an English force of sufficient strength to be considered as a factor could be put into the field.

It was at France then, and at France alone, that the great blow was to be struck. France, attacked from the directions the German plan



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King Albert of Belgium at the Front

He is listening attentively to the British officer who is pointing out to him the strategical features of the battlefield on which they stand.

called for, would be quickly crushed, Paris would be taken and a victor's peace imposed. With France out of the war, England could do nothing, and the German forces would be free to turn on Russia. Russia was known to be rotting with intrigue and treachery. Many German agents from the Germanized Baltic provinces actually held high office in the Russian government. The war against Russia, with Germany driving forward from the west, while Austria struck at the lines of communication from the south, would be as short as the war against France. Germany, here too, would make a victor's peace and would emerge from the war within a year, mistress of Europe, and ready for a world-empire.

HOW THE PLAN WAS TO BE CARRIED OUT

From this résumé of the larger elements of the German plan of campaign, it is readily seen that the essence of German success was speed in execution. France had to be crushed before England could come to her aid, before Russia's millions could be turned to account and take the offensive. Let there be a delay of sufficient length to permit the happening of either of these two contingencies, and the entire German scheme would collapse. How, then, did Germany propose to dispense with France in such rapid fashion?

This question can best be answered clearly by a brief study of the western frontier of Germany, south of the Dutch border.

From Aix-la-Chapelle (which is almost at the common corner of Holland, Germany and Belgium) southward for a distance of about ten miles, the Belgian border is absolutely open, not presenting a single military obstacle. For a distance of ten miles west of this gap, the country is also open and without natural defense. Then the formidable Meuse River is met, with its main crossing at the strongly-guarded city of Liège. South of this gap we come to the rough and heavily-wooded Belgian Ardennes, which, as we approach the northern Luxemburg border, take on the character of veritable mountains. These mountains, carved with deep ravines by the Moselle and other rivers which wind their way through them, continue south almost as far as Metz, where the chain turns eastward into northern

Lorraine. This leaves a gap of relatively open country on the Franco-German border—south from Metz to the Vosges—which gap is almost barren of military obstacles.

Following the border southward we come to the great barrier of the Vosges mountains, which are practically impassable except at the well-defined gaps at Nancy, Epinal and Belfort. This shows the possible lines of German invasion—the two wide sections of open frontier, one in Belgium, the second south of Metz, and, finally, the passages through the Vosges mountains.

The German General Staff, reckoning on the French effort being expended on an attempt to operate westward through the Belfort gap, and wishing to avoid the almost invincible barrier fortresses of Epinal, Nancy and Toul, based its campaign on an advance through the first two of these openings. The main objective was, of course, Paris. But, before Paris, the immediate objective was Verdun; first, because it covered with its guns the great iron areas of Longwy and of Briey, and, second, because the capture of Verdun (using the name to designate the military area about the town rather than the town itself) would uncover and turn the French positions along the Vosges frontier and flank all of the border fortresses.

One German army, then, was to pass through the open frontier, south of Metz, and operate against Verdun, marching due west toward Paris after taking its objective, while a second army was to operate in the north through the gap in the Belgian border. The function of this second army was to skirt along the border of the Ardennes, take in flank the French forces guarding Verdun, and, converging toward the army before Verdun, join with it in the march on Paris. Thus any French defense would be rendered nugatory, every French position would be turned, and the German army, by the very rapidity of its movement, would triumph before the French could make the redistribution of troops which an unexpected attack from the north would make necessary.

FRANCE'S PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

The French plan of campaign was based entirely on the supposition that Germany, be-



The Belgian-German Frontier

Showing the open country north of Aix-la-Chapelle and the Belgian Ardennes, with the road to French territory guarded by Liège, Namur, and Brussels. This was the path chosen by the German Staff for their initial drive at France, in spite of Belgium's status as a "perpetually neutralized state."

ing a guarantor of the neutrality of Belgium, would, from reasons of national honor, maintain and preserve its treaty. An attack through Belgium, although freely and openly predicted by many prominent military men, was not regarded by the French General Staff as probable and no measures were taken to meet such an attack if it did come. The main German attack was anticipated in the Verdun area and was provided for.

But the French plans contemplated more than a passive defense. In the Valley of St. Quirin, south of Sarrebourg, the French boundary changes its easterly course to due south, following the crests of the Vosges mountains. The farther south the deeper is the belt of mountains on the French side of the boundary and the narrower on the German side; or, in other words, the nearer the French boundary comes to the floor of the Rhine valley. The French, therefore, had

planned first to guard the Verdun passageway with a strong force and to launch an offensive move of their own through the narrowest part of the Vosges belt and directed against the Rhine valley. On reaching the Rhine they were not to attempt to force a crossing but were to turn northward up the valley, striking directly at the German line of communications. This move, if successful, would throw the Germans behind the Rhine, remove both Alsace and Lorraine from the German grip, and take from Germany her principal source of iron, without which she could not fight.

Russia, in the meantime, would have obtained the needed time to gather her forces and her resources preparatory to heavy offensive operations which, it was expected, she would launch. Thus, between the French-guarded Rhine on the west, and the Russian hammer on the east, Germany would be crushed.

II—GERMANY STRIKES

Invasion of Belgium and Battle of the Marne—Germany Turns Her Attention to Russia—The Fatal German Mistake

GERMANY'S INVASION OF BELGIUM

THE invasion of Belgium began even before war was formally declared and, with this invasion, the German plan was put into execution. The first resistance was encountered along the line of the Meuse at Liège. Instead of yielding to the invader, as Germany had anticipated, Belgium decided to fight. Here was the first rift in the lute, the first failure of Germany's careful calculations. Engaged in a great game where even hours were precious and days decided the fate of nations, the great German machine was held up by the little army of Belgium. After several days of fighting, the Germans were forced to leave General von Emmich's army behind to invest the Liège area, while General von Kluck, in command of another army, hastened on toward Brussels and against the French left, which was guarded by the expeditionary force of but about 75,000 men. This

struck directly at France along the Franco-Belgian frontier, which was entirely unprotected except for antiquated forts at widely-separated points. The German advance proceeded with great rapidity; but, because of the delay enforced on von Emmich's army by Belgian resistance, a wide gap was produced by von Kluck's rush between his own force, which was on the extreme German right, and the other German forces coming westward through Luxemburg and from Metz. The existence of this gap forced von Kluck to change the direction of his attack and move southward so as to maintain contact; and this change gave the French their great opportunity.

FRENCH FORCED TO CHANGE THEIR PLANS

At this point let us turn to the French operations and see the changes in their strategical plans which had been forced by the unexpected attack in the north. II—1

The French concentrations had been made almost entirely before the Moselle to guard the unprotected frontier south of Metz, and along the Vosges frontier, where France proposed to invade Alsace. The army before the Moselle performed its function of defense well. The offensive army, however, was driven back after initial successes, almost to the French border. This, however, was of but little importance, as the German attack in the north made it necessary to withdraw every available unit in order to meet the onslaught from this unexpected direction.

The French Staff, once the direction of the German attack was disclosed, had but two alternatives. The first was to force the troops concentrated along the Vosges frontier to change front by the left, facing north instead of east. This would have been an exceedingly difficult maneuver, of very doubtful success. It would, however, have enabled France, if successful, to check the German rush and prevent deep penetration into French territory. The other alternative was to effect a new concentration at some point well to the rear, either to oppose the German advance or to strike back when a favorable opportunity presented itself. The French commander, General Joffre, chose the latter, and, as rapidly as transportation facilities permitted, rushed every available man from the Vosges front toward Paris, hastening, in the meantime, the formation of two new armies through a more nearly complete mobilization. Apparently it was Joffre's first intention to stand on the Marne and make there the great effort to stem the German advance. This is evidenced by the report of the British Commander, Sir John French, to his War Office.

"On September 3," he states, "the British forces were in position south of the Marne between Lagny and Signey-Signets. Up to this time I had been requested by General Joffre to defend the passages of the river as long as possible and to blow up the bridges in my front. After I had made the necessary dispositions and the destruction of the bridges had been effected, I was asked by the French Commander-in-Chief to continue my retirement to a point some twelve miles in rear of the position I then occupied, with a view to taking up a second position behind the Seine. The retirement was duly carried out. In the

meantime the enemy had thrown bridges and crossed the Marne in considerable force. On Saturday, September 5th, I met the French Commander-in-Chief at his request and he informed me of his intention to take the offensive forthwith as he considered conditions very favorable to success."

This offensive brought about the battle of the Marne. (*See Volume III.*)


When von Kluck turned southward to close the gap between himself and the army under



General von Kluck

Commander of the Right Wing of the German Armies in Northern France in 1914

von Bellow, he left his right flank completely exposed. This was the condition in which Joffre saw the possibilities of success. His plan was to swing one French army, the Sixth, under General Manoury, about to the north where it would overlap von Kluck's right flank, fill in the gap thus left in the French line with the British, and have the Sixth Army turn von Kluck's right and cut his line of communications behind him, thus cutting off his entire force. In this movement he was almost but successful. Von Kluck saw the blow coming and, before it could quite be driven



General Map of the Marne-Aisne-Oise Territory

The scene of the German enveloping movement that threatened Paris in 1914.

home, began a retreat toward the Aisne. He lost much of his artillery and baggage, but made good his escape, falling back behind the Aisne, where he halted. This was the conclusion of the battle of the Marne.

There was another element, too, which undoubtedly had a material influence on the fighting in the west at this time since it en-

forced the deflection of troops from this all-important theater. That element was Russia.

The Russian mobilization was carried out much more rapidly than Germany had calculated upon or had considered possible. Austria had done nothing to hamper Russia's efforts; so that, at a time when Germany needed all her resources concentrated in the west for concerted action against France, she suddenly saw East Prussia invaded, and the Russians at the very gates of Königsberg. This caused a withdrawal of two army corps from France at a time when they were vitally needed. In other words, Germany was forced into a position where she was waging two wars against highly-formidable opponents, on two widely-separated fronts, at one and the same time.

This point of view is substantiated by Lieutenant General Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven, of the German General Staff, who, in his *Deductions from the World War*, says:

"When the German Western army engaged in the battle of the Marne, its original first-line troops had been reduced not only by two army corps, which had been sent to the East, but also by two further army corps, which it had been necessary

to leave behind at Antwerp and Maubeuge."

Germany's failure, the first of many that were to follow, is, therefore, not to be wondered at.

During the remainder of 1914, Germany made several efforts to extricate herself from the positions into which the defeat at the

Marne had thrust her. The Crown Prince made a terrific attack on Verdun, the defense of which was in charge of General Sarraill, and received the first of the several heavy defeats which the future had reserved for him. There, as at the Aisne, a temporary cessation of hostilities ensued, the lines became stabilized, the Germans intrenched themselves solidly, and the war of movement ceased from Soissons to the Swiss frontier.

North of Soissons, however, no such lines were established and there was still possible that mobility which true strategy demands.

GERMANY'S DOUBLE PROBLEM

Germany, at the outbreak of war, was faced with a problem similar to that which, on several occasions, had confronted Napoleon. She was at war against a coalition of powers, the combined strength of which was greatly superior to that with which she and her allies could muster in opposition. Germany, too, adopted at the outset the Napoleonic plan of concentrating all force again a part of the coalition in an attempt to force that part to make peace; and then to turn on the remain-



© Paul Thompson.

Ruin of a Fort at Maubeuge

This type of frontier defense, which before the war was considered impregnable by the Belgians, was soon shattered by the German "big Berthas" (42-cm. howitzers).

The flanks of both armies were more or less in the air and without adequate protection. It was natural, therefore, that each commander should conceive the idea of outflanking the other. This both tried to do, so that there really developed a race toward the North Sea. Neither army being successful in its endeavor, the only result was the extension of the intrenched lines from Soissons to the sea. Thus mobility on the Western front came to an end and was replaced by trench warfare. And this war of the trenches was all that was produced from Germany's grand strategic endeavor. The mountain had labored and brought forth a mouse.


ing fraction and do likewise. The theory is identical with that of splitting a hostile army and defeating its wings in detail. In this case, however, the hostile bodies were already split by the accident of geography, and Germany was free to move against either one or the other.

At the outbreak of the war, Germany found herself faced by France on the west and Russia on the east. Great Britain, Germany hoped, might stay out of this war, and be attended to later. The logical move, then, was to strike against the weaker enemy, defeat him, force a separate peace, and then turn on the other. Either wing, if struck suddenly

with the full force of Germany, unhampered and undiverted by any danger from the other, would, before defensive mobilization could be effected, be crushed and crumpled like a house of cards.

Let us, then, examine the relative strength of eastern and western enemies of Germany on August 1, 1914, in order to determine on which front the logic of the situation demanded that Germany should strike.

France, through her system of compulsory military service, was already well recruited. Her standing army was nearly a million men, and her plans for mobilization could bring to



Joffre and Nivelle

The French Commander-in-chief in conversation with the Commander of the Verdun army, who in May, 1916, succeeded General Pétain.

the colors an additional force equally large.

Moreover, having, since 1871, had reason to fear Germany, she was more or less prepared for the struggle. There was the string of border fortresses for defense—Verdun, Nancy, Epinal, Belfort—stretching out from Luxemburg to the Swiss frontier blocking the passage of the Vosges mountains. There was an excellent system of railroads and highways, second not even to those of Germany, over which troops could be moved with great rapidity. There was a long sea coast studded with open ports into which the factories of the world could pour their munitions, supplementing those of the industries of France. There was the French Navy, second to that of

Germany, possibly, but capable of protecting the country's shipping. Finally, there was that intangible force—difficult to measure and to define but of incalculable value—the spirit of France; a spirit which Germany knew existed and which, in intensity, is not less strong than the German devotion to the Fatherland. Indeed, this spirit has many times proved itself to be one of the most powerful forces in history; a force which never flags, that knows no defeat, that fights beyond the point where hope is dead—and still wins.

These were, briefly, the forces, excluding Great Britain, which Germany had to face when she decided to strike to the west.

There were no such forces as these in Russia. The Russian bureaucracy, in the first place, was made up of men the great majority of whom were from the Baltic provinces and who were pro-Teuton in their sympathies rather than pro-Slav. The Russian people were not united, the spirit of patriotism was weak, there was an absence of any national ideal uniting the people into that solidarity so essential to the prosecution of a war. Manufacturing resources were limited and unorganized, and were concentrated for the most part in Russian Poland, west of the Vistula. Russia could, moreover, be cut off from the seas except at Vladivostok, from which the traffic was limited by a single and very long railroad haul. Thus, Russia was chiefly dependent for supplies and munitions on her domestic manufactures, except during the summer weather, when the White Sea ports would be open. In addition to this, Austria, Germany's ally, was cut off completely from participating in an attack on France, her territory stretching squarely across Russia's southern flank in Poland. From this accident of geography, Austria, if Germany could engage Russia's attention on the Polish frontier, could outflank the Russian army at all points along the Galician boundary.

GERMANY'S MISTAKE IN 1914

Had Germany struck eastward against Russia, instead of westward against Belgium and France, what would have been the result? In the first place Great Britain proposed to Germany that, if she would preserve the neutrality of Belgium and direct no of-

fensive against the northern coast of France, she would remain neutral. There would also have been a great difference in the attitude of France. France, unquestionably, would have lived up to her treaty with Russia. But there was a strong pro-German party in France at the time, and this party, if the sacred soil of France had remained untouched, would have been extremely powerful. France with the Germans on her soil is one thing; France with her soil unscarified by the German heel is another. The war on France would not have been popular and the spirit which has meant so much to France and to the Entente would have been, for the most part, lacking. Russia, in such case, would have received the full force of a blow delivered with the combined strength of Germany and Austria.

We saw, between April and November, 1915, what such a condition would bring about. Germany, although holding long lines in the west, turned on Russia, and in this short time all but eliminated her from the war. Had this blow been delivered nine months earlier with the additional men Germany would have had at her command through confining herself to defensive action against France, the entire Russian army could have been destroyed, and the Germans could have taken the Russian capital. An independent peace would then have followed, and Germany would have been left free to deal with France. When matters had reached this stage, France, who entered the war only to fulfil her treaty, also would have made peace, and the war would have been over within six months. Germany's rule in the east would have been unquestioned, the Russian menace completely done away with, and the Hamburg-Persian Gulf right of way secured, for Turkey was already in German grasp.

Why was this not done? Why, if the German dream led only from Hamburg to Bagdad, did Germany strike west when there were such overwhelming advantages in locating the war in the east? Why did Germany deliberately flaunt Great Britain and risk drawing her into the war, when, by turning to the east instead of the west, Great Britain would have remained neutral? Why did Germany ignore the fact that, in 1914, France, if not invaded, would have withdrawn from

the war if Russia had made peace, since France only entered the war through her treaty with Russia?

To all of these questions we can find but the one answer. It is that, at the beginning of the war, German military control lay in the hands of men who looked to a westward expansion as well as an extension to the Persian Gulf. The Kaiser himself looked eastward. In fact, shortly before war broke out he negotiated with England a treaty which was never signed for the joint control of the Bagdad railway. But the Crown Prince, head of the military party, looked westward, filled the military councils with men of similar ideas (prominent among whom was von Falkenhayn, later Chief of Staff), and the western campaign was the result. These men figured that, by coming down through Belgium, they could take Calais, and gain control of the Belgian coast from the Franco-Belgian frontier to Holland. They figured that they could flank the fortifications of Verdun, which had been constructed to defend against an attack from the east but not from the north, break a gap in the French defensive line at this point, reach Paris, and force on France a peace which would give Germany the French iron mines of Longwy and of Briey. They figured that the possession of the important strategic coastal cities would place Germany in position to begin a colonial policy, a policy of expansion over the entire world. With her guns pointed at England's throat from Antwerp, Ostend and Calais, she meant to begin the attack on the far-flung British Empire.

In control, then, of three-quarters of all the iron of Europe, with France reduced to a second or third-rate power, Germany could begin a naval development which would eventually wrest from England the title of Mistress of the Seas and place in Germany's hands the mastery of the world on land and sea. "World Power or Downfall," said Bernhardt in 1912. But how could world-power be reached without destroying France, and rendering England impotent? No—the Pan-German dream was not Hamburg to Bagdad, but Calais to Bagdad.

Once France was conquered, Germany considered that it would be very simple to deal with the eastern phase of Pan-Germania.

Russia would not last three months. Petrograd was swamped with sedition; every Russian council was filled with German spies; the Russian Premier himself was a German agent; the Russian Czarina, cousin of the Kaiser, was loyal to her cousin's interests. Russia was without immediately available iron and coal, without sufficient factories; she had not the equipment with which to wage war. In six months Russia would have become truly a German vassal, Serbia would have been eliminated, and the eastern boundary of Ger-

views of the elder von Moltke on just this question. His statement was as follows:

"In view of our fortifications in Strassburg, Metz, Mayence, and Coblenz, Field Marshal Moltke was so convinced of the strength of our military position on the Western front that he regarded it as possible, in case war should break out on two fronts, that we should limit ourselves to the defensive on the Western frontier until the Russian war was conducted to an end. He was of the opinion that, with our railroad communications and fortifications on



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A Belgian Front Line Trench Before Antwerp

many would have become coterminous with the western boundary of Persia. German domination of both the European and Asiatic continents would be complete.

PAN-GERMAN MOUTHINGS

The bibliography of Pan-Germania is replete with allusions to this ambition. The greed of the Pan-Germans for territory caused them to throw discretion to the winds and cast aside the military theories of the wiser heads of the preceding generation.

In January, 1893, Bismarck published the

the Western frontier, the French could not so conduct the war as to break through our lines; and he accordingly believed that we could carry the Russian war to a conclusion and then first, as against France, pass over from the defensive to the attack."

The entire scheme of the German militarists was laid bare in a secret memorandum sent by Chancellor Michaelis to Austria in 1916. This memorandum contained the following passage:


"The motive of all of Germany's acts is the lack of territory, both for the development of commerce and colonization. Germany has

to solve two problems—the freedom of the seas and the opening of a route to the south-east. And these two problems can only be solved through the destruction of England.

“Our object is the permanent securing of the German Empire in Central Europe and the extension of its territory. No one who understands the significance of this war can doubt that, in spite of our wish to be moderate, we shall not allow ourselves to be deterred from extending the borders of the empire and from, under all circumstances, annexing such territories as are fitted for colonization and are not subjected to the influence of the sea power.

“We can weaken her (Russia) materially by taking away her border territories, the Baltic provinces. By using skilful policies the Baltic provinces can easily be Germanized. They will be settled with Germans and their population will double itself. That is the reason why they must be annexed. . . . The frontier between the German empire and Poland must be materially altered. . . . The lake, which we shall not leave in the hands of the Russians at any price, will be included within our borders.

“In the Vosges the boundary line must be improved by the annexation of some valleys, so that the German frontier troops can no longer be fired upon from French territory. France will lose Briey and a strip of land west of Luxemburg. The value of Briey in an economic and military sense is evident from the fact that 16,000,000 tons of iron ore are produced there. For the safeguarding of the German and Luxemburg iron industry Longwy must remain permanently in our hands.”



The World's Coal and Oil Supply in 1914

This chart shows the sources of these two essentials without which the waging of war would be impossible. Great Britain depended on Mexico for fuel oil and oil lubricants. Germany's oil shortage became most serious. France and Italy were in need of coal, and the coal supply of the United States, about one-half of the entire world's production, was drawn upon heavily by the Allies.

The military council, then, which decided to make France the main theater of war, failed not only because its members failed to consider all the elements in Belgium and Russia but because they violated the military pro-

scription against waging two major wars on widely-separated fronts at the same time. It is seldom possible to violate well-established military principles successfully. "Never divide your forces in the face of the enemy," a maxim of Napoleon, is the most dangerous of all maxims to depart from. If caught in the midst of this operation by a sudden attack it means inevitable ruin. In our Civil War, Lee did it at Chancellorsville, when he detached Jackson's command and sent it down the Plank Road to fall on Hooker's flank.

But Hooker's Intelligence Department failed him, and Jackson attacked before Hooker realized what was going on. It was, however, a daring scheme, for if Hooker had attacked while these two armies were separated, he would have destroyed them both, one after the other.

Germany was not so fortunate. Contrary to her expectations she was forced to conduct two major operations at once, and gained a decision in neither. And the price of error at that time was the cost of the war.

III—THE BRITISH BLOCKADE

How Great Britain Constantly Tightened Her Economic Grip on Germany Until the Latter Was in Dire Straits

IN the preceding chapters there have been presented the outstanding theories of the strictly military side of the opening moves of the war. But strategy has to do with something more than mere military plans. There is interwoven with purely military strategy an economic strategy which is just as vital as the movement of armies. Often, too, one merges into the other, so that it is impossible to draw a definite line between them.

When one army moves against the lines of communication of the other its purpose is to threaten the life-line, the line by which an army receives its food, its military supplies. This is a case of a complete merger of economic and military strategy. When one nation, through a preponderance of sea power, blockades the ports of another, the latter, being a large importer of food and raw materials and, therefore, not self-supporting, we have what appears superficially to be an example of economic strategy alone.

And yet the two are really identical. In the second case the lines of communication are maritime. These lines, moreover, are not those of an army alone but of a whole people. And when these lines are ruptured by superior strength at sea, the life of both army and people is interrupted, the army does not get what it needs, the people are pinched to the last extremity to supply the fighting force,

and the morale of both suffers and deteriorates. This brings us to that important phase of the Allied defense evidenced by the British blockade of Germany.

Hardly had war been declared than the British Government announced its Orders in Council, which were, in effect, a limited maritime blockade against Germany. The object was twofold: first, to pen the German fleet behind the Kiel Canal and thus make the ocean secure for the British mercantile marine; and, second, to cut Germany off from the overseas world. Both objects were vitally important as war measures. It was generally believed at that time that the war would be of short duration. Germany believed it because she had planned it; the Allies believed it because they underestimated Germany's strength. If it turned out that the war lasted only a short time, Germany would not be starved, would not indeed be seriously affected as far as the war itself was concerned. Germany's carrying trade, however, would be broken up and, when peace came, England would be in a highly-improved commercial position. If, on the other hand, the war did run on for a long time not only would Germany be starved but England would need to call on the neutral markets of the world for assistance and, therefore, had to keep the ocean lanes open for her ships.

GERMAN REPORT ON THE SITUATION

The problems in which the blockade caused Germany to become involved were investigated by a group of sixteen German scientists including economists, statisticians, physiologists, agricultural chemists and food specialists, who produced a composite view of the subject in a small book made up almost entirely of con-

albumen. Thus, there will be an apparent deficit of 22,590 billion calories and 764,000 tons of albumen. On the other hand, the authors hold that the minimum physiological requirements are only 56,750 billion calories, containing 1,605,000 tons albumen, which would give a large surplus of calories and a small deficit of albumen, but they make certain recommendations which, if carried into ef-



Photo by P. Thompson.

How Americans Helped to Feed the Allies

Increased home production of all food products was encouraged in order that a surplus for export would be assured. Volunteers raised potatoes on waste bits of land, lawns were plowed up and planted, and education in agriculture for old and young was stimulated by the Government. The acreage planted to cereals was heavily increased.

clusions. These conclusions were summarized as follows in *The Annalist* of New York on March 1, 1915:

"The simplest statistical elements of the problem are the following: Germany, with a population of 68,000,000, was consuming food products, when the war broke out, equivalent to an aggregate of 90,420 billion calories, including 2,307,000 tons of albumen; whereas the amount now available, under unchanged methods of living and feeding, is equal to only 67,870 billion calories, with 1,543,000 tons of

fect, would bring the available supply up to 81,250 billion calories and 2,023,000 tons of albumen.

"Germany raises (averages for 1912-13) about 4,500,000 tons of wheat and imports nearly 2,000,000 tons (about 73,000,000 bushels). On the other hand, it exports about 530,000 tons net of the 11,900,000 tons of rye produced. It imports nearly 3,000,000 tons of low-grade barley and about 1,000,000 of maize, both chiefly for feeding stock. Its net imports of grain and legumes are 6,270,-

000 tons. Of its fruit consumption, about 30 per cent. has been imported. While Germany has been producing nearly its entire meat supply at home, this has been accomplished only by the very extensive use of foreign feedstuffs. The authors of this work estimate that the imports of meats and animals, together with the product from domestic animals fed with foreign feedstuffs, amount to not less than 33 per cent. of the total consumption. They also hold that about 58 per cent. of the milk consumed in Germany represents imports and the product of cows fed with foreign feedstuffs. Nearly 40 per cent. of the egg consumption was hitherto imported. The consumption of fish has averaged 576,000 tons of which not less than 62 per cent. was imported; and the home fisheries are now confined, besides the internal waters, almost wholly to the Baltic Sea—which means the loss of the catch of 142,000 tons hitherto taken from the North Sea. Even the German's favorite beverage, beer, contains 13 per cent. of imported ingredients.

"The authors assume, as already intimated, that nearly all of these imports will be lost to Germany during the full duration of the war, and they take up, under this big limitation, the problem of showing how Germany can live upon its own resources and go on fighting till it wins. They undertake to show how savings can be made in the use of the supplies on hand, and also how production can be increased or changed so as to keep the country supplied with food products."

These scientists then proceed to show their economic defense against the blockade.

"In the first place, they insist that the prohibition of the export of grain be made absolute; in other words, the small exception made in favor of Switzerland, which has usually obtained most of its grain from Germany, must be canceled. Savings in the present supplies of grain and feedstuffs must be made by a considerable reduction in the live stock, inasmuch as the grain, potatoes, turnips and other stuffs fed to animals will support a great many more men if consumed directly by them. From the stock of cattle the poorer milkers must be eliminated and converted into beef, 10 per cent. of the milch cows to be thus disposed of. Then swine, in particular, must be slaughtered down to 65 per cent. of


the present number, they being great consumers of material suitable for human food. In Germany much skim milk and buttermilk is fed to swine; the authors demand that this partial waste of very valuable albumens be stopped. The potato crop—of which Germany produces above 50,000,000 tons a year, or much more than any other land—must be more extensively drawn upon than hitherto for feeding the people. To this end potato-drying establishments must be multiplied; these will turn out a rough product for feeding animals, and a better sort for table use. It may be added here that the Prussian Government last autumn decided to give financial aid to agricultural organizations for erecting drying plants; also, that the Imperial Government has decreed that potatoes up to a maximum of 30 per cent. may be used by the bakers in making bread—a measure which will undoubtedly make the grain supply suffice till the 1915 crop is harvested. It is further recommended that more vegetables be preserved, whether directly in cold storage or by canning or pickling. Moreover, the industrial use of fats suitable for human food (as in making soaps, lubricating oils, etc.) must be stopped, and people must eat less meat, less butter, and more vegetables. Grain must not be converted into starch. People must burn coke rather than coal, for the coking process yields the valuable by-product of sulphate of ammonia, one of the most valuable of fertilizers, and greatly needed by German farmers now owing to the stoppage of imports of nitrate of soda from Chile.

"In considering how the German people may keep up their production of food, the authors find that various factors will work against such a result. In the first place, there is a shortage of labor, nearly all the able-bodied young and middle-aged men in the farming districts being in the war. There is also a scarcity of horses, some 500,000 head having already been requisitioned for army use, and the imports of about 140,000 head (chiefly from Russia) have almost wholly ceased. The people must, therefore, resort more extensively to the use of motor plows, and the State Governments must give financial assistance to insure this wherever necessary; and such plows on hand must be kept more steadily in use through company owner-

ship or rental. It may be remarked here, again, that the Prussian Government is also assisting agricultural organizations to buy motor plows. The supply of fertilizers has also been cut down by the war. Nitrate has just been mentioned. The authors recommend that the Government solve this problem by having many of the existing electrical plants turn partly to recovering nitrogen from the atmosphere. This, they say, could be done without reduc-

big reduction in the make of that valuable fertilizer.

"Thus, there is a lack of horses, of fertilizers, and of the guiding hand of man. This last, however, can partly be supplied by utilizing for farm work such of the prisoners of war as come from the farm. As Germany now holds considerably more than 600,000 prisoners, it can draw many farm laborers from among them. Prisoners are already used



Scene in a German Ship-building Yard

The great ship in the background has just been launched. German shipyards at Kiel and elsewhere were kept in full swing during the war. In addition, Germany contracted for thousands of tons of shipping in Scandinavian ports, in return for which she sent necessary commodities.

ing the present production of electricity for ordinary purposes, since only 19 per cent. of the effective capacity of the 2,000,000 horse power producible by the electrical plants of Germany is actually used.

"The supply of phosphoric fertilizers is also endangered through the stoppage of imports of phosphate rock (nearly 1,000,000 tons a year) as well as the material from which to make sulphuric acid; also, through the reduction in the production of the iron furnaces of the country, from the slag of which over 2,000,000 tons of so-called Thomas phosphate flour was produced, will involve a

in large numbers in recovering moorland for agricultural purposes.

FOR INCREASED CROPS

"This latter remark suggests one of the recommendations of the authors for increasing agricultural production—the increased recovery of moorlands. They show that Germany has at least 52,000 square miles (more than 33,000,000 acres) of moors convertible into good arable land, which, with proper fertilizing, can be made at once richly productive; they yield particularly large crops of grain


and potatoes. Moreover, the State Governments must undertake the division of large landed estates among small proprietors wherever possible—and this is more possible just now than ever, owing to the fact that many large owners have been killed in battle. The reason for such a division is that the small holder gets more out of the acre than the large proprietor.

"As Germany makes a large surplus of sugar, the authors advise that the area planted in beets be reduced and the land thus liberated be planted in grain, potatoes, and turnips; as a matter of fact, it is reported that the Government is now considering the question of

and various economies be practiced—they could not be touched on in the limits of this article—Germany can manage to feed its people. But they insist, in their earnest, concluding words, that this can only be done by carrying out thoroughly all the methods of producing and saving food products advised by them. It is a serious problem, indeed, but one which, all Germany is convinced, can and will be solved."

BEGINNINGS OF THE BLOCKADE

In war and other materials Germany's imports were correspondingly heavy and import-



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Submarine U-65

One of the types of German undersea craft that operated in American waters.

reducing the beetroot acreage by one-fourth. The authors also recommend that sugar be used to some extent in feeding stock, sweetening low-grade hay and roots with it to make them more palatable and nutritious. It is also regarded as profitable to leave 20 per cent. of sugar in the beets, so as to secure a more valuable feed product in the remnants. Still another agricultural change is to increase the crops of beans, peas, and lentils—vegetables which contain when dried as much nutrition as meat. Germany will need to increase its home production of these crops to replace the 300,000 tons of them hitherto imported.

"Such are the principal points covered by these experts. Their conclusion is that, if their recommendations be carried out fully,

ant. Of iron and coal she had an abundance. Having seized in the first two months of the war the French iron districts of Longwy and Briey, as well as the coal mines of both France and Belgium, she had an abundance of both minerals. Of other materials, however, not indigenous to either Germany or Austria, she had to depend on what her ships could bring in. Copper, so vital in ammunition manufacture both for bands on shells and for brass for shell and cartridge cases, was an import. Cotton, out of which is made nitroglycerine—the first step in the manufacture of smokeless powder—she had obtained only from America or from Russia. Rubber, a vitally important war material put to a thousand uses, she had to bring in. Leather she obtained in part

from her own cattle but was forced to bring in more than half her total requirements. Of wool she had but a small local supply—much less, indeed, in proportion to her needs, than of leather. For food, clothing, and war materials, then, Germany was desperately dependent on the outside world. This fact formed the basis of the British Orders in Council which later became the British Blockade.

There were certain fundamental weaknesses, however, in the British position, which weaknesses continued during the first two years of the war. The first was that the contraband list put out by the British did not contain cotton. The result was that Germany imported, while cotton was free, huge stores of this staple, more than sufficient indeed to meet her demand while her chemists were developing a substitute. It is highly probable that this action of England greatly prolonged the war. Had cotton been declared contraband in September, 1914, and had the doctrine of continuous voyages, which we applied in the Civil War, been applied to cotton cargoes, the German military machine would, in all probability, have broken down within two years.


GERMANY'S TRADE WITH NEUTRALS

The greatest difficulty, however, existed with neutrals. Under the rules of international law as it existed in 1914, a blockade, to be binding, must be effective. This means that it must operate equally against all neutrals so that the country blockaded is cut off from all intercourse with all neutral powers. The position of the Scandinavian powers and of Denmark and Holland was such that no such blockade could be enforced. England, therefore, could not prevent traffic between these powers and Germany, and, therefore, did not, in the first months of the war, attempt to declare or enforce a true blockade. The Order in Council of March 15, 1915, was in fact in the nature of an answer to the German decree which declared a war zone about England, which it was proposed to enforce through the agency of the submarine.

The result of the British inability or failure greatly to restrict the traffic between the northern European neutrals and Germany pre-

vented the blockade, in a large measure, from having any marked effect. Indeed it defeated its own purposes. All it did accomplish was to keep open the line of communications between England and America and the East.

Hardly had the Orders in Council been promulgated when the exportation of both food supplies and raw materials from America to European neutrals began to multiply. Although cut off from the world markets and under the consequent necessity of preserving



Area of the Submarine Blockade in the North Sea and the Atlantic as proclaimed by Germany.

her stock of gold, Germany still had coal and iron to sell or exchange. And these went to Denmark and Holland, Norway and Sweden, for food products. Thus the German situation was ameliorated. As time passed, however, the Allies saw their failure to accomplish the desired results and took steps to rectify their error. A practical blockade was established and a limit placed on the amount of food-stuffs that neutrals were permitted to import. They were, in fact, brought down to a pre-war basis. The assumption was made that any excess over pre-war importations was intended for German use. Then Germany began to feel the pinch. When America en-

tered the war the final step was taken and the northern neutrals were practically rationed. Then German isolation became complete.

SUBMARINE WARFARE

Germany attempted a similar blockade of the Allied countries through the instrumentality of submarine warfare. Her first effort in this direction—the declaration of a war zone about parts of Great Britain—has already been mentioned. This zone she attempted to extend—going so far as to declare a blockade of all Great Britain. This was protested against so strongly as being a manifest illegality that it was abandoned. Considerable damage was done, however, to Allied shipping, the loss at times reaching serious proportions.

In giving up the idea of a submarine blockade Germany, however, was making but a temporary concession to neutral powers. Her real purpose was to wait until she felt able really to break up traffic between American and English ports. Accordingly, she went into an orgy of submarine building, and, in February, 1917, declared Great Britain, the coast of France and that of Italy in a state of blockade, and announced her intention of sinking, without regard to character or national-

ity, any and all ships found within a certain radius of the proscribed areas.

For a time it seemed as if she would succeed. The loss in tonnage through the depredations of the under-sea pirates so greatly exceeded the rate of the world's production of ships that the Allies were in serious danger. The defenses against the submarines were gradually improved, however, the number and size of vessels sunk gradually diminished and the menace dwindled.

The value of the British blockade was very great. No other one factor was so largely instrumental in bringing about Germany's defeat. It was the first time in history that an entire nation, of huge population, had ever been blockaded, cut off from all intercourse with the outside world, with the purpose of starving it into a military defeat. The idea is not a pleasant one to contemplate, it is true. Germany complained bitterly against the starving of women and children—non-combatants. But the principle is not in any way different from investing a city, as Napoleon did at Mantua, or as the Germans themselves did at Metz and Paris. It is a legal, well-recognized military right. It was rather to the scale on which it was done, to the great numbers affected, that the principal criticism was due.

IV—FIRST RUSSIAN CAMPAIGNS

Russian Invasion of East Prussia—Tannenberg—Russian Advance in Galicia—Teuton Victory on the Dunajec—Great Russian Retreat

THE Allied strategy at the opening of the war, in so far as it comprehended combined operations in East and West at all, contemplated simultaneous pressure on both sides of the circle with which the Central Powers were generally circumscribed. Coöperation was provided for in a most general way. No attempt had been made for knitting together the efforts of Russia and of France should the outbreak of war make the treaty that existed between these countries operative.

The foregoing chapters have outlined what happened in France during the first few

months after war broke out. But developments in the East took on an entirely different phase from those in the West. Whereas Germany was on the aggressive in the West, in the East the unexpected quickness of Russia proved too much for Austria alone and forced Germany, who desired nothing more than to remain entirely negative on the East Prussian frontier, to assume an aggressively defensive attitude.

The Germans had placed full reliance upon Austria for the conduct of Eastern affairs until they should prove able to dispose of France

and then turn East to assist her. In accordance with this plan, Austria had mobilized her army in Galicia ready for attack. The general plan of campaign was based on cutting off western Poland and pushing the Russian army behind the Vistula. The objective of the campaign was, then, entirely Russian Poland.

Austria's Army in Galicia was divided into

tions, force this army to fall back behind the Vistula in order to preserve its liaison with the force in the south. The success of this plan was based on the same hypothesis as was the German campaign in the West—the tardiness of Russian mobilization. Germany's strength lay in her speed, Russian strength in her man-power. The former it was felt could neutral-



© London Times History.

German Refugees from East Prussia Arriving in Berlin, August, 1914

At this time the Russians were advancing into Prussia and the civil population was in a panic.

two parts. One of these was facing east to prevent an invasion of Austrian territory by way of Bessarabia and to prevent also the army operating against Russian Poland from being taken in rear and having its communications cut. The other faced north and was to drive up along the general line of the Vistula, striking at the flank of any force Russia might attempt to send into East Prussia and, by a threat against the lines of communica-

ize the latter before the man-power could be made available.

RUSSIA SPRINGS A SURPRISE

But Russia was ready and hardly had war been declared before two Russian Armies were advancing against Lemberg. The Austrians, completely surprised by this totally unlooked-for opposition, were badly defeated in heavy





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Archduke Frederick of Austria

Commander of the Austrian Army in the first Russian campaign.

fighting between the Vistula and the Dniester River and their armies routed. They fled both west and south—toward Cracow and the crests of the Carpathians, abandoning all of Galicia to Russia except the heavily fortified city of Przemyśl which the Russians promptly invested. A month after the declaration of war saw the complete breakdown of the carefully laid plans of Germany and Austria in the east.

Simultaneously with the offensive against Austria, Russia began an invasion of East Prussia. Within two weeks of fighting the Russians had broken through the German defensive screen in the Masurian Lake district and forced the German command to fall back upon Königsberg. In the meantime, another Russian Army, marching through the region west of the Masurian Lakes, inflicted a heavy defeat on a German defensive force in that section and drove it also back upon Königs-

berg. The last week in August, then, found the Austrians completely beaten and East Prussia almost entirely cleared of Germans except for the armies which had retreated to Königsberg as a result of their defeats.

BATTLE OF TANNENBERG

This unexpected state of affairs forced Germany to detach immediately a part of her forces which were operating against the French and dispatch them hurriedly to East Prussia to stem the tide of invasion. The eastern command was placed in the hands of von Hindenburg, who had been in retirement. The two Russian Armies, the first under Rennenkampf and the second under Samsonoff, while operating under a common plan, had not succeeded in establishing contact. The first had left Russia, based on Kovno, in its pursuit of the Germans toward Königsberg. At the time von Hindenburg took charge of the German forces this Russian Army was in the vicinity of Insterburg. The second Army was based on Warsaw and was marching through the Masurian Lake district toward Danzig. As the battle which followed close on Hindenburg's appointment was one of the decisive battles of this period, his strategy is worthy of passing notice.

Hindenburg had placed the strength of his command in a great semicircle on either side of Allenstein. At the entrance to this semicircle was the town of Soldau, directly on the Warsaw-Danzig railroad, and on Samsonoff's line of communications. At this point was stationed another German army. This army, however, was meant to be the bait of the German trap.

Hindenburg's objective was the destruction of Samsonoff's army. There was no territorial objective at all. The plan was that when Samsonoff, in his advance, should strike the army at Soldau, this army should retreat, fighting strong rearguard actions, upon the German center. Samsonoff, it was figured, would follow, thinking that he was penetrating the heart of the German lines. When he was deep enough into the curve, Hindenburg's two flanks should extend themselves and envelop both those of Samsonoff, cutting in behind him and getting across the Warsaw-Danzig Railroad. Retreat would thus be im-

possible and the destruction of the Russian Army would follow.

This is exactly what happened. Samsonoff pursued the German bait as far as Allenstein and halted there thinking he had won a great victory. But a German force coming from Thorn turned his left wing and reached Soldau behind him, while he was busy for three days throwing himself against the German center which was strongly and heavily held. At the same time, another German force had turned his right flank, and Samsonoff's doom was sealed. He tried to make a rapid retreat but the door at Soldau was closed, and, in the maze of lakes and marshes, his entire army was destroyed.

Hindenburg attempted the same strategy in order to destroy the second army. But *Rennenkampf*, although isolated, made good a painful retreat back into Russian territory.

Tannenberg, the name by which the struggle between Hindenburg and Samsonoff is designated, was one of the most decisive victories of the war. It was not conclusive in the sense that an entire nation was rendered militarily impotent, but it did settle definitely and positively the fate of a single army. In that sense it is a classic of the successful combination of strategy and tactics. It has its negative side, however, in that, while Germany was forced to play an offensive *rôle* in the Masurian Lakes, her armies in the west, which needed every available man, were weakened at a crucial moment, in order that success in the east might be possible.

The rest of the year 1914 was spent by both Russian and German Armies in surging back and forth between the Vistula and the East Prussian frontier. For months all of Russian Poland was the battleground. The result was indeterminate except in so far as Germany was able to occupy the greater part of this industrially developed province and thus impair Russia's ability to supply her need of manufactured products.

The beginning of 1915 saw the war on practically all fronts deadlocked. From a war of exceedingly rapid movement, of great shifting of troops with almost incredible speed and precision along more or less classical lines, it had become a static war, a war of position—the immobility of a continuous trench line with both flanks guarded by impassable nat-

ural obstacles. It was a new military idea, not paralleled by any past experience.

Germany had failed in her grand scheme but held the advantage of territory for whatever it might be worth. The Allies had gained through having become acquainted with German plans and methods. They knew what they had to face and were given the time to remedy their lack of preparations.

One attempt and only one was made in the west to bring matters to a decision. This took the form of a combined British and French attack against either side of the huge salient



General Rennenkampf, commander of the Russian Army in East Prussia


which the Germans had projected into their lines, the apex of which was at Noyon, pointing at Paris. This attack was directed in the vicinity of Loos on the part of the British and in the Champagne on the part of the French. The first attack was directed eastward, the second toward the north. The object of these was to break through the German positions, and blot out this salient, capturing the German forces which held it. Had it been successful an enormous gap would have been created in the trench line, the German Army would have been cut in half and the war would have been over. But the Allies had not appreciated the strength of the German positions, the attacks

broke down with heavy losses, and the west again became stagnant.

GERMAN ATTACK ON THE DUNAJEC—MAY, 1915

In the east, however, the advent of spring brought swift changes. The Russians captured Przemyśl, which they had invested late in the fall, and hastily moved against the crests of the Carpathian Mountains with the idea of invading Hungary. The Russian line at

though hastily reconstructed it was forced to give way rapidly. This success enabled the Germans to take the Carpathian line directly in the rear and exposed the lines of communication of the entire Russian mountain front to attack. Pivoting on the Vistula, where it crosses the Russian-Galician boundary, the Russian line south of this point swung back until there was grave danger from the rapidly-narrowing angle at Warsaw. A rift in the line from the Vistula eastward was certain



Russians Entering a Burning Town in Eastern Galicia

that time extended along these crests as far as the source of the Dunajec river, thence along the river before Cracow, and almost due north, with various sinuosities through Russian Poland to the sea. During the early spring months the Russians battled without surcease in their efforts to penetrate the Carpathian barrier. But the Austrian defense, stiffened by German contingents, held so that no progress was made.

Germany, in the meantime, had been concentrating heavily at Cracow for a move against the Dunajec river line. At the beginning of May, 1915, an attack was launched against the line along the river in tremendous force. The Russian line was definitely broken;

to produce disaster. To avoid this possibility there was nothing for the Russians to do but evacuate the Polish capital and establish new lines further eastward. This they did in August, 1915, with tremendous losses in both men and material. Finally, after a long retreat, they established themselves on a line from Riga through the Pinsk Marshes to the Rumanian frontier, from which the Germans could not force them.

Such a retreat indicated the complete collapse of the entire Russian military machine, and so indeed it was. It was the heaviest defeat of the war up to this time, and opened the way to rapid extension of German power through the Balkans and to the Near East.

V—THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGNS

Allied and Teutonic Interests in the Near East—Excellent Strategy and Faulty Tactics of the British—Failure of "Holy War"

GERMAN publicists, for several years before the war, filled their writings with references to Germany's "place in the sun."

By this they meant an expansion of Germany, both territorially and through spheres of influence, toward the Near East. It was for this purpose that Germany fomented the First Balkan War, and later when this failed of its purpose, the Second Balkan War. The German dream of the moment was complete control of the Hamburg-Bagdad route through the Balkans and on into Mesopotamia. The essence of this control was the unification in German interests of all that territory of the Balkan States through which the Oriental railroad ran and the further extension of this control through Asiatic Turkey.

Equally important to Germany's securing control of this route was the breaking of Great Britain's hold on the eastern situation. This could be accomplished in two ways which fit into each other nicely. The first was to break the road by which England kept in contact with the East—that is the water route through the Mediterranean and Red Seas. The weak link in this road is the Suez Canal. Writing on the Teutonic conception of the term "Freedom of the Seas," M. Maurice Reuai, a former Austro-Hungarian deputy, wrote: "If the Central Empires succeed in liberating Egypt and, with it, the Suez Canal, then, after the restitution of this country to its legitimate masters and the evacuation of the three naval bases above-mentioned, the Mediterranean can be considered freed, and the freedom of the seas guaranteed in these parts to all peoples.

"The Suez Canal is the Achilles heel of the British Empire of to-day. It is the gate by which England communicates with India, her finest colony. From the standpoint of the commercial independence of the Continent it

is of great importance that this base of her naval power should be taken from England and placed under the suzerainty of a State capable of guaranteeing the neutrality of the canal and the free passage of the ships of all nations."

GERMANS PLAN "HOLY WAR"

By blocking British egress, then, from the eastern gateway out of the Mediterranean, the British Empire would be cut in half and the forces battling in western Europe would be deprived of any assistance from the eastern world. The second method was, by some means, to incite the Moslem population of the world—and the population of India is largely Moslem—to a holy war against Great Britain. This would not only destroy all British power in the East but would turn India against Britain herself. Such a war would be more readily undertaken by the Moslems if British prestige in the East could be shaken by some great disaster. No disaster could quite equal the loss of the Suez passage.

There were, too, other weighty considerations underlying the idea of a consolidation of the Balkan States in German interests. Austria-Hungary, as Germany well know, was the weak link in her chain. The heterogeneous races which made up the Austro-Hungarian population were uncertain, unstable, not to be trusted too far. Serbia was already at war, exposing Austria's back door to invasion. If the Allies should see fit to strengthen the Serbian forces sufficiently, a blow delivered from the Danube front might disrupt the entire Austrian Empire. This door had to be closed.

Again, there was the military, financial and economic situation of Russia to consider. Russia had an almost inexhaustible well of manpower. A population of upward of 180,-


000,000 people can put into the field at least 18,000,000 fighting men. But Russia had neither the raw material nor the manufacturing resources to support one-sixth of that number. Not only were the resources of the European neutrals available to supply this deficiency, but with the British fleet in control of the seas the output of America could be poured into Russian ports. These ports were but three in number: Archangel, Vladivostok and, by way of the Dardanelles, Se-

tion and preserve much more nicely the balance between imports and exports.

TURKEY JOINS GERMANY

For all of these reasons it was highly important that Germany should close the Black Sea by gaining complete control of Turkey. This, by various means with which we are not at present concerned, she succeeded in doing. Turkey had been the tool of Germany for some years. The rôle was in no sense a new one and there never was a possibility for the Allies to destroy the liaison.

Turkey's first hostile step was taken late in September, 1914, when she declared the Straits closed to all shipping. A month later war was declared against the Entente. It was a strategic victory of the highest order, worth more than a dozen battles, in that it reduced the fighting possibilities of Russia by at least half and brought up new and most perplexing problems for the Allies to solve. The first of these was the opening of the entrance, through a warm sea, to Russia. The second was Suez. The third was Bulgaria.



Djavid Bey
Turkish Minister of Finance.

bastopol. Of these, Archangel, by reason of ice, was an open port for but a few months in the year. Vladivostok was too far away to be reached by any power but Japan. Sebastopol, on the other hand, was not only open every day in the year, but, with the Straits open, was within reasonable distance of both France and England.

There was, moreover, the economic situation to consider. The Russian Black Sea belt, of which Sebastopol was the outlet, was the richest grain country of Europe. Not only could Russia do much to feed the Allies, but she could, at the same time, through the sale of wheat, greatly improve her financial situa-

THE IMPORTANCE OF BULGARIA

Bulgaria, thus enclosed between Austria and Turkey, both Germanic Allies, became the key to the whole Balkan situation. With Bulgaria on the side of the Allies not only would Serbia be safe but Turkey was certain to be defeated and forced into a separate peace; and with the Balkan States thus consolidated against Germany, the eastern entrance to Austria would become the Achilles heel of the Teutonic Alliance, while, against the main tendon, the sword of the Allies would already be pressing. If, however, Bulgaria joined the Teutons, the entire Balkans would be a German unit, the doom of Serbia would be sealed, and the lock of finality would be fastened in the hasp of Russia's great door. Bulgaria, however, had been, like Turkey, a German tool in the Second Balkan War, and, unless the Allies were prepared to pay a high price, she would again, in all probability, follow the German leading-strings.


It is a strange fact that the Allies did not perceive at once the deep significance of Turkey's declaration of war, or the relation of

this event either to the general Balkan situation or to the war as a whole. One man, and only one man, saw the situation in its proper proportions. That man was Winston Churchill. He saw that, if the Allies could take Constantinople, the Turkish Empire would be shaken to its foundations and the millions of Asiatic Turks would force their government to yield to British power. He saw that Russia would have a seaport in the south not

of the British dreadnoughts as their high explosive shells were thrown into the fort of Sedd-El Bahr.

HOW CONSTANTINOPLE WAS PROTECTED

The defense of Constantinople against a sea attack is based entirely on the Gallipoli Peninsula and the Dardanelles, and Constantinople, it was thought, would fall like a ripe



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A Safe Shelter for German Infantry

A well guarded position near Dixmude. The men are firing with the protection of a sloping concrete roof, designed to deflect enemy bullets.

only for war purposes, but a port over which she could exercise suzerainty until it was in the distant future wrested from her by military conquest. He saw that Bulgaria would be forced into the Allied ranks because, should she not join them, it would lay her open to simultaneous attack from three sides. He saw the war won. And he convinced his government. And just as the British answer to Napoleon was the guns of Trafalgar, so, more than a century later, the answer to the two Kaisers and their Moslem ally was the roar

apple. The main objective in the Dardanelles was a narrow channel of water, with its critical point in the Narrows between the forts of Kilid-Bahr and Kale-I-Sultanie, the former on the European side, the latter on the Asiatic. Both of these forts (which are but a mile apart) were defended by powerful modern guns, so that, within a radius of half a mile, are established permanent works that control the military destinies of the entire thirty miles of straits. With the Narrows in their hands a hostile force would soon be able

to clear both banks and the battle fleet could then go through. It is obvious, however, that the Narrows could only be held through the medium of a land force holding one of the forts on either side. The mere destruction for the moment of the guns of one of the forts by the artillery of the fleet can produce no permanent effect unless a land force is present to take advantage of the situation.

"When the time comes to act," said Marshal Foch in his *Principles of War*, "artillery



General Sir Ian Hamilton

Commander of the British Military Forces at the Dardanelles.

shakes the enemy's resistance, and infantry must destroy it. To compel the enemy's retreat one must march on him; to conquer the position, to take his place, one must go there. The most powerful of fires does not give that result and here begins the work of the masses of infantry." In other words, a battle fleet cannot accomplish a successful attack against a land position unless land forces are ready to follow up the artillery preparation.

THE DARDANELLES ATTACK

The first British plan of attack held no such provision. It was nothing but a storm-

ing operation by the fleet alone, on the theory that its fire would destroy the land fortifications so that it might pass through to the Bosphorus. Very seldom has it happened that basic principles have been violated with successful results. Nor did it happen on this occasion. The effort of the British resulted in total failure.

The plan was then changed to include the necessary coöperation of the land and naval forces. The fort at Sedd-El Bahr on the tip of the peninsula having been silenced, troops were landed and advanced as far as the village of Krithia. These, however, were simply holding troops to immobilize the bulk of the Turkish Army while the main attack was delivered from Anzac Cove toward Maidos, the narrowest part of the peninsula. This move, if successful, would have cut off completely the bulk of the Turkish Army through the severance of its line of retreat, and at the same time would have cut off the garrison of Kilid Bahr, thus forcing the surrender of the fortress.

But this movement, like that of the fleet, resulted in failure. The essence of success in any strategical plan is the element of surprise. The navy had prevented this element from being present. The bombardment of the forts began on the 25th of February and it was not until the middle of April that the army really went into action. The Turks and their German masters were thus amply warned of the coming attacks and made effective preparations for defense against them. The fight was carried on until early December. Then, when its hopelessness had become apparent, the British withdrew to aid the Serbs who were battling against a new enemy, the Bulgarians.

THE CAMPAIGN A FAILURE

The strategy of the fight at Gallipoli was as sound as any conceived by the Allies during the war. But the tactics were, for the reasons mentioned, miserable, and destroyed one of the most brilliant conceptions of the war. Subsequent events in southeastern Europe only served to emphasize what had been lost.

Had the British been successful in their attempt to break through the Dardanelles, Suez, of course, would never have been menaced; there would not have been enough fight

left in Turkey for her to have undertaken a campaign against it. As it was, however, the Turk, apparently fearing little whatever England might do, began, even before the Gallipoli campaign opened, a series of small operations against the eastern bank of both the Canal and the Red Sea. These were defeated by a combination of Indian troops and several British battleships which were in the Canal.

Aleppo, where it was eventually to pass through a tunnel. Again, this road, from Aleppo south, runs not far from the Palestine coast, laying it open to an attack from forces landing at Tripoli, Beirut, or Haifa. Finally, to reach the Canal, troops would have to move over the Et Tih Desert and the Sinai Peninsula, where there is no railroad at all. Therefore, no German attack ever ma-



Ottoman Troops off for the Front

The Turkish Army had been trained under German military instructors, with General von Sanders at their head. In the battles with the British they gave a good account of themselves.

Other futile attacks were made later, but accomplished little.

The Teutons themselves, in spite of the importance of Suez, never undertook a campaign against it. There were several reasons for this, all of which focus on the possible means of communication. The only railroad over which supplies could be brought was that from Constantinople through Adana to Aleppo and thence south through Palestine. This road, however, was not fully completed, but contained a serious gap between Adana and

terialized and the Turks eventually gave up all attempts to interfere with Great Britain's eastern traffic.

In spite of this, however, they did attempt to call a holy war and inspire a general uprising of the Moslem people. This failed completely to bear fruit. There was no response to the call. Although, therefore, the Teutonic Allies achieved a defensive victory at Gallipoli, they failed to achieve one of the main results that Turkey's declaration of war had promised.

VI—CAMPAIGNS IN SERBIA

Successes of the Serbs Against Invading Austrians—Mackensen's Drive from the Danube, in Conjunction with Bulgarian Attacks, Leads to Conquest of Serbia

FIRST AUSTRIAN INVASIONS

FROM the moment war was declared, the Serbian Army, small and inadequately equipped, was, nevertheless, a thorn in Austria's side. All during the Russian campaigns Serbia's resistance to Austrian invasion and her constant ability to repel attacks were a source of great trouble.

The first Austrian attempts to cross the Danube and reach the Serbian capital were repulsed with heavy losses. And yet the Danube front offered the only means by which an invasion of Serbia could be made. The crossings were effected late in August, 1914, and the first invasion was under way. The great bulk of the invading force was moving down the valley of the Jadar (Vardar), the object of this being to defeat the main Serbian force in the wedge of land between the Save, the Drina and the Jadar, and thus open the road to Valjevo and Kraguyevatz. Serbia would then be almost entirely at Austria's mercy. At Jarebitsa, however, the Austrians were halted, while at Belikamen a large column of 80,000 men was completely routed. The Serbians followed up this victory by driving a wedge between the Austrian forces in the Jadar Valley and the column advancing from Shabatz. The latter force was struck first and thrown back, and then the former was forced to retreat upon Leshnitsa and Losnitsa. This latter retreat was pressed and the Austrians, in what is known as the battle of the Jadar, were driven out of Serbia. The column from Shabatz, finding itself alone, withdrew without further molestation.

Late in the fall of 1914 another and much more formidable attempt at invasion was made. This time the Austrians were at the outset much more successful and occupied almost all of northern Serbia, including the capital. But

again a heavy Serbian attack broke up their advance, and they were driven out with heavy losses. This ended all attempts at invasion until late in the Fall of 1915.

During this time, the Battle of Gallipoli was in progress, while coincident with it, there was being waged one of the greatest diplomatic battles of the war. This battle was waged in Sofia by the diplomats of the two warring groups and had, for the common objective, Bulgaria.

BULGARIA'S WAITING GAME

The advantages to the belligerents of drawing Bulgaria to their side have already been mentioned. King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, one of the most astute as well as one of the most unscrupulous monarchs in Europe, saw clearly the important position he held and realized that he was in a sense the balance of power in the entire European situation. He was, therefore, in a position to demand an exorbitant price for his country's neutrality, and he was determined to obtain the last farthing. His country naturally sided with Germany as against Serbia, its traditional enemy. It was ever Serbia which had prevented Bulgaria's growth and expansion to the west and south; it was Serbia which held Macedonia, the much-coveted land. Here was, too, the weakness of the Entente position. The Entente countries could not offer Bulgaria Macedonia, the only territory which she particularly desired, because it belonged to one of their number. Germany, on the other hand, while she did not hold Macedonia, saw her way clear to take it, pointed out the way to Bulgaria, and promised that it should be hers.

But Bulgaria was wary. She was in a position where she must choose correctly. If she sided with the loser of the war instead of the

winner, not only were her dreams of Macedonia shattered, but the probabilities were that she would lose also that which she already held. So King Ferdinand craftily waited, watching the progress of the fighting on the Gallipoli Peninsula. At least not until that was decided would he be free to make a move. As week followed week and month followed month without the British gaining any advantage, as the Turks continued to give every indication of an ability to hold their own against the best the Entente could do, Ferdinand was gradually emboldened to come out of his shell and take sides. The great German victory over the Russians further served to hasten this action and give him additional assurance. He wanted something more than promises for his services, however, and demanded concrete evidence of what Germany and Austria proposed to do toward securing for him possession of Macedonia. The result was the beginning of operations by the Central Powers against the Danube front. Then Bulgaria saw the opportunity to stab Serbia in the back, while she was engaged on the Danube, and, on October 14, 1915, declared war.

THE CONQUEST OF SERBIA

The Germans had other reasons in addition to the need of Bulgaria for waging war on Serbia and eliminating her from the conflict.

These reasons the Allies should have perceived but did not, largely because, up to this time, in spite of the Gallipoli operations, they had failed to grasp the relation between the control of the Balkans and the war as a whole. With Germany, there was, of course, the desire to acquire complete control over the route from Berlin to Bagdad—that is, the Oriental railroad. To control this completely it is obviously necessary to control the country through which it passes. If any of this country should remain in the hands of a nation hostile or antagonistic to German interests, traffic could be seriously impeded if indeed it could not be broken up entirely. Serbia was the bridge by which the Oriental road passed from Austria to Constantinople, by reason of the fact that one link in this road runs from Belgrade to Nish entirely through Serbian territory. It was, moreover, a weak link from



A Serbian Soldier of the 1st Ban

Germany's viewpoint, as the road over this stretch runs through tunnels and over bridges which could very readily be destroyed and the continuity of the whole system broken. What was equally important and demanded immediate consideration was the fact that, as matters stood, Germany was completely iso-

lated from her important ally, Turkey, who, battling against the English, was in need of ammunition and supplies. To supply these was impossible when all trains had to pass through Serbian hands. These, then, were

to Salonika with a main branch which comes into this stem at Nish. In this particular campaign, the Serbs were drawing their supplies entirely from Salonika, to which port, under the treaty with Greece made at the con-



The Balkans in 1914

Showing the geographical relations of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania as they were before the opening of hostilities.

the main considerations which led Germany to bribe Bulgaria and destroy Serbia.

Any military campaign against Serbia in which the aggressors lie both on the north and the east, resolves itself entirely into a railroad problem. It is from that angle, therefore, that the Teutonic strategy must be considered. Serbia is practically divided by a single railroad stem which runs from Belgrade

to Salonika with a main branch which comes into this stem at Nish. In this particular campaign, the Serbs were drawing their supplies entirely from Salonika, to which port, under the treaty with Greece made at the con-

gars were successful, two prime objects would be at once accomplished: the railroad to Constantinople would be thrown open, and Serbia's line of communications with her Allies would be cut.

END OF SERBIAN RESISTANCE

The battle opened with the attack of Mackensen against the Danube front, where he secured crossings. Immediately thereafter Bulgaria declared war. The Serbian forces in the field, while amply sufficient to defend their country from the Bulgars, were woefully insufficient to combat this double menace. After stubborn fighting on both fronts they were forced to give way. Bulgarian troops forced the passes in the mountains, and, coming down into the plains, reached the Belgrade-Salonika road. Large bodies of the Serbians were thus cut off and fled to the mountains to the west.

This marked the beginning of the end of

Serbian resistance. The Serbian Army, or what was left of it, fell back upon Salonika, while the Austrians, who held the right of the advancing army, extended over into Montenegro and Albania to the Adriatic.

The attitude of the Allies toward this attack on Serbia is most difficult to understand and no explanation has ever been made. It is inconceivable that the intention of Germany and Bulgaria should not have been known. The Serbian Prime Minister had informed the British Government, in the summer of 1915, that Prince von Bülow of Germany had brought to Sofia for signature a treaty with Germany which was based on Bulgaria's declaring war. But the Allied statesmen seemed to be under the delusion that some sort of Balkan League could be formed which, if it did not act entirely in the interests of the Entente, would at least be neutral. The basis of this delusion was, of course, the Allied diplomats at Sofia, who were most thoroughly outwitted and duped.



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Serbian General Voivode Mishich and His Staff

That Bulgaria was Germany's tool in the Second Balkan War was common knowledge. That she was only beaten through the eleventh-hour action of Rumania was also well known. How any diplomat familiar with Balkan history could have thought that there was any possibility of Bulgaria siding with her sworn enemies and taking up arms against her sworn friends is a mystery.

England, it is true, was busily engaged on the Gallipoli Peninsula at the time. But this campaign had been going on for a long time and was an admitted failure. There was not the remotest chance of success. In England, the campaign was felt to be already a failure. If England could have brought herself to the point of giving up the Gallipoli venture and transferring the troops there engaged, the entire history of the Balkans would have been different, and the war, in all probability, much shortened. In such a case, Turkey could have been driven from the war, if

not by strictly military action by shortage of supplies, and the end which came in 1918 would have come at least a year before. But England did not withdraw from Gallipoli; she contented herself with joining the French in promises of aid to Serbia, upon which promises the Serbian General Staff relied and based its calculations. They were, however, never kept.

Another mystery, too, surrounds this operation. The Serbians, not for a moment deceived by what was going on at Sofia, pleaded with the statesmen of the Entente to permit them to declare war on Bulgaria, thus anticipating Germany's action at a time when both Austria and Germany were so involved with Russia that they could have done little to aid. But, still hypnotized by the dream of a Balkan League, the Allies refused to see the logic in such a procedure, and pinned their faith to a futile diplomacy, which was doomed from the outset to failure.

VII—THE VERDUN CAMPAIGN


Ambitious German Plan Contemplated a Heavy Blow at the French Right Wing—Iron Fields of Briey Were also a Factor

THE operations of 1915 had very generally ended to Germany's advantage. The most important of these were in Russia. The defeat of Russia on the Dunajec and the long and disastrous retreat which followed had apparently eliminated Russia from further reckoning. Viewing the situation, then, from the German side of the Rhine, there was nothing to fear in the east during 1916. Rumania would not dare to enlist on the side of the Allies with Russia practically eliminated from the war. Russia herself could not resume an offensive attitude. An Allied invasion of Turkey through Gallipoli was a dead issue which could not be revived. Germany, therefore, could view the eastern situation with perfect satisfaction and complacency.

On the Western front, however, the intense efforts of Great Britain could not but be disturbing. Through voluntary enlistment and conscription Great Britain had increased

her military forces to over four million men. Germany's initial advantage in artillery and shell was fast being neutralized by increased production in all of the Allied countries. By summer, much of the new British Army would be ready to take the field, and this army, it was assured, would be as fully equipped with artillery as was Germany's. The Allies, feeling their superiority, would then launch an offensive with all the advantage which holding the initiative brings. This was the situation which faced Germany at the beginning of 1916.

Germany could give but one possible answer: the Allies must be attacked before their preparations were sufficiently complete to permit their plans to crystallize. Taking advantage, therefore, of the favorable situation in the east, Germany drew upon the Russian front for additional divisions, weakening that front to the limit of safety, and reinforcing



"Little Venice" on the Meuse at Verdun

the Western front to the maximum of her available resources. When their concentrations had been effected, the Germans struck the French late in February, 1916, at Verdun. This attack was intended not as a means of "bleeding the French white," since Germany was in no position to wage a campaign of attrition, and her own losses were certain to equal if indeed they would not exceed those of the French. It was intended to destroy the Allied resistance, bring the war to a rapid close and bring about peace. Germany's strategical conception, too, was entirely correct. Had her attack succeeded as planned, she would have achieved a victory so important,

so far-reaching, that peace would have followed inevitably.


THE MEANING OF VERDUN

A study of the relation of Verdun to the general battle-line will reveal the German plan fully. In the discussion of Verdun, however, we must not consider merely the town of that name, surrounded by individual forts. Rather, we must regard the name as indicating a fortified area enclosed within the French battle-line on the north and the Argonne Forest and the Heights of the Woevre on the west and east respectively. This area

formed the hinge about which the battle-line turned after it left the Champagne country to follow the heights of northern Lorraine and the Vosges crests. It stood as the guardian of both of these wings, and, if it gave way, both would collapse and crumble. There was no similar sector of the Western front, no sector where a breach made in the French lines would cut off or, indeed, of necessity, affect any material part of the French Army. But a breach at Verdun would have enabled the Germans to cut the communications of

doubtedly have been followed, as it would have placed the entire Champagne country in the hands of the Germans and with it an excellent line of approach to Paris—the Verdun-Châlons-Paris railroad. Without that road the Germans, advancing on Paris, could have no free line of communications to Germany.

There were, too, in addition to this vast result that would flow from the capture of Verdun, two other considerations which rounded out the strategical picture. The first



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At the Verdun Front

The German Crown Prince bestowing the Iron Cross on an Infantry Captain

the entire right wing of the French Army from Verdun to the Swiss frontier and to isolate it from Paris. Once such a breach was effected Germany could have left a holding force to occupy the attention of the French right wing and prevent its junction with the main army, while the French Army itself, its right flank in the air, would have had that flank enveloped and rolled back upon Paris.

Or, of course, the reverse operation might be carried through, the main French Army being held by a holding force while the German strength was centered on capturing the isolated wing. The former plan would un-


was the fate of the French Army which was defending Verdun with the Meuse River at its back. This army, if the line was broken, would have been destroyed or captured. The Meuse was spanned by both permanent and pontoon bridges, but, if a sudden retreat had been forced, these would have proved pitifully inadequate to have carried the army across, so that it and its impedimenta would have been penned up between the German guns and the river. Nothing could have saved it. Such a victory would amply have justified the terrific price which the army of the Crown Prince was prepared to pay.

THE ECONOMIC FACTOR

The second consideration was an economic consideration no less powerful than the military consideration. This found its expression before the war in the battle between France and Germany for supremacy in the European iron field. Gabriel Hanotaux, of the French Academy, thus expressed it: "Germany cannot remain mistress of the world's metal industries unless she can keep and extend her possessions of mineral ores in the French Prov-

mann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor, by the six great industrial and agricultural associations of Germany. "If the production of pig iron and steel," says this memorandum, "had not been doubled since August, 1914, the continuation of the war would have been impossible. At present, the mineral of the Briey furnishes from 60 to 80 per cent. of the appliances made from iron and steel. If this production be disturbed the war will be practically lost."

Thus we can see behind the scenes and



A Stricken Field Before Verdun

The scene of terrific German assaults on March 8th and 10th, 1916, which were repulsed with great losses.

ince of Briey and the neighboring regions. . . . We have a statement from German experts declaring that, so long as these mines are under the cannon of Verdun, the economic and military destiny of Germany remains precarious and exposed to French domination. We are in a position to affirm that one of the chief reasons for the war has been the desire to conquer the Briey basin and seize the strategical key of that immense wealth—in a word, Verdun."

This view is substantiated by a *Confidential Memorandum on the Conditions of Future Peace*, which was addressed to Beth-

view the considerations which prompted Germany to begin the most terrific, the longest sustained single attack in military history. For five months the German attack lasted, with heavy losses to the French, it is true, but with a heavier casualty list as the German share. It was ended by the beginning of the battle of the Somme and the unexpected revival of the Russians, who, just before the Somme battle opened, delivered a terrific attack against the Austrians in Galicia. Thus Germany was forced to abandon her own offensive at Verdun in order to save herself from disaster in other fields.



VIII—CAMPAIGNS OF 1916

Allied Plan for a Great Concentric Attack—Brusiloff's Successful Offensive —The Battle of the Somme—Germans Forced to Plan Retreat

IN viewing the strategy of the Allies in the campaigns of 1916 we must, in order to get a thorough grasp of the entire situation, study it from two different angles. The first might be termed the grand strategy in which the entire war area is brought to our vision and the relation between the engagements in the different theaters made clear. The second is the strategic conceptions behind the individual battles.

Previous to the spring of 1916 it is not too much to say that there was no such thing as grand strategy in any of the Allied plans. Such strategy necessarily implies a unity of command. There must be a single directing genius who sees the various theaters of war as a whole, who knows his forces in every theater, their strength and their weakness, and who possesses similar knowledge of the enemy. Only from such knowledge can unity of action be obtained. Of all human activities, none other places such emphasis on the necessity for such centralized effort.

There was no such thing in the Allied camp as a single control, either through a General Staff functioning in the same manner as did the German Staff, or through an individual commander. It was not because there was not sufficient military knowledge among the Allied leaders to appreciate that only through such a medium could the efforts of all the members of the alliance be exerted with maximum effect. Rather it was a combination of circumstances that went deep into the very nature of the alliance.

The first was the geographical condition. By the accident of geography, the Allies were entirely split—Russia and the Balkan Allies on the east; England, France, Italy and Belgium on the west. Intercommunication was difficult, accurate information hard to obtain. Between these two groups were the Central Powers whose espionage system had penetrated

Russia to such an extent that even high officials of the Russian Government were in their employ. Therefore, information which did come out of Russia was not to be relied upon.

Then again there was that in the nature of the Western Allies which made them unfitted for such highly centralized control. War as an institution was not designed for governments whose basic principles demand freedom for the individual, since, with such freedom, necessarily comes loss of government control, decentralization and lack of coherent organization. It was difficult for these countries to change the habit of thought of a century, and not only to centralize power in the heads of their own government but also to centralize the power of their countries into a single head who could and would act for them all.

Finally, there was the natural dislike that any nation would feel in placing its resources in both men and materials at the disposal of a representative of a foreign race who does not even speak the same tongue. This was exaggerated by the fact that no commander in any of the Allied Armies had been sufficiently successful to claim any military precedence over the leaders of other Allied Armies. And until such a man did appear, until there came upon the horizon a soldier of such marked ability, such military stature, that he stood far above his fellow-soldiers, no man could lay claim to common leadership.

FIRST STEPS TOWARD CENTRALIZED CONTROL

During the winter or very early spring of 1916, however, an effort was made on the part of the Allies to create a General Staff with wide but uncertain powers, who were to plan in broad outlines the strategy of the campaign, leaving the conduct of the opera-


tions themselves to the individual powers concerned. The plan adopted had its foundation in the geographical situation which has just been described, a situation in which one group of warring nations surrounded another group. The interior group had certain very positive military advantages. Its resources in men and material were centralized and could be moved in a straight line to any section of the circumscribing circle in the shortest possible time.

If we picture Germany as within a wheel, operating from the hub along the spokes toward the rim, we shall have an exact comparison. With interior lines there is no waste of effort, there is no lost time. Any point or section of the rim can be strengthened if need be, men can be shifted from any section of the front to another section with great facility and dispatch. The Allies, operating on the outside of the rim, were in exactly the opposite position, having long lines of communication and being able to effect transfers of troops only by moving them par-

allel to the fighting front. The transfers became impossible when it was a question of moving from the Western to the Eastern front or vice versa.

To destroy this great advantage which the Germans held, it was decided, therefore, to attack on all points of the circle so that Germany, although possessing the advantage of interior lines, could not use that advantage in the transfer of troops since the pressure against her lines would be general and not localized. There were to be no quiet sectors which could be drained of troops to strengthen some other sector.

There was a second feature of this plan which involved the time of the attacks. The Austrians, being somewhat involved in Italy through the offensive which they had begun in the Trentino, were to be given time to become thoroughly involved so that they would be pinned down in the mountains beyond recall. Then Russia was to attack. If the Russian attack were successful, the Ger-



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A Ruined German Concrete Shelter

The remains of one of the so-called impregnable concrete outposts near Fort Malmaison, which was completely wrecked by French heavy artillery fire. The entire top of the outpost was knocked off and only the foundation remained.

mans would have to withdraw some of their forces in the west to bolster up the Austrians. As soon as this had been accomplished, France and England were to strike in France, and, finally, Italy was to fall in line and begin an offensive. In this way, it was hoped, Germany and Austria would not only be subjected to heavy losses in men but would also be forced to contract their lines and draw in toward the center of the circle which circumscribed them. There were, therefore, in the Allied strategy, the two elements of attrition and of beating back the Austro-German lines.

BEGINNING OF THE GREAT CONCENTRIC ATTACK

Russia was selected to deliver the first of this series of attacks for several reasons. First, Germany considered Russia so nearly out of the war as a result of her terrific beating of the year before, that a revivification of her military strength was looked upon as impossible. There would be, then, the element of surprise which is always present in successful strategical enterprises. Secondly, Germany was concentrated in the west because of her own offensive at Verdun, and, regarding Russia as no longer to be feared, she had weakened her Russian front in order to carry out her purposes in the west. It was presumed, therefore, that Russia would make better progress under conditions as they existed.


The Russian attack, under the direction of General Brusiloff, began in the early part of June, 1916, on a very wide front, which extended from the great marshes of the Pripet River to the northern border of Rumania. The selection of this front was based primarily on the fact that it was held by the Austrians whom the Russians had never found difficult to beat back. The Austrians, however, were separated from the Germans by the broad Pripet marshes and could only be reached by their ally by the railroad from Brest-Litovsk to Kovel. It was known, too, that certain elements of the Austrians—principally the Czecho-Slovaks—were affected with the seeds of revolt, and would, at a favorable opportunity, throw down their arms and desert in the hope of bringing about an Austrian defeat and their own independence. Finally, the Austro-German position in Rus-

sia had, as its foundation, the railroad system which passes through the towns of Kovel and Lemberg, and these towns were the main objective. The importance of this railroad system lay in the fact that, in Russia, the avenues of transportation are few, and, aside from the railroads, are extremely poor. The problem, then, was essentially a railroad problem, as only by this means could the requisite amount of material be kept in motion to the front.

Reference to the map of Europe shows Kovel as the main railroad center of the Pripet district. Coming into Kovel from the west and northwest are railroads from Brest-Litovsk and Warsaw by way of Lublin and Cholm. Running south from Kovel is a road which generally paralleled the battle-line and connected with Lemberg.

Lemberg is the largest railroad center in eastern Galicia. From it roads radiate in all directions. These roads, leaving both Lemberg and Kovel, were the life-lines of the Austrian army north of the Danube River. If Kovel fell into Russian hands there would have been a section of the Austrian lines more than a hundred miles long without railroad transportation in a country which, in summer, is a tremendous marsh or swamp through which passage by an army is practically impossible. A retirement by the Austrians would then become necessary, which would have necessitated a material readjustment of the entire eastern battle-line. The Austrians would not alone be affected should they be forced to fall back, but the German right wing would be exposed to a flank attack so that, to avoid serious embarrassment, the Germans would also have been involved in the retreat. This retreat would have extended for many miles—to the general line of the Bug River. Then, should Rumania be induced to enter the war, her army, thrown against the flank of the over-extended Austrian line, would endanger the entire German position in the Balkans.

The Russians broke through the Austrian positions, far beyond the defensive zone, and, in the course of the offensive, took something like a half million prisoners, many of whom were Czechs. But the very rapidity of the Russian advance threw their armies into confusion; they outran their transportation, and were thus checked as soon as German assist-



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War Is No Respector of Places

This photograph shows the wreck of the village church at Mancourt, on the Somme. The ruins were used by French machine gunners in repulsing a German counter-attack. Through the window two fallen Germans are seen.

ance was sent down from the north. This check came along the Stockod River before Kovel, and before Lemberg, neither of which towns was occupied by Brusiloff's men. There was heavy and continuous fighting in these positions, but, late in the summer, the offensive gradually died out with its main objects not accomplished. Austria had indeed been struck a damaging blow, but all hope of either splitting the Austrian Army from that of the Germans or of causing a general retreat westward had gone. Russia had made her effort and was, for the time being at least, exhausted.

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME


While the Russian attack was in full swing, the British and French on the first of July began their part of the operations in the Battle of the Somme. The Allied object in beginning this battle was threefold. First, it was hoped to relieve the pressure on Verdun, where the Germans were maintaining a persistent offensive. The success of the Russians

against the Austrians had, as Sir Douglas Haig stated in his report of the Somme battle, caused a movement of German troops from the Western to the Eastern front. This, however, did not lessen the pressure on Verdun. In spite of the French resistance and the heavy losses inflicted on the Germans, the strain continued to increase and the intensity of the German attacks did not lessen.

"In view, therefore, of the situation in various theaters of war," reported General Haig, "it was eventually agreed between General Joffre and myself that the combined French and British offensive should not be postponed beyond the end of June."

The second object was to assist the Allies in the other theaters of war by stopping any further transfer of German troops from the Western front; while the third object was a stage in the campaign of attrition, of wearing down the German strength. These are sufficient reasons to show why an attack was made at that particular time.

It does not explain why this particular section of the battle front was selected for this



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Speeding Railroad Construction in France

Broad-gauge railways were constructed frequently by the British at the rate of a mile a day to bring up re-inforcements. This official photograph shows a trestle which was completed in one week.



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French Soldiers Go Scouting on the River Meuse


They are making a reconnaissance along the stream between the two lines. Dangerous work, doubtless, but all in the game. The French army presented a wonderful example of what might be accomplished in developing efficiency in an emergency.

great effort. For this we must turn to the map and see the location of the battle-lines on the first of July, 1916. (See map, Vol. III, p. 87.)

From Arras to Rheims, the battle-line was a huge curve, convex toward the west, the con-

of heavy weather put an end to the fighting.

At that time the battle front was still static. There was no open fighting. It was simply a question of breaking down one series of trenches only to have a new series spring up in the new positions which the Germans were



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Behind the German Lines at Verdun

A photograph taken from a small balloon, nicknamed the "Sausage Ball," while observing operations in the rear of the Germans.

tour of the curve being roughly a semicircle with the center of the arc near Compiègne. This curve was really a huge salient biting into the Allied territory. The German forces holding this curve were supplied by two main railroad stems, one, having a common origin at Laon, divided west of La Fère, one branch running to Noyon, the other through Ham to Amiens. This section of the front was selected for attack on the theory that, by pushing in the German lines north of the latter railroad, a sufficient threat would be made against it to force a withdrawal of the German lines lest their communications be cut. It was, then, really with all of these objects in view that this battle was waged from July 1st, 1916, until late in the fall, when the advent

forced to take. There was, therefore, but little room for strategy, the essence of which is mobility.

OBJECTS ACHIEVED BY SOMME BATTLE

The results achieved by this battle, in so far as the three first-named objects are concerned, were complete. General Haig, in commenting on these, stated to the British Secretary of State for War:

"The three main objects with which we had commenced our offensive in July had already been achieved at the date when this account closes, in spite of the fact that the heavy autumn rains had prevented full advantage from being taken of the favorable situation created by our advance, at a time when we

had good grounds for hoping to achieve yet more important successes.

"Verdun had been relieved, the main German forces had been held on the Western front, and the enemy's strength had been very considerably worn down.

"Any one of these three results is in itself sufficient to justify the Somme battle. The attainment of all three of them affords ample compensation for the splendid efforts of our troops and for the sacrifices made by ourselves and our allies. They have brought us a long step forward toward the final victory of the Allied cause.

"The desperate struggle for the possession of Verdun had invested that place with a moral and political importance out of all proportion to its military value. Its fall would undoubtedly have been proclaimed as a great victory for our enemies, and would have shaken the faith of many in our ultimate success. The failure of the enemy to capture it, despite great efforts and very heavy losses, was a severe blow to his prestige, especially in view of the confidence he had openly expressed as to the results of the struggle.

"Information obtained both during the progress of the Somme battle and since the suspension of active operations has fully established the effect of our offensive in keeping the enemy's main forces tied to the Western front. A movement of German troops eastward, which had commenced in June as a result of the Russian successes, continued for a short time only after the opening of the Allied attack. Thereafter the enemy forces that moved east consisted, with one exception, of divisions that had been exhausted in the Somme battle, and these troops were always replaced on the Western front by fresh divisions. In November the strength of the enemy in the Western theater of war was greater than in July, notwithstanding the abandonment of his offensive at Verdun. It is possible that if Verdun had fallen large forces might still have been employed in an endeavor further to exploit that success. It is, however, far more probable, in view of developments in the Eastern theater, that a considerable transfer of troops in that direction would have followed. It is, therefore, justifiable to conclude that the Somme offensive not only relieved

Verdun but held large forces which would otherwise have been employed against our Allies in the east.

"The third great object of the Allied operations on the Somme was the wearing down of the enemy's powers of resistance. Any statement of the extent to which this has been attained must depend in some degree on estimates. There is, nevertheless, sufficient evidence to place it beyond doubt that the enemy's losses in men and material have been very considerably higher than those of the Allies, while morally the balance of advantage on our side is still greater.

"During the period under review a steady deterioration took place in the morale of large numbers of the enemy's troops. Many of them, it is true, fought with the greatest determination, even in the latest encounters, but the resistance of still larger numbers became latterly decidedly feebler than it had been in the earlier stages of the battle. Aided by the great depth of his defenses and by the frequent reliefs which his resources in men enabled him to effect, discipline and training held the machine together sufficiently to enable the enemy to rally and reorganize his troops after each fresh defeat. As our advance progressed, four-fifths of the total number of divisions engaged on the Western front were thrown one after another into the Somme battle, some of them twice, and some three times; and toward the end of the operations, when the weather unfortunately broke, there can be no doubt that his power of resistance had been very seriously diminished."

The latter part of the plan was also successful. The deep penetration into the German positions which resulted from the Somme battle made a possible renewal of activity in the spring a source of grave danger to the Germans in the Noyon salient. In addition to this, it had practically ruined their entire defensive system over a considerable section of front so that both a rectification of the line and an entirely new defensive system had to be undertaken. These were prepared in carefully selected positions along what came to be known as the Hindenburg Line and, early in the spring (1917), before an Allied attack could fall, the German retreat to the new positions occurred.

IX—ITALY IN 1915 AND 1916

Opening Attacks—Austrian Offensive in the Trentino Broken Short by Russian Offensive in Galicia—Capture of Gorizia and Advance on Trieste

GERMANY, Italy and Austria were, at the outbreak of war in 1914, bound together by a treaty of military alliance. This treaty, however, was for defensive purposes only, so that, from the outset, there was reason to doubt Italy's participation on the side of the Teutonic powers. In every treaty calling for defensive coöperation, there can be no coercion at the outbreak of hostilities. Each party to the treaty is the sole judge as to whether a given war is offensive or defensive, and is, therefore, the only judge of its own actions in pursuance of the treaty.

Germany and Austria knew that the war which they had seen fit to provoke was not defensive. They knew that, on the contrary, it was a war of aggression, begun for territorial aggrandizement. When Italy, therefore, refused to join them at the outset, they felt aggrieved but were in no sense disappointed or surprised. They had not considered Italy in their calculations, so that her refusal to be a party to their schemes had no immediate effect on their military plans. They did, however, feel that Italy would remain neutral and so would constitute a threat to the southern flank of the French army, thus immobilizing a considerable number of troops. But, early in the war, France was assured that she would have nothing to fear from Italy, so that even this part of the plan failed.

Austria's dealings with Italy after war broke out were marked by an atmosphere of haughty domination. Particularly is this true with regard to the dealings with Serbia, which Italy resented because of her own interests in the Balkan Peninsula. When Italy made her resentment at this attitude evident, both Austria and Germany adopted different tactics. Fearing that Italy would break with them and join the Entente, their arguments became those of bribery. Italy was promised definite accretions of territory at Austria's expense on con-

dition that she maintained her neutrality. But Italy knew from past experience with both Germany and Austria that these promises would be binding only until it was expedient for those powers to withdraw them.

After much arguing and negotiating, Italy, in the middle of May, 1915, declared war on Austria although not on Germany. Austria had, however, seen the negotiations approaching a crisis and was by no means unprepared for Italy's final action. Her plan was purely defensive. It was no part of her strategy to take aggressive action, at least until Russia was finally disposed of. As long as Russia continued an active factor there would be no troops to spare for an offensive campaign against Italy.

ITALY STRIKES AT AUSTRIA

Italy, however, had other ideas. She had nothing to gain by acting defensively. She was not engrossed in campaigns in other fields. Rather was it her part to strike while Austria was so busy with Russia and, therefore, unable to divert a great proportion of her strength to this new theater.

Italy's problem was probably the most difficult in any theater. From the Swiss border all around her boundary to Tolmino there was the heavy mountain wall of the Alps with its few passes leading down into the plains of northern Italy. On the Eastern front, from Tolmino south, is the Isonzo River. The Isonzo, a glacial stream, comes down toward the sea through a narrow gorge with steep, almost unscalable, walls, with a swift current which makes fording impossible. The eastern bank of the Isonzo is, moreover, studded with mountain peaks, some of them of considerable height, which make observation very simple and give great advantage to a defensive force occupying this bank.

Nevertheless, in spite of these defensive barriers, the eastern or Isonzo front is the only front on which offensive operations are possible. It is the only front by which any truly important object can be reached, the only front which is sufficiently open to give an offensive any reasonable chance of success. The accident of topography, therefore, imposed on Italy an offensive on the Isonzo front.

THE INVASION OF THE TRENTINO

In Trentino an entirely different picture was presented. This province, divided by the valley of the Adige, is like a funnel, the hopper of which is north of Tyrol with its mouth near Verona. Leading from this funnel are a number of alleyways, the passes through the heavy mountains which border the valley of the Adige into the plains of northern Italy. The funnel is, moreover, divided by a single main railroad which comes down from Innsbruck through Trent to Verona, where it connects with the main Italian system of the north running from Milan through Brescia and Verona to Gorizia.

As soon as war was declared, Austria, who had anticipated this action on the part of Italy, began pouring her troops down from Innsbruck into Trentino. This front, therefore, while it held great possibilities for an Austrian offensive, as it would lay open the plain of Italy and cut behind any offensive Italy might begin on the Isonzo front, possessed no offensive value to the Italians. Their strategy, consequently, was based on invading Trentino only far enough to block up the passes and prevent Austria from coming through, and conducting their main offensive to the east toward Laibach and Vienna.

In one particular Italy's action would have seemed to be most propitious. At the moment she declared war Austria was heavily involved against Russia. The attack along the Duna-jec had been launched and the Russians were in retreat, being pushed hard by both the Austrians and the Germans. There was also pending the Teutons' attack on Serbia which, launched in the Fall, drew a great many Austrian troops into this theater. There was every reason for the Allies to hope for a decided Italian victory over her ancient enemy, a victory which might well split Austria and

lay the Germans open to a southern invasion.

Unfortunately, however—and it was unfortunate for all theaters of war—the Allies were not sufficiently strong to risk any determined effort against the trench system in the west. They were still in the stage of




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Riva, Porta San Marco, Trentino

preparation, almost of transition from peace to war. Every attempt to advance indicated strongly that their attack was not yet adequate to the German defense. Germany, therefore, was free to do what she should have done in 1914—stand on the Western front in a strictly defensive attitude and turn her forces eastward where there was a greater

chance of victory. Austria, who the previous year had been pinned down absolutely to the front in Russia, was able, through German assistance, to turn great strength against Italy and oppose her advance. It was not vital that Italy should be attacked. Isolated as she was, she could do no damage if only she could be held where she was. Therefore, the Aus-

Taken altogether, 1915 was a year which the Allies could not regard happily. On every front their efforts had met with a decided check. Although they had won the diplomatic battle which brought Italy into the war, they had lost the battle in Bulgaria, and had seen their ally, Serbia, overrun and destroyed. Beaten back in an attempt to break the Ger-



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Italians Celebrating Mass Before Going Into Battle

These forces were operating on the Isonzo front when this picture was taken.

trians were satisfied to remain on the defensive and let Italy take the initiative.

ITALIAN ATTACKS ON THE ISONZO

Italy had no difficulty in occupying the small strip of Austrian territory between her own eastern boundary and the Isonzo. But all her efforts to effect a crossing at Gorizia, which town she needed for her supply line, were unavailing. The strength of the Austrian positions, coupled with her own inability to supply herself with the requisite amount of materials to keep up a consistent attack, prevented her from making a material advance during this year.

man lines in the west, they were able to make no more impression on the defenses of the Turks on Gallipoli. The only victories, in fact, in the European theater were won by Germany: one against Russia and the other against Serbia. For their year's work, the Allies had nothing to show.

Their troubles were due, of course, partly to the fact that, unprepared for war in 1914, their preparations were forced upon them while war was actually in progress. Their principal task was, therefore, to hold on, to keep the Germans back while they were getting ready to go forward.

There was, however, another difficulty—that of lack of unity in command. All of the

campaigns undertaken in 1915—with the single exception of the combined attack of the French and British at Loos and in the Champagne—were undertaken as individual isolated efforts, irrespective of their relation to the war as a whole. The Allies had yet to realize that the German positions in the west were so strong that, if defended by forces even approximately equal to their own, they were impregnable. The Allies saw mobility destroyed and the war reduced to a static condition. Strategy, whose very foundation is mobility, had found its Nemesis in trench warfare.

They saw the war, therefore, reduced to a game of attrition, of wearing the Germans down little by little by a series of scattered efforts. There was no attempt to match Germany in brains; there was but the effort to exceed her in man power and materials. Not for two years were the Allies to see the light.

HEAVY FIGHTING ON THE ITALIAN FRONT

All during 1915, the Italians and Austrians hammered each other, the former across the Isonzo, the latter both on that front and in Trentino. Except for the fact, however, that the Italians did succeed in penetrating sufficiently far into Trentino to bottle up the passes, and at the same time effected and made good the crossing of the lower Isonzo, the results of the series of battles may be considered indeterminate.

This condition prevailed until May, 1916, when Austria undertook a heavy offensive in Trentino. At that time Austria was completely freed of Serbia. The Bulgarians alone had been given the task of watching the Allies before Salonika and of holding them in position. Russia, as a result of the defeat of the previous summer and fall, was considered out of the war. There was no theater, therefore, to divide with Italy Austria's attention. She was free to try the same driving tactics in the Alps that she had used so successfully, with Germany's assistance, against Serbia and Russia.

So she massed her troops in Trentino and concentrated an overwhelming mass of artillery in preparation for a crushing movement which she hoped would land her in Italy's great northern plain. Italy, in the meantime,

knew that these concentrations were being made and had plans under way to meet the coming attack when Austria struck in a tremendous effort to break through the passes east of Lake Garda, in the hope of striking the railroads which reached up to the Isonzo front and severing the lines of supply of the Italian Isonzo armies.

The Italians were caught in the attack before they had made their preparations to meet it. For ten days they fell back steadily, abandoning all their outposts until they were forced to their own soil. It seemed as if the Austrian purpose was to be accomplished when the Italian army stood on almost the last line of hills before the plains were reached, and the Austrian menace was over.

ITALIANS CAPTURE GORIZIA

In June, 1916, the Russians began a tremendous offensive against the Austrians in Galicia the initial success of which held such a threat of dire disaster that Austria hastily drained the Italian front of men in order to bolster up her tottering lines in the east. Shortly afterward, the British and French opened the battle of the Somme, which, with the German efforts at Verdun, pinned the Germans down on the Western front and prevented the transfer of troops to other fields which were under pressure.

This gave Italy her opportunity. Under the necessity of protecting the rear of the Isonzo army, Italy struck first in Trentino and quickly wrested from the Austrians practically all of the ground gained in their May offensive. The outlets from Trentino into the Italian plain were thus sealed as before. Attention was then turned to the Isonzo front. In a terrific attack against the Austrian positions before Gorizia, the Italians fought their way across the river and took this important stronghold, thus securing for themselves excellent communications between the two sides of the Isonzo. From Gorizia to the Gulf of Trieste the east bank was cleared and occupied.

At this point Italy had before her two objectives from which to choose. The first was Laibach, on the road to Vienna. Had Italy taken this as her next objective it would have meant that an effort was to be made to

drive Austria from the war, that the Allies were looking immediately at victory as the first thing to be achieved, leaving the matter of individual aspirations to receive settlement at the peace conference. The other was Trieste, the great city of Italia Irredenta. An attack here, to the exclusion of Laibach, would mean nothing else than that the unity of control, which was evidenced by the com-

It is somewhat remarkable that the events of the last six months of 1916 in all theaters did not impress themselves more strongly on the Allied command. For the first time there was true coöperation, a realization, apparent at least, that the policy of scattered efforts, which had marked the Allied operations from the beginning, could bring only inconclusive results. And yet none of the nations in the



The Water Front at Trieste

This beautiful seaport commanding the Adriatic was one of the principal objectives of the Italian advance.

munity of action on all European fronts, extended no further than a suggestion as to the time of attack, leaving the details, if they may be called details, to the local commander.

The latter proved to be the case; Italy's commander turned to the Carso, the rough plateau which guards the pathway to Trieste, as his next objective. Heavy fighting followed, the Italians reaching to within eleven miles of Trieste. The advent of winter, however, and what was still more fateful, shortage of ammunition, compelled the Italians to cease fighting until the next year.

Entente could come to the point of placing its army under the dictation of a foreign commander, for the general good. This was due, to a certain extent, to selfishness, and, to a still greater extent, to national pride.

Italy was not up to this time considered as holding a front unified, with that in France. Hers was regarded, on the contrary, as a subsidiary field. Its true relation to the war was not understood, probably not even considered. It required the catastrophe of the next year to teach the Allies the lesson that they should have learned in 1915.

X—EUROPEAN CAMPAIGNS OF 1917

Nivelle's Unsuccessful Offensive—British Capture Vimy and Messines Ridge—Costly Attacks on Passchendaele Ridge—Submarine Depredations—The Italian Disaster

THE results of the various Allied offensives in 1916 produced something akin to a panic at German Headquarters. The Kaiser had proclaimed on more than one occasion that he would win the war despite the odds against him because of the unified command in the Central Powers. He now saw that everything indicated an end to this advantage through the consolidation of Allied military affairs in a single controlling body.

This was certainly pointed to by the 1916 operations. During the lull in the fighting which followed the advent of winter the Germans, therefore, prepared to offset this new advantage of the Allies by a desperate attempt to starve them and cut off the flow of military supplies to Europe. They, therefore, had prepared in France a new line carefully selected with a view to its defensive value, and improved the natural strength by defensive works of a character that his old defenses had not approached. It was the German plan to retreat to this line during the very early spring of 1917, before any new Allied blow could fall, and then, while this impregnable position was held, to begin an unrestricted and unlimited submarine warfare against the world in order that no cargo or other ships could reach any of the Allied countries.

Because of the already existing shortage in world tonnage, it was figured that enough vessels could be sunk to cripple beyond repair the Allied ability to wage war. This was to be accomplished before the end of the year, during which time the Army in the west would lie idle, simply holding its positions.

The first part of this plan was carried through without a hitch. The retreat to the new line—which became known as the Hindenburg Line—was made without molestation before the British and French could strike. The declaration of submarine warfare had a

result that Germany failed to foresee. Basing her opinion on the fact that she had murdered American citizens in the brutal sinking of the *Lusitania* without having received anything more than a scolding for her crime, Germany thought that the soul of America was so sordid and materialistic that it would accept any insult without more than a resentment in words. That America would really act she did not believe. This last move, however, fanned the spirit of the American people themselves into flame, and forced a severance of diplomatic relations. In a few more weeks a declaration of war followed.

GERMAN FAILURES TO READ PSYCHOLOGY

Successful war is a study of psychology even more than a question of strategy and tactics. To understand one's opponent, to know what he will do under a given set of circumstances, to follow the workings of his mind, is of as much advantage as superior artillery. It was this quality that made Lee the greatest military mind of his time. It was because of this ability to know his opponents without under-rating them that he violated the fundamental rules of strategy without fear of the result. He fought Antietam with a river at his back, knowing that, if he was defeated, McClellan would not follow up the victory and press him back upon the river. He divided his forces when in active contact with the enemy because he knew his opponent was not of a type endowed with the alertness of mind to take quick advantage of a sudden change.

Germany's psychology of the war was a failure throughout. She possessed a strange inability to understand other peoples, their ideas of honor and of right, the most ordinary functioning of their minds. It was to this



The Allied Front from the Sea to Reims in
April, 1917

fact, more than to any other, that her failure may be traced.

Almost coincident with the severance of diplomatic relations between America and Germany was the revolution in Russia. Whatever plans the Allies may have had for concerted action in 1917 were at once broken up. Russia was immediately in a state of uncertainty. The Allies could not plan with her or for her. Certainly no such tremendous internal upheaval could occur without throwing out of joint the entire government in its every department. Very soon it became evident that Russia was out of the war, that except for the immobilization of a certain number of German divisions by very reason of the uncertainty of the situation, nothing could be expected or hoped for.

The Allies plainly did not know what to do

with such a situation, so they did the worst thing possible—they did nothing. Russia was allowed to go her way without any effort to hold her in line.

NIVELLE'S OFFENSIVE AND VIMY RIDGE

In France, however, there seemed to be a ray of hope. Great Britain had resisted all efforts to centralize the general command of the Allied forces in one generalissimo because of the fact that no man had made such a success as to warrant placing the British Army under his control. But in the winter of 1916 General Haig, the British commander, received instructions to place himself under the orders of General Nivelle, of the French Army, who was to assume supreme command of the Allied forces in the west.

Nivelle's plan of operations was very similar to that attempted in 1915. The British were to attack Vimy Ridge, seize the ridge and move to break the line toward Cambrai. The French were to attack simultaneously with the British north of the Aisne and west of Reims, in an endeavor to flank the Germans out of Laon. This would destroy the base on which rested the entire north and south section of the German line. The Germans would thus be forced to retreat while under the great pressure of Haig's attack on the Arras front.

General Nivelle's attack failed—some claim because his preparations were not complete, others because the casualties were so heavy that the government ordered the attack stopped. That the French casualties were very great is unquestionable. That the Allies were on the verge of a great victory when the attack was halted is equally certain. As it was, the attack proved a failure and the grand plan of 1917 fell with it.

The British, however, were successful in storming Vimy Ridge, a position which was destined to prove the great bastion of defense against the German attack the following year. But the breakdown of the French attack north of the Aisne caused the battle here to die down.

GERMAN SUBMARINE HAVOC

In the meantime the German submarine campaign was playing havoc with Allied ship-



Sixty-fifth Congress of the United States of America;

At the First Session,

Began and held at the City of Washington on Monday, the second day of April,
one thousand nine hundred and seventeen.

JOINT RESOLUTION

Declaring that a state of war exists between the Imperial German Government
and the Government and the people of the United States and making
provision to prosecute the same.

Whereas the Imperial German Government has committed repeated acts of
war against the Government and the people of the United States of
America: Therefore be it

*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That the state of war between the United
States and the Imperial German Government which has thus been thrust upon
the United States is hereby formally declared; and that the President be, and
he is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military
forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war
against the Imperial German Government; and to bring the conflict to a
successful termination all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by
the Congress of the United States.*

Champ Clark,

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Thos. R. Marshall

*Vice President of the United States and
President of the Senate.*


Approved 6 April, 1917

Woodrow Wilson

© Harris and Ewing.

This Resolution Declared War on Germany

When President Wilson signed this joint resolution of the houses of Congress, war was officially declared between the United States and Germany. Congress convened on April 2, but the swearing in of new members occupied some time and the attempts of pacifists to thwart the declaration of war delayed the passage of the measure until April 6. It was the first official act of the 65th Congress, as the entry at the top of the page shows.



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In Kiel Harbor

The Kiel Canal was cut through Schleswig-Holstein in the years 1887-95 at a cost of \$39,000,000. By making a short connection under German control between the Baltic and the North Seas, it virtually doubled the striking power of the German Navy, enabling the fleet to appear unexpectedly in its full strength in either sea.

ping and was causing great worry among the Allied leaders. The defense against the submarine was not yet effective and the loss in shipping was much greater each month than the world's ability to build. In an effort to lessen the intensity of this method of warfare, if indeed not to break it up almost completely, the British undertook a series of operations against the submarine bases on the Belgian coast. These operations took the form of an offensive in Flanders, working eastward from Ypres. Such an operation, it was considered, would cut the German communications with Zeebrugge, their principal base on the coast, and force the Germans to draw back toward Antwerp, or even give up the coast entirely.

The first step in this operation was the taking of Messines Ridge, one of the hills south of Ypres, which juts up from the level plain of Flanders. The next operation was against Passchendaele Ridge, a chain of high positions directly east of Ypres.

It was a repetition of the battle of the Somme. Day after day the British plowed through the mud and morass of the shell-torn lowlands, gaining considerable ground but at

tremendous cost. In the month of August, 1917, alone nearly 30,000 men were killed in the Flanders fighting. The move was a failure. It did not accomplish the object for which it was undertaken and its result was in no sense commensurate with the cost in human material. This, with the exception of local attacks, which were not made in pursuance of any true strategical plan, ended the fighting in France for that year.

THE ITALIAN DISASTER

In Italy, however, advantage was again taken by the Teutons of preoccupation in other fields to open a new offensive. In spite of the fact that war had never been declared between Italy and Germany, Germany had been sending troops to Italy at various times to assist the Austrians. The latter had not been successful in any theater of war except in cases where German divisions had been with them. Italy felt, therefore, that with Germany held fast in France, her chances of beating Austria were greatly enhanced. In August, therefore, while the fighting on Pas-



Photo by Donald C. Thompson.

An Austrian Shell's Deadly Work

This high explosive shell landed in the Italian barbed wire entanglements in front of a mountainside trench. Earth and shattered rock were thrown great distances. It is truly said that in the Alpine campaign the aggressors fought against both man and nature, so tremendous were the topographical difficulties.

Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly.

schendaele Ridge was at its climax, she suddenly launched a heavy attack between Tolmino and Gorizia and up over the Bainsizza Plateau toward the Chiapovano Valley. The object of this attack was to cut the Austrian Army in half and, while it was thus divided, to defeat its southern wing. Thus not only would the Carso and Trieste fall, but the way to Laibach would be thrown wide open and Austria would receive a death blow.

The Chiapovano Valley is a narrow rift in the heavy mountain wall which extends eastward from the Isonzo Valley. It forms the eastern boundary of the Bainsizza Plateau, so that if it could be reached by the Italian Army, the Austrian line would be split at the point of penetration, as the eastern wall of the valley is an unscalable perpendicular cliff.

The Italians were well on the way across the Bainsizza—in fact but four miles separated them from their objective—when their supply of ammunition began to run low and their appeal to their Allies brought no results. And it was here that the great tragedy of a decentralized command was felt. There was no one in Europe who could order England and France to send Italy what was needed. America was the only hope. But America was afflicted with the same sort of political inability that had affected the Allies in the Balkans in the earlier days. She did not perceive for a moment the political strategy of the situation. Actuated by some indefinite, baseless hope that a separate peace might at some future date be made with Austria, she did not declare war on Germany's ally and hence could not send ammunition or materials to Italy with which to fight Austria. Italy was, therefore, forced to halt her movement just as it was on the verge of a victorious ending.

But greater tragedies than this were in store. Heavy German reinforcements had been sent to the Austrians and mobilized on the Plezzo-Tolmino front. On this same front there was also a great concentration of heavy guns in preparation for a large-scale offensive. The Italian Army on this front had, in the meantime, been thoroughly rotted with propaganda of various kinds. The soldiers were made to believe that the Austrians had refused longer to fight, that they were ready to come in and surrender. The same

sort of pacifist preachings which had done so much to destroy Russia were used with telling effect.

When the Teuton attack was launched, therefore, it fell upon an army whose morale was at its lowest ebb and from whom all military ideas had departed. This army broke and opened a wide path for the Austro-German forces to come through, and, at the same time, exposed the left flank of the Italians who had been fighting on the Bainsizza Plateau. The Teutons crossed the Isonzo under the protection of the bridge heads of Monte Santa Maria and Monte Santa Lucia and poured down the Judrio Valley. This struck at the rear not only of the forces on the Bainsizza but those in Gorizia and on the Carso as well.

Resistance on the part of the Italians was useless until they could make their supply lines secure. They, therefore, began a rapid retreat. Guns and ammunition were freely abandoned in the movement to keep the Army from destruction. At the Tagliamento a strong effort was made by the Italian rear guard to halt the advance. It proved unavailing, however, although the effort gave valuable time in which to gather the Army together. Finally, on the banks of the Piave, the Italians stood and fought the battle out. And the long retreat was at an end.

For the first time since Italy's entrance into the war, the Allies were forced to recognize her as an integral part of the Western front, as the extension, indeed, of the French right. Had Italy been beaten to the extent of giving the Austro-Germans control of the entire northern Italian plain, an invasion of France from the south would almost certainly have been attempted. But to make the Allies believe this, it seemed necessary that Italy should be actually faced with defeat.

Then the true situation was appreciated. During the Italian retreat the danger was seen in France and England, and divisions of both the French and British Armies were rushed south to aid Italy's defense. But it was a tardy recognition of a patent geographical fact.

At the same time the Italian collapse emphasized the necessity for a unified command. The way was thus paved for the appointment of Marshal Foch as generalissimo of the Allied forces.

XI—THE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN—1916

Treachery of Russian Government Under Stürmer and Protopopoff Fatal to Rumania—Victories of Mackensen and Falkenhayn— Rumanians Driven to Sereth Line

THE great Russian offensive in Galicia in 1916 came to a close early in August. On the 28th of August, Rumania entered the war on the side of the Allies.

These two events do not have any apparent connection. Had Rumania taken this step while the Russian offensive was in full swing, it would have been easy to account for her move. The Austrians, being on the verge of defeat by Russia, might need but that additional force thrown suddenly on their flank to encompass their total defeat. Rumania's step then would have been entirely logical.

But to have entered the war but a few weeks after the Russian offensive had been checked and beaten back presents a paradox which logic does not explain. In spite, however, of the apparent lack of connection between these two events, they are, in fact, bound together indissolubly. The declaration of war was forced on Rumania by Russia herself, who, at the time, was presided over by Stürmer and Protopopoff. Evidence found in the secret archives of Russia, and placed in the light by the Russian revolution, reveals that Russia delivered an ultimatum to Rumania in which there was contained a threat to invade Rumania if she did not move against Austria. "Now or never," said the ultimatum, "for it must not be hoped that we shall again permit the Rumanian Army later on to make a military promenade and enter Austro-Hungarian territory in triumph." In response, then, to a positive demand from an extremely powerful neighbor, Rumania declared war.

She could not have done otherwise. No help was to be got from England and France. They were deeply involved at the time of the ultimatum (July 1st, 1916) in the Battle of Verdun and the Battle of the Somme, which was just scheduled to begin. They were not

in a position, therefore, to override the demand of the Russian Government and made no effort to do so. It was subsequently proved that both Stürmer and Protopopoff were, although at the head of the Russian Government, in the employ of the Germans, so that, when they ordered Rumania to take this step, it was in Germany's interest.

There were several reasons why Germany wanted Rumania in the war, provided she could dictate the way that war should be waged. In the first place, as Hindenburg said, it restored Germany's freedom of action, gave her back the initiative. Again, there was always the possibility that Rumania, being a Latin country and having pro-Ally sympathies, might join the Allies at a less opportune moment, a moment which might mean either the defeat of Austria or a defeat of Bulgaria through coöperation with the Allied force at Salonika.

Finally, Rumania had what Germany needed and Germany needed a good excuse to go in and get it. Germany needed petroleum products and Rumania was a great oil-producing state. She also had an abundance of grain and Germany needed food. The mountains west of the Sereth River produced minerals of all kinds in considerable volume and Germany wanted them. It was necessary, however, if Rumania's entrance into the war was not to prove a boomerang, that her plan of campaign should be known beforehand; that Germany, indeed, should dictate how and where Rumania was to fight. For this purpose Stürmer and Protopopoff were again used.

Rumania, when she was forced to declare war, immediately asked the Russian Government for assistance. She pointed out that she could not undertake, with but sixteen divisions of troops, to hold the entire Danube front from the Serbian corner to the great

bend in southern Dobrudja, and, at the same time, conduct an offensive over the long Transylvanian front. The Rumanians proposed that they should take and hold the bridgeheads over the Danube and begin an offense in Transylvania. For this, they said, they would need 200,000 Russians to hold back a concentration of as many Bulgars and Turks who



Prince Charles

The Crown Prince of Rumania, born in October, 1893.

had mobilized against the southern border of Dobrudja.

RUMANIA OPENS THE FIGHT

Russia ordered Rumania to do nothing about the Danube front. She declared that the Bulgarians would lay down their arms and refuse to fight. And, as for Dobrudja—"Who is threatening the Dobrudja front?" she asked. Finally, she agreed to send two Russian divisions, one of which, when it arrived, was found to be made up of Czechoslovak prisoners captured from the Austrians.

Acting under these orders, and with the assurance of Bulgaria's intention not to fight, Rumania began hostilities with an invasion of Transylvania. The Germans delayed until the Rumanians were deeply involved on this front, and then the trap was sprung in Dobrudja. The Bulgarians and Turks under Mackensen delivered a powerful attack against the totally inadequate forces on the southern border of this province, and, with their left flank protected by the Danube, advanced toward the Constanza-Cernavoda Railroad. This railroad was Rumania's sole connection with the Black Sea and the main route by which coöperation with Russia could be hoped for.

Seeing the danger, Rumania tried to meet it by withdrawing four divisions from Transylvania and hurrying them to Dobrudja to resist this advance. This at once compromised the Transylvanian operations and rendered the advance there nugatory, in addition to placing the forces there in an extremely hazardous position.

The Dobrudja operation, as was expected, proved to be a German success, in spite of the reinforcements, and Mackensen's troops advanced through the province to the marshes of the Danube on its northern border. Falkenhayn, in the meantime, had begun his invasion of Rumania from the north just as soon as he was assured that this front had been greatly weakened by the withdrawal of the divisions sent to Dobrudja. Hardly was he on Rumanian soil than the Bulgars and Germans crossed the Danube on the southern Rumanian border and, cutting in behind the Rumanian forces who were defending the Transylvanian frontier, marched to meet him.

THE TEUTON PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

The Teuton plan then became clear. It was to cut off the entire western half of Rumania, thus splitting the Rumanian Army, and then, turning east, to have Falkenhayn and Mackensen join hands. Mackensen, having obtained possession of the bridge over the Danube at Cernavoda, had ready access from Dobrudja to the west. The Rumanians, trusting too far to the representations of Stürmer, were totally unprepared for this latest move and the Teuton plan was carried through without mishap. A large force of Rumanians



Balkan Frontiers, 1913-1915

Showing the new national boundaries made effective by the Treaty of Bucharest, when Turkey surrendered her grip on the Balkan states.


were cut off and forced to surrender, while the main army began its retreat towards Bucharest. The pause that came before Bucharest was evacuated was but momentary, and, after severe fighting, the Rumanians fell back behind the Sereth, abandoning to the Germans all of the wealth of the rich Wallachian plain. From this position the Germans were unable to drive them. Winter came on and with the first snow, the fighting was brought to a close.

Before the Rumanians declared war, the

and forced him to regroup his army to meet the onslaught. This paralyzed his offensive measures and forced him to remain idle while Rumania was being crucified.

DIRE RESULTS OF RUMANIA'S DEFEAT

The fall of Rumania was a heavy blow to the Allies. They had counted heavily on Rumania being able to deliver a crushing blow to the Austrian right flank as soon as Russia was able to resume the offensive. They had



The Rumanian Royal Palace, Bucharest, Facing the Austrian Frontier

French, with full realization of the predicament they were in and completely unable to force Russia to withdraw her ultimatum, promised to conduct on the Salonika front an offensive simultaneous with that of the Rumanians. This, it was expected, would draw to Salonika so many Bulgarian troops as to prevent the Bulgars from sending more than a few divisions to the Danube. Greece, however, was filled with pro-Germans, some of whom, learning of the preparations of General Sarrail, the French commander at Salonika, promptly made known his plans to the Bulgarians. The latter, therefore, as a defensive measure, struck Sarrail's front on both flanks

thought, too, that Rumania would be of invaluable assistance in assisting the Salonika operations by striking at the rear of the Bulgarian forces and cutting their line of communications from both Belgrade and Sofia. They did not, in spite of Russia's ultimatum, appreciate the treachery of the Czar's government; probably the greatest blow in the east was this crumbling of all their plans for the control of the Balkans.

Nor did Germany obtain the results from her success that she had hoped. The oil wells which she needed so badly were set on fire in the retreat and a great deal of the grain which Rumania had stored was similarly de-

stroyed. She did gain, however, much-needed prestige and encouragement at home which counteracted the depression caused by her losses on the Somme and Russia's victorious

sweep in Galicia. She also obtained a certain freedom of action which was denied her as long as Rumania's ultimate action remained in doubt.

XII—THE PROBLEM OF 1918

Germany's Desperate Need to Win a Decisive Victory—Why She Chose the Picardy Front for Forcing the Supreme Decision

IN attempting to present a complete picture of the large elements of the strategy of the last year of the war, it is necessary to consider a great many different factors that played an important rôle in influencing the decisions both of the Germans and of the Allies. The German decision to attack rested largely on the situation in Russia and on the extent of America's preparation.

The defection of Russia from the Allies, the surrender of the Bolshevik government to Germany through the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, vastly improved Germany's strategic position. For the first time since the war broke out, she was able to concentrate her strength on a single front—the West—with an excellent system of railways behind her. There was no longer the necessity of a large German army to hold the Russians back in the Pripet Marshes. A police army was, of course, necessary. To have denuded the Russian front of troops was entirely too dangerous a proceeding to attempt. German treachery at Brest-Litovsk had left behind bitter resentment, dissatisfaction and a desire to burst the bonds that German voraciousness had welded. Though relatively impotent, the Russians were really in a state of transition, and therefore were unstable, mentally unsettled. They were completely dissatisfied with Germany's interpretation of the Brest-Litovsk agreement. The fires which Germany had kindled she could not extinguish, but was compelled to leave smouldering, with the constant threat that, without warning, they would break out into a consuming conflagration. Of this, there was no immediate danger, it was true; but Germany did not dare gamble with time. Within a year Russian dissatisfaction and un-

rest might crystallize the anti-German sentiment and draw together the various elements in a union against the common foe. This would again pin down, on the Eastern front, many German divisions and permit Allied concentrations in the West against a German army still hopelessly divided. This situation, out of which any development was possible, demanded action before Russia could again be welded together.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY'S FLIGHT

Very serious, too, was the internal situation in both Austria-Hungary and Germany. Austria-Hungary was torn by internal dissension; revolution was at her door. The many races of which this polyglot empire was composed were restless, muttering audibly for independence. How long she could be held in line the Germans could not tell. They only knew that she was badly weakened and still weakening. The following letter from the Austrian King to his brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma, written early in March, 1917, reveals the desperate character of the situation most eloquently:

"My dear Sixtus: The end of the third year of this war, which has brought so much mourning and grief into the world, approaches. All the peoples of my empire are more closely united than ever in the common determination to safeguard the integrity of the monarchy at the cost of even the heaviest sacrifices.

"Thanks to their union, with the generous coöperation of all nationalities, my empire and monarchy have succeeded in resisting the gravest assaults for nearly three years. Nobody can question the military advantages secured by my troops, particularly in the Balkans.


"France, on her side, has shown force, re-

sistance, and dashing courage which are magnificent. We all unreservedly admire the admirable bravery, which is traditional to her army, and the spirit of sacrifice of the entire French people.

"Therefore, it is a special pleasure to me to note that, although for the moment adversaries, no real divergence of views or aspirations separates many of my empire from France, and

"Belgium should be entirely reëstablished in her sovereignty, retaining entirely her African possessions without prejudice to the compensations she should receive for the losses she has undergone.

"Serbia should be reëstablished in her sovereignty, and, as a pledge of our good will, we are ready to assure her equitable natural access to the Adriatic, and also wide economic con-



The Western Front, March, 1918

The entire stretch of the fighting lines from the Channel to the Swiss border. The dotted line shows the extreme limit of the German advance in 1914. The solid line shows the front in March, 1918. Note the network of railways in support of the German lines in northern France and Belgium.

that I am justified in hoping that my keen sympathy for France, joined to that which prevails in the whole monarchy, will forever avoid a return of the state of war for which no responsibility can fall on me.

"With this in mind, and to show in a definite manner the reality of these feelings, I beg you to convey privately and unofficially to President Poincaré that I will support by every means, and by exerting all my personal influence with my allies, France's just claims regarding Alsace-Lorraine.

cessions in Austria-Hungary. On her side, we will demand, as primordial and essential conditions, that Serbia cease in the future all relations with and suppress every association or group whose political object aims at the disintegration of the monarchy, particularly the Serbian political society, Narodni Ochrana; that Serbia, loyally and by every means in her power, prevent any kind of political agitation, either in Serbia or beyond her frontiers, in the foregoing direction, and give assurances thereof under the guarantee of the Entente Powers.

"The events in Russia compel me to reserve my ideas with regard to that country until a legal definite government is established there.

"Having thus laid my ideas clearly before you, I would ask you in turn, after consulting with these two powers, to lay before me the opinion first of France and England, with a view, thus, to preparing the ground for an understanding, on the basis of which official preliminary negotiations could be taken up and reach a result satisfactory to all.

"Hoping that thus we shall soon be able together to put a limit to the sufferings of so many millions of men and families now plunged in sadness and anxiety, I beg to assure you of my warmest and most brotherly affection.

"CHARLES."

This letter shows the complete need of Austria for peace. It shows also that Germany must have had some doubt of the loyalty of her ally, and German knowledge that conditions were such that Austria would welcome a separate peace rather than no peace at all, regardless of what sacrifices were made to obtain it. Subsequent events have shown that Austria's need for peace was more political than military; that the Empire, tottering on its base, was about to collapse.

GERMANY FORCED TO STRIKE

With Germany the situation was not as bad as in Austria but was still far from satisfactory. The German people, one with their government as long as they were winning, in whose eyes the only crime was that of defeat, were commencing to mutter openly at the failure to produce victories. The Allied blockade, which for more than a year had been most rigid and entirely effective, was producing a telling effect on the morale of the non-combatants. The military leaders, who had promised so much and had given so little, were rapidly losing caste. Nothing could satisfy but a victory.

Aside from internal and political considerations there were also powerful military influences at work. Germany could not continue to rest on the defensive and hope to avert defeat. It is an elemental military fact that a war cannot be won by defensive measures alone any more than strategy can obtain victory unless the tactics are such as to make it possible to seize the advantage which strategy has produced. The necessity for offensive ac-

tion was therefore absolute if Germany was to win.

Germany was, in the middle of March, 1918, at the height of her man-power on the Western front. She had in the field early in January of that year, in all theaters of war, 230 divisions of troops, of which 175 were in France, 51 in Russia and 4 in Italy. As rapidly as possible, however, she was sending troops from Russia to France. In some cases complete divisions were transported. In others inferior divisions were carefully gone over,



Emperor Karl

Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary before the dissolution of Austria-Hungary.


the best men drawn out, and, from these, new divisions were formed, and these, too, were moved westward. The net result was that, on March 20th the Germans had on the front in France 206 divisions of about 12,000 men each, a total strength of, approximately, 2,500,000 men. In addition to this, there was a new class to be called, the class of 1920, numbering, according to a statement of Lloyd George before the British Parliament, 550,000 men. In addition to removing the men from the Russian front, a great mass of artillery and supplies was also sent westward, so that Germany had mobilized on the Western front the maximum of both men and sup-

plies of which she was capable. This was her stake with which she proposed to make the great gamble. World-power or downfall was indeed to follow.

While Germany was thus at the point of greatest strength, the Allies were far from being in such a favorable condition. America, who stepped into the war just in time to take Russia's place, remained impotent. She had

men across the Atlantic, who, in accumulating numbers, would be certain to swing the balance against Germany. They were not there, however, in March, 1918, and Germany, if she ever proposed to attack, had to do so before they arrived.

The Allied strength was, then, less than that of Germany, the combined force being not more than 2,000,000 men. Germany had,



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
On the Champagne Front

A French gun that helped to check the German drive on Paris in June, 1918.

but few men in France and but little military equipment of any kind. She was still unable to put in the field numbers in any way commensurate with the necessities. But America was steadily gathering impetus as she went. She was, except for food and money, a negligible factor in 1917. With the same exception, she would probably be similarly negligible in 1918. In 1919, however, it was certain that she would begin the mobilization in France of her full resources. Even in 1918 there was certain to be a steady stream of fresh, eager

moreover, the advantage of initiative, an advantage which would enable her to select the front of attack and mass along that front. After all, it is not superior numbers that bring victory. It is the ability so to manipulate numbers that there is always a superior force at the point of contact. This is the crux of all strategy. The ability to do this, the opportunity to do it, comes with initiative.

The Allies had no intention of attacking. Time was on their side; they could afford to wait. This the Germans fully realized and



The Situation on the Eastern Front in 1918

Showing Germany's hold on the Russian frontier and the growing opposition to her on the part of the Russian peoples.

they could, therefore, take advantage of it. They felt, therefore, perfectly free to go forward with their own plans, without any fear of a counter-move on the part of their enemy.

THE CHOICE BEFORE GERMANY

The Germans having decided upon an offense, determined on a gigantic attack in a final effort to achieve complete victory. The next consideration was where should the attack be made. The Allies knew it was coming. They knew, too, with approximate exactness, when it would come. But where they did not know. The Germans had three choices of front, success in any one of which would have brought enormous results: Verdun, Champagne, and Picardy.

At Verdun, however, the Germans were in the same position they were in February, 1916, when they began the second battle of Verdun. The French, by a series of widely-separated attacks, had regained all of the

ground that had been lost in the terrific four months' battle. They held the dominating hills from which they could only be driven through heavy fighting. Verdun held a tradition of disaster for the Germans and of undying glory for the French. Psychologically and from a military point of view, therefore, Verdun was not the logical point of attack.


The Champagne—between the Argonne Forest and Reims—was much more attractive. This front had been inactive for nearly three years. The ground was passable, not plowed up nor pitted with craters by shell fire. If the French line could really be broken, the Germans would penetrate at least as far as the Paris-Châlons railroad, the main life-line of the Verdun front, cut this, and isolate the forces east of the break.

But the disaster would even be greater than this. Roughly speaking, the battle line from the Swiss frontier to Reims was a right angle, the apex being at Verdun. If the western leg of this angle could be beaten back a period

would be reached when it would be doubled against the other leg. The result would be that Verdun would be pinched and the line along the Vosges frontier cut off from Paris.

There would, however, be this disadvantage. In case matters reached the point where the German advance threatened to isolate the line along the Vosges, the French could reconstruct another line pivoting on the moun-

A war is not won as long as the enemy's forces remain in the field intact, capable of organized resistance, and with a potential ability to take an aggressive attitude. While, therefore, a successful attack in the Champagne might have resulted in the acquisition of many additional square miles of French territory, it would have destroyed neither the French nor the British army, and the war,



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Saving the Art Treasures of Amiens

During the German offensive, British soldiers were detailed to remove old masterpieces and other valuables from the museums and churches of the city.

tain of Reims and extending north and south from this point. Such a line would yield to the Germans a vast stretch of French territory. But the French line would still stretch out before Paris, guarding it from German hands. It had long since been demonstrated that the capture of territory, no matter how great the area might be, did not necessarily bring victory.

The object of war is to destroy armies, not to gain territory except in so far as that territory contributes to the enemy's destruction.

after a period of movement, would settle back into a war of the trenches, into a war of stagnant immobility. This would be a step back to the Fall of 1914 and would bring Germany no nearer victory than she was then.

On the contrary, such a prolongation of the war would insure her defeat. For time was with the Allies. To win, therefore, Germany had to destroy stationary warfare, restore a war of movement, and, through great ability in the open, outgeneral the Allies and achieve victory.

THE PICARDY FRONT

The fronts at Verdun and in the Champagne having been discarded, there remained but that of Picardy. This front, at the outset, has very material advantages over the Champagne in the matter of communications. This is readily understood when we realize what course is followed by supplies in their flow to the battle front. From great shipping or supply centers at home, supplies go over lines radiating from these centers back of the battle front. These lines then come up perpendicular to the battle front. From these secondary or field bases, the supplies have to be distributed over the battle front. This demands that these field bases be railroad centers from which the roads run parallel to the fighting front.

In the Champagne these conditions are not found. There is a single road paralleling the front, running from Challerange to Bazancourt. But, between these points that road touches no center of supplies nor is it tapped by any other road coming down from the north. This section of the front leaves much to be desired, then, in the matter of communications.

On the Picardy front, there was quite the reverse situation. There was, behind the German lines, an excellent chain of large field bases, beginning well to the north at Lille, and extending through Douai, Cambrai and St. Quentin. Each of these in turn was reached by one or more roads coming in from the east, all of which led directly or indirectly to one of the greater supply points in Germany. This chain of bases was linked together by a railroad system which paralleled this entire part of the battle front making the distribution of supplies a simple matter. Such an attack as that which Germany was compelled to launch in order to win would demand a great and constant flow of ammunition and, therefore, place a great burden on all types of transport. For such duty this railroad system, with its many ramifications, was admirably adapted.

In attacking on the British front in Picardy a further advantage was to be had. The bulk of the French army had been trained before the war in open warfare. Not only had

France always maintained a large army but this army was annually mobilized for the purpose of maneuvers. It, therefore, was more or less skilled in open fighting and its leaders were experienced in war of this type. The same held true of the Germans.

The British, on the other hand, had had no training in open warfare. The men in the trenches knew nothing but trenches. They had come into the army when the war was a stagnant affair; they had never seen anything else. As the Germans proposed to carry the war out of the trenches, they would thus possess the great advantage of superior training and a consequent superior knowledge of the special tactics that were to be pursued.

Behind the British lines, moreover, there were points vital to both the British and the French Armies. The first of these was Amiens, through which passed the great railroad systems from Calais, Boulogne and Abbeville, binding together the British north of the Somme River and the French to the south. If Amiens could be taken not only would this connection be ruptured but, as all of the supplies shipped from England were landed at one of these points, distribution would be made impossible as *all* of the north and south lines pass through Amiens. Behind Amiens lay the sea which, if Germany could reach it, would physically separate the Allied forces and, through the interposition of the German army between, prevent all contact or communication between them.

The situation would then be entirely in Germany's hands. Having split the Allied Army, she could destroy the wings in detail. Against either wing, depending on her own choice, she could place a holding force and concentrate all of her efforts against the other. Unlike the situation in the Champagne, there could be no change of front; the farther Germany pushed through, the farther the British would have to fall back, the nearer they would approach total disaster.

The Picardy front, then, was the only one where success would mean a true military decision; the only front that offered the promise of the destruction of an army.

It was on this front, then, that Germany decided to make her gamble for complete victory.

XIII—GERMANY'S LAST OFFENSIVE

The First Two Phases: the Attack of March 21, 1918, about St. Quentin and the Break-through at Armentières in April, 1918.

HAVING decided to attack the British front, the Germans formulated their strategic plan. It involved a double attack, one at the junction of the British and French at La Fère on the Oise River, northward to St. Quentin; the other against the salient at Cambrai which was left as the net result of the British offensive of the preceding November (1917). The object of the first was to split the British and French and throw in between them a separating wedge of German troops. The point of juncture of two armies under independent commands is almost invariably a point of weakness by virtue of the lack of unity of control. Add to this circumstance the additional feature of the two armies speaking a different language and the certainty becomes absolute. It was expected that on the front attacked the British line would be completely ruptured and that the Germans would pour through the breach. Were the Cambrai salient allowed to remain, the right flank of the assailing army would be exposed to attack. A sudden blow against this flank might well destroy the entire movement. To prevent this was the object of the subsidiary attack.

The objective of the German offensive was first Amiens and then Abbeville at the mouth of the Somme. The advance was to follow generally the line of the Somme, flanking the British positions at Arras and Vimy Ridge as well as completely turning the French positions in the south. Pushing along the Somme to the sea, the Germans, with the Allies hopelessly separated, would be able to defeat them in detail.

On March 21st, 1918, the German attacks were delivered. Everything happened as had been planned. The British line was first bent, then broken, and the Germans poured through the gap. Taken in front and flank, the British in the Cambrai salient had to fall back to pre-

serve contact and soon the entire British line south of Arras was in retreat. So sudden was the blow, so unexpected the break, that the French south of the Oise were unable to maintain their liaison with the British at all. The result was a gap, at one period eighteen miles wide, between the two armies. In spite of their careful preparation and training for this one thing, however, the Germans did not take advantage of the situation. There are but two possible reasons for this failure to seize the golden moment. They had either become too demoralized, too out of hand through the rapidity of their own advance, or the German leaders sensed a trap and were afraid to put their heads into it until they had explored it. The delay was fatal. Before they could collect themselves several French divisions had been hurried to the scene and the gap was closed. The Germans pressed on, however, though with increasing difficulty. They were finally brought to a definite halt at the Ancre and the Avre. This ended the first phase of the great German attack.

REASONS FOR THE DISASTER

Before analyzing the second phase we may well look at the reasons for this disaster to the British Army. The key was given in a speech by Lloyd George in an address before Parliament on May 9th, 1918. The Fifth British Army, which in the beginning of this battle was commanded by General Gough, had held the front over which the Germans had broken through. But a short time before the right of this army had extended only as far south as St. Quentin, this being the point where the French line joined. The French commander, General Pétain, however, wanted the British to extend this front. They held, he pointed out, but 100 miles of front, while the French held 336. Moreover, the French




General Sir Henry Wilson

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Successor to Gen. Sir William Robertson as Chief of the British General Staff early in 1918.

needed as many of the Army as possible for agricultural purposes. Marshal Haig yielded to the French, and General Gough, though given no additional men, took over the line as far south as La Fère, relieving the French who were withdrawn. This decision was made previous to the meeting of the military

that the German concentration here was heavier than on any other section of the entire line from Switzerland to the sea. All during the months of January, February and March, the British Intelligence Service was reporting still heavier concentrations, the information given being most complete and accurate.




The German Offensive of 1918

Showing the three salients created by the German advance and held by them until Foch launched his furious counter-offensives beginning July 18th west of Soissons

staff of the Versailles Conference (the Allies' permanent war council) in the early part of February, 1918.

That such a decision was reached at all is most surprising; that it was not revoked before March 21st would be almost unbelievable had we not the word of the British Premier that it was not. The German reaction at Cambrai, in November, showed that this section of the front was most heavily manned,

Not only that, the coming German attack was foreseen in January in full detail by Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the British Staff, as was proved by Lloyd George himself. On April 9th, the British Premier stated before Parliament: "This problem was considered very closely by the Military Staff at Versailles, and I think it right, in justice to them, to point out that, after a very close study of the German position and of the probabilities



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Carrying the War Underground

French sappers digging a tunnel preparatory to exploding a mine under German trenches.

of the case, they came to the conclusion, and they stated their conclusions to the military representatives and to the ministers in the month of January or the beginning of February, that the attack would come south of Arras; that it would be an attack on the widest front ever yet assailed; that the Germans would accumulate ninety-five divisions for the purpose of making that attack; that they would throw the whole of their resources and their strength into breaking the British line at that point and that their objective would be the capture of Amiens and the severance of the British and French forces.

"That was the conclusion which Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial Staff, came to, and which was submitted at that time, two or three months ago, and I think that it was one of the most remarkable forecasts of enemy intentions ever made. As a matter of fact, the attack was made, I think, by about ninety-seven divisions; it was an attack on the widest front that had ever been engaged. The object undoubtedly was the capture of Amiens and the severance of the British and French forces. So that, almost in every detail, that very remarkable forecast has been verified in the event.

"Another remarkable prediction was that it might probably succeed in penetrating the British line to the extent of half the distance of the front attacked."

Thus the British were forewarned. That they were not forearmed was due to the fact that the majority of their generals did not believe that the Germans would attack at all. It was a strange conclusion, strangely reached, and was almost ruinously inaccurate. In their retreat, the British Army had pivoted on a point south of Arras. This point was the hinge which the German attack had struck at in passing, though with no concentrated effort, but had not broken. But as matters had turned out, the possession of this hinge was to mean success or defeat.

FLANKS FIRMLY HELD AGAINST GERMANS

As the Germans approached the latter stages of the first phase of this great battle they found that the two flanks of the new salient they had created were holding fast, the British on the north and the French on

the south, maintaining a stiff and impenetrable defense. In the center, and down the Somme, the German advance continued slowly. As the wedge deepened it was gradually drawing to a point so that the ultimate situation would be that the German lines would form an acute angle which it would be necessary to push forward.

The offensive difficulties here were very great. A narrow front upon which has been imposed limitations which restrict its extension is almost impregnable, where the opposing forces are even approximately equal. No matter how many men a commander may have available he cannot use more than a certain number per mile of line. To attempt to do so would only cause congestion and involve unnecessary casualties. Therefore, in order that Germany might make use of the men she was prepared to throw into the caldron, it became necessary to widen the possible front of attack which continued until, along the Avre, it had become but little more than a point.

Again, under such conditions we must consider the question of supplies. Transportation is naturally a vital problem. In an offensive on a grand scale the volume of material which must be sent up to the artillery positions and beyond to the battle line itself is enormous. In order that the flow may be kept continuous, there must be a number of parallel lines of approach. The more restricted the front is the smaller the number of such avenues. Those that there are rapidly become congested so that movement is soon impossible. Add to this the destructive effect of artillery fire converging from three sides, and the necessity for widening the front and thus removing these restrictions becomes apparent.

The key to the situation lay in the hinge which has been mentioned—the Arras defenses. The principal features of these defenses are found in the Heights of Notre Dame de Lorette and in Vimy Ridge, the latter a high space near the village of Vimy which commands the ground to the south as well as to the east and was in itself a bastion of great strength. It was necessary, therefore, that, in order to continue the fight for Amiens, this position be taken. The German efforts to do this constitute the second phase of the battle of Picardy.

GERMAN ATTACK AT ARMENTIÈRES

The first attempt was a hammer and tongs frontal attack which was beaten back. Then came a period of rest during which the Germans prepared another thorough attack. The plan on this occasion was to break the line at Armentières, where the British and the Portuguese Armies joined, cut in behind both Vimy Ridge and the Heights of Notre Dame de Lorette, and then turn south to flank both positions and straighten out the line to the Somme and the Avre. Once more all went according to German plans; the defensive line broke between Armentières and the La Bassée Canal, and again the Germans poured through the gap into the back areas.

Here, however, the Germans did a most unusual, and it proved, a most unwarranted thing: they changed objectives in the middle of the engagement. Position after position having been uncovered through the breach in the line, the vision of the northern Channel ports dawned brightly on the German horizon. It seemed for the moment that the Germans had but to hold out their hands and Calais would be in their grasp. They, therefore, did not turn south to cut in behind the Arras defenses as they had intended, but, throwing in reinforcements, endeavored to beat their way to the sea before the gap could be closed. It was a fatal change of objective. The grand vision was turned into a mirage.

On the eastern edge of the Forest of Nieppe the Germans were halted in their advance. They were thus caught in a narrow trapezoid, one side of which was the high ground south and southwest of Ypres, another the very considerable Forest of Nieppe, while the third was the La Bassée Canal. The territory enclosed, which is the territory the Germans occupied and through which all of their transportation had to pass, was a low-lying plain, every point of which was subject to the direct observation of the Allies and subject to artillery fire from at least two directions. It was while in this position that extremely heavy losses and an ever-increasing defense forced the Germans to give up the fight. This ended the second phase of the great battle.

The events of the first two phases of the battle for world-domination had a pronounced effect on the remainder of the German cam-

paign. The more important elements in these first efforts may, therefore, be reviewed in relation to what followed.

The Germans had begun this attack in March with 204 or 205 divisions on the Western front with which they were prepared to take the supreme gamble. By the end of April, they had engaged 103 of these divisions, 79 against the British and 24 against the French, the remainder having been used against the British and French together.

These divisions had suffered heavily. On the opening days of the fighting, the German losses were not so heavy; but in the closing week of the first phase and all during the second phase of the fighting their losses were highly disproportionate both to the results achieved and, what was more important, to the losses of the Allies.

This is shown clearly in the statement of General Maurice, Director of War Operations in the British War Office, made in the latter part of April. "Of the German divisions which the British engaged," said General Maurice, "twenty-eight have been fought twice. Of the German divisions which the French and British engaged together, fifteen have been fought twice and one thrice." This statement shows how roughly the Germans were handled where the fighting was heaviest; that is, against the British. Some idea of the German losses can be gathered from the fact that, under the circumstances of the attack, a division was usually allowed to remain in action until its losses were 30 per cent. of its strength. The Germans were therefore very much weakened and were in a position where further efforts would be anticipated by the Allies with almost complete certainty that they would be made and that these efforts would have to be made with reduced forces.

The most important event which these battles produced, however, was the unification of the Allied command. This was done actually on the battlefield but was officially confirmed in the following laconic announcement:

"The British Government and the French Government have agreed to give General Foch the title of Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies operating in France."

This was the most important decision of the war and its full effect was felt in the succeeding days of battle.

XIV—LAST GERMAN ATTACKS

Foch's Brilliant Strategy in Allowing the Germans to Stretch to the Marne the Salient Made by Their Attack on Chemin des Dames

AT the conclusion of the fighting in Flanders, the Germans found themselves in an uncomfortable position. They had, in a sense, lost all of the value of the initiative which they possessed in the latter days of March, 1918. Whether they desired to or not, they were forced to attack or acknowledge themselves defeated and wait until the rapidly arriving forces of America gave the Allies a sufficient preponderance in numbers to crush them.

This they could not do. They had to go on. Nor could they alter their first objective. They did not have sufficient reserves to make a new start. Moreover, as has been shown, no other section of the front offered them a chance of victory. They were, therefore, deprived both of the power to decide whether to take the offensive or not, and to decide where the offensive should take place. When they moved to attack it would have to be on a front directly connected with Amiens and the march to the sea. They could not go forward because of the narrow angle through which they would have to work. They had tried to widen this angle through an attack in the north and had failed. There remained but the alternative of an attack in the south, to widen it from that quarter. The Allies followed this reasoning closely and were, therefore, prepared for the next move.

The problem which General Foch, now Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces, found himself confronted with, was still defensive. He knew that the Germans would have to attack again and it was entirely satisfactory to him that they should attack. He did not have the reserves up to this time to take the offensive himself. His plan was, therefore, to let the Germans attack, force them to throw the maximum number of men into the attack and at the same time to husband his strength so that when the time came

to reverse the program and take the offensive, he would have a positive superiority in manpower. The rest of the fighting was, therefore, a battle of reserves.

MORE GERMAN THRUSTS


The first move made by the Germans was a heavy attack against the French lines in the valley of the Matz River. This stream empties into the Oise at the northwest corner of the large Forest of Compiègne, just north of the city of that name. The German object was to gain the mouth of the Matz, cutting well behind the Compiègne Forest, and thus force a complete realignment of the French positions both north and east. The result would be the desired widening of the angle at Amiens and the flanking of the French line east of the Oise and along the heights of the Chemin des Dames. But just such a move had been thoroughly discounted by having been foreseen. The Germans met with the most stubborn resistance from the outset and, although they gained somewhat, the net results were entirely negative except for the casualty lists that were piled up. It was attrition on a vast scale, on a scale much more vast than any one had dreamed of. It suited General Foch's scheme exactly.

The failure here again put the onus on the Germans to select a more vulnerable spot for another effort. As can readily be seen from what has been said of the object of the offensive in the Matz Valley, the crux of a southern extension of the Amiens salient is found in the Forest of Compiègne. Added to this is the Forest of Villers-Cotterets to the southeast, but the main barrier is the Compiègne woods. These the Germans had to take in order to accomplish their object. In these woods, then, is found the key to the next German attack.

This attack, delivered in the latter days of May, was primarily against the French front north of the Aisne, where it ran along the Chemin des Dames overlooking the Ailette Valley. It was delivered in very much the same manner as was the original attack of the preceding March.

The French lines were thin, the German concentration exceedingly heavy. The result was that a break occurred, the French were

than the Allied commander decided to make his stand at the Marne, nearly thirty miles away. It meant that a great additional belt of French territory would be overrun. It meant too that there would be a degree of uneasiness if not of panic in the Allied countries at the apparent inability to hold the Germans in check. But it must be recognized that the territory between the Vesle and the Marne has but little if any military value.



© Brown Bros.

The Ruin of a French Manufacturing Plant

pushed not only off the Chemin des Dames but across the Aisne River. The Germans soon forced the crossing, the French not being able to hurry reserves sufficiently quickly to meet the new thrust, and continued their advance south of the river. At the Vesle some effort was made to check the rush but it proved unavailing. The Germans were present in too great force.

At this juncture, Foch gave evidence of the great courage and brilliancy which formed the basis of his appointment as Commander-in-Chief. Hardly had the Vesle been crossed

There is not a single position there of definite strength. It was, therefore, idle to waste men to try to hold it, especially as Foch's object was to hold his men back and force the Germans to use theirs until he was ready to react. By withdrawing to the Marne, Foch placed between his center and that of the Germans a formidable military obstacle—the Marne River, deep, and with high banks—which could be readily defended and which could be considered safe, thus giving him an opportunity to maneuver elsewhere.

It must be remembered, too, that the Ger-

man objective was not Paris. It is to be gravely doubted whether the German General Staff ever considered going as far south as the Marne. The objective was to widen the Amiens salient so that their original plan of campaign could be followed through. By drawing them on to the Marne, therefore, Foch drew them away from this objective and forced them, with a diminished force, to great-

Led on by the lack of resistance, the Germans followed the retreating French to the river, and only when they found themselves checked by this barrier did they attempt to return to their original plan. This took the form of an effort to widen this new salient by an attack against the western side. But Foch had fortified this side too strongly. A division of American troops had been placed



Exploring Captured Ground on the Chemin des Dames

This was a famous battleground from the beginning of the World War.

ly lengthen their lines, weakening their striking power at any other point.

This is shown by what happened after the Vesle River was crossed. There was no fighting between the Vesle and the Marne. The German advance each day was a good day's march for infantry under the most favorable marching conditions, showing that there was no resistance. But, as Foch withdrew his center to the Marne, he banked the sides of the rapidly-forming salient, particularly the western side. The wisdom of this was shown in the fighting after the Marne was reached.

in the line near Château-Thierry and Belleau Wood, and the French line from the American left to Villers-Cotteret had been heavily reinforced. The Germans were, therefore, beaten back in every attempt to push westward; in fact they even lost to an American counter-attack some of the ground they held. Thus the last great attempt to win the war and the war was defeated.


GERMAN HOPES KILLED

It was at this point that the Germans realized their defeat. They had held hope

up to this juncture that a victory was possible. But the element of time had been working rapidly against them. The American forces had been pouring overseas to build up the reserves Foch needed. After each attack the Germans had permitted, from necessity, great lapses of time while they summoned their waning resources for the new blow. This

ment they attempted it they became hopelessly confused, and much of their machinery failed to function.

Theirs was the opportunity, in the first attack, to drive through the breach they had made between the British and the French and reach their objective. But the attack was planned on a definite time schedule. At a cer-



The Marne Salient, 1918

Showing the dangerous pocket in which the Germans found themselves as a result of Foch's strategic retreat, with the flanks firmly held at Soissons and Reims. The shaded area near Château-Thierry indicates the scene of the Marines' victory in Belleau Wood.

time proved to be all that was needed for the German defeat.

The German plan by which the Allies were to be beaten was sound and was based on a careful consideration of all possible contingencies save one. The Germans did not consider their own lack of mental elasticity, their own peculiar quality which makes it impossible for them to depart from a plan previously mapped out in order to make the utmost of unexpected conditions. The mo-

tain time a given place was to be occupied and at that time, based on such occupation, certain other things were to be done. If, however, that place was reached before or after the schedule, the machinery broke down. This is a peculiar psychological condition which belongs to the German mind, a condition which made its appearance many times during the period of the war. But at no other period did this rigidity of mind and of plan bear such disastrous results.

Great Britain, by her occupation of Bagdad and the Valley of Mesopotamia in the early part of 1917, obtained control over the Mesopotamia Valley, with an estimated area of 143,000 square miles and a population of 2,000,000, and by her occupation of Jerusalem obtained control of Palestine, with an area of about 16,000 square miles and a population of approximately 500,000.

XV—THE LAST CAMPAIGN

Foch's Strategy Aimed Not at Driving German Armies from France But at Destroying Them—Capture of Sedan—The Armistice Signed

THE check along the Marne in the early days of June definitely decided the battle of Picardy. It was the final step. With that check Germany realized that her last chance of victory had passed.

There was still, however, an opportunity to avoid a disastrous defeat. That chance was found in the possibility of inflicting another local defeat on the French so that public opinion in the Allied countries would be affected to the point where a peace proposal would find strong adherents. The plan by which this was to be accomplished was, in brief, to strike on both sides of Reims, one army pressing across the Marne and extending eastward, while a second struck the French east of Reims and moved south. If these movements were successful, Reims would have to be evacuated, the Montagne de Reims, a huge forest on high ground to the south, would be turned, and the German lines would extend along the Marne from Chateau-Thierry to Châlons. This would immediately expose the left flank of the army in the Champagne and would force it to retreat, pivoting on Verdun. It would bring into German control another large French area and impress the pacifist socialist element in France, which had been steadily increasing in numbers, with the advisability of making peace. Thus, instead of losing the war, Germany might be able to end matters by a compromise.

After long preparation, these attacks were delivered in the middle of July. Along the Marne the first rush brought the Germans across the river, where they maintained a slight advance without, however, being able to extend their lines more than a few kilometers on the south bank. Here they were held, in spite of terrific efforts to fight their way south and east behind Rheims.

East of Reims they met with a disastrous check from the very outset. Having been ad-

vised of the plan which was under way by German prisoners, the French were waiting for just what occurred. The result was a costly German defeat. General Foch, in the meantime, had been making his plans, and while the Germans were heavily engaged in the south and east, he suddenly delivered the counter-blow for which the world had been waiting.

FOCH'S ADMIRABLE STRATEGY

The strategy of the Allied Commander-in-Chief can best be understood through a study of the man himself and his own theories of war, of which theories, fortunately, he has provided us with knowledge in his own book, the *Principles of War*. Foch, in the first place, did not recognize the existence of such a thing as a strategic victory. The only victory he knew was a tactical victory, a victory gained through battle.

"Modern war," he said, "knows only one argument, the tactical fact, the battle, for which it requires all the forces, relying on strategy to bring them there, and engaging all these forces with tactical impulsion to arrive to shock. A worthy opponent is not put to flight by any cleverly chosen direction. He is not nailed down any more than a paper roof would prevent rain and cold from entering a house."

"If you wish your opponent to withdraw, beat him, otherwise, nothing is accomplished; and there is only one means to that end, the battle."

These quotations illustrate one central fact in war. The object of war is the destruction of armies. Territory may give you an advantage of position, it may cause the enemy to retreat. All this, however, is useless unless it is followed up by action of a character to destroy, disperse or capture the army of your

opponent. As long as that army remains in the field, a force potent in defense, intact, with its morale unbroken, no war can be truly won. Foch's plan, then, looked to battle, not to an attack here or another there because this or that line of communications was threatened.

"Modern war," he states, "in order to reach its purpose—to impose one's will on the enemy—knows of but one means: the destruction of the opponent's organized forces."

His central idea, then, was, by constant attacks, to nail the German army down and



Foch's Hammer-Blows on the Western Front

The counter-attacks, beginning in August, 1918, which crumpled up the exhausted German armies and precipitated their final retreat.

He set as his objective not a process by which he would free France and Belgium from the invader by a clever flanking move. His objective was solely and alone the German army, and this army he proposed to destroy. The only peace he could sense was a peace brought about through victory, and this meant that, as a fighting machine, the German army should cease to exist.

make it fight; to prevent it from retreating unless such retreat could be turned into disaster. He proposed to wear the Germans out. Then, when all was in readiness and he held sufficient preponderance of strength, he would deliver the *coup de grâce* which would end the war.

"In the battle in line, tactics merely consist in overcoming the hostile resistance by a slow

and progressive wear of the enemy's resources; for that purpose, the fight is kept up everywhere. It must be supported, and such is the use made of reserves."

This plan, of course, is but a bare outline of principle. But in any consideration of the war from the 18th of July to its close it must not be forgotten that everything else was subordinated to this plan. Whether or not the Germans fell back is relatively unimportant. A skilful fighter will often retreat to avoid a blow, and so escapes being hurt.

can troops, at least half-trained, were arriving in Europe at the rate of nearly 300,000 men a month. Foch knew, therefore, that he had practically an inexhaustible well from which to draw, a reservoir, in fact, from which he could repair his wastage and keep the battle going. In the course of a few months he would be able to add a half million men a month for months to come. He was free, therefore, to use up all of his reserves of British and French veterans and put the American forces in as reserves in their places until



The River Front at Château-Thierry After the German Retreat

(A sketch drawn on the spot in July, 1918.)


The only vital questions are: did the blow land? did it weaken the power of resistance to the next one? And so we must judge of the value of each of the Allies' blows against the German lines.

At the time Foch began his counter-offensive, there is considerable doubt whether, in spite of the Germans' losses incident to their own series of offensives, he had a superiority in numbers of well-trained men. But what he lacked in numbers he made up in generalship. "The art of war," said Napoleon, "consists in having always more forces than the opponent, with an army weaker than his, at the point where one attacks, or where one is attacked by him." But from the first of April, Ameri-

they were sufficiently trained to act as shock troops.

Before, however, he was free to put his theories to the test, before he dared begin the actual campaign which was to end the war, there were several preliminary moves which had to be made.

A glance at the battle lines as they were on July 18th, 1918, will show two huge salients jutting into the Allied positions. The first of these was about Amiens, where this important junction was in danger and, with it, the sea coast. The second was on the Marne about Château-Thierry, where Paris itself was threatened. In both salients the Germans were known to be in great force. This was



Drawn by Walter Hale.

Soaring Home from the Battle-Front: Marne Valley

true at Amiens because they did not dare leave this angle unguarded lest an attack against the sides should crush it in. In the second case it was true because the Germans were already concentrated there as a result of the battle which they themselves had initiated. Were Foch to mass his forces at any other points while the Germans were so strong in

these vital sectors, his attack might but serve as the signal for a heavy attack at either salient which, because of his concentrations elsewhere, he could not parry or meet. It was necessary, therefore, that, before he could begin a general attack, he must first destroy these two salients and prevent a thrust at either nerve center while he was preoccupied elsewhere.

FOCH MEETS BLOW WITH BLOW

While the Germans were preparing for their final attack, Foch himself was planning for an attack against the side of the salient which the previous battle of the Marne had left. The concentrations for this attack were made in the Forests of Compiègne and of Villers-Cotterets, where natural cover made it possible for them to be completely concealed. While the Germans were heavily involved south of the Marne in their final struggle, General Foch sprung his carefully-prepared trap on a front from the Aisne as far south as the Ourcq, on the western side of the Château-Thierry salient.

The effect was electrical and illustrated the exactness of his calculations. The German line gave way instantly, badly cracked. Full liaison was maintained between its parts but only through heavy sacrifice. Taken completely by surprise, the Germans gave ground rapidly during the first two days' fighting. Then the defense stiffened. But the damage had been done.

The Germans south of the Ourcq and on the Marne saw their danger. They saw the French lines creeping steadily across the base of the angle and promptly they began a retreat. This retreat was conducted with the utmost skill and caution. The German losses during it were by no means excessive after the first three days' fighting. But, in this case, it was the retreat which Foch desired in order that his hands might be untied and complete freedom of action given to him.

Attention was next given to the salient at Amiens. Here the main blow fell on the southern side of the angle and was delivered jointly by the British and the French. Like the attack against the Marne salient, it was a complete surprise, the German positions being penetrated for a distance of about fifteen miles in two days of fighting. In very rapid time the Germans were thrust back first to the old positions they held at the beginning of the battle of the Somme two years before, and then, by a persistent and continuously-maintained series of attacks, to the positions they occupied on March 21st, 1918, when their great gamble for victory was begun.

Foch was now absolutely free to carry out his plans and put in practice the theories that

he had been preaching for twenty years. He could not be hurt by a German counter-effort. The magnitude of his attacks had forced the Germans to concentrate every possible man against him. They could not make preparations for an attack elsewhere. They were forced to fight where and as General Foch dictated.

It was now early September. A great change had occurred in the forces under Foch's command since July. The American troops had been gradually perfecting themselves, their training was rapidly reaching the most advanced stage, at which they were ready to participate in the battle as an independent army. This was the force Foch was depending on to deliver the *coup de grâce* when the enemy should be beaten into a sufficient degree of weakness.

This force, aggregating over a million men, was being concentrated in the Argonne region between the Aisne and the Meuse. Here they had a double duty to perform. Their first task was to act as a holding force, pinning down by virtue of their numbers a considerable German strength, so that no shift of troops could take place to other parts of the line, which were under constant and heavy pressure. The second task was to attack through the Argonne and advance to Sedan.

As a preliminary move to the second step, as well as to further the first, the old salient at St. Mihiel was snuffed out. This peculiar angle in the line had existed since 1914 and was the sole relic of the attempt made at that time to encircle Verdun. It constituted a menace to an American advance along the Meuse, as it overlapped the American right flank and made a turning movement against this flank a possibility. Consequently, as a preliminary step, it was destroyed, the American forces cutting cleanly across the base of the angle and capturing or destroying most of the troops that had held it. No sooner was this menace removed, than the main attack through the Argonne Forest was put in preparation.

THE LAST PHASE

In the meantime, with the positive purpose of destroying the German army, Foch had set ablaze the entire line from Verdun to the North Sea. Fear of disaster had forced the



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
The Beautiful Town Hall in Arras

One of the first buildings in France to be destroyed by the Germans.

Germans to abandon without a fight the salient south of Ypres. The celebrated Hindenburg line had been struck and broken. South of Arras where it hinged on the old line built in 1914, the Allies had broken through these well-established defenses and were flanking the line to the north while beating down the

Allies in the south. Striking along the sea coast they drove forward, recovering, each day, miles of territory.

The Germans were fighting desperately. There was no sign of panic under the constant blows at the various parts of the line. But they were terribly weakened. Defeat was



Foch and General Mangin Inspecting Rhine Fortifications

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Field Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, and General Mangin on the German boat *Bismarck*, during their tour of the Rhine district to prepare for eventualities in case the Germans refused to sign the Peace Treaty.

resistance to an advance against the main German bases.

The strength of the German position in France depended on a series of bases strung out from north to south and connected by an admirable system of railroads. These were Roulers, Douai, Cambrai, St. Quentin, La Fère and Laon. It was against these that the forward move toward the east was directed. One after the other they fell. The Belgians in the north were just as active as were their

in their souls. Their morale was gone and Foch knew it. There was nothing hurried in their movements as they fell back from place to place. Each retreat into which they were beaten was carefully executed. But each drove the iron of defeat a little deeper and made it more and more certain that there was to be no escape. Almost as quickly as they advanced in 1914, the Germans were driven across France and Belgium, back to the Ardennes.





Perspective Map of the Western Front

Showing the Furthest German Advance (September, 1914) and the Armistice Line of November 11, 1918.





It is to be noticed, however, that they were falling back along their lines of communications, not against them: that is their line of retreat was generally parallel to these communications so that they could withdraw much of their material and keep supplied. Here was the offensive function of the American army in the Argonne. It has been stated that the objective of this army, in its drive through the Argonne, was Sedan. Sedan possessed something more than the sentimental value which attached to it by virtue of the fact that the surrender of Marshal MacMahon there in 1871 was really the decisive blow of the Franco-Prussian war. It was the most important point on the entire southern section of the battle front, influencing the entire German supply system.

Between Liège in Belgium and Verdun a huge wedge juts westward dividing the northern country from the south. This wedge is a rough maze of tangled hills, in many instances rising to the height of mountains. It is known as the Belgian and French Ardennes. From a military standpoint it is almost im-

penetrable, and no railroads of importance cross it. The Germans were dependent, then, upon those main lines which passed around the Ardennes as they came from the east, one such road skirting the northern edge, another the southern. That on the south followed the line of the river Meuse, coming from Mannheim and Metz. On this road, well in the shadow of the Ardennes, was Sedan. Once the Americans took Sedan, the Germans would be completely severed from all direct communication with their home bases and forced to rely upon the entirely inadequate, inferior and indirect lines which penetrated the Ardennes.

This was the meaning of Sedan and the reason why it was the objective of the freshest and most numerous single army in France. When it fell into American hands, while the German armies from the sea to the Aisne were being beaten almost to the point of destruction, the German end came in sight. Shortly afterwards the Germans sued for peace and the armistice which brought the war to a close was signed.

XVI—AT PAN-GERMANY'S BACK DOOR

Victory in Mesopotamia and Palestine Sealed Doom of Turkey and Bulgaria and Fanned Flames of Revolution in Austria-Hungary

THE success of General Foch's strategy in the final battles on the Western front was due, in no small part, to Allied activities in other fields. Not the least important of these were the Turkish theaters of war—Mesopotamia and Palestine.

During the period of the war there was much discussion as to the relation of these distant theaters to the front in France. This discussion gave rise to what might be termed two schools. The first, led by able military men, protested against the diversion of forces into minor theaters on the ground that it was a useless frittering away of much needed strength. The German Army was concentrated on the West, it was argued, and it was the German Army which had to be defeated. Nothing was accomplished, it was asserted,

by defeating but a small fraction—say ten per cent.—of the forces of the Germanic Alliance, while the other ninety per cent. was left in the field with its strength unimpaired. Since the object of war was to destroy the army of one's opponent, this army must be sought out and confronted with full force. A scattering of forces produced only a weak front to the main enemy without offering any corresponding advantage. Thus argued one side.

The other side, led also by able military men, held that these forces in far fields had a distinct and useful function to perform in bringing about the end of the war. They harked back to the days of Napoleon, to the days when war was being waged against coalitions. Napoleon was successful as long as he was able to break up the coalitions that were



Napoleon In His Study

From a copy made by Flocchi (1812) of David's portrait now in the Louvre. Early in the 19th Century this "Scourge of Europe" and its would-be arbiter found himself overpowered, in somewhat the same circumstances as William the Second, of Germany.

formed against him by defeating one of the component parts and forcing it into a separate peace. Being thus freed of a part of the strength against him, he swept on, defeating other units until the main enemy, finding himself deserted, was forced to sue for peace. But when such a coalition refused to be broken, when it maintained its unity and cohesion throughout, Napoleon was defeated. Therefore, they argued, Germany's weaker allies should be defeated. The war should be car-

ried to them until they were forced out of the war. Germany, then, exposed on all sides, would collapse and peace would follow.

TURKEY THE KEY TO THE EAST

This was peculiarly true in the World War, it was claimed. Turkey was the key to the Eastern situation. Turkey was also the weakest link in the Teutonic chain. If Turkey could be eliminated Russia would immediately secure an outlet through a warm sea, her

II-6

stores of food would be available to the Allied world, she would be easy to supply with ammunition and materials for war purposes. But there was a more important object still. With Turkey eliminated, the gateway into Sofia would be thrown open, Bulgaria, who expected a quick and triumphant war, finding herself open to invasion, would sue for peace, and Germany and Austria would be left alone. Austria, within the shadow of revolution for the last three years of the war, would be unable to withstand an attack from the rear, and she, too, would collapse, leaving Germany to fight the war out alone. This was the military argument of the second school.

There was, however, a political argument much more potent than the military argument. Germany looked for an expansion to the East. So her diplomacy had run, so her greatest desires were manifest. She had achieved great victories in the East. Her Moslem ally had withstood the assaults of Great Britain. She herself had almost disposed of Russia. If the war was compromised, if Germany was able to force a peace by understanding rather than a dictated peace, no combination of circumstances could prevent her from being really the victor by reason of her extensions Eastward. Not only that; even if the Allies were victorious in the West and forced Germany to make their sort of peace, her superiority in the East, demonstrated so often at the point of the sword, would create a prestige in her favor which, should she rise again, would draw the East to her.

The outcome of the war proved the argument of this second school. Its adherents never claimed, be it understood, that Germany could be beaten in the East. They knew and recognized that defeat would have to come in the West, where the great bulk of the German Army was concentrated. But they did contend that, by defeating Germany's more Eastern allies, the way would be made easy for an inevitable victory on the only front where real victory could be obtained—the front in France and Belgium. They did claim that if Germany could be driven out of the East entirely, if her hold could be completely broken in Russia, Bulgaria and Turkey, under no conceivable circumstances could Germany emerge from the war with profit except by a complete victory over the Allies.



General Sir Edmund H. H. Allenby

The Deliverer of Jerusalem entered the sacred city on December 11, 1917, four hundred years after the Turks had captured it. With the help of the Arab tribe, the Hedjaz, he eliminated Turkey from the war.

This latter point of view received very tardy acceptance by the Allies. Indeed it was not until the fall of 1916 that it was accepted. It was then that the Allied General Staff in Europe decided on a combined campaign against Turkey. It was useless to attack Bul-

manent trenches and the mobility that strategic demands was entirely possible.

PALESTINE AND MESOPOTAMIA CHOSEN

Accordingly it was decided that the Turks should be attacked in Palestine by the British under General Allenby and in Mesopotamia, following the general line of the Tigris, by the British under the command of General Maude. These two widely separated campaigns give, at first blush, the appearance of being entirely independent conceptions. As a matter of fact, they were part and parcel of but one grand military conception. The object of the attack was Adana, behind the wall of the Taurus Mountains. The plan was that the Mesopotamian force should advance up the Tigris against Bagdad and the great Turkish base at Mosul, while the Palestine Army should march on Aleppo. These two forces would then be constantly converging and, if the advance continued, must meet. The advance from Palestine, if successful, would sever the only Turkish line of communications—the line through Aleppo to Mosul—and thus force a retreat before Maude's army in Mesopotamia. The latter army, then, without opposition, could march to Aleppo and the combined forces move on Adana.

The Russians, in the meanwhile, were to operate in the north in the Armenian Mountains, cover the right flank of the advancing British, take the Black Sea ports, and prevent the Turks from being supplied from that direction. In the latter stages of the campaign, the Russian Army, putting forth its tentacles toward the south, would extend from the Black Sea to the Gulf of Alexandretta, and the Turks would be completely hemmed in behind the Taurus Mountains. It was strategy on the grandest scale. It was not contemplated that this could be done in a year. The fighting season in this Near Eastern country is but a few months long, after which excessive heat makes quiet imperative. But it was calculated that two years would see the object of these campaigns accomplished.

In the early fall of 1915, the British made their first effort in the Near East, an effort which in 1918 resulted in the destruction of Turkey's power. This, the first of the eastern movements, however, was undertaken as a



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Austen Chamberlain

Unionist leader in the House of Commons during the war. He was one of those who were held culpable for the disaster to Townshend at Kut-el-Amara.

garia. It could be done only via Salonika and the positions before that Greek city were so formidable, by reason of the natural defenses afforded by the mountains of Macedonia, that success was a matter of grave doubt.

In Turkey, however—that is, in Mesopotamia and Palestine—there was room for a display of true strategy. There were no per-

measure of defense rather than as an appreciation of the importance of Mesopotamia as a real theater of offensive operations. All during 1914 and 1915, German and Turkish emissaries had been busy in Persia and Afghanistan, even in India, stirring up anti-British activity. Conspiracies were discovered at Delhi and Lahore. A German conspiracy was discovered in Bengal which was scheduled to break out in the form of a revolt on Christmas day. The East was in a ferment and British prestige was weakening rapidly.

Coupled with this was the damage which had already been done to the British oil fields in Persia at the head of the Persian Gulf. Here the British had made vast investments in

The expedition, however, failed miserably. Utterly insufficient for the task it was to perform, it advanced as far as Ctesiphon where it was forced to fall back. At Kut-el-Amara, a large British force under General Townshend, which had been acting as rearguard in the retreat, was cut off and surrounded. In a few months it was starved into submission and forced to surrender.

While the British were penned up in Kut-el-Amara, the Russians operating in the Armenian Mountains were advancing steadily. There were several objects for which a campaign in this wild and difficult country were undertaken. One was to divide the Turkish Empire by cutting off that part of it south of



New Zealanders Digging Trenches in Mesopotamia

development work which were endangered by the activities of the Turks and the pro-Germans in Persia.

THE MESOPOTAMIAN EXPEDITION

To strengthen her position in the East as well as to guard the Persian oil fields, Great Britain organized late in 1915 an expedition against the Turks in the East. This expedition was based on Basra, near the head of the Persian Gulf, and was intended to sweep up the Tigris and clear the Turks away from the Persian border. An advance was planned, too, to Bagdad, which it was intended to take and hold. "The capture of Bagdad," said Mr. Austen Chamberlain, "might be a decisive factor in preserving peace in the Middle East and up to and on the Indian frontier."

the Erzerum-Alexandretta line from Asia Minor proper and Turkey in Europe. Such a conclusion would mean, as will be shown presently, the practical annihilation of the Turkish Empire through complete defeat.

Another was to open up to Russia a direct overland route to the Mediterranean Sea. This would, of course, mean the fall of Constantinople and, consequently, the accomplishment by land of that which Great Britain had failed to accomplish by water. With these grandiose objectives, Russia moved against Erzerum, a heavily-fortified area which stands guard over Western Armenia and Anatolia and commands all of the best roads in Trans-Caucasia. Erzerum fell before the Russian attack after but five days of bombardment. Its garrison, however, of about 150,000 men escaped before it could be cut off,

Had the Russians been able to surround this garrison and capture it, the probabilities are that, in 1916, they would have reached their objectives and put Turkey out of the war. But with the escape of these forces it was conceded that Russia's chances of ultimate success were small. She pushed on, however, and finally occupied Trebizond on the Black Sea. But here her advance in Armenia came to a halt. In the south, however, her left wing was swinging westward toward Bagdad, south of which the British were again making preparations to advance. Before anything could be accomplished of a definite nature, however, summer came and operations in the Mesopotamian plain had to be abandoned.

RENEWAL OF MESOPOTAMIAN ADVANCE

Operations began again in this theater in the late fall of 1916. The British, who had been entirely reorganized and greatly strengthened, advanced rapidly up the Tigris, and by a series of well-executed turning movements by their cavalry, drove the Turks unceasingly before them. It was a constant series of moves against the Turkish lines of communications. As fast as the Turks would assume one position, the British cavalry would make a wide swoop against their rear and threaten to seize control of the Tigris behind them and cut off their supplies. Then there would come a retreat to a new position and the operation would be repeated. The only limit to the British advance was the marching ability of the men.

Kut-el-Amara soon fell after but a short fight, and the way to Bagdad was opened up. The City of the Caliphs, too, was soon in British hands (March 11, 1917), after which the movement was halted both to allow the Russians to come through and to give the British themselves time to reorganize before making the next forward move. The Russians at this time were back in Persia, whither they had retired after the campaigns of 1916. Here they were confronted by the Turks, who depended on the road through the Khan-ikin Pass for their supplies. But the approach of the British toward the only road through this pass threw the Turks into a panic and they began a wild flight for the Turko-Persian border. Before they could reach it the British

were squarely across their line of communications, making a successful retreat impossible. The Turkish Army was, therefore, broken up and fled to the hills, leaving the way open to the Russians. In a short time a junction between the British and the Russians was effected and the first great step toward the downfall of the Moslem Empire had been accomplished.

The Palestine Army up to this time had been preparing for an extended campaign but had made no open move. It was destined, however, to play a most important rôle in the settlement of the war.

To digress for a moment, the British on the front in France during 1917 had had a discouraging year. Their losses had been terrific and they had but little to show for them. Vimy Ridge had been taken and the salient at Ypres wiped out by the capture of Messines Ridge. But the great offensive on Passchendaele Ridge, by which it was hoped to seize Zeebrugge and drive the Germans from the coast of Belgium, had proved a failure with a ghastly casualty list, the British having nearly 30,000 men killed in the month of August alone. At a meeting of the Allied war chiefs, held in the early fall of 1917, it was decided that the German front in the West could not be broken down except at a prohibitive cost in men and that, as an alternative, the forces in the East should be heavily reinforced and a great effort made to weaken Germany by tearing her from her Eastern allies. Preparations were thereupon made to eliminate Turkey.

ALLENBY CRUSHES THE TURKS

General Allenby, operating in Palestine, was the first to get into action under this plan. He stormed the important port of Gaza, and swept up the Palestine coast to Jaffa, capturing Jerusalem (December 11, 1917) and occupying the heights on the west bank of the Jordan.


Victory seemed almost within his grasp when the great German offensive was launched in France. The great demand for men that the break in the Allied front created immediately put a stop to the Palestine operations. The reinforcements which had been sent there were taken away and the entire movement

brought to a standstill. This period of enforced quiet lasted until the Allies took the offensive in July, 1918. As soon as it was felt that they had the situation well in hand, General Allenby's forces were again increased and preparations made for a continuation of his offensive toward Aleppo.

The campaign which followed was the most brilliant campaign of the war. The forces

the flank, and turning eastward cut the Turkish line of communications, and, at the same time, completely envelop the broken Turkish right wing. The first step then was the breaking of the Turkish right. This was done and the cavalry poured through. Allenby thus reports the opening stages of the campaign:

"Preparations for this battle entailed a good deal of marching. The troops were always



In Palestine: Bringing in a Captured Turkish Airplane

employed were the British, who were operating on the western side of the Jordan, and the Arabs, operating on the eastern side. The Turks had about 100,000 men, who were opposed by a somewhat larger body of the Allies. Practically the entire strength of the Turks was facing the British forces on the west bank of the river. General Allenby's plan was simplicity itself. It was to break down the Turkish right which rested on the sea; once the break was effected to send through a considerable cavalry force, which was to rush by

moved by night and remained hidden in the orange and olive groves in the daytime. The British mastery of the air prevented enemy observers from seeing any change in the dispositions and the movements of large columns. Troops of all arms were thus concealed skillfully in a country where the marching of men raises huge columns of dust, and the Turk, too, possessed positions that commanded a wide range. But he remained mystified, which is the finest tribute that could be given to the work of the British Staff.

"The infantry opened a way for the cavalry to pass through, and then there was a wonderful spectacle of long columns of British yeomanry and Australian light horse and picturesque Indian cavalry moving over a wide expanse of country throughout the coastal sector of the plain of Sharon to get to the enemy's rear."

The resulting operations were carried out with great dispatch. The enveloping movement of the British had the Turks completely surrounded except on the east side of the Jordan, so that the principal work of the cavalry was, as General Allenby stated in his official report of the operations, that of "collecting the disorganized masses of enemy troops and transport as they arrived from the south." The Turkish Army was totally destroyed, the number of prisoners alone reaching a total of about 80,000. It was the first and indeed the only decisive defeat that any power sustained during the war. The way was thus cleared for a march to Aleppo with the positive assurance that there was no organized force to offer resistance en route. Turkey as a belligerent had disappeared.

BULGARIA'S TURN

Bulgaria, whose back door would be thrown wide open by a decisive Turkish defeat, had in the meantime been watching the operations in Palestine with anxious eyes. At the first evidence of a Turkish collapse the government wavered between a continuation of hostilities and a request for peace. This indecision had its reflection in the Army. While matters were in this condition, the Allies struck the Bulgarian lines before Salonika between Lake Doiran and the Cerna River. At the first rush the Bulgarian line broke, was cut in half, and began a retreat. On the first of October, 1918, Uskub was in the hands of the Allies, whose advance continued without interruption. King Ferdinand made a frantic appeal to Germany for help, but Germany was too busy with her own troubles to heed the call. Bulgaria had, then, nothing to do but surrender, which she promptly did. This threw Austria open to invasion from the rear and turned the indistinct rumblings of revolution, which had so disturbed the Hapsburg's peace, into a roar.

XVII—FINAL ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

Failure of the Last Austrian Offensive Against Italy in June, 1918—Italian Counter-offensive Brings Collapse of Austria-Hungary

ALMOST from the day that the Germans began their offensive against the Allies in France, their government had pressed hard upon that of Austria-Hungary to begin similar action against Italy. Emperor Karl, however, knew the tremulous state of his own throne, knew the uncertain temper of his own people. As was shown in his letter to Prince Sixtus, he wanted peace because that was the only way in which he could bolster up his tottering house. Finally, however, the pressure became too great and he was stirred to action.

In the middle of June, 1918, he launched an offensive against the Italians from the Asiago Plateau across the mountains to the Piave and down that river to the sea. The object

of this attack was, first, to pin the Italians down along the Piave front, and then to break through the mountain barriers down into the plain behind the Piave line.

It was not altogether unreasonable to anticipate some degree of success in such a movement. But some months had elapsed since the disastrous Italian defeat at Caporetto and the long retreat which came to an end only on the banks of the Piave River. In that defeat, Italy, her military organization shaken to its very foundations, had lost heavily in men, but, what was even more fateful, in material as well. The loss in guns had seriously crippled Italy's power, and, without raw materials, her recuperative power was believed to be small.




Photo by Hare.

An Italian Machine-Gun Nest Fighting on the Piave

The machine-gun came to be considered the deadliest weapon of the World War. Sheltered by trees and bushes, one machine-gunner was often able to hold hundreds of the enemy at bay.

Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly.

The same sort of insidious propaganda that had corrupted the Italian forces at Caporetto had, too, been carried on when the lines were stabilized at the Piave. Therefore, the disaster at Caporetto could, it was believed, be duplicated. If this were accomplished by a break through the mountains via the Asiago Plateau, there was strong probability that Italy could be forced into peace, and the right flank of the Allied Army in France exposed to attack from the south. This would prevent the French in the north from taking up any defensive line and holding for any length of time.

FAILURE OF LAST AUSTRIAN OFFENSIVE, JUNE, 1918

The grand Austrian attack, however, had not been in progress twenty-four hours when it was seen that it was destined to prove a failure. Such attacks, when successful at all, have always penetrated deeply at the first rush of the infantry. But, from the first, the Austrian forces were held back. Their total gain, in the first two days' fighting, was insignificant. They were more successful along the Piave than in the mountains, where the main attack fell; for, whereas in the latter, their progress was almost entirely negative, on the former front they did cross the Piave and establish themselves in force on the western bank.

They were, however, utterly unable to exploit this success. They were pinned down across the river, unable to advance. While in this predicament, torrential rains flooded the Piave, which is ordinarily a small stream, and carried away the pontoon bridges, leaving the Austrians stranded on the western bank. The Italians took prompt advantage of the situation and, by heavy attacks, either captured the Austrian troops who had made the crossing or drove them into the river. Thus the Austrian offensive, which, it had been hoped, was to be of such material assistance to the Germans in France, proved to be a fiasco, and the Austrian position was more dangerous than before the attack was undertaken.

The fact was that none of the elements which it was hoped would bring victory were present. The Italian morale, instead of hav-

ing been sapped by propaganda as it had been at Caporetto, was entirely good. Heavy as their losses had been in the retreat of six months before, the Italians were still unshaken, and the damage to the artillery equipment had been largely repaired. They were, in fact, ready for the attack and were expecting it. This failure left Austria powerless to initiate further operations and the two armies remained facing each other across the Piave.

GREAT ITALIAN ADVANCE—1918


In the middle of October, Bulgaria had surrendered to the Allies and Turkey was making every effort to do likewise. Germany herself was being torn to pieces in the west, every day bringing news of fresh Allied victories. The situation in Austria was, as a result of all these circumstances, becoming more and more desperate.

At this Foch ordered the Italians to attack. The strategy employed was similar to that which has marked the Italian operations from the beginning. It consisted, briefly, in blocking up the outlets of the Trentino into the northern Italian plain, as a defensive measure to protect the rear, and launching a heavy offensive on the eastern Italian front.

The result was as Foch had hoped and anticipated. The Austrian Army, rotten with sedition, dissatisfaction, fear, crumpled up like a house of cards. The retreat, which began in fair order, turned into a rout, and in the short space of two weeks, practically all that Italy had fought for since 1915 was in her hands.

This disaster to Austria told in most eloquent fashion the true condition of affairs within the Central Powers. The canker of revolution had eaten its way deeply into their vitals; the seed of Bolshevism, which they had sown in Russia, had been blown back by adverse winds into their own land, and had taken root and germinated. The people, upon whom so much sympathy had been wasted, were ready to throw over the government which they had so ardently supported; not because it had done wrong, not because it had deceived, but because it had committed the one unforgivable sin of failure.

The complete defeat of all of Germany's eastern allies, combined with the irresistible



Courtesy of Red Cross Magazine.

Austrian Prisoners in Italy

Italy's prisoners of war were treated humanely and in accordance with the rules laid down by the Hague Convention.

pressure on the front in France, left her nothing to do but surrender or be completely destroyed.

In the analysis which has been made of the strategy of this last year of the war the attempt has been made to show that the series of German offensives were not individual, localized movements at all, but part and parcel of the same general plan with which the

Germans started out on the 21st of March, 1918. Only in the last attack, when the effort was made to cross the Marne and encircle Rheims, was there a divergence from the central idea.

On the side of the Allies the same may be said. Although the various theaters of war were widely separated geographically, the appointment of Foch as commander-in-chief,

giving him control of the Allied forces in all parts of the world, tied the Allies together in spite of the limitations of space and time and compelled them to act as a unit. The advantage of the central control, which the Germans had had since 1914, was thus offset. The Allies, moreover, had a superiority in manpower and in mechanical equipment, or the machinery of war. Given this, together with superior brain power in their commander, and victory was assured.

It may appear on its face that in using to such an extent his resources in what were always considered subsidiary fields, Foch violated his own theories of confronting his main enemy with his greatest concentrations. As a matter of fact, reflection will show that the reverse is really the case. He used to the utmost every force he possessed everywhere. The pressure on every front was kept at high pitch and was consistently maintained throughout. At no time was it possible for the Central Powers to take advantage of their superiority in position. Although they continued until the end to operate on the interior of a circle, they were unable to derive any benefit from this position by shifting forces from one danger point to another. The pressure simultaneously exerted on all sides made this impossible without disaster following quickly in the wake.

THE "EASTERN SCHOOL" VINDICATED

The final solution of the Balkan riddle, and the destruction of the military power of Austria, also tends to confuse those who during the war maintained steadily that such campaigns were fruitless and a sheer waste of forces. For the end of the war was brought about just as much through the total defeat of the Germanic allies as it was through the actions on the Western front. Had Germany's eastern allies been able to maintain the integrity of their positions against the blows of the Entente, and thus have kept secure the eastern

frontier of Germany, she could still have held out for another year. The Meuse from the Dutch border to the Ardennes, the Ardennes themselves, the heights of Lorraine and of the Vosges, offered Germany a defensive line of tremendous natural strength, a line which it would have taken the Allies a long time to break through. Had she been secure from attack in the east, she might still have occupied that line and, before it could have been broken, negotiated for peace.

The American forces, the only reserve there was, had nearly reached their limit without pausing to refit and recoup. But a short time more and they would have had to cease their offensive. This is shown clearly by their casualty list. At the time of the Armistice their losses had already reached 30 per cent. of the men fit for service, and no division during the last two years of war was considered able to continue efficiently when their casualties exceeded this figure. This itself would have caused a cessation of violent activity, which would have given Germany needed respite.

Under existing conditions in the east, however, of what value would be the respite? Not only would East Prussia and Silesia have been invaded under circumstances which would have meant positive defeat in those theaters, but the great economic advantages which Germany already had in Russia and from which she hoped to recoup from the war would have been lost. The Allies would have taken over the situation in Russia, driven Germany out and occupied the economic supremacy which she meant to be hers.

This was the situation which the collapse through military defeat of Bulgaria, Turkey and Austria brought about. And in a most eloquent manner it preached the triumph of those who, from the early days of the war, looked over the heads of the armies struggling in France to the little known East as offering the great opportunity for complete military victory.

Writing after the Kaiser's downfall, the editor of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* said: "Wilhelm II had the misfortune of being placed in a position which he was not competent to fill. When he delivered speeches containing threats and other indiscretions, they were only the sentiment of the moment, improvisations which no one would have taken seriously if they had come from another source. But when a Kaiser talks it has effect, and it is impossible to measure the consequences of the Kaiser's speeches. . . . His permanent position in the world will be that of a mischief maker. But it could hardly be otherwise, for the Kaiser never was checked by controlling authorities, which had the power to repress his indiscretion."

XVIII—"GERMAN EFFICIENCY"

Its Limitations More Than Neutralized Its Advantages—The Allies Eventually Produced an Organization That Conquered It

THE foregoing chapters give in broad outline what might be termed the grand strategy of the war, the plans of the two belligerents in each of the important campaigns and the reasons why these plans were adopted. From these general plans, viewed in retrospect, certain conclusions may be drawn.

The Germans failed because their entire plan was based on speed of execution, on the absence of delay. They had laid out a complete schedule on which the Army was to run. They took no account of any contingencies which might delay. If their train ran into a siding, if a wreck loomed up ahead, they were for the moment lost, mentally befuddled; and time had to pass before they could again get on the main line called for by their schedule.

There was a complete and total absence of flexibility, of elasticity in their operations. All was a stiff unyielding rigidity, incapable of quick moulding to meet the change in the fortunes of war.

There was, too, as another vital factor in the German defeat, the peculiar psychology characteristic of a semi-barbarous people; for it was their own Goethe who said of them that they were barbarians whom civilization had only made ferocious. From the beginning of the war until the end they were utterly unable to understand the condemnation of the world at their methods. The violation of the neutrality of Belgium, an act which forced an alignment of all the decent peoples of the world against Germany, in feeling if not in fact, has yet to produce any feeling in Germany except absolute justification because of its expediency. The revulsion of the world against the sinking of the *Lusitania*, with its great numbers of defenseless women and innocent children, has always been to them an unintelligible sentiment. The active hostility

of the world against their unlimited and unrestricted submarine warfare they cannot see as an outburst of righteous indignation on the part of an outraged world. To them it was but an evidence of jealousy of German success, of desire to tear Germany down from the pedestal on which her own genius had placed her.



Gen. von Bissing

Appointed Governor-General in Belgium, December, 1914.

This was the thing, indeed, which the world fought against and conquered; this swash-buckling arrogance which denied the right of other peoples to live and breathe if it did not suit the Teuton will. This is the thing which brought the world to arms in its own defense, and brought Germany to the depths of ignominious defeat.


Just how badly they really were defeated, however, only the future can tell. The British blockade, with all of its terrible effectiveness,

did not starve the German people or their Army into submission. There was want in Germany at the close of the war, but no starvation. The conditions as they were found immediately after the armistice were, indeed, no worse than in England and not as bad as in France. Of fats, and fats alone, was there a true and irremedial shortage. Generally the people were found well fed and well cared for, the half-grown children robust and in sound health. From the standpoint of food alone Germany could have continued the war for another year. That she saw fit to lay

peace or for war, and Germany lacking the raw material, but possessing the organizing genius and the manufacturing facilities—here is an economic combination which the world may well regard with doubt as to the future.

GERMAN ORGANIZATION FAILED

In no way was the German genius for organization shown more emphatically than in the war. The world stood aghast at what was termed German efficiency. It was German organization. This organization produced



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A German Signal Corps Company at Work

down her arms can be ascribed to the collapse of her allies and the fact that she was face to face, alone, against the world.

And just as she found defeat in the West, so may she look to the East for victory. In Russia is found all that Germany fought for, all that she hoped to gain through world conquest. Unlimited land, unlimited wealth as yet not touched, and, with it all, a people who yield readily to the control of intense organization. And no man can deny the genius of the German for organization. This is what Russia lacks and needs. And this is one thing Germany can give her. Russia, possessing the raw material, all the raw material needed for

German preparedness which the world called efficiency. Just how efficient or inefficient the Germans really were, when neither the time nor the occasion permitted the formulation of plans laid long in advance, is shown by the consistent German failures throughout the war. A casual reading of the first four years of war produces the impression that Germany was everywhere victorious and the Allies were always defeated. As a matter of fact, this is far from being the case, as reflection will show. What is the object of war? It is, it can be nothing else than the destruction of the military force of one's opponent, so that one's will may be absolutely imposed upon the van-

quished. The acquisition of territory does not tell the story. The only question is: what happened to the opposing army? Did it escape and remain in the field or was it captured, destroyed or dispersed? Not once during the entire war did Germany win such a victory as to eliminate from the field of battle the army against her. Belgium was destroyed, it is true. But the Belgian Army was not. It fell back to Antwerp, immobilized a large German force by holding it there



Truth in Fetters

According to the Germans, England by her cable censorship was able to mould public opinion against them.

in siege operations, and, even then, escaped. And it lived to fight its way back across Flanders and to enter, as a victor, Antwerp, Ghent and Brussels.

In Serbia we have the same story. Serbia was overrun and immolated. But the Serbian Army survived. And it was this Army which delivered the final attack against the Bulgars and entered Belgrade and Sofia as a victor in the war. And, in Italy, when the Germans, with Austrian assistance, broke the Italian line and sent it reeling backward across the Tagliamento and behind the Piave, the Italian Army was not destroyed. The territory

that Germany gained was valueless. It brought to Italy no defeat and but little discouragement. The Italian Army lived, too, lived to break the back of Austrian power on this same Piave, and to wreck its military machine in the Alps.

And in Rumania it was the same. The Army in flight, the country overrun and ground under the heel, Germany was still unable to bring home to her people a military decision but was forced to see all of her efforts rendered unavailing through the regrouping of the Rumanian forces and their stand on the Sereth. It was only the treachery of Russia that brought about the treaty of Bucharest, not the power of Germany.

And thus did German efficiency fail. It had but narrow vision. It saw so far and then became blurred and clouded, and lost itself in the fog. History, therefore, will not lay its finger on a single campaign and call the result a decisive German victory. For, in every case, the other army only retreated to bide its time. And, when this time was ripe, it came back to its own and itself enjoyed the fruits of victory.

MISTAKES OF THE ALLIES

The Allies were not free from mistakes—vital mistakes which had far-reaching results. But whereas German mistakes lost the war, those of the Allies but prolonged it.

They gravely underestimated Germany's strength from the first day of the war. France considered that, if England furnished 100,000 men for duty on the continent and policed the seas, Germany could be beaten. Yet England furnished more than fifty times this number before Germany asked for peace.

It was not indeed for many months after the war began that Germany's real strength became apparent. When the realization came, the Allies calmly set about to prepare for the long, wasting struggle that was ahead of them. The preparations which it had taken Germany forty years to make, the organization which was the product of the mobilized genius of all Germany, were matched and excelled by the Anglo-Saxon and the Gaul in three years.

The more highly civilized world will, therefore, look askance at German efficiency and be more liable to watch for German trickery as a substitute. Give a man certain mental

advantages, but deprive him of all conscience, all scruples, all sympathies and tolerance for other peoples and their views, and the only limit to his accomplishments is that enforced by the welding together of his fellow-men into a crusade of righteousness, honor and fair dealing.

It is not otherwise with nations, which, after all, are but large groups of men, subject to the human weaknesses, the virtues and vices, that mark the individuals which make them up. And as individuals suffer through foul dealing, so nations have suffered and will continue to suffer. To unscrupulous treachery Germany owed her successes, incomplete as they were. And to these she owed her defeat—a defeat which will bend the shoulders of future generations with its weight of ignominy and national disgrace.

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The Flash of the Guns at Night

Both sides utilized the flashes to locate the positions of the enemy's guns for counter-battery work.

FOCH'S PRINCIPLES OF WAR

His Teachings as a Military Schoolmaster Triumphantly Vindicated by
His Strategy in the Greatest Battle of History

By T. R. YBARRA

I

VICTORY IN ATTACK

HISTORY scarcely presents a case of the vindication of a man's lifelong beliefs and teachings like that of Ferdinand Foch.

Twenty years ago Foch, a lieutenant colonel, was giving a series of lectures at the War College in Paris which embodied a clear-cut, complete theory of the art of war. It was a theory of action, of positive movements for a definite end, summed up in Foch's phrase: "Attack! Attack! Attack!"

Hardly had the war begun when Foch got the first chance to show that his views were not mere class-room theorizings. In the center of the French line at the Marne he attacked, though his troops were exhausted and well-nigh beaten, and brilliantly vindicated his belief. In the race to the sea he was aggressive, resourceful, always ready to hit back at the German invaders. When the French assumed the offensive in Champagne it was Foch who directed their movements. And when the Germans smashed through the Allied lines in March, 1918, and terrible disaster menaced the Allied cause, it was Ferdinand Foch who, as the man best suited to cope with the emergency, was placed in command of all the Allied armies.

Here was his chance. Did he really believe what he had preached? Would he, face to face with a crisis such as had confronted no other general in the history of the world, prove a renegade to his teachings of a lifetime? Would he seek, in a purely defensive campaign, some way of warding off the frightful blows of the German war leaders, steeped, as was Foch the schoolmaster, in the belief

that the solution of all war's problems was: "Attack! Attack! Attack"?

Not he. For a while he parried the German blow, drew back his men. But in his mind all the time was the principle that had guided him always, the principle that led Napoleon Bonaparte and Frederick the Great to victory. Having checked the German invasion before Amiens, having helped Sir Douglas Haig to halt it around Ypres, having denied it the road to Paris at Château-Thierry, Foch leaped to the attack.

On the Soissons-Montdidier front he first showed his hand; there a German offensive was beaten to pieces by a resolute French counter-offensive. Then the Germans launched their last desperate onslaught toward Châlons, the movement that was to give them Paris and victory and peace. Foch, instead of rushing his reserves to the threatened sector and using them up in the face of the German thrust, struck the side of the German "pocket" between Soissons and the Marne a hammer-blow that utterly surprised the enemy, sent his regiments reeling backward, made him retreat hastily from the whole Marne salient. That started Foch on his string of coördinated, unerring, unceasing blows that brought the German Army into the dust and made its leaders beg for an armistice. "Attack! Attack! Attack!" Foch the field-marshal had vindicated Foch the schoolmaster.

Historians may write that this trait in Foch's character, as much as anything else, doomed Germany. France's rôle in a world-war being essentially a defensive one—all French war experts have assumed for years a German invasion of France, and planned to meet it—it is quite possible that the German war lords may have expected no more from France than defensive moves, which,

however resolute and unyielding, can never be more than defensive. In Foch, however, they met a man to whom the defensive was anathema; who assumed it only when driven to it, and then only as a detested temporary expedient. Another French leader, having finally checked the German attack of the spring of 1918, might have continued to stand on the defensive, and France, wearied by years of war, might have made a patched-up peace with the Germans standing, unbroken, on French soil.

But Foch checked the Germans and then went after them with every ounce of strength at his disposal. He did not attack them simply to force them out of France. He attacked them to destroy them. On the 11th of November, 1918, the German Armies, after four months of Foch's terrific blows, were threatened with a catastrophe that had it come to pass, would have dwarfed Metz and Sedan, the classic modern examples of the elimination of entire armies as the result of a military operation. Foch the schoolmaster was about to eclipse von Moltke, Germany's great exponent of the Napoleonic method of making battle the objective of all strategy, the destruction of the enemy's army the objective of all battle.

What, then, were the principles laid down twenty years ago by Foch the schoolmaster? What is his theory of war, so insistently preached, so triumphantly vindicated? It is laid down, where all may read, in the great commander's *The Principles of War*, a book consisting of the series of lectures which he delivered at the French War College in 1900. The reader has to rub his eyes to realize that they date back as far as that; over and over again he finds entire passages which seem to be dealing with the final battles that won immortality for Foch in 1918; over and over again he is stunned by the amazing certitude with which Marshal Foch, the commander, applied the beliefs of Colonel Foch, the lecturer.

FOCH ON THE ART OF WAR

In *The Principles of War* (translation by J. de Morinni, published by H. K. Fly Company, New York) Foch writes:

"The teaching of war goes back to the most ancient times, but it is not until 1882-

83 that we find in France any efficient and practical instruction in warfare.

"Where was the difficulty? Was it to be found in the nature of the matter taught, in the true *theory* of war, or was it in the *manner* of teaching this theory after it was ascertained?

"The difficulty was due to both causes.

"The theories prevailing among us until that time were incorrect. They truly listed the different factors which affect the result of war; superiority of morale, of knowledge, of command, of armament, of supplies, of defense, etc. They truly explained that the result depended on such factors, but they divided them all into two classes:

"1. The first were the moral advantages; quality of the troops, of the command, amount of energy shown, passions displayed, etc.; which cannot be figured exactly as to quantity; all of these were systematically left out of a reasoned study and of a theory which it was desired to make a scientific one of war; or rather, all of these were presumed to be equal on either side.


"2. The second class comprised all material factors which influence results; armament, commissary, nature of the ground, numbers, etc.; but which are far from everything.

"At the same time that moral factors were eliminated as *causes* they were also eliminated as *results*. Defeat thus became the product of material factors, whereas we shall find it later to be a purely *moral* result, the result of a state of mind, of discouragement, of fear brought on the vanquished by a combined use of moral and material factors employed simultaneously by the victor.

"The theory was, therefore, that to be victorious one must have numbers, better armament, bases of supplies, the advantage of terrain. The armies of the Revolution, Napoleon in particular, later answered: We are not more numerous, we are not better armed, but we shall beat you because by our planning we shall have greater numbers at the decisive point; by our energy, our knowledge, our use of weapons we shall succeed in raising our morale and in breaking down yours.

THE HUMAN FACTOR IN WAR

"In such manner these theories, believed true because founded on mathematical bases,



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An Actual View of a Battle from an Airplane

In the foreground French soldiers are advancing, using shell holes as protection against the fire of Germans, who can be seen in the background.

were entirely wrong because they had not considered the most important factor of all—whether it be a question of command or of execution—the human factor with its moral, intellectual and physical aspects. They were fundamentally wrong because they tried to make of war an exact science. It was as if, in order to learn to ride and drive a horse, you were content to handle the figure of one, learning the names and positions of the differ-

saturated with the sound theories of Clausewitz and Scharnhorst, handled their armies in that war like living organisms. The result was written at Versailles in 1871. In 1914 the Prussian school, still retaining much of its sound military value, had, nevertheless, turned too much to worship of the material side. Too much Krupp, too little soul was in the army that met Ferdinand Foch. The result was written at Versailles in 1919.



Krupp Works at Essen

Here were produced the big guns whose projectiles smashed the Belgian forts, supposed to be impregnable. The Krupp interests are not merely centered in one town, but they control a number of other establishments. The armistice had not been signed before the Krupps had extensive plans for the manufacture of new types of ordnance and for the capture of foreign markets.

ent parts of the body. Who would dream of learning only thus to manage a horse, without taking into account its life, its blood, its temperament, without mounting the living animal itself?"

There speaks Foch, the man who never forgot that the soldier was a human being, that an army, no matter how well equipped with the best appliances that science can afford, depends, in the last analysis, on men. The French in the war of 1870-71 had become pedantic in their military theories; the Prussians,

Foch, in his lectures, kept constantly in the minds of his pupils the *human* side of war. He insisted, too, that war was a thing of basic principles; that students must seek in history those basic principles; that, though capable of infinite variation, they are immutable. He foresaw in the years to come a war that would make the greatest of preceding conflicts look insignificant; a war in which science would supply the most frightful weapons, in which men would be moved in masses undreamed-of before. Yet, foreseeing all this, he insisted:

"War's principles are basic and immutable." And, lest his pupils get the idea that, once having learned these principles, they were by that very act great generals, he quoted Napoleon's dictum: "One may teach tactics, military engineering, artillery work about as one teaches geometry. But knowledge of the higher branches of war is only acquired by experience and by a study of the history of the wars of great generals. It is not in a grammar that one learns to compose a great poem, to write a tragedy." And Foch added to this: "Which does not mean that grammar must not be learned, but that in every art a knowledge of the principles is not synonymous with a power to create."

"You will be asked later to be the brains of an army," he continued; "I say unto you to-day: *Learn to think*. In the presence of every question, considered independently and by itself, ask yourself first: *What is the objective?*" That is the first step toward the state of mind to be attained."

II

BATTLE THE TRUE GOAL OF WARFARE

FOCH taught his students that the "nation in arms," the basis of the kind of warfare that was sure to confront them as leaders and subordinates when France should again fight, must needs bring back the *absolute* conception of war, the conception that wars are waged to win victory, that victory alone is the justification of a commander. He decries the old "fencing" methods beloved of theorists like Massenbach, who caused the Prussians to play into Napoleon's hands at Jena; the theories that made Marshal Saxe say: "I do not favor battles. . . . I am sure that a clever general can wage war as long as he lives without being compelled to fight a battle."

That view is the diametrical opposite of the Foch view. For him, as for Napoleon, there is nothing as desirable as a pitched battle.

"Where," he asks, "can we study modern operations better than in the history of the French Revolution, which, from the beginning, set up so high the aims of war and the means

(numbers, enthusiasm, passions) employed in its service? Nowhere can better models be found than in the actions of Napoleon, who made use of that wonderful military power in order to triumph by:

"Taking advantage of human emotions;

"Maneuvering masses of men;

"Giving to operations the most crushing nature ever known.

"That is why modern war draws its theories from Napoleon. . . .

"As we have already seen, modern war returns to the principle of a *decision by arms*, and no other can be accepted. Instead of blaming the battles of Bonaparte as barbarous actions it recognizes in them the only efficient means; it also seeks battles in the same manner.

"A modern army is faced by an opponent whose ideas of war are similar; who will be little affected by any invasion or occupation of his territory; who will only acknowledge defeat when no longer able or willing to fight; that is, when his army shall have been destroyed materially or morally.

"For that reason, modern war can admit of no other arguments than those which help destroy an army: the battle, the destruction by force. . . .

"Let us therefore no longer speak of maneuvers merely intended to reach the opponent's lines of communication, to seize his stores, to enter this or that portion of his territory. None of these results is an advantage in itself; it only becomes one if it facilitates battle under favorable circumstances, if it permits the most favorable employment of forces."

Combating the argument that, instead of seeking battle, a general might await the enemy, Foch declares emphatically: movement is the rule of strategy. A general, according to him, must not wait for the enemy to strike—at least not indefinitely—because, if the battle be not sought, it may not happen, or may happen under unfavorable conditions, and preclude the chance of destroying the enemy's forces.

"Of all mistakes," he says, "one only is disgraceful: inaction." Could anything more accurately reveal the mind of the man who, nineteen years later, counter-attacked an attacking enemy in such fashion that he exposed that enemy to utter annihilation?

III

A DEFENSIVE CANNOT CREATE VICTORY, SAYS MARSHAL FOCH

IN the following the actual history of 1918 leaps forth from the theories of the school-master of 1900:

"Let us establish first that, in order duly to fulfill the double purpose of being the logical aim of strategic operations and the effective means of tactics, battle cannot be merely defensive.

"Under that form it may, it is true, halt the enemy in his advance; it keeps him from attaining some immediate objective; but such results are purely negative. Never will it destroy the enemy or procure the conquest of the ground he occupies, which is the visible sign of victory; it is unable, therefore, to ever create victory.

"A battle of this kind, purely defensive, does not, even if well conducted, make a victor and a vanquished. It is merely something to be decided again later.

"A purely defensive battle is like a duel in which one of the men does nothing but parry. He can never defeat his opponent, but on the contrary, and in spite of the greatest possible skill, he is bound to be hit sooner or later.

"Hence we find that the *offensive* form, whether it be immediate or as succeeding the defensive, can alone give results. It must consequently be *always* adopted at some stage or other.

"Every defensive action, then, must end by an offensive blow or successful counter-attack if any result is to be gained. It is an elementary principle, if you wish, but neglect of it has been frequent. It was not understood by the French Armies of 1870. . . ."

"A BATTLE IS NEVER LOST MATERIALLY"

"Where shall we find the method whose existence is now evident? Will it consist in the number of enemies killed? Is it a question of doing more harm by having more guns and more rifles, or better guns and better rifles, than the enemy? Is superiority found merely in material advantages, or does it come from other causes? We must seek the answer in an analysis of the psychological phenomenon of battle.

"'A hundred thousand men,' says General Cardot, 'leave ten thousand of their number on the ground and acknowledge defeat; they retreat before the victors who have lost just

as many men, if not more. Besides, neither know, when the retreat occurs, what their losses are or what the enemy's casualties may be.' It is not, therefore, through the material factor of losses, and still less through any comparison of figures, a greater number of casualties, that they give in, renouncing the fight and abandoning to the opponent the ground in dispute.

"Ninety thousand defeated men withdraw before ninety thousand victorious men solely because they have had enough, and they have had enough because they no longer believe in victory, because they are demoralized and have no *moral* resistance left. Which leads Joseph de Maistre to say: 'A battle lost is a battle one believes one has lost, for a battle is never lost materially.' And if battles are lost morally, they must also be won in the same way, so that we can add: '*A battle won is a battle in which one refuses to acknowledge defeat.*' . . .

"In order that our army be victorious, its morale must be higher than that of the enemy, or it must obtain such superiority of morale from the higher command. To organize the battle we must, therefore, in order to break the enemy's morale, raise ours to the highest pitch.

"The will to conquer: such is the first condition of victory, consequently the first duty of every soldier; and it is also the supreme resolution with which the commander must fill the soul of his subordinates.

"That necessitates, for an army that desires to conquer, the highest sort of command, and it necessitates in the man who undertakes to battle one important quality: the ability to command."

BATTLES OF 1918 FORESHADOWED

That commanders, not soldiers, win battles, is one of the cardinal points of Foch's beliefs. He is absolutely opposed to the theory of the "battle in line," in which, the engagement having become general, the commander relies on chance or inspiration for the next move. That there are instances of this sort of thing which have brought success he acknowledges; but he cogently remarks: "In every lottery there are fortunate men who win a prize, yet no sensible person depends on lotteries as a means to fortune." He summarizes his objections to the battle in line as follows:

"The engagement is general and needs to be supported everywhere; forces being used up,



The Firing Line in Flanders

German soldiers are firing on the enemy from their trench. Note that loopholes were made of small wooden boxes and sewer pipes. The entrance to the dug-out where the men lived is seen below.

Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly.

they are renewed, replaced or increased. The result is a constant wearing-down, against which one struggles until the result is obtained from one or more lucky actions of the troops, subaltern leaders or soldiers, always from some source of secondary importance which can only employ a part of the resources available.

"The total is made up of a series of more or less similar minor battles, out of the control of the higher command.

"It is an inferior form of battle, therefore, if we compare it with the battle of maneuvers, depending on the leadership of the Commander-in-Chief, on judicious and combined use of resources at hand, on the value of *all* these resources, true economy of forces aiming at the concentration of efforts and of masses on one chosen point. Till the last it remains a single combination of combats differing in their intensity, but all aimed in one direction for the purpose of accomplishing one final result: *the foreseen, determined and sudden action of masses employing surprise.*"

Is that not Foch's great battle of 1918 in a nutshell?—those carefully-prepared, concentric blows, wide apart but coördinated, delivered suddenly, when and where the enemy could not predetermine, all with one objective, the destruction of the German Army. Yet those words were written in 1900!

IV

THE RESERVE AS A SLEDGE-HAMMER IN ATTACK

FOCH continues his criticism of the battle in line as against the coördinated battle of maneuver in these words:

"In the battle in line, tactics merely consist in overcoming hostile resistance by a slow and progressive wear of the enemy's resources; for that purpose, the fight is kept up everywhere. It must be supported, and such is the use made of the reserves. They become warehouses into which one dips to replace the wear and tear as it occurs. Art consists in still having a reserve when the opponent no longer has one, so as to have the last word in a struggle in

which wearing-down is the only argument employed. In that case, the reserves have no place chosen in advance; there must be some everywhere, ready to be employed wherever needed to continue action on the whole front. They are gradually absorbed, and their only purpose is to keep the battle from dying out.

"In the battle of maneuvers, the reserve is a sledge-hammer planned and carefully preserved to execute the only action from which any decisive result is expected: the final attack. The reserve is meanwhile husbanded with the utmost caution, in order that the tool may be as strong, the blow as violent, as possible.

"Finally, it is thrust into the struggle boldly, with a firm determination to carry a chosen point. Employed for that purpose as a mass, in an action surpassing in energy and violence all the other stages of the battle, it has but one objective.

"According to Napoleon, there was *no general reserve as such*. He had troops reserved, but for the purpose of maneuvering and of attacking with more energy than the others....


"The battle in line is a principle of the French Army of 1870, or rather the absence of principle as to the conduct of the battle. It is a case of everyone for himself, defeat being always officially due to the arrival of strong reinforcements on the German line; but these reinforcements were precisely troops reserved and brought in numbers to that point to create the demoralization by which armies are destroyed.

"This wording of our official reports shows also that if these fresh troops had come to us, it is only as reinforcements that they would have been used, for distribution all along the line, and not as a means to an action of which nobody thought."

"Attack! Attack! Attack!" Constantly, in the elucidation of his principles, Foch rings the changes on that slogan. It is never absent from a page of his book. It was never absent for a moment from his thoughts when at last he put his principles to the test.

This résumé of his principles may be concluded with the following typical Foch sentence:

"The various phases of the battle remain the same: To prepare the decisive attack; to execute the decisive attack; to profit by the decisive attack."



④ *Underwood and Underwood.*

Big French Guns Being Rushed to the Front

These huge weapons were brought up by the French when they reinforced the British during the German drive in Flanders in March, 1918.

HAIG'S OWN STORY OF THE WAR

Decisive Factors of Britain's Military Machine Set Forth by the British Commander In a Complete Final Report

WITH his final official chronicle of the advance of the British armies into Germany, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, commander-in-chief of the British Armies on the Western front, issued a complete summary of all the operations under his leadership during the war, viewing them as one great battle. This summary constitutes one of the most comprehensive and valuable historical documents on the great conflict.

The deductions drawn by the British commander are applicable by no means to the British alone but to combatants in general. He gives a bird's-eye view of the tremendous struggle on the Western front, always viewing it as a harmonious whole, with interlocking parts, never treating any one operation as self-contained, invariably singling out the "high lights," the salient features that imprinted upon the series of battles in the British zone their special character. He emphasizes not only the new lessons learned but the instances where it was found that old theories remained sound in spite of sweeping changes in the technique of warfare.

I

THE WEARING DOWN PROCESS

RIGHT at the start of his review the British commander sets forth its underlying scheme in these words:

"In this, my final dispatch, I think it desirable to comment briefly upon certain general features which concern the whole series of operations carried out under my command. I am urged thereto by the conviction that neither the course of the war itself nor the military lessons to be drawn therefrom can properly be comprehended unless the long succession of battles commenced on the Somme in 1916 and

ended in November of last year on the Sambre are viewed as forming part of one great and continuous engagement.

"To direct attention to any single phase of that stupendous and incessant struggle and seek in it the explanation of our success, to the exclusion or neglect of other phases, possibly less striking in their immediate or obvious consequences, is, in my opinion, to risk the formation of unsound doctrines regarding the character and requirements of modern war.

"If the operations of the past 4½ years are regarded as a single continuous campaign, there can be recognized in them the same general features and the same necessary stages which, between forces of approximately equal strength, have marked all the conclusive battles of history. There is in the first instance the preliminary stage of the campaign in which the opposing forces seek to deploy and maneuver for position, endeavoring while doing so to gain some early advantage which might be pushed home to quick decision. This phase came to an end in the present war with the creation of continuous trench lines from the Swiss frontier to the sea.

"Battle having been joined, there follows the period of real struggle in which the main forces of the two belligerent Armies are pitted against each other in close and costly combat. Each commander seeks to wear down the power of resistance of his opponent and to pin him to his position, while preserving or accumulating in his own hands a powerful reserve force with which he can maneuver, and when signs of the enemy becoming morally and physically weakened are observed, deliver the decisive attack. The greatest possible pressure against the enemy's whole front must be maintained, especially when the crisis of the battle approaches. Then every man, horse, and gun is required to coöperate, so as to com-

plete the enemy's overthrow and exploit success.

"In the stage of the wearing out struggle losses will necessarily be heavy on both sides, for in it the price of victory is paid. If the opposing forces are approximately equal in numbers, in courage, in morale and in equipment, there is no way of avoiding payment of the price or of eliminating this phase of the struggle.

"In former battles this stage of the conflict has rarely lasted more than a few days, and has often been completed in a few hours. When Armies of millions are engaged, with the resources of great Empires behind them, it will inevitably be long. It will include violent crises of fighting which, when viewed separately and apart from the general perspective, will appear individually as great indecisive battles. To this stage belong the great engagements of 1916 and 1917 which wore down the strength of the German Armies.

"Finally, whether from the superior fighting ability and leadership of one of the belligerents as the result of greater resources or tenacity or by reason of higher morale, or from a combination of all these causes, the time will come when the other side will begin to weaken and the climax of the battle is reached. Then the commander of the weaker side must choose whether he will break off the engagement, if he can, while there is yet time, or stake on a supreme effort what reserves remain to him. The launching and destruction of Napoleon's last reserves at Waterloo was a matter of minutes. In this World War the great sortie of the beleaguered German Armies, commenced on the 21st March, 1918, lasted for four months, yet it represents a corresponding stage in a single colossal battle."

II

GOVERNING FACTORS IN THE WAR

MARSHAL HAIG declares that the duration of the war was governed by certain definite factors which he enumerates as follows:

"In the first place, we were unprepared for war, or at any rate for a war of such magni-



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Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig
Commander-in-chief of the British forces in Europe.

tude. We were deficient in both trained men and military material, and, what was more important, had no machinery ready by which either men or material could be produced in anything approaching the requisite quantities. The consequences were twofold. First, the necessary machinery had to be improvised hurriedly, and improvisation is never economical and seldom satisfactory. In this case the high-

munity had to be watched with the greatest care. During the battles of 1917 ammunition was plentiful, but the gun situation was a source of constant anxiety. Only in 1918 was it possible to conduct artillery operations independently of any limiting consideration other than that of transport.

"The second consequence of our unpreparedness was that our Armies were unable to



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After the Battle

The Commander-in-Chief of the British forces is congratulating the Canadians for their fine work in smashing through the German lines in September, 1918.

water mark of our fighting strength in infantry was only reached after two and a half years of conflict, by which time heavy casualties had already been incurred. In consequence, the full man power of the Empire was never developed in the field at any period of the war.

"As regards material, it was not until mid-summer, 1916, that the artillery situation became even approximately adequate to the conduct of major operations. Throughout the Somme battle the expenditure of artillery am-

intervene, either at the outset of the war or until nearly two years had elapsed, in sufficient strength adequately to assist our Allies. The enemy was able to gain a notable initial advantage by establishing himself in Belgium and northern France, and throughout the early stages of the war was free to concentrate an undue proportion of his effectives against France and Russia. The excessive burden thrown upon the gallant Army of France during this period caused them losses, the effect of which has been felt all through the war

and has directly influenced its length. Just as at no time were we an Empire able to put our own full strength into the field, so at no time were the Allies as a whole able completely to develop and obtain the full effect from their greatly superior man power. What might have been the effect of British intervention on a larger scale in the earlier stages of the war is shown by what was actually achieved by our original Expeditionary Force.

present war was undoubtedly based on similar principles. The margin by which the German onrush in 1914 was stemmed was so narrow and the subsequent struggle so severe that the word 'miraculous' is hardly too strong a term to describe the recovery and ultimate victory of the Allies.

"A further cause adversely influencing the duration of the war on the Western front during its later stages, and one following in-



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Guarding the Powder Magazine in Hyde Park, London

"It is interesting to note that in previous campaigns the side which has been fully prepared for war has almost invariably gained a rapid and complete success over its less well prepared opponent. In 1866 and 1870, Austria, and then France, were overwhelmed at the outset by means of superior preparation. The initial advantages derived therefrom were followed up by such vigorous and ruthless action, regardless of loss, that there was no time to recover from the first stunning blows. The German plan of campaign in the

directly from that just stated, was the situation in other theaters. The military strength of Russia broke down in 1917 at a critical period, when, had she been able to carry out her military engagements, the war might have been shortened by a year. At a later date, the military situation in Italy in the autumn of 1917 necessitated the transfer of five British divisions from France to Italy, at a time when their presence in France might have had far-reaching effects.

"Thirdly, the Allies were handicapped in



their task and the war thereby lengthened by the inherent difficulties always associated with the combined action of Armies of separate nationalities, differing in speech and temperament, and, not least important, in military organization, equipment, and supply.

FRONTAL ATTACKS NECESSARY

"Finally, the huge numbers of men engaged on either side, whereby a continuous



© G. P. Putnam's Sons.

Situation Shortly Vacant

"In an old fashioned house in France an opening will shortly occur for a young man with good prospects of getting a rise." (Cartoon by Bairnsfather.)

battle front was rapidly established from Switzerland to the sea, outflanking was made impossible and maneuver very difficult, necessitated the delivery of frontal attacks. This factor, combined with the strength of the defensive under modern conditions, rendered a protracted wearing-out battle unavoidable before the enemy's power of resistance could be overcome. So long as the opposing forces are at the outset approximately equal in numbers and morale, and there are no flanks to turn, a long struggle for supremacy is inevitable."

III

BIG LOSSES OF ALL BELLIGERENTS

PARTICULARLY interesting are the Field Marshal's remarks on casualties. General unpreparedness, he finds, was responsible for the loss of many thousand brave Britons. Nevertheless, despite the huge casualty lists which struck myriads of households with grief during the weary months of the war, the British commander is of the opinion that most of the losses incurred were unavoidable. Writing in April, 1919, he says:

"Given, however, the military situation existing in August, 1914, our total losses in the war have been no larger than were to be expected. Neither do they compare unfavorably with those of any other of the belligerent nations, so far as figures are available, from which comparison can be made. The total British casualties in all theaters of war, killed, wounded, missing, and prisoners, including native troops, are approximately three millions (3,076,388). Of this total some two and a half millions (2,568,834) were incurred on the Western front.

"The total French losses, killed, missing, and prisoners, but exclusive of wounded, have been given officially as approximately 1,831,000. If an estimate for wounded is added, the total can scarcely be less than 4,800,000, and of this total it is fair to assume that over four millions were incurred on the Western front.

"The published figures for Italy, killed and wounded only, exclusive of prisoners, amount to 1,400,000, of which practically the whole were incurred in the Western theater of war.

"Figures have also been published for Germany and Austria. The total German casualties, killed, wounded, missing, and prisoners, are given at approximately six and a half millions (6,485,000), of which the vastly greater proportion must have been incurred on the Western front, where the bulk of the German forces were concentrated and the hardest fighting took place. In view of the fact, however, that the number of German prisoners is definitely known to be considerably understated, these figures must be accepted with reserve.

"The losses of Austria-Hungary in killed,



Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly.

The Harvest of Death

A photograph taken somewhere in Flanders after one of the innumerable combats that wore down the contending armies at the rate of more than 15,000 a day. The battle lines were vast cemeteries, where the living fought over the resting places of the dead.

missing, and prisoners are given as approximately two and three-quarter millions (2,772,000). An estimate of wounded would give a total of over four and a half millions.

"The extent of our casualties, like the duration of the war, was dependent on certain definite factors which can be stated shortly.

"In the first place, the military situation compelled us, particularly during the first portion of the war, to make great efforts before we had developed our full strength in the field or properly equipped and trained our Armies. These efforts were wasteful of men, but in the circumstances they could not be avoided. The only alternative was to do nothing and see our French Allies overwhelmed by the enemy's superior numbers.

"During the second half of the war, and that part embracing the critical and costly period of the wearing-out battle, the losses previously suffered by our Allies laid upon the British Armies in France an increasing share in the burden of attack. From the opening of the Somme Battle in 1916 to the termination of hostilities the British Armies were subjected to a strain of the utmost severity which never ceased, and consequently had little or no opportunity for the rest and training they so greatly needed.

"In addition to these particular considerations, certain general factors peculiar to modern war made for the inflation of losses. The great strength of modern field defenses and the power and precision of modern weapons, the multiplication of machine guns, trench mortars, and artillery of all natures, the employment of gas and the rapid development of the aeroplane as a formidable agent of destruction against both men and material, all combined to increase the price to be paid for victory.

NEVER BEFORE SUCH MASSES OF MEN

"If only for these reasons, no comparisons can usefully be made between the relative losses incurred in this war and any previous war. There is, however, the further consideration that the issues involved in this stupendous struggle were far greater than those concerned in any other war in recent history. Our existence as an Empire and civilization itself, as it is understood by the free Western

nations, were at stake. Men fought as they have never fought before in masses.

"Despite our own particular handicaps and the foregoing general considerations, it is satisfactory to note that, as the result of the courage and determination of our troops, and the high level of leadership generally maintained, our losses even in attack over the whole period of the battle compare favorably with those inflicted on our opponents. The approximate total of our battle casualties in all arms, and including overseas troops, from the commencement of the Somme Battle in 1916 to the conclusion of the Armistice is 2,140,000. The calculation of German losses is obviously a matter of great difficulty. It is estimated, however, that the number of casualties inflicted on the enemy by British troops during the above period exceeds two and a half millions."

IV

THE VALUE OF A VIGOROUS OFFENSIVE


HAIG'S views on the relative value of offensive and defensive warfare have the true Foch ring. He believes in the attack. The object of all war in history, he points out, and a purely defensive attitude can never bring it.

"The idea that a war can be won by standing on the defensive and waiting for the enemy to attack," he says, "is a dangerous fallacy, which owes its inception to the desire to evade the price of victory. It is an axiom that decisive success in battle can be gained only by a vigorous offensive. The principle here stated has long been recognized as being fundamental, and is based on the universal teaching of military history in all ages. The course of the present war has proved it to be correct."

The Germans, then, were fated to find both in Foch and Haig adversaries who, even if thrown temporarily on the defensive by special circumstances, were never inclined to accept it definitively, but always were awaiting the moment to regain their ascendancy by reverting to the attack. In Foch this belief, driven home constantly in his famous *Principles of War*, is basic, ever-present. He was fortunate to have in Haig a colleague who

recognized its soundness. And the Germans, whose god of war is the god of attack, were doomed, in attacking Foch and Haig, to meet two generals in whose plans the defensive was always an intrusion, the offensive the true solution of all problems.

soil, especially if its standard of discipline is high, may maintain a successful defense for a protracted period, in the hope that victory may be gained elsewhere or that the enemy may tire or weaken in his resolution and accept a compromise. The resistance of the Ger-



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Reinforcements for the Front

A British official photograph of the bomb-room in a large fuse factory.

Haig elaborates his ideas on this subject as follows:

"A defensive rôle sooner or later brings about a distinct lowering of the morale of the troops, who imagine that the enemy must be the better man, or at least more numerous, better equipped with and better served by artillery or other mechanical aids to victory. Once the mass of the defending infantry become possessed of such ideas, the battle is as good as lost. An army fighting on enemy

man Armies was undoubtedly prolonged in this fashion, but in the end the persistence of our troops had its natural effect.

"Further, a defensive policy involves the loss of the initiative, with all the consequent disadvantages to the defender. The enemy is able to choose at his own convenience the time and place of his attacks. Not being influenced himself by the threat of attack from his opponent, he can afford to take risks, and by greatly weakening his front in some places

can concentrate an overwhelming force elsewhere with which to attack. The defender, on the other hand, becomes almost entirely ignorant of the dispositions and plans of his opponent, who is thus in a position to effect a surprise. This was clearly exemplified during the fighting of 1918. As long as the enemy was attacking, he obtained fairly full information regarding our dispositions. Captured documents show that, as soon as he was thrown once more on the defensive and the initiative returned to the Allies, he was kept in comparative ignorance of our plans and dispositions. The consequence was that the Allies were able to effect many surprises, both strategic and tactical."

GERMAN ARMIES WEAKENED BY ATTRITION

In previous utterances Marshal Haig always held to the belief that the battles of 1916 and 1917—the Somme, Vimy, Messines, Passchendaele—which, to many, looked like a useless sacrifice of life for gains relatively incommensurate, were extremely valuable as steps toward final victory. Subsequent developments have not changed his view. He reiterates it thus in his final summing up of the war:

"The rapid collapse of Germany's military powers in the latter half of 1918 was the logical outcome of the fighting of the previous two years. It would not have taken place but for that period of ceaseless attrition which used up the reserves of the German Armies, while the constant and growing pressure of the blockade sapped with more deadly insistence from year to year at the strength and resolution of the German people. It is in the great battles of 1916 and 1917 that we have to seek for the secret of our victory in 1918.

"Doubtless, the end might have come sooner had we been able to develop the military resources of our Empire more rapidly and with a higher degree of concentration, or had not the defection of Russia in 1917 given our enemies a new lease of life.

"So far as the military situation is concerned, in spite of the great accession of strength which Germany received as the result of the defection of Russia, the battles of 1916 and 1917 had so far weakened her Armies that the effort they made in 1918 was

insufficient to secure victory. Moreover, the effect of the battles of 1916 and 1917 was not confined to loss of German man power. The moral effects of those battles were enormous, both in the German Army and in Germany. By their means our soldiers established over the German soldier a moral superiority which they held in an ever increasing degree until the end of the war, even in the difficult days of March and April, 1918."

V


CAVALRY IN WAR NOT A BACK NUMBER

IT is interesting to note that Haig pays tribute to the value of cavalry. Himself a cavalry general before the war, he has not seen in this war, as many have professed to see, the knell of that arm of the service, to which so many victories have been credited in wars of the past. It was the long duration of trench warfare, according to Haig, that brought doubts to men's minds as to the value of the mounted arm. As soon as the trench deadlock was broken things became different.

"In the light of the full experience of the war," he declares, "the decision to preserve the Cavalry Corps has been completely justified. It has been proved that cavalry, whether used for shock effect under suitable conditions or as mobile infantry, have still an indispensable part to play in modern war. Moreover, it cannot safely be assumed that in all future wars the flanks of the opposing forces will rest in neutral states or impassable obstacles. Whenever such a condition does not obtain opportunities for the use of cavalry must arise frequently.

"Throughout the great retirement in 1914, our cavalry covered the retirement and protected the flanks of our columns against the onrush of the enemy, and on frequent occasions prevented our infantry from being overrun by the enemy's cavalry. Later in the same year at Ypres, their mobility multiplied their value as a reserve, enabling them rapidly to reinforce threatened portions of our line.

"During the critical period of position warfare, when the trial of strength between the opposing forces took place, the absence of



Lancaster Times History.

The Great Somme Offensive, 1918

British infantry charging a German position at Montaubon.—From a drawing by an artist attached to the British forces.


room to maneuver made the importance of cavalry less apparent. Even under such conditions, however, valuable results may be expected from the employment of a strong force of cavalry when, after there has been severe fighting on one or more fronts, a surprise attack is made on another front. Such an occasion arose in the operations before Cambrai at the close of 1917, when the cavalry were of the greatest service; while throughout the whole period of trench fighting they constituted an important mobile reserve.

"At a later date, when circumstances found

cavalry at this period was a marked feature of the battle. Had the German command had at their disposal even two or three well-trained cavalry divisions, a wedge might have been driven between the French and British Armies. Their presence could not have failed to have added greatly to the difficulties of our task.

MOUNTED TROOPS ON THE ENEMY'S HEELS

"In the actions already referred to east of Amiens, the cavalry were again able to dem-



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General Gouraud Addressing His Cavalry

The commander of the Allied forces on the right of the Marne salient is shown reviewing his cavalry during their pursuit of the Germans to the Aisne river in 1918.

us operating once more in comparatively open country, cavalry proved themselves of value in their true *rôle*. During the German offensive in March, 1918, the superior mobility of cavalry fully justified their existence. At the commencement of the battle, cavalry were used under the Fifth Army over wide fronts. So great, indeed, became the need for mounted men that certain units which had but recently been dismounted were hurriedly provided with horses and did splendid service. Frequently, when it was impossible to move forward other troops in time, our mounted troops were able to fill gaps in our line and restore the situation. The absence of hostile

onstrate the great advantage which their power of rapid concentration gives them in a surprise attack. Operating in close concert with both armored cars and infantry, they pushed ahead of the latter and by anticipating the arrival of German reserves assisted materially in our success. In the battle of October the 8th they were responsible for saving the Cambrai-Le Cateau-St. Quentin Railway from complete destruction. Finally, during the culminating operations of the war, when the German Armies were falling back in disorganized masses, a new situation arose which demanded the use of mounted troops. Then our cavalry, pressing hard upon the enemy's heels, hastened

his retreat and threw him into worse confusion. At such a time the moral effect of cavalry is overwhelming and is in itself a sufficient reason for the retention of that arm.

"On the morning of the Armistice, two British Cavalry Divisions were on the march east of the Scheldt, and before the orders to stop reached them they had already gained a line ten miles in front of our infantry outposts. There is no doubt that, had the advance of the cavalry been allowed to continue,

during the last stages of the struggle contributed powerfully to their success. But Haig the soldier, the leader of men, speaks again in these sentences:

"It should never be forgotten, however, that weapons of this character are incapable of effective independent action. They do not in themselves possess the power to obtain a decision, their real function being to assist the infantry to get to grips with their opponents. To place in them a reliance out of proportion



Disguised British Guns

In the winter campaigns when no leafy boughs were available, gunners were forced to trust to bare limbs to camouflage their batteries from enemy aviators.

the enemy's disorganized retreat would have been turned into a rout."

VI

"A MAN'S A MAN FOR A' THAT"

HAIG pays tribute to the services rendered by highly-developed mechanical contrivances that came to the front in the great war—motor transport, heavy artillery, trench mortars, machine guns, aeroplanes, tanks, gas, barbed wire, etc.—and declares that the superiority of the Allies in the possession of these

to their real utility, to imagine, for example, that tanks and aeroplanes can take the place of infantry and artillery, would be to do a disservice to those who have the future of these new weapons most at heart by robbing them of the power to use them to their best effect.

"Every mechanical device so far produced is dependent for its most effective use upon the closest possible association with other arms, and in particular with infantry and artillery. Aeroplanes must rely upon infantry to prevent the enemy from overrunning their aerodromes, and, despite their increasing range and versatility of action, are clearly incapable

in themselves of bringing about a decision. Tanks require the closest artillery support to enable them to reach their objectives without falling victims to the enemy's artillery, and are dependent upon the infantry to hold the position they have won.


"As an instance of the interdependence of artillery and tanks, we may take the actions fought east of Amiens on August 8, 1918, and following days. A very large number of tanks were employed in these operations, and they carried out their tasks in the most

VII

THE ARMY'S DEBT TO SCIENCE

HAVING made clear his belief as to the relative value of the human and mechanical factors of warfare, the British commander takes care to show that he is by no means blind to the enormous value of the latter. He acknowledges indebtedness to science in these interesting sections of his summary:

"This war has given no new principles; but



The Wright-Martin Military Reconnaissance Machine of 1917—150 Horsepower

brilliant manner. Yet a scrutiny of the artillery ammunition returns for this period discloses the fact that in no action of similar dimensions had the expenditure of ammunition been so great.

"Immense as the influence of mechanical devices may be, they cannot by themselves decide a campaign. Their true rôle is that of assisting the infantryman, which they have done in a most admirable manner. They cannot replace him. Only by the rifle and bayonet of the infantryman * can the decisive victory be won."


* This judgment is confirmed by the fact that the highest per cent. of casualties was suffered by the infantry.—Ed.

the different mechanical appliances above mentioned—and in particular the rapid improvement and multiplication of aeroplanes, the use of immense numbers of machine guns and Lewis guns, the employment of vast quantities of barbed wire as effective obstacles, the enormous expansion of artillery and the provision of great masses of motor transport—have introduced new problems of considerable complexity concerning the effective coöperation of the different arms and services. Much thought has had to be bestowed upon determining how new devices could be combined in the best manner with the machinery already working.

"The development of the Air Service is a matter of general knowledge, and figures showing something of the work done by our airmen were included in my last Despatch. The combining of their operations with those of the other arms, and particularly of the artillery, has been the subject of constant study

modification of training and methods both for attack and defense, and resulted ultimately in the establishment of the Machine Gun Corps under an Inspector-General.

"During the same period, the growth of our artillery was even more remarkable, its numbers and power increasing out of all propor-



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Back to Open Fighting on the Western Front

Trench warfare was gradually abandoned after the great Allied offensive that finally resulted in the armistice. In the open style of fighting the machine-gun played an important part. This official photograph shows a British unit lying in ambush with a Lewis gun only 100 yards from the German lines.

and experiment, giving results of the very highest value.

A MACHINE GUN TO 20 INFANTRYMEN

"As regards machine guns, from a proportion of one gun to approximately 500 infantrymen in 1914, our establishment of machine guns and Lewis guns had risen at the end of 1918 to one machine gun or Lewis gun to approximately 20 infantrymen. This great expansion was necessarily accompanied by a

tion to the experience of previous wars. The 486 pieces of light and medium artillery with which we took the field in August, 1914, were represented at the date of the Armistice by 6,437 guns and howitzers of all natures, including pieces of the heaviest caliber.

"This vast increase so profoundly influenced the employment of artillery and was accompanied by so intimate an association with other arms and services that it merits special comment.

"In the first place, big changes were re-

quired in artillery organization, as well as important decisions concerning the proportions in which the different natures of artillery and artillery ammunition should be manufactured. These changes and decisions were made during 1916, and resulted in the existing artillery organization of the British Armies in France.

"In order to gain the elasticity essential to the quick concentration of guns at the decisive point, to enable the best use to be made of them and to facilitate ammunition supply and fire control, Artillery Commanders, acting under Army and Corps Commanders, were introduced and Staffs provided for them. This enabled the large concentrations of guns required for our offensives to be quickly absorbed and efficiently directed. The proportions required of guns to howitzers and of the lighter to the heavier natures were determined by certain factors, namely, the problem of setting in the comparatively limited areas available the great numbers of pieces required for an offensive; the 'lives' of the different types of guns and howitzers, that is the number of rounds which can be fired from them before they became unserviceable from wear, and questions of relative accuracy and fire effect upon particular kinds of targets.

"The results attained by the organization established in 1916 is in itself strong evidence of the soundness of the principles upon which it was based. It made possible a high degree of elasticity, and by the full and successful exploitation of all the means placed at its disposal by science and experience, ensured that the continuous artillery battle which began on the Somme should culminate, as it did, in the defeat of the enemy's guns.

"The great development of air photography, sound ranging, flash spotting, air-burst ranging and aerial observation brought counter-battery work and harassing fire both by day and night to a high state of perfection. Special progress was made in the art of engaging moving targets with fire controlled by observation from aeroplanes and balloons. The work of the Field Survey Sections in the location of hostile battery positions by re-section and the employment of accurate maps was brought into extended use. In combination with the work of the Calibration Sections in the accurate calibration of guns and by careful calculation of corrections of range required to

compensate for weather conditions, it became possible to a large extent to dispense with registration, whereby the chance of effecting surprise was greatly increased. In the operations east of Amiens on August 8, 1918, in which over 2,000 guns were employed, practically the whole of the batteries concentrated for the purpose of the attack opened fire for the first time on the actual morning of the assault.

"The use of smoke shell for covering the advance of our infantry and masking the enemy's positions was introduced and employed with increasing frequency and effect. New forms of gas shell were made available, and their combination with the infantry attack carefully studied. The invention of a new fuze known as '106,' which was first used in the battle of Arras, 1917, enabled wire entanglements to be easily and quickly destroyed, and so modified our methods of attacking organized positions. By bursting the shell the instant it touched the ground and before it had become buried, the destructive effect of the explosion was greatly increased. It became possible to cut wire with a far less expenditure of time and ammunition, and the factor of surprise was given a larger part in operations.

VIII

TREMENDOUS GROWTH OF ARTILLERY

AN examination of our principal attacks will give a good idea of the increasing importance of artillery. On the first day of the Somme Battle of 1916 the number of artillery personnel engaged was equal to about half the infantry strength of the attacking divisions. On this one day a total of nearly 13,000 tons of artillery ammunition was fired by us on the Western front. Our attacks at Arras and Messines on April 9 and June 7, 1917, saw the total expenditure of artillery ammunition nearly doubled on the first days of those battles, while the proportion of artillery personnel to infantry steadily grew.

"During the period following the opening of the Somme Battle, the predominance of our artillery over that of the enemy gradually in-





Photo by Major Jackson.

The French Town of Bethune as Seen from an Airplane

Bethune figured often in the war news. It was taken by the Germans early in the war and changed hands several times.

Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly.

creased, till at the time of the Arras Battle it had reached a maximum. In the course of the summer and autumn of 1917, however, the enemy constantly reinforced his artillery on our front, being enabled to do so owing to the relaxation of pressure elsewhere.

tack on July 31st, our artillery personnel amounted to over 80 per cent. of the infantry engaged in the principal attack on our front, and our total expenditure of artillery ammunition on this day exceeded 23,000 tons. During the succeeding weeks the battle of the



© Western Newspaper Union.

A British Field Gun in Action on the Salonika Front


A British official photograph showing one type of camouflage used by the Allies to conceal their guns from the enemy airplanes.

23,000 TONS OF METAL FIRED ON ONE DAY AT YPRES

"The battle of Ypres in the autumn of 1917 was one of intense struggle for artillery supremacy. By dint of reducing his artillery strength on other parts of the Western front, and by bringing guns from the east, the enemy definitely challenged the predominance of our artillery. In this battle, therefore, the proportion of our artillery to infantry strength was particularly large. In the opening at-

rival artilleries became ever more violent. On the two days, September 20th and 21st, about 42,000 tons of artillery ammunition were expended by us, and in the successful attack of October 4th, which gave us the main ridge about Broodseinde, our artillery personnel amounted to 85 per cent. of the infantry engaged in the assault.

"During the winter of 1917-1918 the enemy so greatly added to his artillery strength by batteries brought from the Russian front that in his spring offensive he was able tem-



From Textbook of Military Aeronautics.

How Big Howitzers Fire

This shows how the big howitzers were enabled to fire over hills and hit an unseen target by means of aeroplane spotting. The signal "Y" in the foreground of the picture was used to inform the observer to change to another target.

porarily to effect a definite local artillery superiority. This state of affairs was short-lived. Even before the breakdown of the German offensive, our guns had regained the upper hand. In the battles later in the year the superiority of our batteries once more grew rapidly, until the defeat of the German artillery became an accomplished fact. From the commencement of our offensive in August, 1918, to the conclusion of the Armistice, some

for frontal attacks made the employment of great masses of artillery essential.

"The massing of guns alone, however, could not have secured success without the closest possible combination between our batteries and the infantry they were called upon to support, as well as with the other arms. The expansion was accompanied, therefore, by a constant endeavor to improve the knowledge of all ranks of both artillery and infantry and



Photo by Dickie

Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly.

England Calls to Canadian Woodsmen

Of the twelve non-combatant battalions which up to January, 1917, the Dominion of Canada had sent overseas for duty, five were composed of Canadian woodsmen, later engaged in cutting timber in England for trench construction and other building work on the French battle front.

One of these units of lumber-jacks with part of its equipment is seen in the photograph.

700,000 tons of artillery ammunition were expended by the British Armies on the Western front. For the fortnight from August 21st to September 3rd, our average daily expenditure exceeded 11,000 tons, while for the three days of crucial battle on September 27th, 28th, and 29th, nearly 65,000 tons of ammunition were fired by our artillery.

"The tremendous growth of our artillery strength above described followed inevitably from the character of the wearing-out battle upon which we were engaged. The restricted opportunities for maneuver and the necessity

the air service concerning the work and possibilities of the other arms.

"An intelligent understanding of 'the other man's job' is the first essential of successful coöperation. To obtain the best results from the vast and complex machine composing a modern army, deep study of work other than one's own is necessary for all arms. For this study much time is needed, as well as much practical application of the principles evolved, and for reasons already explained, opportunity sufficient for adequate training could not be found. None the less, the best possible use

was made of such opportunities as offered, and much was in fact accomplished."

IX

THE ARMY BEHIND THE LINES

AFTER praising the admirable work of the Signal Service, Marshal Haig shows how the immense expansion of his army from six to over sixty infantry divisions, together with a constant increase in other arms, called for a corresponding development in the rearward services connected with the supply and maintenance of such vast forces in the field.


"As the Army grew," he says, "and became more complicated, the total feeding strength of our forces in France rose until it approached a total of 2,700,000 men. The vastness of the figures involved in providing for their needs will be realized from the following examples: For the maintenance of a single division for one day nearly 200 tons dead weight of supplies and stores are needed, representing a shipping tonnage of nearly 450 tons. In an army of 2,700,000 men, the addition of one ounce to each man's daily rations involves the carrying of an extra 75 tons of goods."

The organizations created to cope with these vast demands found their duties rendered even more arduous when the effects of Germany's submarine warfare began to be felt. If the armies in France were to be provided for, they must be as much as possible self-supporting, dependent as little as possible on the sea. Haig tells how this was achieved:

"Vast hospitals and convalescent depots capable of accommodating over 22,000 men were erected west of the Seine at Trouville. Additional General Hospitals with accommodation for over 7,000 patients were established in the neighborhood of Boulogne, Etaples, and elsewhere. Between January, 1916, and November, 1918, the total capacity of hospitals and convalescent depots in France grew from under 44,000 to over 157,000 persons.

"Great installations were set up for the manufacture of gun parts and articles of like nature, for the repair of damaged material as well as for the utilization of the vast quantities of articles of all kinds collected from the battlefields by the organization working under

the direction of the Controller of Salvage. The Forestry Directorate, controlling over 70 Canadian and other Forestry Companies, worked forests all over France, in the North-West, Central and South-West Departments, the Vosges, Jura, and Bordeaux country. As the result of its work our Armies were made practically independent of overseas imported timber. The Directorate of Agricultural Production organized farm and garden enterprises for the local supply of vegetables, har-



Sir Francis L. Bertle, the Former British Ambassador in Paris

vested the crops abandoned by the enemy in his retreat, and commenced the reclamation of the devastated area.


"At the same time, a great saving of shipping was effected by the speeding up of work at the docks. The average tonnage discharged per hour in port rose from 12½ tons in January, 1917, to 34½ tons in July, 1918; while the average number of days lost by ships waiting berth at the ports fell from some 90 ship days per week at the beginning of 1917 to about nine ship days per week in 1918.

"For the accommodation of so wide a range of services, installations of all kinds, hutments,

factories, workshops, storage for ammunition, clothing, meat and petrol, power houses and pumping stations, camps and hospitals, had to be planned and constructed by the Directorate of Works. Our business relations with the French, the obtaining of sites and buildings, called for the establishment of a Directorate of Hirings and Requisitions; while my Financial Adviser in France assisted in the adjustment of financial questions connected with the

"It is hardly too much to assert that, however seemingly extravagant in men and money, no system of supply except the most perfect should ever be contemplated. To give a single example, unless our supply services had been fully efficient the great advance carried out by our Armies during the autumn of last year could not have been achieved.

"Wars may be won or lost by the standard



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British Artillery in Action

An official photograph taken in the summer of 1918 showing a part of the British artillery which drove back the Germans in the last victorious Allied drive.

use of French railways and harbors, the exploitation of French forests and similar matters. The safeguarding from fire of the great number of buildings erected or taken over by us and of the masses of accumulated stores was entrusted to a definite staff under the supervision of a fire expert."

SUPPLY SERVICE A VITAL FACTOR

The British commander sums up his views on the supreme importance of the part played by the service of the rear in these words:

of health and morale of the opposing forces. Morale depends to a very large extent upon the feeding and general well-being of the troops. Badly supplied troops will invariably be low in morale, and an army ravaged by disease ceases to be a fighting force. The feeding and health of the fighting forces are dependent upon the rearward services, and so it may be argued that with the rearward services rests victory or defeat. In our case we can justly say that our supply system has been developed into one of the most perfect in the world."

X

IDEAS NOT ANTIQUATED BE-
CAUSE OLD


MARSHAL HAIG, it has been said, does not believe that the lessons of the war have superseded all previous lessons derived from other wars. Foch, in his *Principles of War*, written years before the outbreak of the struggle just ended, prophesied that, however vast the theater of war might be in the future, however complicated the problems arising from the springing to arms of entire nations, the basic truths of war would remain immutable and commanders be compelled to condition all their strategy on these unchanging truths. The British leader shares this view, as may be seen from these sentences in his summary of the war:

"The experience gained in this war alone, without the study and practice of lessons learned from other campaigns, could not have sufficed to meet the ever-changing tactics which have characterized the fighting. There was required also the sound basis of military knowledge supplied by our Training Manuals and Staff Colleges.

"The principles of command, Staff work, and organization elaborated before the war have stood the test imposed upon them and are sound. The militarily educated officer has counted for much, and the good work done by our Staff Colleges during the past 30 years has had an important influence upon the successful issue of the war. In solving the various strategic and tactical problems with which we have been faced, in determining principles of training and handling of troops and in the control and elaboration of Army organization generally, the knowledge acquired by previous study and application has been invaluable. Added to this have been the efficiency and smoothness of working resulting from standardization of principles, assisted in many cases by the previous personal acquaintance at the Staff College of those called upon to work together in the field.

"The course of the war has brought out very clearly the value of an efficient and well-trained High Command, in which I include not merely commanders of higher formations, but their Staffs also.

"This has been the first time in our history that commanders have had to be provided for such large forces. Before the war, no one of our generals had commanded even an Army Corps such as has been used as a subsidiary formation in the battles of the last few years. In consequence, commanders have been faced with problems very different to those presented by the small units with which they had been accustomed to train in peace. That they exercised their commands with such success as most of them did shows, I venture to think, that their training was based on sound principles and conducted on practical lines.



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A Clean Shot

A hole made by a single shell in the wall of a house in France, showing the ruins of a church in the background.

"Similarly as regards the Staff, the magnitude of our operations introduced a situation for which no precedent existed. The Staff Colleges had only produced a reserve of Staff officers adequate to the needs of our Army on a peace footing, and for the mobilization of the Expeditionary Force of six divisions. Consequently, on the expansion of the Army during the war many officers had to be recruited for Staff appointments—from good regular officers chiefly, but also from officers of our new Armies—and trained for the new duties required of them. Though numbers of excellent Staff officers were provided in this way, it was found as a general rule that the relative efficiency in Staff duties of men who had passed through the Staff Colleges, as compared with men who had not had that advantage, was unquestionably greater. . . .

"It may be accepted as a general rule that previous organization should be upset as little as possible in war. As each war has certain special conditions, so some modification of existing ideas and practices will be necessary, but if our principles are sound these will be few and unimportant. In the present war, new organizations and establishments for dealing with the demands of both the fighting and the rearward services have been brought into

PRE-WAR PRINCIPLES SOUND

"As the result of our own experience and that of the French during the fighting of 1915, all kinds of trench weapons were invented: bombs, bomb throwers, mortars, and even such instruments as trench diggers. In those days the opinion was freely expressed that the war would be finished in the trenches and every effort was made to win victories in



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Barbed Wire for Defense

British engineers taking up reels of wire during the great German offensive of 1918 with which to construct new entanglements.

being continually, and added to or absorbed by our existing organization and establishment.

"The constant birth of new ideas has demanded the exercise of the greatest care, not only to ensure that no device or suggestion of real value should be overlooked or discouraged, but also to regulate the enthusiasm of the specialist and prevent each new development assuming dimensions out of proportion to its real value. As the war went on, their number was very great.

the trenches themselves. In consequence, rifle shooting was forgotten and was fast becoming a lost art. Similarly as regards artillery, the idea of dominating and defeating the hostile artillery before proceeding to the infantry attack was considered an impossibility.

"Then followed the experience of the battle of the Somme in 1916, which showed that the principles of our pre-war training were as sound as ever. That autumn a revival of old methods was inaugurated. Musketry shooting was everywhere carried out, and bay-

onet fighting was taught as the really certain way of gaining supremacy in hand-to-hand fighting. At the same time . . . the greatest care was devoted to artillery shooting, as well as to the training of all arms for open fighting. The events of the next two years fully confirmed the lessons drawn from the battle of the Somme. In short, the longer the war has lasted the more emphatically has it been realized that our original organization and training were based on correct principles. The danger of altering them too much, to deal with some temporary phase, has been greater than the risk of adjusting them too little."

XI

ENGLAND'S CITIZEN SOLDIERS

THE feature of the war," says Marshal Haig, "which to the historian may well appear the most noteworthy is the creation of our new armies." And he adds:

"To have built up successfully in the very midst of war a great new Army on a more than Continental scale, capable of beating the best troops of the strongest military nation of pre-war days, is an achievement of which the whole Empire may be proud. The total of over 327,000 German prisoners captured by us on the Western front is in striking contrast to the force of six divisions, comprising some 80,000 fighting men all told, with which we entered the war. That we should have been able to accomplish this stupendous task is due partly to the loyalty and devotion of our Allies and to the splendid work of the Royal Navy, but mainly to the wonderful spirit of the British race in all parts of the world.

"Discipline has never had such a vindication in any war as in the present one, and it is their discipline which most distinguishes our new Armies from all similarly created Armies of the past. At the outset the lack of deep-seated and instinctive discipline placed our new troops at a disadvantage compared with the methodically trained enemy. This disadvantage, however, was overcome, and during the last two years the discipline of all ranks of our new Armies, from whatever part of the Empire they have come, was excellent. Born from a widespread and intelligent appre-

ciation of the magnitude of the issues at stake and a firm belief in the justice of our cause, it drew strength and permanence from a common-sense recognition of what discipline really means—from a general realization that true discipline demands as much from officers as from men, and that without mutual trust, understanding, and confidence on the part of all ranks the highest form of discipline is impossible.

"Drawn from every sphere of life, from every profession, department, and industry of the British Empire, and thrust suddenly into a totally new situation full of unknown difficulties, all ranks have devoted their lives and energies to the service of their country in the whole-hearted manner which the magnitude of the issues warranted. The policy of putting complete trust in subordinate commanders and of allowing them a free hand in the choice of means to attain their object has proved most successful. Young officers, whatever their previous education may have been, have learned their duties with enthusiasm and speed, and have accepted their responsibilities unflinchingly.

OFFICERS FROM ALL RANKS OF SOCIETY

"Our universities and public schools throughout the Empire have proved once more, as they have proved time and again in the past, that in the formation of character, which is the root of discipline, they have no rivals. Not that universities and public schools enjoy a monopoly of the qualities which make good officers. The life of the British Empire generally has proved sound under the severest tests, and, while giving men whom it is an honor for any officer to command, has furnished officers of the highest standard from all ranks of society and all quarters of the world.

"Promotion has been entirely by merit, and the highest appointments were open to the humblest provided he had the necessary qualifications of character, skill, and knowledge. Many instances could be quoted of men who from civil or comparatively humble occupations have risen to important commands. A schoolmaster, a lawyer, a taxicab driver, and an ex-Sergeant-Major have commanded brigades; one editor has commanded a division, and another held successfully the position of

Senior Staff Officer to a Regular division; the under-cook of a Cambridge College, a clerk to the Metropolitan Water Board, an insurance clerk, an architect's assistant, and a police inspector became efficient General Staff Officers; a Mess Sergeant, a railway signalman, a coal miner, a market gardener, an assistant secretary to a haberdasher's company, a Quartermaster-Sergeant and many private soldiers have risen to command battalions; clerks have commanded batteries; a schoolmaster, a collier, the son of a blacksmith, an iron moulder, an instructor in tailoring, an assistant gas engineer, a grocer's assistant, as well as policemen, clerks, and privates, have commanded companies or acted as adjutants.

"As a body, and with few exceptions, new officers have understood that the care of their men must be their first consideration, that their men's comforts and well-being should at all times come before their own, that without this they cannot expect to win the affection, confidence, loyalty, and obedience of those they are privileged to command, or to draw the best from them. Moreover, they have known how to profit by the experience of others, and in common with their men they have turned willingly to the members of the old Regular Army for instruction and guidance in all branches of their new way of life.

A TRIBUTE TO THE REGULARS

"On their part, officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the old Regular Army have risen to the demands made upon them in a manner equally marvelous. Their leaven has pervaded the whole of the mighty force which in 4½ years of war has gathered from all parts of the world round the small, highly

trained Army with which we entered the war. The general absence of jealousy and the readiness to learn, which in the field has markedly characterized all ranks of our new Armies, is proof both of the quality of our old Army and of the soundness of our pre-war training. If further proof were needed, it is found in the wonderful conduct and achievements of our Armies new and old, and in the general pride with which they are universally regarded.

"In the earlier stages of the war the Regular Army was called on to provide instructors and cadres round which the new Armies could be formed. All that was best in the old Regular Army, its discipline, based on force of character, leadership, and mutual respect, its traditions, and the spirit that never knows defeat have been the foundations on which the new Armies have been built up. Heavy demands were necessarily made upon our establishment of trained Regular officers, most regrettably depleted by the heavy sacrifices of the early days of the war. The way in which such demands have been met by those who survived those days has justified our belief in them.

"Neither have the officers of the new Armies, whether drawn from the British Isles or the Dominions, risen with less spirit and success to the needs of the occasion. The great expansion of the Army, and the length of the war, necessitated an ever-increasing demand being made on them for filling responsible positions in command, Staff and administrative appointments. The call has been met most efficiently. The longer the war continued, the greater became the part played in it by the new Armies of the Empire."

FOCH SAYS HE WAS GUIDED FROM ON HIGH

Field Marshal Foch, in an interview in Paris, on January 1, 1920, cabled to the *New York Times*, intimated his belief that the Allied victory was willed by God and that he himself was divinely inspired:

"When in a historic moment a vision is given to a man and when in consequence he finds that this vision has determined movements of enormous importance in a formidable war, I believe that this vision—and I think I had it at the Marne, on the Yser and on March 26—comes from a providential power in the hand of which one is the instrument, and I believe that the victorious decision was sent from on high by a will superior and divine.

"The idea of victory—it had to be at all costs. 'Je la veux.' I wished it, yes, but that was easily said. To gain it it was necessary to recognize that the war of human beings never changes in essence. It varies only in its tools. I remember that before Arcola, the master Napoleon had said, 'I must get out of Verona,' and he had been beaten several times. On the Marne I did not forget this advice. I had been beaten and I said to myself, 'I will be beaten four times or five times if need be, but I will survive.'"



Painting by François Flameng

On Guard in Alsace



FOCH'S PART IN THE WAR

His Rise from Corps Commander to Leader of All the Allied Forces
Traced by a Prominent French Military Writer

THE career of Marshal Ferdinand Foch, commander-in-chief of the Allied armies, was described in a concise and admirable article by Commandant A. Grasset, a well-known French military writer, in *L'Illustration*, soon after the close of the war. Commandant Grasset's study shows clearly the different steps by which the great commander rose to the highest position; it shows his energy, his unchanging cheerfulness, his indomitable will-power, which is summed up in his belief that the attack is the secret of all military success; that the bringing about of a decisive battle is the sole aim of all sound strategy.

The French writer is thoroughly conversant with Marshal Foch's books on the military art, and he demonstrates how closely the principles enunciated there by Foch the military schoolmaster are linked up with the operations of Foch the general. There is probably no other case in history, except Napoleon Bonaparte, in which a commander has so faithfully practiced what he preached. The students who listened to Lieut. Col. Foch nineteen years ago at the French War College supposed him to be talking to them of an imaginary battle, adduced merely as an illustration of their teacher's views. Yet, in reality, he was setting before them the plan of the decisive battle of 1918, the series of concentric blows at the German line from Metz to the North Sea that sent Foch's opponents reeling back in defeat and made them sue abjectly for an armistice.

Before taking up Foch's record in the great war Commandant Grasset gives a brief résumé of his principles of warfare, set forth by him in the now famous series of lectures at the War College in 1900. He writes:

"The courses given by Colonel Foch made a profound impression on all the officers who had the privilege of hearing them. The basic

ideas therein, simple and luminous, are roughly the following:

"'War is a simple art,' said Napoleon, 'and consists entirely in execution.' It is a simple art in its larger conception—Foch agrees to that—since the most marvelous creations of strategy are within reach of all and are passionately discussed every day around billiard tables. It is a simple art in its conception, but infinitely complex in execution, since its execution necessitates both a profound knowledge of the material and moral means brought into play and of that complicated organism called an army. It also requires from the commander a will power, firmness, energy and strength of soul that no cataclysm can weaken, and which can shine irresistibly upon the mass of men. In other words, it is an art accessible only to an extremely limited body of picked men."

To master this art, according to Foch's principles, the student should study history and concrete cases, problems based on realities, not on didactic dreams. And the teacher must evolve a *unity of doctrine* that will allow everyone to act for himself but toward a common end, thus assuring perfect coordination of all brains toward the common aim assigned by the high command of an army.

Students of the art of war should be ceaselessly told that the ultimate aim of all military operations is *the battle*. Freeing his mind from all preconceived notions, from all rigid conceptions, a commander must ask himself: "What is the actual situation?" Faced with the unknown, the ignorance of the whereabouts and strength of the enemy which is the very essence of war, he must seek the answer of his question by *getting information*. Having done that, he must act upon precise information, not according to preconceived ideas or hypotheses which rarely come true no matter how logical they may be. He must en-

deavor at all costs to preserve that liberty of action so harped upon by Napoleon. He must remember that "to command does not mean to be mysterious"; in other words, he must make perfectly clear to his subordinates what he wishes to do in order that each of them may act intelligently within his own sphere.

Foch is no believer in the line battle, the parallel battle, where two armies face each other on immensely long lines and bring about a general action. His ideal is the *maneuver-battle*, where the commander-in-chief can retain complete control instead of leaving the outcome to the unaided valor of his soldiers; where he can let loose at the right moment the *decisive attack*, which is the expression of his will, and which alone gives *victory*. In this attack everybody should take part to the full limit of his ability; there should be no inactive *strategic reserve*. And, when the moment of supreme crisis arises, when it seems that all that is humanly possible has been done, but in vain, the commander must prove his firm conviction that *mind dominates matter*, or, in Foch's own words:

"Victory equals will power. A battle won is a battle where one does not wish to acknowledge one's self defeated. Victory goes always to those who deserve it by greater will power and intelligence."

But all this will power would be futile if the commander could not imbue his soldiers with it. "The army," says Foch, "is to the chief as the sword to the soldier; it is worth only the impulsion that he gives to it. . . . Generals not soldiers win battles. A beaten general is a disqualified general." These words, so applicable to the battles of 1918, were spoken not by Marshal Foch, winner of those battles, but by Lieutenant-Colonel Foch, stating his principles nearly twenty years before.

"To inform one's self, to know how to think, to know how to will." Therein, says Grasset, lies Foch's whole conception of warfare.

FOCH AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

The French writer then turns to Foch's war record, taking us back to the summer of 1914 when he was commander of the 20th corps with headquarters at Nancy. This corps

was part of the Second Army, under Castelnau. On August 14th Castelnau took the offensive and moved over the frontier of Germany. After initial successes he was stopped at the formidable German defensive positions running through Morhange and Sarrebourg and driven back with heavy losses. The German success was largely due to use of heavy artillery, the importance of which in the warfare of the future was foreseen by Foch in his lectures at the French War College.

The Germans, trying to follow up their success, were checked around Nancy. Foch contributed greatly to the successful stand of the French army; in fact, he got a taste of his favorite form of warfare, the offensive. The counter-attacks of his corps and other units of the French army were so vigorous that the Germans suspended their attempts to advance.

Foch was then summoned to organize a new army at the center of the French line, between the armies of Franchet d'Esperey and Langle de Cary. This he did with great promptness. Not knowing of the existence of this new force, a huge mass of Germans, 300,000 strong, under von Bülow and von Hausen, hurl themselves forward expecting only slight resistance.

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

The battle of the Marne is on. Commandant Grasset writes:

"At noon on September 5th Manoury's army, driven forward by the fiery ardor of Galliéni, strikes von Kluck's flank and starts eighteen hours earlier the battle that was arranged for six o'clock next morning. Everywhere the order is sent to stop the retreat, to stand, to assume the offensive. . . . General Foch has transferred his headquarters to Pleurs, from which he can easily move toward Sézanne and la Fère-Champenoise. He must bar three great highways to the enemy on a front of 35 kilometers: the roads from Epernay to Sézanne and la Fère-Champenoise, and that from Châlons to Arcis-sur-Aube. Moreover, he must hold the plateaus north of Sézanne, upon which rests the right of Franchet d'Esperey, and protect this army against an enveloping movement by preventing the enemy at all costs from debouching south of the marshes of Saint-Gond.



Field Marshal Ferdinand Foch

Considered by experts the greatest military genius that the World War produced.

"The 42d Division is to hold the heights of Sézanne—a special task entrusted to picked troops. The Moroccan division and the 9th Corps are to guard the debouchments of the Marshes of Saint-Gond, likewise an arduous task, since the marshes are almost dry and the Prussian Guard is going to attack them. The 11th corps is to stop the German masses on the plain as they move from Châlons toward Troyes. The 9th division of cavalry is to cover the right flank of the army at the camp of Mailly.

d'Esperey and hold the enemy all along the rest of his line in order to give the contiguous armies time to attack. He throws in the 42d division under Grossetti and, after desperate fighting, succeeds in holding back the Germans. But his reserve disappears, since he is obliged to send the 60th division to aid the 11th corps, which had been attacked by two German corps and was falling back, and the 52d division to the aid of the 9th corps, engaged in furious fighting in the marshes of Saint-Gond. Foch, then, is without reserves



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A Bird's-eye View of Nancy, France

"These units are capable of placing in line, all together, no more than 70,000 combatants. Two men per meter are not many for stopping in the open 300,000 men who think themselves victorious. Napoleon wanted five men per meter to give battle and the Germans here are going to have ten.

"All that General Foch has for an attempt to transform the struggle into a *maneuver-battle* such as he conceives it should be, are the 52d and 60th reserve divisions. A weak instrument for such a heavy task!"

On September 6th Foch receives the order to support on his left the offensive of Franchet

and his whole line is being assailed by tremendous masses of the enemy; far from being able to assume the offensive, he is hard pressed trying to hold. Grasset continues:

"This fury does not move general Foch. With his clear good sense, to which the immensity of the drama seems merely to give greater keenness, he sums up the situation in these words: 'Since they are trying so furiously to break through, it is evident that things are going badly with them elsewhere.'

"He spoke these words at the very moment when the 6th German Corps, withdrawn from the firing line, was leaving the region of

Rébais and moving to the rear to stop on the Ourcq the enveloping movement of Manoury; when the English army, freed by this retreat, passed to the offensive in the vicinity of Coulommiers; at the precise moment of the first reflux of the invasion!

FOCH'S IMMORTAL DISPATCH

"On September 8th the German High Command realizes that victory by means of an enveloping movement is eluding it. But, being obstinate, it still means to try to chain fortune by stopping Manoury on its right by sending powerful reinforcements and by having Bülow and Hausen crush Foch. It is to be a strategic rupture instead of an enveloping movement, and victory is to be no less decisive.

"Throughout the 8th the fight continues to be waged with extreme violence. On the left, Franchet d'Esperey, by a strong blow, disengages the 42d division by pushing his 10th corps forward. But, on the right, the 11th corps falls back, overwhelmed by twofold superior forces, crushed by heavy artillery. It suffers heavy losses. It loses la Fère-Champenoise. And the 60th reserve division, also decimated, retires upon Mailly.

"In the center, the 9th corps, attacked also in the rear, yields ground. The Prussian Guard is approaching Mondement, and, if Mondement is taken, the 9th army will be cut in two. It is nearly noon and the enemy still has before him plenty of time for exploiting the victory which seems assured.

"His victory! But has not Colonel Foch taught in his courses that a battle is lost only when one is morally convinced that one has lost it? Though the general removes his headquarters to Plancy, because the German shells are beginning to make trouble in the functioning of the various branches of service, he is so little convinced of the enemy's victory that he sends to the commander-in-chief this laconic report:

"'Hard pressed on my right; my center yields; it is impossible for me to move; situation excellent; I attack.'

"A piece of bravado? Certainly not! While, with the telephone receiver at his ear,

For the positions of the French and German Armies at successive stages in the Marne battle, see Maps, Vol. III, pp. 30 and 31.

he listens, chewing a cigar, to the alarming reports that come to him from every direction, he follows in his mind the progress of the offensive of Manoury on the Ourcq, of Franchet d'Esperey on the Petit-Morin. He must hold, hold at any price, because *'victory goes*



Two Famous French Generals

General de Castelnau is shown on the left with General Franchet d'Esperey by his side.

to those who deserve it by greater will power.' And since the weaker one is the more one must attack, he orders the troops flowing back, 'hallucinated with weariness,' to move forward. Supported by the army of d'Esperey, the 42d division gains ground; everywhere else there is no advance, but the enemy, astonished and worn out, stops and the essential positions are held until nightfall."

THE HEROIC 42D

Next day it seems as if the limit of human endurance has been reached. The critical moment approaches. It is now that, according to the teachings of Colonel Foch of the War College, victory will go to him who has one last battalion of reserves ready at hand to hurl into the furnace, when his adversary has none left.

The Germans have none. But Foch still has the heroic 42d division, withdrawn, utterly

other such characteristic instance of this ability in a general," says Grasset.

The 42d got into line about six in the evening, after four hours of mortal anxiety, during which, says the French writer, men felt that the fate of their country was being decided. Yet, during this time, General Foch, who had played his last card, was taking a quiet horseback ride with a lieutenant and discussing matters relating to philosophy and political economy!

Attacked by the heroic 42d, Hausen's men,



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Marshal Foch Reviewing Guards at St. Germain-en-Laye

exhausted, from the firing-line shortly before. It is tired, it has suffered heavily, but it is available. "Forward!" It strikes at the right of the 12th German corps, passing Connantre, where Bülow and Hausen aim to effect a junction.

The 42d has scarcely had any relief at all after three days and nights of terrible fighting; parts of it have not even come up. To get results from such troops a commander must have solved the secret of "*causing the supreme energy animating him to pass into the masses of men forming his army.*"

"Only in the campaign of France in 1814, under the eye of Napoleon, can one find an-

certain a moment before of complete victory, fall back, or dig in. Next morning, September 10th, he is in full retreat. That evening Foch's headquarters are in la Fère-Champenoise. On September 11th the 9th French army lines the bank of the Marne between Epernay and Châlons. On the 15th the Germans are solidly intrenched along the Aisne, and the French, lacking heavy artillery, are content to dig in and await the day when the offensive can be resumed.

THE RACE TO THE SEA

Both sides decide that a break in the front cannot be made under existing conditions, that

an enveloping movement alone can bring victory. On the flank toward Switzerland no such movement can be carried out; there is only the western flank. All their energies, therefore, are to be concentrated on trying to outflank the enemy in that direction, even at the risk of greatly weakening all other parts of the front.

The French movement by the left flank begins promptly and effectively. Castelnau's

Conneau and Mitry. Foch now finds his old chief, Castelnau, subordinate to him.

After a conference with Castelnau, Foch hurries northward, skirting the battle-line, confers with de Maud'huy, and, having obtained an exact knowledge of the situation all along his front, he establishes his headquarters at Doullens. His immediate task is to speed up by every means at his disposal the transportation into the North of the troops



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When the German Lines Broke

An official photograph of German prisoners captured in the first battle of the Marne, which stopped the German attempt to reach Paris in 1914.

whole army, summoned from Alsace, detains in the neighborhood of Beauvais in time to check another German drive toward Paris. Manoury's army reaches the vicinity of Arras, where it too breaks the force of a German assault. And, on October 4th, General Foch is informed suddenly by telephone that he has been appointed to take charge of the co-ordination of operations of the group of French armies in the North. These are the armies of Castelnau and de Maud'huy (6th and 10th), the group of territorial divisions of General Brugère (four divisions), and the cavalry of

and *matériel* which are being transferred from other parts of the battle-line. In this region Foch comes into direct contact with the British army, four corps of which prolong his line to the left.

Up to October 9th no forward movement of the enemy is reported. But on that day the great Belgian fortress of Antwerp falls into the possession of the Germans, and the Belgian army, having escaped from the fortress because the Germans had made the final assault without completely investing the city, manages to escape and retreat toward the

Yser. To cover its retreat Foch sends by rail at full speed from Dunkirk to Ghent the marine fusiliers of Admiral Ronarch, which, having accomplished their mission, are to fall back



General de Maudhuy

Commander of the French Tenth Army.

on Dixmude and support the right of the Belgian army posted behind the Yser.

THE YPRES TO DIXMUDE SECTOR

The Germans launch a great general attack on October 13th, against French and Belgians, but are stopped in their tracks. At the same time the 19th German corps hurls itself upon Ypres, where the English do not yield an inch. While these battles are raging Foch fortifies hastily the weak part of the line south

of Dixmude and, on October 17th, four English corps have closed a dangerous gap between Ypres and Cambrai. Grasset writes:

"Now the weakest part of the northern front is the sector from Ypres to Dixmude, on account of the delay which the arrival of the English has caused in the detraining of French troops. But powerful reinforcements are headed for this region, where General d'Urbal has been appointed on October 20th to the command of the French troops. On the 22d, the 9th corps arrives; on the 1st of November the 16th and 32d. Night and day, trains, automobiles, motor trucks, glide along behind the firing line, and, while the cannon thunder and make the earth tremble, while villages crumble beneath great shells, they unload at the points designated by General Foch their precious cargo of energy.

"The staff officers who served under the orders of General Foch at this time are unanimous in declaring that it was his skill and will power that achieved everything, his activity that animated all. Unimagined difficulties arose which were overcome no one knew how. Were heavy cannon needed at some point?—some were found and taken there. Was a battalion needed here, a brigade there?—battalion and brigade were delivered where they were wanted, at the moment when they were wanted. Units detrained at night and were sent off on motor trucks or entrained again without anyone knowing how they were to get to their destination, nor whether they had eaten or would eat . . . and they arrived, and were where they were needed to stop the enemy.

"And, together with this crushing work the general has another task to perform, perhaps even more difficult; he must keep up the morale of our allies who are deeply impressed by the paucity of our means, the power and ferocity of the enemy. October 20th, the night from the 20th to the 21st, the day of the 21st, are long hours of anguish. Dixmude is crushed under shell fire; the Germans, whose forces are renewed every minute, hurl themselves with greater fury than ever on the Belgian lines, which finally yield. Keyem and Beerst are taken; the Belgians have thrown in their last reserves; they are exhausted, short of munitions; the Yser is on the point of being forced. The staff is considering retreat on Dunkirk. That would mean disaster.

THE CRISIS AT YPRES

"Foch, apprised by telephone, hurries to the scene. He arrives accidentally in the midst of a council of war where our brave allies, death in their hearts, are discussing the last measures to be taken.

"In simple words he points out a line of withdrawal and suggests that the region be inundated. Inundation saved Holland in other days; it will save Belgium! Nobody

give him the coast-line so eagerly coveted."

Then come the crucial days of the battle of Ypres, when the fate of France and the British Empire trembled in the balance. Grasset describes Foch's part in them in these vivid words:

"On the 30th, in deep columns, the enemy strikes once more against the Belgian center, which he has previously crushed with his heavy artillery.

"Ramscappelle is captured; the center is



Ypres in 1918

A view of Belgium's battle scarred city. Its capture would have menaced the safety of the Channel ports. In its defense the British on one day in 1917 expended 23,000 tons of artillery ammunition.

had thought of that. It is decided to hold somehow or other, until the land is flooded.

"Moreover, here is the 42d division, the division of the marshes of Saint-Gond. It counter-attacks and the German line is once more fixed where it is. To show his unshakable will to hold and force victory the general, on October 24th, establishes his headquarters at Cassel.

"On the 28th the plain to east of the Yser, the German trenches and batteries, begin to disappear under water. The enemy plans to retire, but before he wishes to try another supreme effort against this army which he deems at the limit of its resources, whose defeat will

pierced; victory seems assured. But the 42d division is still there. A brilliant bayonet charge disposes of the dislocated and decimated columns of the enemy, which recoil not to return this time. His retreat is through the water; he loses most of his cannon stuck in the mud; he scarcely rescues his fieldpieces. The Belgian army has been saved.

"On this same 30th of October the British 1st corps is violently attacked before Dixmude by large forces. Crushed by heavy artillery, submerged under the flood of assailants, it weakens. Its retreat will uncover the left of the French 9th corps.

"General Dubois sends to the aid of our

allies the feeble forces available, and asks for reinforcements.

"Foch ~~hurries~~ to Saint-Omer, where Marshal French has his headquarters. It is one in the morning; the marshal has just gone to bed. They awake him.

"'Marshal, your line is pierced.'

"'Yes.'

"'Have you troops available?'

"'No.'

"'I will bring you mine. General Joffre is sending me eight battalions. Take them and—forward!'


"Deeply moved, the marshal grasps the hand of General Foch.

divisions are exhausted, decimated, dislocated; they are incapable of further resistance; there is nothing to do but die.

"'No, marshal,' exclaims Foch. 'We must hold, hold at any cost. After that there will be time to die. Hold till this evening; I will come to your aid.'

"While talking, because French does not understand the French language well, the general writes out on the reverse of the order to retreat, already prepared, what must be done to prolong resistance. He holds out this sheet of paper; but the marshal is not convinced and remains inexorable.

"Foch becomes animated:



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A Somme Battlefield

Showing the ruins of a sugar factory shot to pieces by shell fire in one day.

"'Thank you,' he says. And, at dawn, the battle, fed by this new blood, resumes its full fury."

But the enemy takes Gheluvelt and Hooge and the last English reserves fall back. It looks like the end. Again Foch is told. He knows that if the line can hold twenty-four hours, it will give the 16th and 32d French corps time to detrain. And once more he hastens to French. Grasset describes this second meeting thus:

"By a providential stroke of luck the automobile of Marshal French happens to be passing. . . . Informed of the presence of General Foch, the marshal consents to stop.

"This time he is in despair. His last reserves have been consumed in the furnace; his

"'If the old infantry of Wellington can no longer hold to-day behind trenches, then my "boys" must get into the line!'

"French straightens up.

"'The infantry will hold,' he says.

"With one stroke he crosses out the order to retreat, and, on the back, under what Foch has written, he dashes off these few words and signs them: 'Carry out the order of General Foch.'"

Finally, the Germans give up their terrific attacks and the Channel coast is saved. The Allies are too weak to follow up their advantage. Foch's marvelous work has definitely assured the results of the victory at the Marne. The two operations were interdependent, and together spelt Germany's definite defeat in the war.




Photo by Hare.

Dragging Mighty Guns to the Battlefield

The Battle of the Somme, which started July 1, 1916, and continued for months with steady gains for the British and French forces, probably surpassed in numbers of men engaged and in casualties the Battle of Verdun. The casualties on both sides aggregated 1,350,000.



IN ARTOIS AND ON THE SOMME

The war of positions sets in. The enemy digs strong trench systems and, confident in his superior numbers and weight of artillery, turns his attention to the Eastern front. The task of Foch is to mark time, to heap up *matériel* in quantities unimagined before. And his troops are forced to dig trenches, often working up to their knees in icy water, exposed to the destructive fire of the enemy.

The French troops in the north make a few local attacks; their British Allies assail Givenchy and Neuve-Chapelle. But nothing definite occurs until the spring of 1915, when the Allies are so much stronger that they can turn their attention once more to the offensive. Foch, the apostle of attack, prepares an assault on the German positions in Artois, which is carried out with brilliant valor in May and June. The assigned objectives—Neuville-St. Vaast, the Labyrinth, Carency, Souchez, Notre-Dame-de-Lorette—are taken together with 8,000 prisoners and a score of cannon. But there is nothing decisive about it. It shows the fallacy of partial local offensives.

The next offensive is more ambitious. It is carried out in September in Champagne and nets 20,000 prisoners. There are also heavy attacks in the north, by the French at Souchez and the British at Loos and Hulluch, but the enemy's counter-attacks and heavy artillery hold them up. But this time the results are greater than before, the enemy being forced to suspend the offensive which he has started in Galicia.

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME

The next great Allied offensive is that of the Somme in 1916. Foch is placed in charge of the French part in this important operation. Under him are to be 40 French and 20 English divisions. His plan of attack is approved on February 21st, 1916. The attack is to be made north and south of the Somme, between Chaulnes and Gomécourt. Before it can be started, the Germans hurl themselves upon Verdun. Another Allied council determines that the Somme offensive must be hurried up to relieve Verdun. Verdun, however, absorbs the French reserves. In April Foch is

told that, of the 40 divisions promised him, he can have only 30; later these are reduced to 26. Fortunately, British reinforcements have arrived and he gets 26 British divisions instead of 20.

The Somme offensive is launched July 1st, 1916, after a terrific bombardment. It progresses with the regularity of clockwork. Soon 10,000 Germans are prisoners and the plain of Péronne is dominated by the Allies. The British reach the German third line, capturing 11,000 prisoners, but are finally checked around Delville Wood and Thiepval. But Foch continues his attacks so vigorously that he deflects German reserves to his part of the line, and the British are able to take Pozières and drive the enemy from Delville Wood.

In September Foch resumes the offensive toward Bapaume, Péronne and Nesle, the British advance in coöperation, the "tanks" make their appearance in force and strike terror to the hearts of the foe. The Germans are thrown back all along the line of Ginchy, Bouchavesnes and Thiepval, losing thousands of prisoners. Bad weather at last puts a stop to the fighting. In October and November some important points are occupied, including Ablaincourt and Saillières, but the main advance ceases.

"These events," says Grasset, "were due largely to the vigorous operation undertaken to relieve the Somme, and, after that, to the tenacity, the offensive spirit, and the activity of General Foch."

AS COUNSELOR OF THE ENTENTE

Foch reached the age limit on September 30th, 1916, but was deemed altogether too valuable to be retired. On December 13th of that year he was placed at the head of a Bureau of Study at Senlis, his task being to coördinate Allied operations not only on the Western but on all other fronts. But, convinced that the west alone was where the war could be decided, he turned to the elaboration of a plan to check a possible German offensive through Switzerland and, with the title of commander of the Foch group, he set to work in coöperation with the Swiss staff, on a complete plan to meet such a move on the part of the enemy. He completed the plan in March, 1917. Then, on May 15th, 1917, he was ap-

pointed Chief of Staff of the French army, to replace General Pétain, named commander of the armies of the North and Northeast.

Russia went to pieces early in 1917 and the Central Powers, free to turn their attention westward, struck not in Switzerland but in Italy. The Italian Isonzo front caved in; producing a veritable military disaster. Foch remained unmoved. He sent this laconic telegram to Cadorna:

"If you need our troops we are ready to march."

And French and British troops were poured into Italy with extraordinary promptness. The Italian High Command was inclined to retire as far as the Mincio. Foch rushed to Italy.

"He persuaded Cadorna that he was not beaten," says Grasset, "and that the enemy can be stopped on the Piave and in the Trentino."

The Italian Army, suddenly reanimated, resists strongly on the Piave and the Asiago plateau. And it is from those positions that it is destined to launch its attacks in 1918, when its hour to strike shall have come.

As a result of these events a council of war is formed at Versailles, the first step toward unity of command. Its task is to correlate the efforts of the Allied armies. General Foch is appointed representative of France in this council.

And now Germany turns her eyes westward. Italy lies crushed; France comes next. The French Army must be annihilated before the American Army, already being rapidly trained, shall be in a position to do its share on the battlefields of Europe.

The Allies receive reports of a formidable enemy concentration along the Western front. One hundred and eighty-eight German divisions are identified, only 109 of them in the line, which implies that a mass of maneuver has been formed of some eighty divisions. On the front from the Oise to the sea, facing the English and Belgians, the Germans are reported to have received reinforcements totaling 30 divisions; in front of the French there are 10 new divisions. And two new armies are being formed: the 17th, about Valenciennes, under Otto von Bülow, and the 18th, near Le Cateau, under von Hutier, victor of Riga, the specialist in sudden attacks.

The enemy defensive system, consisting of



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General Pétain

The silent, ascetic general who was in command of the French forces at Verdun.



Photo by D. C. Thompson.

Prepared for an Assault

Italian soldiers in a trench in anticipation of a rush from the enemy. Such rushes were always preceded by a furious bombardment, which was relied upon to demoralize the defenders of the trench about to be stormed. Then the fire lifted to a point behind the trench and the infantry came on in waves.

four principal lines, is too strong to be broken by a counter-offensive designed to forestall the German plans of attack.

Foch has foreseen the German assault. Despite his energetic protests, however, the available Allied reserves on the Western front are reduced. There is nothing to do but meet

the Germans, if they attack, with as strong a resistance as is possible under the circumstances.

THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF 1918

The Germans attack. On March 21st, 1918, after a short but terrific artillery prep-

aration, 42 German divisions smash against the British front between la Fère and Fontaine-les-Croisilles, held by 17 British divisions belonging to the 3d and 5th armies. They break the front around St. Quentin and, during the next few days, pour through breaches in the Allied line until the latter are forced back almost to Arras in the north, and past Chauny and Noyon in the south. It is a critical moment. Grasset writes:

"This extremity of peril and this brutal blow

the French, English, American and Belgian forces fighting on the Western front.

"The Entente had a chief. The first condition of victory had been fulfilled at last."

THE GENERALISSIMO ON THE DEFENSIVE

So serious is the situation that a chief of another caliber might have deemed it desperate. There is a double German menace: toward the Channel ports, against the British



Courtesy of Red Cross Magazine.

On the Road to Amiens

This farmer saved his cattle and his cattle saved their food.

was needed to open men's eyes and silence false pride. At last it was realized that the Entente was going to be definitely beaten unless it consented to coördinate all efforts toward a common end. On March 26th, at Doullens, at the suggestion of the British government, General Foch, without yet receiving the supreme command of the Allied armies, was placed in charge of the coördination of the operation of these armies. . . .

"Beneath the growing menace of imminent disaster, all objections were swept aside and General Foch was appointed *generalissimo* of

army, and toward Paris, against the French. The success of either might ruin morale and drive the government to make peace.

This peculiar situation makes it necessary to place the reserves—and there are not many—in such a way that they may help to arrest either a German onslaught on the coast or a dash toward Paris. Owing to this, the freedom of the commander-in-chief to use these reserves is greatly impaired.

Bülow's army, a bare eight miles from Amiens, has placed under the fire of its guns the only railway communicating with the

northern part of the front, and von Hutier, on March 30th, launches another attack, with Paris as its ultimate objective. Foch is ready for the new blow. Grasset writes thus of how he meets it:

"Established at Sarcus, an insignificant village of Picardy, with a very reduced staff, the victor of Saint-Gond and the Yser considers the situation serious but by no means desperate; he feels that will power, energy

closing the wide breach opened towards Paris, and, thanks to prodigies of heroism, to painful sacrifices as well, it keeps up the connection between English and French and stops Hutier's offensive in its tracks.

"The check hereabout is final, it appears. Of the 90 German divisions which were in this neighborhood 83 at least have been engaged and rudely handled. The attacking columns can get no further support. The



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The French Garrison on Kemmel Hill

Though the Germans captured Kemmel in May, 1918, by sheer force of numbers, the defending French made a stout resistance. This drawing by Ernest Prater portrays the last fight of the French troops at this point, considered one of the most stirring episodes of the war.

and intelligence will overcome all difficulties.

"To form reserves the parts of the front that are not threatened must be drawn upon. General Pershing nobly places at the disposal of General Foch the small American army, which, according to agreement, was not to be used on the field of battle until much later. His divisions immediately relieve on quiet sectors veteran French divisions, which are placed on the firing line.

"A new group of Franco-British armies, placed under General Fayolle, succeeds in

German offensive on Paris is at the end of its resources. It has failed.

"So the German high command turns to a more modest plan, exactly proportionate to the forces at hand. Paris, it decides, is altogether too inaccessible and a front of 80 kilometers (50 miles) is too long for weakened reserves. Amiens, then, is to be the new objective. And the new front of attack is to be only 40 kilometers (25 miles) long.

"The new attack is launched between the 4th and 8th of April. Like its predecessors

it is checked after furious combats. The Amiens road, like the Paris road, is barred; German reserves are melting away; more than 100 divisions have already disappeared, more or less, in the furnace."

So far Foch has bested his formidable adversary. But Hindenburg has other cards up his sleeve. Balked before Paris, balked at

British army. The enemy crosses the Lys, reaches the slopes of Mount Kemmel. But again Foch is ready:

The gradual transfer of the German objectives to the north has shown him what to do. Little by little, because the Amiens railway is under enemy fire, he has, for a long time, been sending French reserves north-



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The Last Struggle Before Rheims

French soldiers, before going to the trenches, receiving final instructions from their officers.

Amiens, he decides to attack with 20 divisions along the front between Ypres and La Bassée with the object of reaching Calais and Dunkirk, the great Channel ports. Success will mean the thrusting back of the British left and isolation of the Belgian army.

THE GERMAN BLOW AT YPRES

On the 9th the attack begins with the smashing of a Portuguese division, which carries away in its retreat five divisions of the

ward. Already the troops of de Mitry are aiding the British.

After a series of desperate battles around Ypres the German offensive in that region is brought to a halt. At the end of April, the German armies in the north have thrown at least 150 divisions into action, of which 50 have been in the line two or three times. Their losses have been heavy and unmistakable signs of lowered morale begin to show among them. But, unfortunately, the British army is too exhausted to pass to the offensive

and General Foch is obliged to keep part of the French reserves in the north because of the shaken condition of his British allies. The American army is rapidly increasing in numbers but is not yet sufficiently trained to be counted upon, and Italy asks that the two French divisions sent to aid her armies be allowed to stay where they are and sends only two Italian divisions to help on the Western front.

In short, after the first battles of 1918, the Allies have only 172 divisions against 212 refitted German divisions. Foch has not yet at hand the weapon needed to bring victory and the double threat of the enemy against Paris and the coast remains.

Soon the threat against Paris becomes serious. As a result of the pocket driven into the Allied line about Amiens by Hutier's attacks a base for an offensive some 25 miles long has been made between la Fère and Montdidier. This base is useless, however, as long as the heavily-wooded Compiègne-Villers-Cotterets front remains available for an expert master of maneuver like Foch. Any German attack on Paris would always be exposed to a flank attack from this direction.

The said front is too strong for frontal attack, so the enemy decides to encircle it by storming the Chemin des Dames, where the French command, relying on the natural strength of the position, has only five divisions in line and four in reserve along the 25-mile front between Anizy-le Château and Berry-au-Bac.

On May 27th, 22 German divisions assault these positions, sweep away the defenders, and, two days later, are on the Vesle. On the 29th the enemy occupies Soissons, on the 31st he crosses the Ailette, on the 1st of June he enters Château-Thierry and stretches his line along the Marne from that town to Dormans.

Cannon of a range hitherto unheard of hurl tons of explosives on Paris. But France stands firm.

"As for General Foch," writes Grasset, "never was his faith, which he communicates to others, more ardent, never was his mind calmer and more lucid, his eye clearer."

He masses reserves, including American troops, around Villers-Cotterets, waiting a chance to bite into the new German line. And all along the line German attacks are checked

and hurled back; before Rheims, Compiègne, Villers-Cotterets. When they are ended Hindenburg has left only three fresh divisions and about thirty more or less exhausted.

THE DECISIVE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE

Foch recognizes at once that the big pocket created by the enemy in his advance to Château-Thierry is the weak spot in his line, since, having failed to take Rheims, he has no good rail line to keep the big forces there supplied. The French commander now knows where he will strike a month later in the final great offensive that is destined to end German hopes of victory.


Aviators soon report unusual enemy activity north of Dormans. The Germans, it seems, are piling up enormous amounts of munitions there, and big cannon, rushing up great masses of men and assembling boats with which to cross the Marne. Another formidable rush on Paris is evidently under preparation along the south bank of the Marne, which they know to be defenseless.

Foch hears these reports. His genius shines more brightly than ever before.

"Informed of what is going on," writes Grasset, "the generalissimo refuses to make the slightest change in his plans. He refuses, above all, to send too large reinforcements for the defense of the Marne. If the enemy is about to make the mistake of placing his reserves south of the river, these reserves will no longer be opposite the forest of Villers-Cotterets, and the German pocket will become a deadly menace to the enemy.

"Once more it is a case of '*battle—the struggle between two wills.*'"

"We shall see what will result from the will of Foch pitted against the will of Hindenburg. In refusing to strengthen the defense of the Marne, thus tempting the enemy to hurl the mass of his reserves in that direction, did not the teacher of the War College think, in a flash of genius, of Napoleon's refusal to support his right on the day of Austerlitz, when Davout pulled back that right toward the ponds, tempting the Russian reserves to pursue him; causing them, in order to do it, to evacuate the Pratzen plateau? Perhaps that will remain Foch's secret. Anyhow, the fine maneuver which is about to begin, which is



Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly

Rheims—Ruined City of Kings

The old Rheims is no more. Its shattered Cathedral and countless shell-torn buildings point an accusing finger at the foe, but a new city will rise as a monument to the spirit of France.

destined to be crowned by decisive victory, is the grandiose development of the operation of which the day of Austerlitz was the dazzling cinematographic representation."

On July 15th the Germans cross the Marne in their new attack on Paris, and strike out southward. In doing so they seal their doom.

On July 18th, at dawn, the hour agreed

they stand at the Aisne and Vesle—from Soissons, retaken by Mangin, to beyond Rheims, the glorious city, horribly mutilated, but victorious.

A wild cheer goes up all over the world. France feels that victory is coming. And Foch is raised to the proud rank of Marshal of France.



A View of Château-Thierry in August, 1918

In this sector the American 3rd Division immortalized themselves in the defense of the Marne. The corner stone was laid soon after the armistice for a monument to be erected in memory of their fallen comrades.

upon long before, Mangin and Degouette's forces, behind a rolling barrage, debouch from the forest of Villers-Cotterets and smash the weakened German center along a front of 12 miles. By the 19th the Allies have captured 20,000 prisoners and 400 cannon.

Stunned by this terrific blow, Hindenburg recoils. The Germans precipitately abandon the south bank of the Marne. On the 21st they give up Château-Thierry, and, on the 27th, the entire length of the river which, for the second time, has been fatal to them. On the 29th, harassed frontally and in the flanks,

CLINCHING THE VICTORY

He does not rest on his new laurels. Splendid as have been his achievements since he assumed command of the Allied armies they are to be eclipsed by what is yet to come. Says Grasset:

"The operations to come have a special character of nervous activity, vigor and marvelous precision. The marshal is to prove at last, by action, that the principles of the art of war are unchanging, that the basis of his teaching at the War College has lost nothing

of its value, that the Napoleonic conception, clear and flexible, has preserved all its strength, despite the formidable apparatus and heavy creations of the Germanic form of industrial warfare.

"The battle is unchained along a front of nearly 800 kilometers (500 miles), from the North Sea to Switzerland; the entire line bursts into flame; half the territory of France re-echoes day and night the uninterrupted roar of the cannon. And, as attacks follow each other in ten different places and often are superimposed upon each other, as everything seems haphazard in this gigantic drama, one is tempted to assume that everyone is to strike straight ahead, according to his temperament, and that, by this means, the advance, general along the entire front, is probably due to the initiative of the commanders of sectors, or, at the most, to that of the generals commanding armies. But a closer examination proves that it is nothing of the sort; that one sole will has breathed life into the whole thing; that one brain has directed everything, according to a rigorously logical method.

"We have shown that the enemy maintained himself on French soil by means of four general lines of defense. Now we are to see Marshal Foch throw the German armies everywhere behind the Hindenburg line, then pierce that formidable barrier, and, attacking with vigor all the points of least resistance, see him crush or envelop the next lines, always pressing forward, striking incessantly in such a way as not to leave the enemy time for recovery, reform his reserves and make them maneuver, until at last the enemy, driven from all his trenches, deprived of half his artillery, is at Foch's mercy.

"As to the methods employed for obtaining these superhuman efforts from tired troops and decimated reserves—for carrying out, despite the bad condition and overcrowding of the railways, some of which had to be taken from the enemy, the rapid transportation of units, *matériel* and munitions needed for each onslaught; for accomplishing, in a word, with 19 armies totaling 6,000,000 men the marvelous stroke accomplished on the Yser with five armies in 1914—those methods, most certainly, will be a subject for study and meditation among military men for more than a century."

THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE

By September 24th the Germans have been forced back to the Hindenburg line and the formidable salient extending from Albert past Montdidier to Noyon is in Allied hands. This splendid result has been achieved by Foch through six simultaneous Franco-British offensive movements, viz:

1. General Rawlinson and General Deb-



King Albert and Queen Elizabeth of Belgium

Elizabeth, daughter of a Duke of Bavaria, shared the affection of her people with the King.

enemy's attack between Albert and Montdidier. Gain, 12 kilometers. This movement resulted in the capture of Lihons and Quesnoy-en-Santerre. General Humbert, told also to attack, hesitates because he lacks reserves. "Attack anyhow!" says Foch. Humbert attacks, takes Ribécourt. The Oise is reached.

2. The British offensive of Aug. 22d between Albert and Bray-en-Somme. Albert is taken, the outskirts of Bapaume reached. At the same time a vigorous French attack reaches the Ailette; Roye and Lassigny fall. On



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Returning from the Front

British artillery are going to the rear for a rest while others take their places in the line.

August 29th von Hutier falls back to the Péronne-Noyon line, and, fearing to jeopardize his retreat, does not seek to defend Noyon. On the 30th General von der Marwitz gives up Bapaume and Combles.

3. Great offensive in the north. Haig hesitates, fearing that his forces are insufficient. "Attack anyhow!" answers Foch. Haig hurls Horne and Byng against the Scarpe line on August 26th, forcing von Quast to retire between Bailleul and Béthune.

4. On Sept. 6th Rawlinson and Debeney resume their advance between Péronne and Ham; the enemy abandons Ham and Tergnier.

5. Haig, on Sept. 18, strikes again, toward Gouzeaucourt, on a front of 12 miles, which brings his men to the wire defenses of the Hindenburg line.

6. Finally, on Sept. 24, a vigorous offensive by Rawlinson and Debeney, between the Somme and the Omignon, throws von Hutier behind the great barrier before St. Quentin.

The preliminary operations are over. On a front of 100 miles, from the sea to the Aisne, the Allies, tired and reduced perhaps, but with heightened morale, stand before the Hindenburg line.

From this day Germany, who imagined herself on the eve of victory, feels the breath of defeat. And here, in all the glory of apotheosis, says Grasset, is seen the application of a great principle of Foch: "The weaker one is, the more one attacks"; also of another, drawn from his lecture on the battle of Gravelotte:

"In this constant race toward moral as-

cendancy, it was necessary to repeat the requisite aggressive acts throughout one day and to do it without strong reserves. . . . Success was attained in this by isolated acts instead of one great ensemble. . . . In place of the latter, which had to be foregone, there were partial ensembles. . . . It was a moral victory, compounded of energy and action."

THE FINAL MOVES

Already the Hindenburg line has been breached in two places by Horne in the Drocourt-Quéant defensive system. And, on September 12th, a brilliant movement by Americans and French reduces the St. Mihiel salient and brings the Americans before the powerful Michel Stellung.

Once more, from the sea to the Aisne, the Allies hurl themselves at the German defenses—the Wotan, Siegfried and Alberich lines. St. Quentin and Laon fall. One after another the great German defenses crumble before Foch's successive blows.

Germany's situation is hopeless. Not only are the great defensive systems upon which she placed such reliance smashed to pieces and left far behind her retreating armies but there is no more to be hoped from reserves. To hold a line of 450 miles the German High Command has only 160 decimated divisions, 31 divisions for relieving those in line, and, as a

mass of maneuver, only 10, as against 24 as late as Oct. 2d and 45 on Aug. 15th. On the Allied side the 105 French, 60 British, 12 Belgian and 2 Italian divisions have already been reinforced by 26 American divisions, with 10 more about to get into the fight—in other words, the Allies have a total of 215 divisions corresponding, in total number of effectives, to 251 German divisions.

Ludendorff throws up his hands before the threat of an enveloping movement which he can no longer counter. He declares his situation to be desperate; the Reichstag, in two stormy sessions on the 24th and 25th of October, is warned of and senses an imminent catastrophe.

In the meantime, Foch continues his blows, allowing others to frame armistice terms. Debeney drives Hutier before him between the Sambre and the Serre. The British surround Valenciennes. The Americans advance north of the Argonne. King Albert of Belgium draws near to Ghent.

The Germans continue to retreat. The Americans occupy Sedan. And still Foch never relaxes his grip. A big offensive movement is planned, to be carried out by the Americans in conjunction with Castelnau's forces.

But it is never launched. On November 11th the armistice is signed. Foch's triumph is complete.

VISCOUNT FRENCH'S 1914

Caustic Criticism for Kitchener, Smith-Dorrien, Joffre and Others from the Commander of the British Army in that Fateful Year

By T. R. YBARRA

VISCOUNT FRENCH of Ypres, who, as Sir John French, was the first commander of the British Army in France during the war, fired the first gun in what is certain to be a great battle of the books when he published his 1914 a few months after the armistice.

French's part in the war was already a matter of much controversy; already his

friends and foes had ranged themselves for and against him; praise as well as recrimination had clustered about the name of the commander of the "Old Contemptibles," the man who led the retreat from Mons.

But French's book was the utterance of the principal actor in that great drama. That put it in a class apart. He minced no words, shielded no susceptibilities. Blunt and un-

compromising, he set down statements which, if allowed to go unchallenged, sufficed to tarnish reputations deemed beyond the reach of criticism. What French said about Kitchen-er's part in the operations of 1914 made a sensation; so did his remarks on the subsequent shortage of munitions. Scarcely less productive of controversy were his censure of Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, who had been acclaimed a hero for his stand at Le Cateau

BRITAIN'S EXISTENCE AT STAKE

French's book takes up in detail its author's rôle in the war from the entry of Great Britain until after the first battle of Ypres had been fought, the Germans checked, and the Channel ports saved. The British commander clearly shows that he knew what those fateful weeks meant; in his eyes it was the very existence of Great Britain that was in



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'August, 1914—A Belgian Cavalryman Off to the Front

during the great retreat, and his version of the days preceding the battle of the Marne, in which he and Joffre came into disagreement as to the best course to be adopted in breasting the German flood of invasion. Altogether, 1914, in its combination of authoritativeness and plain speaking, stands as a landmark; the first, doubtless, of a long line which every historian must study minutely if he is to arrive at a just estimate of what won and lost the war. It is published by Houghton Mifflin and Co.

jeopardy. He tells of certain days in the Summer of 1914, of others in October and November of that year, when it looked to him as if all the heroism shown by the British at Mons and on the retreat, all the splendid sacrifices of the French, all the grim exhibition of British doggedness confronted by the flower of the German Armies at Ypres, had been in vain; when it looked as if the German lust for world-domination was to emerge from a dream to a reality over the prostrate bodies of the British Empire and the French Republic.

From the start, says French, he was in favor of having Great Britain send as many men as possible to France, of helping France to the limit of British ability. In this view some of those high in military councils did not concur; he tells how Lord Kitchener thought that the British position on the left of the French line at Maubeuge would be too exposed, of how Sir Douglas Haig—later Commander-in-Chief of the British Armies in France—wished to postpone any landing until the campaign had opened and the British chiefs were better able to judge where their coöperation would be most effective.

"Personally I was opposed to these ideas and most anxious to adhere to our original plans," writes French. "Any alteration in carrying out our concentration, particularly if this meant delay, would have upset the French plan of campaign and created much distrust in the minds of our Allies. Delay or hanging back would not only have looked like hesitation, but might easily have entailed disastrous consequences by permanently separating our already inferior forces."

Germany's invasion of Belgium was no surprise to French. He had foreseen it. All reports, he declares, pointed to an intention on Germany's part to violate Belgian neutrality. As for the attitude of Belgium before the war, he writes: "It is most unfortunate that she could never be permitted to decide upon her attitude in the event of a general war. All we ever had in our mind was *defense* against attack by Germany. . . . What we desired above all things was that Belgium should realize the danger which subsequently laid her waste. . . . The idea of *attacking* Germany through Belgium or in any other direction never entered our heads."

French tells of a conversation with the Kaiser which he had in 1911. At maneuvers in Germany the Emperor told the British general that he knew British sympathies were all with France and against Germany. After remarking that the German cavalry was the best in the world he added: "It is not only the cavalry; the artillery, the infantry, all the arms of the service are equally efficient. The sword of Germany is sharp; and if you oppose Germany you will find how sharp it is."

When French left for home the Emperor gave him a framed photograph and, pointing



M. Viviani

Prime Minister of France, from June, 1914,
to October, 1915

to it, remarked semi-jocularly: "There is your arch-enemy! There is your disturber of the peace of Europe!" It did not take long for his joke, if joke it was, to become deadly earnest.

I

OPENING OF THE WAR

FRENCH crossed to France on August 14, 1914, and repaired at once to Paris, where he conferred with French and British notables, including President Poincaré and M. Viviani, then French Premier. He then met Joffre, who made a most favorable impression upon him. "He struck me at once," says the British general, "as a man of strong will and determination, very courteous and considerate,

but firm and steadfast of mind and purpose, and not easily turned or persuaded." Joffre spoke most highly of General Lanrezac, commander of the French troops who were to be on the right of the British line. French came to think far otherwise of Lanrezac; in fact, he lavishes upon him the most scathing disapproval expressed in his book. The English commander met Lanrezac a few days later, and says of him:



Official Portrait by Francis Dodd.

General Sir Herbert C. O. Plumer,
G.C.M.G., K.C.B.

He commanded the British Second Army in the third battle of Ypres.

"I left General Lanrezac's headquarters believing that the Commander-in-Chief had overrated his ability; and I was, therefore, not surprised when he afterwards turned out to be the most complete example, among the many this war has afforded, of the Staff College 'pedant,' whose 'superior education' had given him little idea of how to conduct war."

The battle of Mons began on August 22d. Due largely to Lanrezac's retirement on the right—which, says French, was unexpected—the British soon fell back, beginning the memorable retreat that was not to end till the

Marne was reached. Lanrezac asked French to attack the flank of the German columns which were attacking the French troops. This request, says French, was a puzzle.

"In view of the most probable situation of the German Army," he writes, "as it was known to both of us, and the palpable intention of its commander to effect a great turning movement round my left flank (i.e., the one farthest from Lanrezac), and having regard to the actual numbers of which I was able to dispose, it is very difficult to realize what was in Lanrezac's mind when he made such a request of me."

SMITH-DORRIEN'S STAND AT LE CATEAU

Disapproval of Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien crops up soon after this. Smith-Dorrien became commander of the Second British Corps following the sudden death of General Grierison, who originally led it over from England to France, a few days after his arrival on the continent. French writes that he wanted the command to be given to General Plumer (afterwards to win renown as the conqueror of Messines Ridge), but his request was passed over and Smith-Dorrien received the appointment. On August 25th, says French, after careful deliberation, he decided against standing on the Le Cateau-Cambrai line and in favor of continuing the retreat.

"To hold the Le Cateau position," he writes, "in view of the heavy threat on my front and western flank, was a decision which could only be justified if I were sure of the absolute determination of the French commander to hold on all along the line with the utmost tenacity; but our allies were already a day's march in the rear of us, and every report indicated continual retreat. At least one army corps and two cavalry divisions of the enemy were engaged in an outflanking movement on my left, in which they had already made some progress, and the only help I could depend upon in that quarter was from two French reserve divisions spread out on an enormous front towards Dunkirk, and very hastily and indifferently entrenched. It was unlikely that they would be able to oppose any effective resistance to the enemy's flank movement.

"If this flank attack were successful, my

communications with Havre would be practically gone."

So he issued orders that the retreat was to be resumed at daybreak of August 26th, toward Saint-Quentin and Noyon. Sir Douglas Haig, who was at that time in command of the First Corps under French, proceeded to carry out his commander's orders in spite of the fact that his soldiers were tired from hard marching and harassed by rear-guard fighting. "The retirement of the First Corps," says French (who, throughout his book, speaks approvingly of Haig), "was continued in excellent order and with complete efficiency."

Not so with the Second Corps—Smith-Dorrien's. The cavalry under Allenby (destined to become famous as the conqueror of Palestine) which had been covering the retreat admirably, secured some information at about 2 a.m. of the 26th that made Allenby believe that, unless Smith-Dorrien continued his retreat at daybreak, he was likely to be pinned down to his position by the enemy. Allenby communicated this to Smith-Dorrien, who, according to French, replied that his troops were so exhausted that they could not be moved for some hours. Smith-Dorrien decided to stand and fight.

FRENCH'S CENSURE OF SMITH-DORRIEN

His decision has been hailed as one of the most heroic of the war.* It has been said in many quarters that it saved the British army. French himself, in 1914, praised his subordinate. But he has changed his mind since then—with a vengeance. Writing of the battle that followed, when huge German forces hurled themselves upon Le Cateau, French writes:

"The superb gallantry of the troops, and the skillful leading of divisional and brigade and battalion commanders, helped very materially by the support given by Allenby and, as I afterwards learned, by Sordet and d'Amade (French generals), saved the Second Corps, which otherwise would assuredly have been pinned to their ground and then surrounded. The cavalry might have made good their retreat, but three out of five divisions of the British Army, with the Seventh Brigade, must have been lost.

* See the article on Smith-Dorrien which follows.

"The enemy, flushed by this primary victory, would have pressed in on the flanks of the First Corps, cut off their retreat, and, continuing his combined front and flank attack, would have almost certainly pushed the whole Allied Army off their line of retreat, and a stupendous repetition of Sedan might well have resulted. . . . The effect upon the British Army was to render the subsequent conduct of the retreat more difficult and arduous.



General d'Amade

A French commander in the retreat from Mons.

"The hope of making a stand behind the Somme, or the Oise, or at any other favorable position north of the Marne, had now to be abandoned owing to the shattered condition of the Army, and the far-reaching effect of our losses at the battle of Le Cateau was felt seriously even throughout the subsequent battle of the Marne and during the early operations on the Aisne. It was not possible to replace our lost guns and machine guns until nearly the end of September.

"In my despatch, written in September, 1914, I refer eulogistically to the battle of Le Cateau. I had been, together with my



Lord Kitchener and General Joffre in a Trench on the Western Front

staff, directing the movements of the British Army day and night up to the time of the battle of the Marne—in the course of which battle I received an urgent demand from the government that a despatch should be forwarded.

"It was completed, of necessity, very hurriedly, and before there had been time or opportunity to give thorough study to the reports immediately preceding and covering the period of the battle, by which alone the full details could be disclosed. It was, indeed, impossible, until much later on, to appreciate in all its details the actual situation on the morning of August 26. . . .

"In more than one of the accounts of the retreat from Mons it is alleged that some tacit consent at least was given at Headquarters at Saint-Quentin to the decision arrived at by the Commander of the Second Corps. I owe it to the able and devoted officers of my staff to say that there is not a semblance of truth in this statement."

[It is of interest to compare this last remark with the account by Sir Henry Newbolt, of the

circumstances under which Smith-Dorrien made his stand at Le Cateau, in the article on Smith-Dorrien which follows in this volume.]

French's disapproval of Smith-Dorrien continued after the Le Cateau incident. When he writes of the operations around Ypres in the autumn of 1914 he takes occasion to state that the handling of the Second Corps was not what it should be. Smith-Dorrien later was transferred to a command in Africa; French, too, was superseded by Sir Douglas Haig. And the controversy as to whether one or both of them was at fault in those terrible days of 1914 will not soon subside.

II

FRENCH'S QUARREL WITH KITCHENER

BUT what French says of Smith-Dorrien is mild compared to what follows. After Le Cateau the English general felt convinced that the British were in no condition to make

another stand for some time. Joffre, on the other hand, seems to have been anxious not only to stand but to take the offensive as soon as possible. Joffre, French narrates, visited him on the morning of August 29th at Com-

says (throwing in this other fling at the commander of the Second Corps for good measure): "gave it as his opinion that the only course open to us was to retire to our base, thoroughly refit, reëmbark, and try to land at



The Late Field Marshal Earl Kitchener

Great Britain's Secretary of State for War, who was drowned in 1915 while proceeding on a secret mission to Russia, when H. M. S. *Hampshire* was sunk by a mine off the Orkneys.

piègne and told him what he thought. French, however, stuck to his belief that his men could not do themselves justice in a battle for some days, and that, so far as they were concerned, further retreat was inevitable. In this view French was opposed by some of his subordinates, with whom he discussed it at Compiègne, including Smith-Dorrien, who, French

some favorable point on the coast-line." To this "counsel of despair," French refused to listen.

On August 30th Joffre once more urged French to stand and fill the gap between Compiègne and La Fère. Again the English general repeated that he would be unable to fight for several days. At this juncture Joffre

seems to have enlisted the aid of Lord Kitchener, the British Secretary of State for War, on his side, for, on August 31st, "the demand that we should stand and fight was not only urgently repeated, but was actually backed by imperative messages from the French President, and from Lord Kitchener and the British Government."

Again French refused. His refusal brought Kitchener post-haste to Paris. French and he met. And here comes the most dramatic revelation in French's book—a chapter from the inside of the High Command.

"Lord Kitchener," he says, "arrived on this occasion in the uniform of a Field Marshal, and from the outset of his conversation assumed the air of a Commander-in-Chief, and announced his intention of taking the field and inspecting the troops. . . .

"After some discussion the Secretary of State decided to abandon his intention. . . . In the conversation which followed . . . Lord Kitchener appeared to take grave exception to certain views which I expressed as to the expediency of leaving the direction of the operations in the field in the hands of the military chiefs in command in the field. He abruptly closed the discussion and requested me to accompany him for a private interview in another room.

"When we were alone he commenced by entering a strong objection to the tone I assumed. Upon this I told him all that was in my mind. I said that the command of the British forces in France had been entrusted to me by His Majesty's Government; that I alone was responsible to them for whatever happened, and that on French soil my authority as regards the British Army must be supreme until I was legally superseded by the same authority which had put that responsibility upon me. I further remarked that Lord Kitchener's presence in France in the character of a soldier could have no other effect than to weaken and prejudice my position in the eyes of the French and my own countrymen alike. . . . I told him that I valued highly his advice and assistance, which I would gladly accept as such, but that I would not tolerate any interference with my executive command and authority so long as His Majesty's Government chose to retain me in my present position. I think he began to realize my difficul-

ties, and we finally came to an amicable understanding. . . .

"It is very difficult for any but soldiers to understand the real bearing and significance of this Paris incident. If the confidence of the troops in their commander is shaken in the least degree, or if his influence, power, and authority, are prejudiced by any display of distrust in his ability to conduct operations, however slight the indications of such distrust may be, the effects react instantly throughout the whole Army. This is more than ever true with troops which, as at the moment in question, were being subjected to great and severe demands upon their courage, endurance, and, above all, *faith in their leaders*.


"Then again there was the effect which might have been produced on the French. Ministers and generals were present and witnessed Lord Kitchener's apparent assertion of his right to exercise the power and authority of a Commander-in-Chief in the field.

"Fortunately the matter terminated in a manner which led to no regrettable publicity. Lord Kitchener realized his mistake and left Paris that night."

III

THE DISAGREEMENT WITH JOFFRE

ASIDE from the sensational personal side to this dispute, the underlying cause of Lord Kitchener's visit to Paris is something around which controversy is sure to rage. He went to Paris because French would not stand and fight, as Joffre wished him to do. Now the keystone of Joffre's fame as a great military leader, in the mind of a great many people, is his decision to fall back steadily, despite the advice of those who wished him to stand, until he had reached what he judged to be the position where he could face about and meet the Germans, in full confidence that he could stop their advance. That position, it has been assumed, was the Marne. Everybody knows of Joffre's famous proclamation to his men, already grumbling at the weary succession of orders to keep on retreating, that the moment had come for them to



A Pontoon Bridge Over the River Scheldt
Antwerp is seen on the far side of the river.

© Underwood and Underwood.

stop, turn, and, if necessary, die in their tracks, but not give up another inch of ground. Everybody knows of the new French Army, organized to fall in as a continuation of Joffre's left, the Army that was to strike when the French Commander-in-Chief had at last reached the Marne, where there was to be no more retreat.

Yet Viscount French tells us that Joffre wanted him to stand at Compiègne. Compiègne is considerably north of the Marne. That would imply that Joffre's idea was to give battle long before the Marne was reached.

"I retain the most profound belief," says the English commander, "that had I yielded to these violent solicitations (i.e., from Joffre and the British and French governments), the whole Allied Army would have been thrown back in disorder over the Marne and Paris would have fallen an easy prey into the hands of the Germans."

So there is the basis for a first-class controversy. It may live to regale our grandchildren half a century hence, as the Waterloo controversy regales the grandchildren of the men who fought on that historic field.

IV

CRITICISM OF VON KLUCK

INCIDENTALLY, French hits out at another man who has won considerable credit for his part in the 1914 operations—an enemy, this time, General von Kluck. It has often been stated that this German commander, in his sweeping advance toward Paris, showed excellence alike in advance and retreat; that his quick wheeling movement southeastward during which, for part of the time, his men made a flank march along the front of a hostile army, one of the most dangerous moves possible, was a model of mental suppleness and quickness of decision.

French does not share this view in the least.

"With their usual arrogance and pomposity," he says, "the Germans, ignoring the fact that it was their own negligence which had led them into a most dangerous situation, claim that General von Kluck showed unusual skill in extricating the First German Army from the toils.

"After considering the subject very carefully, and with a thorough knowledge of the situation and the ground, I have formed the opinion that von Kluck manifested considerable hesitation and want of energy."

Splendidly as the Allies fought, he adds, it was the Germans themselves who deliberately threw away their chance of victory—and here too he puts blame on von Kluck. As late as the morning of September 6, 1914, when the battle of the Marne opened, French says that both he and Joffre were sure that the Germans were still advancing, yet the truth was that von Kluck's advance had for hours been a hurried retreat.

"Why this sudden change?" asks French. "Because he then discovered that his communications were about to be threatened on the Ourcq. Surely the most inexperienced of generals might have anticipated some such threat, and, further, might have realized that the line of the river Ourcq afforded him the most convenient and efficient means of securing flank protection. It has been said by critics of the battle that, had Manoury delayed his movement on the Ourcq, von Kluck would not have taken alarm. But when the German general first ordered the counter-march the French general had hardly recrossed the Marne.

"The fact probably is that von Kluck and his staff never really liked the rôle which was forced upon them by the Great General Staff, and that they undertook their part in the battle with wavering minds and with their heads half turned round."

After the Marne French turns to the fighting along the Aisne, the long "race to the sea," when Allies and Germans sought to outflank each other, and to the terrific fighting around Ypres, where, for days, the fate of Great Britain and France was balanced on a hair. His great fear was that the enemy might get possession of the Channel ports and thus threaten the very life of England. He recognized the peril when the Germans began to lengthen out their right flank. When Antwerp unexpectedly fell to the enemy on October 9, 1914, French realized that the menace was imminent; it looked as if a thrust was bound to come which would place the Channel ports in German hands. But again, he says, they missed a great chance.

"Operating from such a base," he says, "there would appear to be no insuperable obstacle to an immediate German advance on Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne. The Belgian Army was in no condition to resist such an advance. The occupation of these places and the formation of a defensive line which would include the whole of the Pas-de-Calais might

AGAIN COMPLAINS OF KITCHENER

The German attack on the Channel did not follow the fall of Antwerp—at least not as soon as French expected. In the meantime, foreseeing it, he was doing his best to get the bulk of the British Army shifted to the north so that he might be in a position to resist the



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The Germans in Antwerp

Refugees outside the town hall in Antwerp, where they made application to the German authorities for permission to remain in the city.

become a *fait accompli* before the troops could arrive from the main theaters to prevent it.

"But here again we have an example of the over-confidence which forever possessed that army which set out for 'world-conquest.' As on the Marne, so at Antwerp, they were not prepared to seize the psychological moment and to play boldly for the great stake."

Interesting in this connection, is Napoleon's remark that Antwerp is as a pistol pointed at the heart of England.—Ed.

coming onslaught. And here again he registers a complaint of the hero of Khartum.

"Lord Kitchener did not make things easy for me," he writes. "Keenly desirous to influence the course of operations, his telegrams followed one after another, each containing 'directions' regarding a situation of which, in London, he could know very little."

For instance, says French, Kitchener communicated with Joffre without letting him

know about it; he sent orders to the troops under General Rawlinson, operating about Ostend, and told French that Rawlinson was not under French's command. All this rasped French.

"Had I been left to exercise my full functions as Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in France," he declares, "I should certainly have made different dispositions with regard to the disposal of these troops. I regret that I must record my deliberate opinion that the best that could have been done throughout this critical situation was *not* done, owing entirely to Lord Kitchener's endeavor to unite in himself the separate and distinct rôles of a Cabinet Minister in London and a Commander-in-Chief in France. I feel it only right and in the interest of my country, with a view to any war we may be engaged in in the future, to make this plain statement of fact. The calamity at Sedan was due in part to interference from Paris with the army in the field, and the American Civil War was more than probably prolonged by the repeated interference on the part of the Secretary of State with the commanders in the field. . . . Such, then, was the general atmosphere of doubt and uncertainty in which I had to work after the fall of Antwerp until toward the 10th of the month (October) when at length the Secretary of State for War consented to allow me full liberty of action to direct the movements of all British forces in France."

French was quite dissatisfied with the operations for the relief of Antwerp, directed from London. Joffre and he had other plans which, he thinks, would have been more efficacious; in fact, he inclines to the opinion that, had they been adopted, Ostend and Zeebrugge might have been saved to the Allies and the terrible menace which German possession of those ports held over Britain for four long years might have been averted.

During the movement of the British Army northward, previous to the battle of Ypres, French came into contact with Foch, for whom the Englishman has nothing but the highest praise. "I regard General Foch as one of the finest soldiers and most capable leaders I have ever known," he says. "He appreciates a military situation like lightning, with marvelous accuracy, and evinces wonderful skill and versatility in dealing with it.

Animated by a consuming energy, his constant exclamation '*Attaque! Attaque! Attaque!*' reflected his state of mind. . . . Of all the generals in this great struggle he most resembled in audacious strategy his great master—Napoleon."

V

THE FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES

COMING to the battle of Ypres, French says bluntly that the stake was the very existence of the British Empire. Possession of the Channel ports would have allowed the Germans to fill it to overflowing with submarines, and thus nullify all efforts of the British Navy to guard against an invasion of England. He declares that such a German lodgment on the Channel would have allowed the Germans to multiply the horrors of air raids over England one hundredfold. He also points out that the Germans used guns effectively during the war at ranges greater than the distance between Calais and Dover, so that, had they held Calais, they could have bombarded England.

Hoping to bring about such a situation the Germans, on October 15, 1914, began the series of terrific attacks which, as a whole, go by the name of the First Battle of Ypres. When it began both French and Foch hoped that it might turn into an Allied offensive operation. They soon saw that this would be impossible; that defense alone, and defense the most dogged and desperate, was all that lay within their power for the time being. It soon became apparent that the enemy was present in appalling force. Entire corps of troops unexpectedly poured into the area close to the coast; they were "like a veritable bolt from the blue."

"It was simply up to us," says French, "to hold on like grim death to our positions by hard, resolute fighting, until relief in some shape should come." Like many another Allied general in those desperate days, he turned longing eyes toward Russia. Would not the Grand Duke Nicholas's successes in Poland and Galicia draw away some of the huge bodies of Germans gathering ominously in front of the Allied soldiers?

Like a cyclone the enemy struck. Never

did British valor shine more gloriously. Allenby, Haig, Rawlinson, Gough, Byng, all destined to greater fame in years to come, and many other officers of lesser renown, fought unflinchingly during those days when the fate of Britain depended on a thin line of tired men, subjected to a test seemingly beyond the limit of endurance of human beings. A hero, little known at least in America, was General Fitz Clarence of the Scots Guards, who, says French, saved the situation on October 31st, one of the two crucial days of the battle, and was killed shortly after. One crisis followed close upon another; as soon as a gap in the line was plugged, another opened; the reserves dropped to the vanishing point. And still the Germans came on, packed together in masses, leaping over their dead, with the dream of the Channel and London and the mastery of the world in their eyes.

"In recalling the fateful hours of those two wonderful days and nights," writes French, "I think we were perhaps in the greatest danger between 2 a.m. and 11 a.m. on Sunday, November 1. Had the French Sixteenth Corps arrived only an hour later than it did, the German advance from the line Wytschaete-Messines would have gained such volume, strength and impetus that nothing could have saved Mont Kemmel from falling into their hands. A vital wedge would have been driven into the very center of the line." And here he pays high honor to the man who was later to conquer Jerusalem. "The greatest threat of disaster with which we were faced in 1914," he says, "was staved off by the devoted bravery and endurance displayed by the cavalry corps under a commander, General Allenby, who handled them throughout with consummate skill." The same high praise, he adds, must be given to "those two redoubtable divisional leaders, Hubert Gough and de Lisle." Gough, it will be recalled, is the man who commanded the British Fifth Army on March 21, 1918, when the Germans broke its front and hurled the Allies back almost to Amiens. Around him has gathered another of the great controversies.

After the repulse of the great German attack around Ypres the adversaries settled down to weary months of trench warfare, that dragged on to such length that they led some military men to believe that the day of mobile



General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Bart, K.C.B.
Commander of the British Fourth Army.

warfare was gone—a view rudely shattered by the Germans in the Spring of 1918 and by Foch in the summer of that most thrilling of years. French, incidentally, was against trench warfare. He states in his book that he was and is of the belief that, given forces anywhere nearly equal, one Army can bend but cannot break the other's trench line.

VI

FRENCH WAS ALWAYS A "WEST-ERNER"

FRENCH was also opposed to the scattering of Allied forces on far-away fronts, holding always that the West front was the place where the war must be fought to a finish.

When the idea became current in the War Office that operations there had reached a condition of stalemate, French was asked to give his opinion. This he did in a long memorandum, in which he spoke emphatically against operations elsewhere—in Russia, through Denmark or Holland, on the North German coast, in Italy, on the Adriatic, in Salonika, Gallipoli, Asia Minor, Syria. In concluding this communication, he said:

"To sum up, my opinions are:

"(1) That the impossibility of breaking through the German line in Flanders has not been proved and that that operation is feasible

"(3) That there are no theaters, other than those in which operations are now in progress, in which decisive results could be obtained."

VII

ANOTHER DIFFERENCE WITH JOFFRE

FRENCH and Joffre came to a disagreement early in 1915 on the question of the importance of the Belgian coast. French wanted to open an offensive there and wrest



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A Bayonet Charge by a Highland Regiment

provided a sufficiency of high-explosive shells and of guns is provided.

"(2) That, even if it were proved impossible to break the German line, so large a margin of safety is needed that troops could not be withdrawn from this theater. It is to be remembered that the Allies are in a much better position to await the outcome of events. Time is against Germany; she will not sit forever behind her entrenchments, and the Allies must be prepared with an adequate force to strike her whenever she may attempt to break out or withdraw.

Zeebrugge and Ostend from the Germans. Joffre considered such a move as of secondary importance; he believed the accumulation of reserves to be the vitally important thing to the Allies, and, therefore, ruled that the offensive desired by French must be delayed.

"I always disagreed with these views," says the English general, "and remain convinced that my plans should have been accepted and tried. I will only add, as a further argument, against embarking on operations in other theaters of war, that our military forces at that time, and for at least fifteen months after-

wards, were not sufficient to enable us to carry on great operations in more than one theater with the necessary power and energy required for success. They could only have resulted in what actually happened in 1915, namely, the series of feeble and on the whole unsuccessful attempts to break through the German line in France, and an absolute fail-

VIII

THE MUNITIONS SCANDAL

FRENCH concludes with a review of the munitions situation, which brought on acrimonious controversy early in 1915. The battle of Neuve Chapelle, he says (March,



General Joffre Interrogating German Prisoners After the First Marne Battle

ure, compelling ultimate withdrawal of our troops, in the Dardanelles. . . .

"Divided counsels lead to half-measures and indecisive action. Such counsels have always had and always will have the most deterrent and disadvantageous effect on any vigorous prosecution of a war, great or small."

The sending of troops to the Dardanelles was, in French's opinion, the chief cause of the failure of Allied operations in 1915. Other causes noted by him were the attitude of the British War Office in failing to speed up the manufacture of munitions of war and the practical collapse of the Russian Armies.

1915), fought and won as soon as he had acquired a small reserve of ammunition, had to be broken off after three days because munitions ran short. He then addressed strong representations to the War Office, but without avail. The second battle of Ypres—when the Germans first used their new poison gas—found the British unprepared as to munitions, says French, and led to desperate defensive fighting surpassed only by the first battle of Ypres. Yet Mr. Asquith, in his Newcastle speech, stated that the Army had all the ammunition it required.

"When I read this speech," says French,

"after all my public and private appeals, I lost any hope that I had entertained of receiving help from the Government as then constituted."

At the battle of Festubert on May 9, 1915, French declares that, in spite of all his demands, less than eight per cent. of the British shells were high explosive and he had only sufficient shell for about forty minutes of artillery preparation before the attack.

"I therefore determined," says French, "on taking the most drastic measures to destroy the apathy of a Government which had brought the Empire to the brink of disaster." He told a friend what he meant to do and the friend warned him that the politicians would never forgive him, that his course would lose him his command. But his mind was made up—especially when, after he got back to his headquarters, he found instructions from Kitchener to send twenty per cent. of his slender stock of reserve munitions to the Dardanelles.

"I immediately gave instructions," writes French, "that evidence should be furnished to Colonel Repington, military correspondent of the *Times*, who happened to be then at Headquarters, that the vital need of high explosive shells had been a fatal bar to our Army's suc-

cess on that day. I directed that copies of all the correspondence that had taken place between myself and the Government on the question of the supply of ammunition be made at once, and I sent my secretary . . . to England with instructions that these proofs should be laid before Mr. Lloyd George, who had already shown me, by his special interest in this subject, that he grasped the deadly nature of our necessities."

Repington's article was published in the *London Times* on May 15, 1915. "The world knows what then happened," says French grimly. An appalling hornet's nest was stirred up. Kitchener was gravely compromised. Ere long, French was no longer commander of the British in France. But Lloyd George, as Minister of Munitions, grappled with the problem, and to him, says French, "we owe unmeasured gratitude."

"For my unprecedented action," he continues, "I claim that no other course lay open to me. To organize the nation's industrial resources upon a stupendous scale was the only way if we were to continue with success the great struggle which lay before us, and I feel that the result achieved fully warranted the steps I took."

And there he rests his case.

SMITH-DORRIEN'S BATTLE

Was the Commander of the British Second Corps Right or Wrong in Making His Famous Stand at Le Cateau?


ON August 26, 1914, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, commander of the Second Corps in Sir John French's British Army in France, thrilled the world by standing at Le Cateau, on the retreat from Mons, against the furious attacks of the onrushing Germans.

Smith-Dorrien's feat was hailed as admirable generalship and consummate daring. Sir John French, his commander, commended him for it at the time. Five years later, however, French, in his book 1914, severely criticized Smith-Dorrien for his action, asserting that it jeopardized the safety of the entire British

army.* French explained his previous praise of Smith-Dorrien by maintaining that the dispatch containing it was written hurriedly, without thorough study of the situation.

After the battle of Le Cateau, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was transferred to a command in Africa. And now his name is coupled with one of the controversies to which the world-war has given rise. Was he right or wrong in standing at Le Cateau? French, with the bluntness of an old soldier, says that Smith-Dorrien was wrong. On the other side of the case there will doubtless be plenty of testi-

* See preceding article on Sir John French's book.



General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien

As Commander of the British Second Corps in the retreat from Mons, his decision to disobey orders and to stand and fight at Le Cateau precipitated a bitter controversy.

mony. Already we have Sir Henry Newbolt's *Tales of the Great War*, in which the author takes the stand that Smith-Dorrien's act will rank him among the great heroes of military history.

Smith-Dorrien was a distinguished veteran of the Boer War. His peace command was at Salisbury and there he was left when the Commander-in-Chief, Field-Marshal Sir John French, and his two Army Corps under Sir Douglas Haig and Sir James Grierson as commanding generals arrived in France. The report of the arrival of the Expeditionary Force was published August 18. It seemed to a neighbor of Sir Horace a pity that in the greatest of wars no use could be found for a soldier with such a combination of judgment and courage, and he expressed that opinion. But the general answered serenely, "Someone must be left at home."

Fate, however, had something to say as to who the someone should be and promptly decided that it could not be Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. Three days later General Grierson died very suddenly in France, and Lord Kitchener offered the command of the 2nd Army Corps to Sir Horace, who accepted and made haste to France, the emergency being one that left no time for debate. He left England August 20th, and on August 23rd was fighting.

He took over General Grierson's staff entire, discussed the situation with them at Bavai the afternoon of the 21st, motored to Le Cateau to confer with the Commander-in-Chief, returned to his own Headquarters and issued orders for continuing the move north the next day. On the 22nd, the Germans were advancing from Brussels and there was the certainty of a battle on the 23rd. The British Army was to form the left flank of the Allied forces and Smith-Dorrien's corps was to be on the extreme left, lining the canal between Condé and Mons, with Haig's corps on its right from Mons to Binche. At the junction of the two, in the center of the line, there was a bulge or salient, made by a big bend in the canal, and Smith-Dorrien saw at once that this would be very difficult to hold if the attack were pushed strongly against it. He therefore prepared to make a second line of defense behind it, and this turned out to be very useful.

Smith-Dorrien had under him such traditional dependables as the 2nd Royal Scots, the 2nd Royal Irish, the Royal Fusiliers—regiments wearing honors of the William III and Marlborough campaigns; George II's regiments, the 2nd Suffolks, the East Surrey, the 2nd King's Own Scottish Borderers—too many to name here, all of the right stuff. The General knew them and was proud of them—he was to be prouder of them.

The Battle of Mons began Sunday, August 23, 1914, and no one has told more clearly, simply and compellingly than Sir Henry Newbolt, in his *The Story of a General*, of "the lonely moment of the night when Smith-Dorrien decided to stand and fight, against all odds and orders."

BRITISH IN AN EXPOSED POSITION

As foreseen by Sir Horace the Germans attacked heavily at the outward curve of the canal. The German artillery had begun shelling with high explosives, increasing in violence, the extent and volume indicating that the British were being attacked by about four Army Corps and outflanked by a fifth. But there was no intention of giving up the position. The British retired from the salient to the support line prepared as stated and held it against great odds. The first day's fighting was satisfactory to Smith-Dorrien, and he and his staff lay down at 10 o'clock that night for a little rest.

"At 3 a. m. General Forestier-Walker, who had been sent for by Sir John French, returned with very disappointing orders. Sir John had been informed at 5 p. m. the day before by a telegram from General Joffre that the 5th French Army on our right was falling back, instead of advancing, so that the British Army was exposed not only on the left flank but on the right as well, and must retire at once in order to keep in line. This could not now be done until the impedimenta had been got clear of the fighting troops, and of course there was no more sleep for anyone. The rest of the night was spent by Sir Horace in ordering this move and in seeing Sir Douglas Haig and settling on a course of action. Baggage and supply trains take time to be cleared away, and both Generals realized that while this was being done they would have a very stiff day's fighting.

'To withdraw in face of such numbers was a most difficult and dangerous operation.


"But even difficult and dangerous operations can be carried out by British infantry if only they are well handled. This second day's battle—which was the beginning of the Great Retreat—may be described as an alternate right and left swing. No orders were given for it, but it took the following course. First, Sir Douglas Haig attacked sharply with the 1st Corps, while Sir Horace withdrew his left, which was exposed to much closer and heavier pressure from the enemy. Then Sir Horace in turn stood fast and hit hard on a line from Valenciennes to Frameries, while the 1st Corps withdrew behind his right, to the Bavai-Mauberge road. Finally, Sir Horace again retired both his divisions and brought them into line on the west of Bavai. At dawn the whole British force stood to arms and the Germans began a heavy bombardment."

FRENCH ORDERS FURTHER RETREAT

It is unnecessary here to follow the details of the retirement under the shock of overwhelming numbers of Germans that seemed inexhaustible despite the slaughter of them as they mechanically advanced against the gun fire of the stubborn and ordered retreat. There was a general belief that the French were beginning to hold the enemy on the right and that a stand would be made all along the line at Le Cateau. But on the third day of the battle the Army Corps (Haig's and Smith-Dorrien's) which had kept well together and actually converged at Bavai, had got separated rather widely, eight miles intervening finally, and the situation was one of anxiety.

"Sir Horace had spent the morning directing the retirement from his motor, and went finally about 3.30 p. m. to Le Cateau to see Sir John French. He failed to find him, for Sir John had started at 2 p. m. for St. Quentin, twenty-five miles off. From Sir Archibald Murray, however, the Chief of the Staff, he received Sir John's orders not to make a stand at Le Cateau, then drove to Bertry, where his own headquarters were even then in the act of preparing to evacuate Le Cateau—clerks, typists and orderlies swarming off in motor-lorries to follow the Commander-in-Chief to St. Quentin. Sir Horace spent the next few hours in selecting a position in case he had to fight next day, and

then drove to Bertry, where his own headquarters were to be. On the way he saw some of General Sordet's French cavalry corps moving across to our left rear. They had been asked to help us during the retirement, but their horses had been too tired—they did their



General Sir Edmund H. H. Allenby,
G.C.M.G., K.C.B.

Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Forces operating in Palestine, who had, in 1914, distinguished himself on the Western front.

best for us next day, when they were most needed.

"The evening was spent in the difficult task of finding out the exact whereabouts of the troops, many of whom had covered thirty miles, and whose rearguards were desperately engaged. It was not until 1.30 a. m. that this was done; and Sir Horace, by way of a night's rest, had to solve two problems. First, how was he to deal with General Allenby's cavalry division, General Snow's 4th Division of infantry and

General Drummond's 19th Brigade—none of them under his command though actually fighting near his corps at the moment? And secondly, in face of the orders he had received, not to fight, how was he to save his weary force from being crushed in the act of retiring—for the Germans were now close up and outflanking him on both sides?

DECIDES TO DISOBEY AND FIGHT

"He quickly came to the conclusion that it was an occasion when he would be justified in disobeying his orders; and taking the cavalry, the 4th Division and the 19th Brigade under his command, he issued instructions for a battle at dawn.

"He could expect no help from his colleague. Sir Douglas Haig was evidently delayed far to the north and east of him, and von Kluck was forcing a wedge in between them. Sir Horace must play the game out alone—he was in the tightest of tight places, for he had his orders, and to obey them literally meant destruction. He knew how foot-weary his men were, and how near to discouragement; if he called upon them to retreat once more, with a confident enemy close upon their heels, the retreat must almost certainly become a rout. It would be no one's fault—the Army would be annihilated, by an overwhelming force, but it would be annihilated and the Empire would be in mourning for fifty years.

"Before daybreak on August 26, Sir Horace had made his two decisions. The first was that he must be master of his weapons. He sent word to General Allenby and General Snow that the cavalry and the 4th Division would come under his command. He made no bones about it, nor did they. It was not the moment to stand on etiquette or wait for official confirmation. The 4th Division was ordered to form the left of the line from Haucourt to Caudry, with the 3rd next it in the center from Caudry to Troisvilles, and the 5th (with the 19th Brigade) on the right at Le Cateau. The cavalry were widely scattered; the brigade and a half near Caudry were to fall back on Ligny and try to guard the left flank, the two and a half brigades at Catillon were to move to the support of the right flank.

"WE SHALL PUT UP A REAL GRAND FIGHT"

"The second decision was the great one—the one for which Horace Smith-Dorrien was born and bred. He made it in the small hours

of the 26th, and shortly afterwards wired to General Headquarters to tell the Commander-in-Chief what he had decided. The reply he received was that the Commander-in-Chief wished to speak to him on the telephone: so at 7 a. m. he walked into the railway station at Bertry and asked to be put through to the British General Headquarters at St. Quentin. He soon heard the voice of General Henry Wilson, Assistant Chief of the Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, and at once explained to him the state of affairs as he saw it. 'My orders are not to fight but to keep on retiring. My men are too weary to march; before they can retire I must fight; a blow to the Germans is the only way of staving off a disaster; and the battle has actually begun.' General Wilson replied, 'Sir John did not intend you to fight, and he wishes you to break off the battle and retire at the earliest moment possible. He is anxious that you should not continue to fight a moment longer than is absolutely necessary. He cannot send you any support—the 1st Corps is incapable of movement. His opinion is that in not retiring you are risking a Sedan.' Sir Horace was prepared to take this risk. 'We shall put up a real grand fight,' he said, 'but with my men too weary to march, both my flanks in the air, and a vastly superior number of the enemy against us, no doubt there is a possibility of our being surrounded.'

FOR THE GOOD OF THE CAUSE

"General Wilson then suggested that Sir John French might be willing to come back and take over the actual command. But Sir Horace had no desire to avoid a responsibility that was rightly his own. 'I strongly deprecate that,' he replied. 'The battle is now going on, on such an extended front that the troops would not know of Sir John's presence on the field, and it is not as if I had any large reserves which he could handle. After all, this is only the commencement of a great war, and if a disaster should occur, it is essential for the good of the cause we are fighting for that the Commander-in-Chief should be free to go to England and bring over another Army. But my one chance is to fight and I am going to do it.' General Wilson could not conceal his admiration. 'Well,' he said, 'your voice is the only cheerful thing I've heard for three days.'

"Sir Horace had sent to General Sordêt an urgent message saying, 'I am going to fight, and I hope you will be able to cover my left.' Sordêt sent back no reply, but in the hour of need he was there.

"By this time the enemy had got the artillery of at least four Army Corps into position. Our guns were outnumbered, five to one; but they made a magnificent fight of it and inflicted huge losses on the Germans advancing in mass. So did our infantry; they made and lay in shallow trenches, some few of which had been hastily and unscientifically dug for them by devoted Frenchwomen, and they were desperately tired; but they shot as no other troops had ever shot, and for seven hours their enemies went down before them like cut grass. At one time the 4th Division, on the left flank, was forced back, but by a brilliant counter attack they regained their ground. Nothing could really shift them but overwhelming gun power. By midday the main artillery duel was over, and some of our guns, especially of the 5th Division, were silenced. This was a severe loss; for, to infantry, even the sound of their own guns is a support. By 2 o'clock the 5th Division had been outflanked, and pounded almost to pieces. At 2.30 Sir Horace received a message from Sir Charles Fergusson that he feared his men could stand it no longer, and were beginning to dribble away. Sir Horace sent him instructions to order the 5th Division to retire. He had not a word of blame for them; he knew they would not fail him till they were in extremes, and he sent instructions to the rest of the troops what to do in case they fell back. His only reserves were two battalions and one battery; these he had already had to use once, and now he sent them in again to cover the retirement.

BEATEN BUT NOT ROUTED

"It was now past 3 o'clock and the 5th Division were coming back in great disorder. It is best to be precise about this, because exaggerated and even hysterical descriptions were sent over to England soon afterwards. Admirably terse and well balanced accounts also came in private letters; one of the best is by Lieutenant Frederick Longman of the 4th Royal Fusiliers, one of General Hamilton's reserve battalions: 'At 1 p. m., a lull—we all thought we had beaten them off. Suddenly a tremendous burst of firing in the center of our line; 3.30, order for a general retirement. Then I saw a sight I hope never to see again. Our line of retreat was down two roads which converged on a village about a mile behind the position. Down these roads came a mob—men from every regiment there, guns, riderless horses, limbers packed with wounded, quite unattended and lying on each other, jostling over ruts, &c. It

was not a rout, only complete confusion. This was the Germans' chance. One battery of artillery sent forward, or one squadron of cavalry, would have turned this rabble into a complete rout, and the whole Army would have been cut up piecemeal. Meanwhile, we were the only regiment I saw in any order. We had not been engaged, and had only lost one officer and about thirty men; we had also had a hot meal, so that we were in good condition. We



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Observing the Movements of the Enemy Through a Periscope

went back in a succession of extended lines, in absolute order, and formed up behind a farmhouse near where the roads met. Here we waited in mass, while the rest of the Army streamed past. It was a most trying half hour. It seemed inevitable that they would follow up, and then the jam in that village would have been indescribable—I have since heard that they had sustained fearful losses, and also a division of French cavalry was covering our retreat. When the rabble had got past we moved off, marching at attention, arms sloped, fours dressed, &c., through the village; 7 p. m., moved off again and marched till 1 a. m.'

THE LEFT FLANK SAFE

"Sir Horace too saw this, and no doubt he too hoped never to see the like again. But he gave not the least sign of dismay. His business was to save his Army. He had already sent his car away, and was now on horseback, with some of his staff; the rest had gone, in accordance with a well-thought-out plan, to important points on the several roads along which the force was retiring, to maintain order and direct those who had lost their units. Sir Horace



Ulk, Berlin.

Berlin Jibes at British Slackers

Chorus—"Your king and your country need you. Won't you *please* join the army?"


rode along the line, and hearing very heavy artillery firing to the westward naturally began to fear that the enemy were outflanking the 4th Division. To make sure about this the General with one A.D.C. galloped up a piece of rising ground, and perceived with joy and gratitude that the noise was not that of German guns only, but the short sharp bark of the inimitable French Horse Artillery. Sordét had played up, and our left flank was safe.

"Sir Horace then rode back to the Roman road—the long and dead straight road from Bavai to Estrées by which the 5th Division were retiring. It was a dispiriting sight, for heavy rain was now falling, and the men who came staggering past were so tired and footsore

that many threw away their packs and entrenching tools, and some could go no further, but rolled over by the roadside and were dead asleep in a moment. The greater number trudged on in a solid mass, units all broken up and mixed together, and groups of men all believing that they themselves were the sole survivors of their regiment. It might be thought that a General had no part to play here—Napoleon, on a day not unlike this, rode off with a '*tout est perdu; sauve qui peut.*' Smith-Dorrien stayed among his men, knowing that all was not lost, because he had the power to handle them even in extreme distress. An American volunteer, who was present, has said the right word about him both here and afterwards. '*I speak,*' he says, '*with profound recognition of his high attainments as a military leader, and of his great heart. Truly, a kinder man I have never met.*'

SMITH-DORRIEN CHEERS HIS TIRED TROOPS

"You may imagine what it meant to these tired soldiers—tired a dozen times over, tired with four days' marching and fighting, tired with killing endless hordes of enemies, tired with facing for nine hours an irresistible tornado of shell and shrapnel—to come suddenly upon this quiet commanding figure of their General. Here was the head of everything, the man who must know all that there was to know; yet he was kind, cheery, unhurried and unworried, walking his horse amongst them, talking to them in his cool, courteous voice, assuring them that all was well, that the attack was over, that they had beaten their enemy to a standstill, that they were only retiring to keep in line with the French Army, and to share in the coming advance. 'Right ahead,' he said to one little bunch after another. 'You'll find a lot more of your battalion further down the road.' For two hours they had the comfort of this voice, and every minute that passed proved the words more true. There was practically no pursuit, no rear-guard action: guns were still firing, but without effect. 'Never mind the guns,' said the General, 'I'll look after them; you go quietly on.' They did go on. It was a very sorry crowd that worked their way back towards St. Quentin that night, but it was not a panic-stricken crowd. The staff backed up their commander; at the gate of every field, and the entrance of every bylane stood an officer collecting a certain battalion or brigade. 'This way Suffolks, this way Manchesters, all this way the 14th Brigade.' It was a tremendous piece of work; more officers were borrowed to help the staff, and the motor-drivers took a hand as well.



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Holland on Guard

The cost of maintaining an army of 500,000 men constantly mobilized imposed a tremendous strain upon the finances of a small nation like Holland—with a total population of but 6,000,000 inhabitants. She was in constant fear of invasion and kept her army up to war strength.

"The general himself, having done what he could for them, went on at 9 p. m. to report to his Commander-in-Chief at St. Quentin. French had gone to Noyon, thirty-five miles further. Smith-Dorrien, weary as he was, went on. It was long past midnight when he reached Noyon, and woke up the Commander-in-Chief. Reports of the direst kind had reached him, and he was

convinced that the 2nd Corps was no longer in existence, and Sir Horace's undefeated serenity seemed to him at first almost outrageous. But when he realized that the fight had indeed achieved its object, and that the three divisions were being put in order to rejoin the line, his skepticism was overcome and he spoke in warm terms of Sir Horace's achievement."

THE MARNE AND VERDUN

Joffre's Strategy as Illustrated by These Two Great Battles—A Description of Both by a French Officer Who Fought In Them

DURING General Joffre's tenure of the chief command of the French Armies the two most tremendous events were the battle of the Marne and the defense of Verdun. On the first his fame as one of the world's great generals mainly rests. The second, though not associated with his personal presence as is the Marne, is an excellent example of the dogged tenacity of Joffre, of the impossibility to move him from a resolution once taken.

As long as men talk of the war they will talk of Joffre's decision, in August, 1914, to fight only when he was ready, on ground of his own choosing. Other generals might have turned about and faced the German invaders from the very outset, disputing every inch of the soil of France. But the result would in all probability have been that the French would have succumbed, that Paris would have fallen, that the Germans would then and there have won the war. By biding his time Joffre drew the enemy ever deeper into hostile territory; he struck at the right moment and broke the most dangerous blow ever aimed at the heart of France. If the war was won at any one battle it was won at the battle of the Marne. If any one man deserves a major share of the glory of winning it, that man is Joffre.

His strategic plan, however, would have been worthless had he not been ably seconded by his subordinates. He created a new army, that of Manoury, on his extreme left, but had not Manoury handled that army splendidly, Joffre's foresight in creating it would have gone for naught.

Similarly, he created another new army, which he placed in the center of his battle line, under Foch. The world knows how Foch handled that army. It knows of the flash of supreme genius, the stroke of inspiration as clean-cut as any that ever came to Napoleon Bonaparte, by which Foch suddenly passed to the offensive with his practically defeated forces, and, taking the Germans completely by surprise, beat them back, pushed his men into a gap that had been formed between two of the enemy armies, and assured victory. Strategically, the lion's share of the credit for the victory of the Marne, judging from what looks at present to be the best available evidence, belongs to Joffre; tactically, it belongs to Foch.

The thrilling days of the Marne and those of Verdun are admirably and concisely told by Raymond Recouly, an officer in the French Army, who wrote during the war under the pseudonym of "Captain X." Recouly was in both battles. In *General Joffre and His Battles* (Scribner) he gives a description of them which the layman can understand without difficulty, from which he can get a vivid idea of what manner of man Joffre is, and of what stuff his military genius is made.

Joffre, Recouly points out, is never afraid to show his hand; after the Marne he published the full series of his General Orders, covering the crucial period from August 25th to September 6, 1914, when the battle was prepared and initiated.

"They confirm the contention," says Recouly, "that the great battle of the Marne

was clearly foreseen, and planned in all its details by the commander-in-chief."

PRELIMINARIES OF THE BATTLE

Let us go back to the situation preceding the Marne. The Germans had launched their main attack, under von Kluck, through Belgium, and were pouring down like an avalanche upon Paris, driving British and French

able responsibility, ever weighed on human shoulders," says Recouly. "A moment's discouragement, an instant's hesitation, and France would have been lost, and Europe and the rest of the world left to discover the meaning of such a disaster as the triumph of Germany."

Joffre did not hesitate. The flash of genius lighted his mind; he saw clearly that the thing to do was to fall back until he should be in a



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Where the French and Germans First Clashed

Ganseplatz, Mülhausen, the city in Alsace-Lorraine which the French attacked in the early days of the war.

before them. The French, who had foreseen such a move—though its fury of momentum surprised them—had aimed to counteract it by launching three offensives of their own in other quarters. These were all failures; the French assailants were beaten back at Mulhouse (Mülhausen), at Morhange, at Neufchâteau. As a result, other German Armies, stretching eastward from von Kluck's, also rolled into France.

That was the perilous situation confronting Joffre. "No heavier burden, no more formid-

position to smite the enemy. Refusing battle with his left flank and his center, he set to work to create those two armies, of Manoury and Foch, which were to turn the scale at the Marne.

On September 4th, von Kluck, who had been driving on headlong for days, straight at Paris, suddenly turned from the direct road to the French capital, veering southeastward. He did this, it may be assumed, because the French Army, not Paris, was his main objective, and because he judged that, by giving

this new direction to his Army, he would contribute better toward enveloping Joffre. As soon as he turned southeastward, Joffre set Manoury in motion. Von Kluck knew nothing of this new army out on his right flank. At the same time, on the morning of September 6, 1914, Joffre issued the memorable order that was heard around the world:

"At the moment of engaging a battle on which the fate of the country hangs it is necessary to remind every one that the time has passed for looking backward. Every effort must be made to attack and to drive back the enemy. The hour has come to advance at any cost, and to die where you stand rather than give way. In the present circumstances no weakness can be tolerated."

Under Joffre in the battle of the Marne were five French Armies—those of Manoury, Franchet d'Esperey, Foch, Langle de Cary and Sarrail, and the British Army under Sir John French. Opposed to them was the huge German mass, strung out from west to east under the following commanders: von Kluck, von Bülow, von Hausen, Grand Duke Albrecht of Württemberg, and the German Crown Prince. On Sept. 6th the battle became general from Meaux, close to Paris, almost to Verdun.

"Those were soul-thrilling days," says Recouly. "We, who lived through them in actual contact with them, knew that they marked a dividing-line in our experience, and that henceforward all we did and were would gravitate about that central moment of our lives."

FOCH'S INSPIRATION

The Germans soon realized the menace to them in Manoury's attack along the Ourcq, on von Kluck's extreme right. The French general, driving ahead with splendid impetuosity, rolled up one of von Kluck's divisions and compelled the German commander to make a change in the disposition of his forces in order to make head at the same time against the new and unexpected French attack and the British Army. The British, and the French Army on their right—that of Franchet d'Esperey—also advanced, placing von Kluck in a precarious position.

The Germans sought to meet the emergency by vigorous action. They drove square-

ly at Joffre's center, held by Foch, between Sézanne and Fère-Champenoise, especially about the marshes of Saint-Gond. The impact was terrific. Foch's resistance was almost crushed. They pushed back his right wing. The Prussian Guard, attacking the marshes of Saint-Gond, hurled themselves on the château of Mondement. But they had in Foch an adversary not only of extraordinary tenacity but of brilliant genius. He had Joffre's order to stand at all hazards. But he did more than that. With his army well-nigh defeated, his right crumbling, his left desperately hard pressed, *he attacked!*

"He accomplished a *tour de force*, almost a miracle," writes Recouly; and again: "At the most crucial period of the struggle General Foch conceived and executed a maneuver which, together with Manoury's movement, was one of the determining causes of victory."

Since that day Foch has risen to greater fame. His strategic combinations, by which he contained the great German offensive of 1918 and then passed suddenly to the offensive, repeating on a vast scale his Marne maneuver, have enshrined his name among the greatest in military annals. But no one act of his shines as does that at the Marne, when his grasp of the situation, that *coup d'œil* which raised Napoleon so high above his contemporaries, told him that attack was the sole salvation for his shaken Army.

It was one of the great moments in the history of war. Foch knew how to seize it and utilize it. Well had Joffre picked the man to command his center.

The night of September 9th Foch's headquarters were in Fère-Champenoise. He had driven a wedge into the German line. The battle was won. Suddenly the enemy fell back to the Aisne and dug himself in. Several times after that he rose up to thunder at the gates of France, but never with such dire menace as in those September days of 1914.

In summing up the qualities of Joffre Recouly * writes:

"In the solitude of St. Helena, Napoleon, who was not entirely without experience in these matters, often put to himself the question: 'What are the qualities that make a great general?' It is rare—so he concluded—to find in

General Joffre and His Battles; copyright 1918, by Charles Scribner's Sons; reprinted by permission.



Courtesy of Red Cross Magazine.

Nos Poilus—“Our Soldiers”

From the Painting by Emile Friant.

one and the same man all the necessary attributes. The first essential for a general is that his intelligence or talent should be in stable equilibrium with his character or courage. The general (to use Napoleon's phrase) should be '*carré*,' that is, 'four-square'; by which he meant that he should be well-balanced. It was another of Napoleon's sayings that a general who has more intelligence than character resembles a ship which carries too much sail; at the slightest whiff of wind it risks capsizing. . . .

"Nothing could be truer than these obser-

extraordinary preparations; they studied the plan of their offensive in all its details; they accumulated a formidable number of men and an inexhaustible amount of ammunition; their officers and soldiers alike were ready to throw themselves into the attack with the greatest impetuosity. . . .

"Our troops retired until the favorable moment came, and then, when the Germans were sure we were beaten, we struck with our full force, and at the crucial moment defeat was turned into victory. From that time the Ger-



General Pétain (X) Watching the Battle at *Le Mort Homme*, Verdun

vations; and they are marvelously applicable to General Joffre. The striking thing in his character is just this admirable balance, typically French."

THE DEFENSE OF VERDUN

With regard to the battle of Verdun, Roucouly declares that the same *rhythm* exists as during the weeks culminating in the battle of the Marne.

"I wish to call attention to this because to my mind it is the dominant and essential feature of these great military events. In August, 1914, as in February, 1916, the Germans made

mans were stopped; and in several places driven back; all their efforts and sacrifices were useless, and only served to mark the importance of their check.

"That was the rhythm of the first four weeks of the war, up to the battle of the Marne, and it was also the rhythm of the first four days of the battle of Verdun, up to the recapture of the Fort de Douaumont by our Twentieth Corps.

"First act: The French fall back as the Germans advance.

"Second act: A decisive battle ends in a victory for the French.

"Third act: The Germans are held in check; they may move to and fro, but they can make



The Ruins of Vaux Fort, Verdun

After seven days' desperate fighting, the Germans succeeded in taking it, but this and other fortresses were ultimately won back by the French.

no serious advance, and will wear themselves out to no purpose." *

Verdun bars one of the principal highways from Germany into France. When the Germans invaded France in 1914, General Sarraill stood successfully against them around Verdun and later pushed them back into the forest of the Argonne. Further attempts to take the great fortress, from the Argonne and

faded and reality had to be faced—the reality that until she had won a great victory over France Germany could not hope to end the war successfully."

So the German High Command decided to make a supreme effort against the French. An attack on a vast scale was planned against Verdun. The Germans chose this objective for various reasons: they thought that success



A Scene on Hill 304, Verdun

The "Demi-Lune" trench, the farthest point of the French advance.

from St. Mihiel, were likewise halted. Verdun barred the road against the enemy of civilization.

In the meantime, during 1915, the Germans had turned their attention eastward and won great but inconclusive victories against Russia and Serbia. The winter of that year found Germany still balking of ultimate victory. "The German people," says Recouly, "had been fed with false hopes and dazzled by glittering visions. . . . Those visions gradually

would make the retreat of the French across the Meuse hazardous; that the inadequate railway facilities of the fortress would greatly embarrass its defenders; that the capture of such a stronghold would prove Germany irresistible, align hesitating neutrals on her side, end the war.

Preparations were made on a tremendous scale. Picked divisions were rehearsed for the attack, formed into a compact mass like Mackensen's phalanx which had broken the Russian lines on the Dunajec the year before.

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GUNS ALMOST WHEEL TO WHEEL

The attack was launched February 21, 1916. It was preceded by a terrible bombardment.

"The number of pieces of heavy artillery which fired incessantly was stupendous. French aviators flying over the German lines agreed in reporting that in the region to the north of our positions . . . it was 'like a display of fireworks.' Such an incessant cannonade came from the little wood of Grémilly, north of La Jumelle, that our observers had to give up marking on their cards the different batteries in action; they were everywhere; the guns stood almost wheel to wheel."

Despite this fire, the French infantry stuck to their positions, burrowing into shell-holes, concealing themselves as best they might, so that, when the Germans followed up with infantry attacks, they were desperately resisted. The fighting became of unparalleled intensity; troops fought on for hours, in a murderous frenzy. At the cost of appalling losses the Germans fought their way past Haumont and Brabant, past Samogneux and Ornes, until, with the storming of Louvemont, they had driven the French back to the line of the forts of Verdun.

Then they attacked Douaumont. The fighting, frenzied before, reached a pitch of incredible fury, a very insanity of battle. "They shall not pass!" General Pétain, commander of the French defense, had told General Castelnau, whom Joffre had sent to look over the situation. And Pétain kept his word. In the open, in underground passages, locked in each other's arms, hanging at each other's throats, men fought like beasts. "In one of our communicating trenches," writes Recouly, "four grenadiers threw bombs steadily for more than twenty hours; it was death for whoever tried to pass them."

Over the dead bodies of thousands of their comrades the Germans got into Douaumont village. A regiment of Brandenburgers crept

up to Fort Douaumont and, after infernal fighting, took it. The German High Command announced that "the corner-stone of the French defenses of Verdun has been carried." But, in truth, the French defense was unbroken.

Then the Germans got a foothold in Vaux village, and stormed Fort Vaux. Once more their *communiqués* foreshadowed the doom of the great fortress. But the French defense held.

Balked on the right bank of the Meuse the enemy drove with bull-like fury at the defenses of the left bank. The names of Hill 304 and "Le Mort Homme" went around the world, as the fighting, equal in fury to any that had gone before, made a hell of each. Here, too, the attacks were broken, the French lines held, the cry of "They shall not pass!" was made good in rivers of blood.

Gradually the attacks of the Germans weakened. There was a limit to the endurance of their regiments, to the number of their reserves. As at the Marne, France had stood, unflinching, at Verdun. Recouly, writing while the battle was still raging, sums up the story in these words which apply to Germany's record in the entire war:

"First, Germany knew that a war of erosion must of necessity be to her disadvantage, because time was working against her, and the resources of England, Russia and France were increasing, while her own steadily diminished. She, therefore, meant to end the struggle by a smashing blow, and chose the sector of Verdun in order to deal this blow to her 'chief enemy,' France. After masterly preparation she had accumulated in this sector all the resources in men and munitions of which she could dispose. The result of the first four days of the battle was in her favor, but as soon as our reserves came up her advance was checked. Willing to sacrifice any number of lives in order to win, she has drawn ruthlessly on her reserves, and at the end of three months of carnage she finds herself in the position of a desperate gambler who has risked his fortune on a single stake, only to find that luck has turned against him."

THE GOUGH CONTROVERSY

Was the Commander of the British Fifth Army to Blame for the German Break-Through Around St. Quentin in March, 1918?

JUST as the World War was the greatest in history it seems that it will be the richest in controversies. Already disputes that bid fair to eclipse those that have raged around episodes of other wars have cropped up and it is practically a certainty that they are but the vanguard of many more that will keep this generation and those to come busy trying to decide the right and the wrong.

How many books remain to be written on the question: "Who won the battle of the Marne?" How many answers will Viscount French elicit to the blunt statements in his book *1914*? Who will decide the pros and cons of the campaign in Russia in 1915? Who lost the chance to force the Dardanelles?

Those are only a few of the questions that have already arisen. And, among this vanguard, there is another question which may develop into one of the most acrimonious controversies of all, viz.: "Who, if anybody, was to blame for the overwhelming of the British line about St. Quentin by the German attack of March 21, 1918?"

The British Fifth Army, it will be remembered, stood on the St. Quentin lines on that fateful March day. It was under the command of Sir Hubert Gough. At dawn on the 21st, in the midst of a heavy mist, the Germans suddenly launched a short but intense bombardment, including myriads of gas shells, and then sent a smashing infantry and machine gun attack at Gough's lines. After desperate fighting the British positions were carried. For days their lines, all the way between Arras and La Fère, sagged back. It was expected that a stand would be made on the Somme. But the Germans forced the crossings of that river, captured Ham and Péronne and Bapaume, and drove their opponents almost to the gates of Amiens. Finally, outside that city and beyond Noyon and Montdidier, the thrust was stopped. The Germans paused for breath;

the Allies set to work to meet the next impact, which, they felt sure, was imminent.

WHO WAS TO BLAME?


Immediately there were irate inquiries as to why the break in the line had occurred. There were bitter remarks about Sir Hubert Gough. Wild tales were circulated that he was an incompetent, occupying his important post because of favoritism. Another story had it that he was under the influence of liquor at the time that the Germans broke through.

Against these tales was the attitude of Sir Hubert's chiefs. Sir Douglas Haig took pains to commend him in his summary of the war. Viscount French, in his book *1914*—published long after the German offensive of 1918—took several occasions to speak in the highest terms of Gough, who was one of his subordinates in the "Old Contemptibles" during the famous retreat from Mons to the Marne, and afterwards at the first battle of Ypres. Also, plenty of students of the war agree that, in view of the overwhelming German concentration before Gough's lines, the fact that the German general, von Hutier, had evolved an entirely new brand of offensive, and considering that a dense mist concealed the assailants on the fatal morning, it was beyond human skill to meet the great German blow successfully.

I

IN DEFENSE OF GENERAL GOUGH

IN 1919 Hamilton Fyfe published in the *Contemporary Review* an article entitled "The Truth About the Fifth Army" in which he takes up the cudgels for Gough. It may be fairly assumed that this is one of the first



By J. F. Bouchor

Wounded British in France


shots in a fight that will be waged for many a year yet.

The English writer, who was at the front during the war, says:

"My own opinion, after watching the retreat in progress and after studying the circumstances

up a stout resistance; and that it 'let down' the Third Army, which, but for the collapse of the Fifth, would have been able to hold its ground.

"That view in my opinion is grotesquely at odds with the truth. . . I heard accounts of the battle within a few days from the staffs



The German Drive on Amiens

Salient formed by the Teutonic drive through Gough's British Fifth Army, March 21, 1918. The arrows indicate the points of Allied resistance.

carefully from Intelligence records, was that General Gough had been unfairly treated, and that the impression prevailing at the time in England was based upon ignorance of the facts. I attempted to correct this impression at the time. General Headquarters would not permit it. It was not thought desirable then to show up the falseness of the view taken by many English reviews and newspapers that upon the Fifth Army lay the responsibility for the loss of so much ground to the enemy; that this army was badly handled and therefore unable to put

of most of the divisions engaged; in some cases from brigade staffs, and even battalion commanders. I saw the successive phases of the retreat for myself, as I had seen beforehand the positions in which our troops awaited the attack and the preparations made in the rear of those positions for defensive action in the event of the front line being overrun. I will say at once that I considered those preparations inadequate, but for this General Gough was not, I submit, solely or even chiefly to blame.

"Recollect what happened. During January,

at the urgent request of the French Ministry, against the judgment not only of Field-Marshal Haig, but even of the French Generals, the British Army took over forty fresh miles of front, stretching roughly from Saint Quentin to La Fère. Along this front the Fifth Army was strung out, its line perilously thin. From the moment of our taking over this territory it was surmised that the heaviest weight of the German attack would be thrown against it. A wise commander always drives at his enemy's weakest point. Also the German High Command was known to favor striking

added, Sir Hubert Gough was one, and he told Gibbs about the special precautions which he had taken along his front to ward off the blow which he felt to be hanging over him. Fyfe continues:

"Most generals of divisions refused to believe that there would be any blow. A fortnight before the offensive opened I heard from the staff of one of the Fifth Army divisions that they could not see why G. H. Q. had warned them to be prepared. But neither at Fifth Army Headquarters nor at Montreuil (British Gen-



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When the British Had Their "Backs to the Wall"

A train of lorries loaded with re-inforcements for the hard-pressed "Tommies."


at the point of junction between Allied forces, a point where, owing to difference of language and system, confusion is especially apt to occur."

Mr. Fyfe concurs with Philip Gibbs, another correspondent who was at the front when the German break-through occurred, in the opinion that most of the British generals were inclined to pooh-pooh the idea that a German offensive was coming in March, 1918. Gibbs stated in an article written during his stay in the United States after the close of the war that, of thirteen generals with whom he spoke just before the German offensive, eleven believed that there would be none. Of those who did believe it to be imminent, he

eral Headquarters) did any illusion prevail. Since he knew that the fifth Army would be attacked with vast numbers, and knew also its weakness, Sir Douglas Haig must be blamed no less than General Gough if the preparations were inadequate."

GOUGH WAS NOT SURPRISED

Fyfe, like Gibbs, gives full credit to General Gough for having a premonition of the German onslaught. As early as January 30th, he says, he had a talk with General Gough, who said that the Germans might very likely attack his army front and would probably gain some ground if they did. The best line of



Drawing Near to the Fighting Zone


French and Belgian ammunition wagons in a town near the front in Flanders awaiting the order to advance.

© Underwood and Underwood.

defense would be the line of the Somme, Gough added, and, until the British got across that river there would be no tragedy.

In view of this forehandedness on the part of Gough and the belief in the German attack on his lines prevailing at British Headquar-

blers, by those who like to 'seem to know,' and even by many who passed on this kind of talk merely because they had nothing better to say. One story which was widely told represented General Gough as having dined in London on the night of March 21st!"



The Price Paid for Victory

French and British dead who fell during the assault on a German trench.

ters, it seems strange to Fyfe that little was done to improve the positions of the Fifth Army.

Apropos of the retirement brought about by the collapse of Gough's lines, Fyfe writes:

"About that retreat and especially the Fifth Army part in it, many absurd stories were afloat. What was particularly unfortunate was that American soldiers arriving in France were apt to be told that British troops became a disorderly rabble, that officers lost their heads, that men wandered like sheep without a shepherd, and that their unworthy conduct caused a grave setback to the Allied cause. Such stories were, I dare say, set agoing, many of them, by spies and traitors, very likely by paid German agents. They were repeated by habitual grum-

II

WHY GENERAL GOUGH RETIRED

FYFE denies that the Fifth Army fought less well than the Third; both, according to him, met the Germans with a courage unsurpassed in any battle of the war.

"The reason for the Fifth Army's retirement lay in this, that it consisted of fourteen divisions, eleven in the line, three in reserve, and that it was attacked by forty-eight. Fourteen against forty-eight! That tells the whole story. No, not quite the whole, either, for this must be said, too, that the eleven divisions in the line were spread over a front of forty miles. Three

miles is considered a very long front for a division to hold. These Fifth Army divisions each held nearly four. The task of the Fifth Army was therefore terrific in every way.

"Yet this was not clearly stated at the time, nor has the story, I think, been fairly told since the event. The instinct to seize upon a scapegoat when things go wrong is one of the most powerful instincts in human nature. Before the facts were known in England, the Fifth Army was blamed for what had happened. The public had thought, we had all hoped, that our line would stand firm against attack. That some territory might be gained by the enemy was known among those who studied the position on the spot. But no one expected the old Somme battlefields to be lost. The disappointment was hard to bear, and someone had to bear the brunt of public irritation. Hurried judgment, hurried glances at the map, made the Fifth Army appear to be the culprit. Then General Gough was sent home. So the slander started. It has been running long enough.

"The first count of the indictment against the Fifth Army was that it had been taken by surprise. There is no truth in that. I read day by day during February and March the reports of its Intelligence branch. There I found evidence cumulative and convincing that the Germans were preparing to attack the Fifth Army front.

NEW GERMAN TACTICS

"That the enemy hoped to surprise us is certain. In the tactics which they developed during three years' close study of the best methods of forcing a fortified front, the element of surprise was given a prominent place. In every one of their attacks the Germans took elaborate precautions to keep their intentions secret both from us and from their own troops. The specially trained assault battalions which formed the hammer-head of their phalanx were moved up only at the latest possible moment. Officers were given sealed instructions. Rumors were spread through the German Armies of probable attacks in a number of directions, so that the direction decided upon might be effectually concealed.

"The difficulty of concealment was increased by the formation which welded the attacking troops and the reserves into a solid mass. This moved forward as a mass; without any slowing down of the forward movement fresh divisions took the places of those which had shot their bolt. The relieving troops passed through those which were to be taken out of the line, and

when their turn came for rest, they were relieved in the same way. The process was called 'leap-frogging,' and gave the enemy useful results. But in no case, excepting that of the attack on April 9, which succeeded beyond expectation for another reason, did their blow fall without warning. That which they struck on March 21 was, as I have shown, awaited by us with full knowledge that it was about to fall.

ODDS AGAINST GOUGH WERE HOPELESS

"Next, the Fifth Army has been reproached with neglecting to make for itself sufficiently strong positions. The answer to this is two-fold. First, the French, when they handed over the line from Gouzeaucourt north of Saint Quentin to Barisis south of La Fère, handed over good positions. General Gough told me soon after the taking over that he was glad to find such excellent work done. This work was to some extent improved by us, and so far as was possible, it was a strong line that we held. I say 'so far as possible,' because (1) it was not considered possible to call upon the men who had come from hard fighting in the north to do hard digging as soon as they took over; (2) it is impossible that even good positions can be very strong if there are not enough men in them to defend themselves against attack by largely superior numbers. This is the second answer to the charge that the Fifth Army did not take necessary precautions for the repelling of the attack at the outset. It did what was possible with the men at its disposal. . . .

"There are no soldiers in the world who could have stood up against such odds and held back an enemy attacking in the proportion of more than three to one. For what did this mean? Not merely that the masses of Germans who flowed over our positions were always more numerous than our men. It meant also that our men, fighting all the time, weary and dazed with the battle, found every day that they were faced by fresh troops, troops who had rested and slept, troops who came into the battle with new vigor.

"The Germans had so many divisions that they could take them out of the line as soon as they were tired and let them recover. Our men had no intervals. They were on their feet day and night. When they were not fighting, they were falling back or hastily improving old defensive positions. They grew so heavy-headed from want of sleep that officers had to go round shaking them to keep them awake. Numbers of them fell by the roadside and slept from exhaustion. This largely swelled the number of

prisoners taken by the enemy. Yet throughout the six days of the battle there was nothing approaching a rout or a panic, there was no disorder on the roads. I have seen other retreats with these features. In this retreat there was hardly so much as disorganization on any large scale. . . .

"It was plain from the articles which were appearing in German and Austrian newspapers before the offensive began, and from the talk which we knew to be current among German officers in the field, that the enemy believed he could by the use of his new tactics reach, if not a decisive result, such as an Arjesh or a Caporetto, at all events such a harvest as Mackensen reaped on the Dunajec and during the long months of close pursuit which followed.

"The German High Command did not underestimate the value of the Allied troops on the Western front. . . . On one part of our front they had a gun to every fifteen yards: we had one to every eighty-five. It was their resolve to deserve success by piling up an immense preparation which gave them such results as they achieved."

FOG HELPED THE GERMANS

Vastly superior numbers alone enabled the Germans to overwhelm the British Fifth Army—that is the view repeatedly emphasized by Fyfe. And he adds:

"Yet even with this vast superiority, the Germans would not have been able to overrun our front as quickly as they did, if they had not had a dense fog to help them. Under cover of this fog they penetrated some points of our thinly-held front line, and as our forces were too small for the undertaking of counter-attacks on a large scale, we were compelled to fall back to positions prepared in advance by the Fifth Army staff as a precaution against such an onrush as the enemy were making now. Upon these positions the northern and central portions of the army were instructed to retire, fighting steadily and taking care not to lose touch with one another.

"These instructions were obeyed by the divisions involved, and the trench system known as the battle-line was occupied with far



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Belgian Dog-drawn Artillery

The work of the dogs attached to the Belgian infantry was remarkable. The dogs were used for drawing automatic rapid-fire guns to the front lines.

less confusion than one would think inevitable under such difficult conditions. Wherever the connection between two divisions was threatened by enemy penetrations, counter-attacks were delivered and portions of the line reinforced. What the Germans did was to try and force their way, in an infinite number of small parties, along little valleys, roads, hedges, anywhere that afforded cover, and so to insinuate themselves between our units.

"All the accounts of the retirement, which ended on March 26, when the remains of the Fifth Army (most of its divisions having by this time been sent out of the line to rest) concentrated upon the defense of the approaches to Amiens, show that it was characterized by hard, steady fighting, always against overwhelming odds, and that the continual changes of position made necessary were all ordered after careful calculation and in concert with other

parts of the line. At critical points prolonged resistance was called for. Several times perilous pressure was relieved by timely counter-attacks. So the piercing of the British line, the aim of the enemy, the threat which hung over us during that week of epic struggle, was prevented. There was no crowning victory for the Germans, no disaster for British arms.

"That escape we owe in chief to the troops engaged. No staff work, however painstaking, can serve unless the dispositions planned are stoutly and steadily carried out. But there is much for which we have to thank the staff of the Fifth Army, and that has not been sufficiently admitted. Now is the injustice done both to General Gough and to the troops of his command exposed. I have tried to show how unfair has been the treatment of the Army Commander and the stigma cast upon the good name of his Army."

THE DARDANELLES CONTROVERSY*

The Cromer Report Censuring Kitchener, Asquith, Churchill and Others
—Defense of Asquith and Churchill

I

WHO WAS TO BLAME?

ONE of the most fruitful fields of controversy in the war was the Dardanelles expedition. This ill-fated venture, it will be remembered, began as a purely naval expedition. British and French warships endeavored to force the straits in February, 1915, preparatory to sailing across the Sea of Marmora, placing Constantinople at the mercy of their guns, and thus eliminating Turkey from the war. But the Turkish shore batteries, cleverly concealed and directed by German officers, met the ships of the Allies with telling effect, and, after sustaining severe losses, the fleet withdrew.

Then troops were brought, landings effected on the Gallipoli peninsula, and a regular land and sea campaign for the reduction of the Turkish defenses was begun. But the Turks, under the leadership of the German General

Liman von Sanders, had had ample time to strengthen their works and man them heavily. From the start, the Allies met the most stubborn opposition. Months dragged by, the expedition suffered severely from battle casualties and disease, and still the Turkish defenses remained untaken. At last, after some heavy attacks which brought only worse losses than ever, the Allied expedition was withdrawn from the peninsula. The last troops left there in January, 1916.

At once an investigation was started and it became apparent that another of the great controversies of the war was on. The investigating commission, headed by Lord Cromer, issued its report on March 8, 1917, a year after the evacuation of the Gallipoli peninsula. It was signed by Lord Cromer (who died a few days later), by Andrew Fisher, representing Australia; Thomas McKenzie, representing New Zealand; Sir Frederick Cawley, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster; James A. Clyde, Lord Advocate; Stephen L. Gwynn, M. P.; Rear Admiral

* For the account of the naval operations at the Dardanelles see Vol. IV. For the account of the military operations in conjunction with the navy, see Vol. III.



Sir William H. May; Field-Marshal Baron Nicholson, and Justice Pickford.

The report created a storm. Opponents of the investigation declared that it was not advisable to publish such findings while the war was still in progress; that the publication had been made for political purposes, to discredit the Asquith administration.

The report was nothing if not candid; high place was no protection for those whom the members of the commission 'adjudged' to blame. Foremost among those censured was Lord Kitchener, who had been Secretary of War when the expedition was decided upon. Next came Winston Spencer Churchill, "the stormy petrel of British politics," who was First Lord of the Admiralty during the same period. Others blamed were Lord Fisher, at the time First Sea Lord; Prime Minister Asquith, and other members of the British War Council.


At the beginning of the Cromer report was a general synopsis of the organization of the War Cabinet. In November, 1914, it is recalled, the War Council consisted of Premier Asquith, Earl Kitchener, and Mr. Churchill, with Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Lloyd George and the Marquis of Crewe, then heads of the Foreign, Treasury and India Offices, respectively, but only in an advisory capacity. Sea Lords Fisher and Wilson were associated theoretically with Mr. Churchill, and General Murray, Chief of Staff, with Earl Kitchener, as technical advisers, but, according to the report, theirs was a silent partnership, as a rule. The members of the commission were "struck

with the atmosphere of vagueness and want of precision which seems to have characterized the proceedings of the War Council."


Winston Churchill, it was stated, had testified that Asquith and Kitchener "settled matters, although he had equal authority with them." This the commission found too modest a statement. The Cabinet, added the investigators, placed all responsibility on the War Council, sometimes requesting that it was not to be told of occurrences on the ground that the fewer who knew of them the better.

Earl Kitchener, it was found, was a dominant influence; he would not impart full information of his plans even to the War Council. It was asserted that his action in holding troops back for three weeks without consulting the Admiralty greatly lessened the chance of the expedition's success. He was, according to Mr. Churchill, "all-powerful, imperturbable and reserved." Mr. Churchill added: "He dominated absolutely our councils at this time. The belief that he had plans deeper and wider than any we could see silenced misgivings."

Discussing the political aspects of the Dardanelles campaign the report stated that one of its objects was to influence Bulgaria and Italy, still neutral at its inception, and further, to relieve pressure on Russia. General Sir Ian Hamilton, commander of the expedition, was quoted to the effect that Earl Kitchener thought the operation would keep Bulgaria from joining the Central Powers, would keep 300,000 Turks busy and encourage Russia.



A Smoke Screen Thrown Out by British Destroyers in the Mediterranean



Where the ill-fated British Expedition came to grief in trying to isolate Turkey by forcing the Dardanelles and capturing Constantinople.

NOTE: THIS PICTORIAL MAP IS DRAWN TO SCALE AND NO MILE SQUARES SHOWN IN PERSPECTIVE.

II

SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS

THE report summarized the conclusions reached as follows:

DARDANELLES REPORT

"The question of attacking the Dardanelles was, on the initiative of Mr. Churchill, brought under the consideration of the War Council on Nov. 25, 1914, as the ideal method of defending Egypt. It may reasonably be assumed that inasmuch as all the authorities concerned were *prima facie* in favor of a joint military rather than a purely naval attack, such an attack, if undertaken at all, would have been of the former rather than of the latter character had not other circumstances led to a modification of the program. A communication from the Russian Government of January 2nd introduced a fresh element into the case. The British Government considered that something must be done in response to it, and in this connection the question of attacking the Dardanelles was again raised.

"The Secretary of State for War (Kitchener) declared that there were no troops immediately available for operations in the east, and his statement was accepted by the War Council, who took no steps to satisfy themselves by reports of estimates as to what troops were available then or in the near future. Had this been done the commissioners think it would have been ascertained that sufficient troops would be available for a joint military and naval operation at an earlier date than supposed, but this matter was not adequately investigated by the War Council. Thus the question before the War Council on January 13th was whether no action of any kind should for the time being be undertaken or whether action should be taken by the fleet alone, the Navy being held to be the only force available.

"Political arguments, which were adduced to the War Council in favor of a prompt and effective action if such were practicable, were valid and of the highest importance, but the practicability of whatever action was proposed was of equal importance. Mr. Churchill appears to have advocated an attack by ships alone before the War Council, on a certain amount of half-hearted and hesitating expert opinion which favored a tentative or progressive scheme, beginning with an attack upon the outer forts. This attack, if successful, was to be followed

by further operations against the main defenses of the Narrows. There does not appear to have been direct support or direct opposition from the responsible naval and military advisers, Lord Fisher and Sir James Wolfe Murray, as to the practicability of carrying on the operations as approved by the War Council, viz., to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with Constantinople as the objective.

NAVAL OPINION NOT GIVEN

"The First Sea Lord and Sir Arthur Wilson, who was the only naval adviser present at the War Council, expressed no dissent. Lord Kitchener, who occupied a commanding position at the time the decision was taken, was in favor of the project. Both Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson would have preferred a joint naval and military attack, but they did not express to the War Council and were not asked to express any opinion on the subject, and offered no objection to naval operations, as they considered them experimental and such as could be discontinued if the first results obtained were not satisfactory.

"The Commissioners think that there was an obligation, first on the First Lord, secondly on the Prime Minister, thirdly on one other member of the War Council, to see that the views of the naval advisers were clearly put before the Council, and that the naval advisers should have expressed their views to the Council, whether asked or not, if they considered the project which the Council was about to adopt was impracticable from a naval point of view.

"Looking at the position which existed on Jan. 13, 1915, the Commissioners do not think the War Council was justified in coming to the decision without much fuller investigation of the proposition which had been suggested to them. The Commissioners hold that the possibility of making a surprise amphibious attack on Gallipoli offered such great military and political advantage that it was mistaken and ill-advised to sacrifice this possibility by deciding to undertake a purely naval attack, which from its nature could not obtain completely the object set out in the terms of the decision.

"The decision taken on the 16th to mass troops in the neighborhood of the Dardanelles marked a very critical stage of the whole operation. It ought to have been clear that when this was once done, even if troops were not actually landed, it would be apparent to the world that a serious attack was intended, and a withdrawal could no longer be effected without running serious risk of loss of prestige. At



Photo by Vaughan.

Australia Answers England's Call

The photograph shows a Colonial regiment about to embark from Melbourne for Gallipoli, where these sturdy men of the Antipodes, by their deeds of unsurpassed valor, wrote an immortal chapter of history.

that moment, as time was all important, no compromise was possible between making an immediate and vigorous effort to insure success at the Dardanelles by joint naval and military occupation and falling back on the original intention of desisting from a naval attack if the experiences gained during the bombardment were unsatisfactory.

TROOPS DELAYED BY KITCHENER

"On Feb. 20th Lord Kitchener decided that the Twenty-ninth Division, part of the troops which by the decision of Feb. 16th were to be sent to the east, should not be sent at that time, and Colonel Fitzgerald instructed the Director of Naval Transport that transports for that division and the rest of the expeditionary force would not be required. This was done without informing the First Lord, and the dispatch of troops was thus delayed three weeks. This delay greatly compromised the probability of success of the original attack by land forces and materially increased the difficulties encountered in the final attack some months later.

"We consider that in view of the opinions expressed by the naval and military authorities on the spot, the decision to abandon the naval attack after the bombardment of March 18th was inevitable. There was no meeting of the War Council between March 19th and May 14th. Meanwhile important land operations were undertaken. We think that before such operations were commenced the War Council should have carefully reconsidered the whole position.

"In our opinion the Prime Minister ought to have summoned a meeting of the War Council for that purpose and, if not summoned, other members of the War Council should have pressed for such a meeting. We think this was a serious omission. We consider that the responsibility of those members of the Cabinet who did not attend the meetings of the War Council was limited to the fact that they delegated their authority to their colleagues who attended those meetings.

KITCHENER AND FISHER AT FAULT

"We are of the opinion that Lord Kitchener did not sufficiently avail himself of the services of his General Staff, with the result that more work was undertaken by him than it was possible for one man to do, and confusion and want of efficiency resulted.

"We are unable to concur in the view set forth by Lord Fisher that it was his duty, if

he differed from the chief of his department, to maintain silence at the Council or to resign. We think that the adoption of any such principle generally would impair the efficiency of public service.

"We think that although the main object was not attained, certain important political advantages, upon the nature of which we have already dwelt, were secured by the Dardanelles expedition. Whether those advantages were worth the loss of life and treasure involved is and must always remain a matter of opinion."

III

KITCHENER SEVERELY CRITICIZED

LORD KITCHENER'S death, the report said, as well as that of his secretary, Major Fitzgerald, rendered it impossible to state with the same confidence as in the case of living witnesses the opinions and aims of Lord Kitchener at different periods of the proceedings. But, the commission added, it did not believe that even deference to the memory of the illustrious dead justified it in abstaining from complete revelations of his actions.

"It is necessary to do justice to the living as well as to the dead," stated the commissioners.

Testifying as to Lord Kitchener's influence on the decision of events, Mr. Churchill said:

"He was the sole mouthpiece of War Office opinion in the War Council. When he gave a decision it was invariably accepted as final. He was never overruled by the War Council or Cabinet—in any matter, great or small. Scarcely anyone ever ventured to argue with him in the Council."

According to Major General Charles E. Callwell, who was Director of Military Operations at the War Office at the time of the Dardanelles expedition, the General Staff virtually ceased to exist because it was not consulted.

Kitchener, it was asserted, pushed the principle of centralization to the limit; this proved successful in minor operations such as those in the Sudan, but in a large and vital operation such as this, it gave one man more work than any individual could do.

Andrew Fisher, Australian High Commissioner in London, a member of the investigation commission, dissented from the majority findings to the effect that the naval advisers should have expressed their views at the War Council, also from the majority opinion that Lord Fisher was not justified in remaining silent. Mr. Fisher said:

"I dissent in the strongest terms from any suggestion that departmental advisers of a Minister, in his company at council meetings, should express any views at all other than to the Minister and through him, unless specifically invited to do so. I am of the opinion that it would seal the fate of responsible government if servants of the State were to share the responsibility of Ministers to Parliament and to the people on matters of public policy. The Minister has command of the opinions and views of all the officers of the department he administers on matters of public policy. Good stewardship demands from Ministers of the Crown frank, fair and full statements of all opinions of trusted and experienced officials to their colleagues when they have direct reference to matters of high policy."

Thomas McKenzie, the New Zealand member of the commission, took a similar view regarding Lord Fisher and the naval advisers. He also expressed the opinion that the commission was not yet justified in coming to a decision as to the results of the Dardanelles enterprise. To reach final decision, he said, it would be necessary to investigate the conduct of the offensive in the Gallipoli peninsula and of the subsidiary operations.

Walter F. Roch, M. P., made a long exposition, in a separate report, of the attitude of Lord Fisher, who, he said, strongly opposed the Dardanelles venture and, on Jan. 28th, left the council table with the declaration that he would tender his resignation.

"Lord Kitchener," added Mr. Roch, "took Lord Fisher aside and urged him that his duty to his country was to continue in office. Lord Fisher reluctantly yielded to Lord Kitchener's entreaty and resumed his seat."


Regarding this incident, Lord Fisher in a newspaper article published in 1919, said:

"Kitchener was so earnest and even emotional that I should return that I said to myself after some delay: 'Well, we can withdraw the ships at any moment, so long as the military don't land,' and I succumbed."

IV

LORD FISHER'S POSITION

ROCH also reported that Lord Fisher, in his evidence before the Commissioners, said he had "taken every step to show his dislike of the proposed operations" and, replying to a question as to why he had made no formal protests at the meetings of the



Lord Kitchener


As Secretary of State for War, he visited Gallipoli and advised in favor of the British evacuation.

War Council, told the Commissioners: "Mr. Churchill knew my opposition. I didn't think it would tend toward good relations between him and myself, nor to smooth working at the Admiralty, to raise an objection in the War Council's discussions."

After the decision to send out the expedition had been made, continued the Roch report, Lord Fisher did all in his power to assist. His whole theory of the use of British sea power in the war, said Mr. Roch, was embodied in the following memorandum to Premier Asquith:

"The Germans have already endeavored without success to scatter our naval strength by attacks on our trade and by submarines and mines. The pressure of sea power is a slow process and requires great patience. In time it will almost certainly compel the enemy to seek a decision at sea. That is one reason for husbanding our resources. Another reason is that the prolongation of war at sea tends to raise up fresh enemies for the dominant naval power, owing to the exasperation of neutrals. This tendency is only checked by the conviction that an overwhelming naval supremacy is behind the nation exercising the sea power.

"The sole justification of bombardments and attacks by the fleet on fortified places, such as



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The British Battleship *Majestic*

She was sunk by a submarine during the naval operations in the Dardanelles, May 27, 1915.

the Dardanelles, is to force a decision at sea. As long as the German High Sea Fleet possesses its present strength and splendid gunnery efficiency, so long is it imperative that no operation be undertaken by the British fleet calculated to impair its superiority, which is none too great in view of the heavy losses already experienced in ships and men, which latter cannot be filled in the period of the war, in which the Navy differs materially from the Army. Even the older ships should not be risked, for they cannot be lost without losing men, and they form the only reserve behind the great fleet."

ASQUITH'S DEFENSE

Following the publication of the Cromer report there was an acrimonious discussion concerning it in the House of Commons on

March 20, 1917. Premier Asquith and Winston Spencer Churchill both took exception to the findings of the investigating commission.

Premier Asquith declared that Lord Kitchener, upon whom had been placed so much of the blame for the expedition by the members of the commission, was a masterful man, endowed with formidable personality, disposed by nature to keep his own counsel. But, insisted the British Premier, it was a mistake to suggest that he lived in isolation and did not consult military opinion as to the conduct of the war. But it was true, he admitted, that during the early months of the war Kitchener acted as his own chief of staff.

"When war broke out," said Asquith, "the General Staff were sent to the front. Their places were taken by officers who had been in retirement. The best and highest authority at that time was Lord Kitchener himself. Upon no man in history had a heavier burden been cast and nothing fills me with greater indignation than the attacks made on Lord Kitchener, whose memory is in no danger and will live."

The Premier said that the Dardanelles expedition was primarily naval because Kitchener proved to the satisfaction of the War Council that the troops which might have made it jointly military and naval were not available at the time of its inception. The War Council, he said, had spent three weeks in examining available resources and in obtaining the opinion of experts on the matter. The adverse view of Lord Fisher, he continued, who was then First Sea Lord, was not founded on technical naval objections but on a preference for a different objective in a totally different sphere of operations.

The delay in sending troops, according to Asquith, was due to the condition of affairs in Russia, which were then bad. Pressure was brought to bear both by the British and French Commanders-in-Chief, he said, to keep troops in France.

Asquith further said that the Dardanelles campaign had saved the situation in the Caucasus for Russia, prevented for months the defection of Bulgaria to the side of the Central Powers, destroyed some of the best of the Turkish troops, and contributed to the favorable result of operations in Egypt, Mesopotamia and Persia.

V

CHURCHILL'S VIGOROUS RE-
JOINER

WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL, First Lord of the Admiralty at the time that the Dardanelles expedition was decided upon, spoke in severe criticism of the manner in which the members of the Dardanelles Commission had prepared their report, on this calamitous affair.

"They built up the narrative by chippings and snippings from documents," he declared, "and by single sentences from the evidence of witnesses." This, he said, was in direct conflict with the accepted principles and detrimental to public and personal interests.

Churchill admitted that the commission had, directly or by implication, swept away many serious and reckless charges and that the burden of responsibility for the expedition, which he had borne alone for two years, was now shared, as a result of the commission's report, with "the most eminent men that the country had produced in generations." Therefore, he said, he welcomed the report as an installment of fair play.

The Dardanelles Expedition, declared Churchill, was not based on the plans of experts and the readiness of experts to execute those plans; nobody had a right to say that naval opinion was not marshaled behind the Admiralty's action in undertaking the venture. He objected to what he called attempts to ascertain whether experts were enthusiastic toward the enterprise long after it had failed and at a time when search was being made for a culprit. Such methods, he thought, were pernicious to the last degree to efficiency and the resolute conduct of the war.

He denied that he urged Lord Fisher to give a silent and reluctant consent to the enterprise.

"Lord Fisher," said Churchill, "did not declare definitely that he consented to under-

take the operation. After balancing all the possibilities he exerted himself to the utmost and even offered to go out himself and take charge of it. It was not until the new situation had arisen and the admiral on the spot was unwilling to go forward that Lord Fisher said he would not press him." Thereafter, said Churchill, differences arose for the first time between Lord Fisher and himself.

Toward the end of his speech Mr. Churchill said that, if naval reinforcements had been furnished, victory might have resulted, as the ammunition of the Turks was almost gone at the time of the Allied retirement from Gallipoli. He also declared that the plans for a purely naval attack had received the approval of all the naval authorities, including the admirals on the spot, Sir Henry Jackson, Admiral Oliver, and the French Naval Staff, and that Lord Fisher himself had agreed to carry out this attack. There was nothing rash, he contended, about the idea of forcing the Dardanelles by a naval attack; the decision to undertake it was not foisted upon an unwilling Admiralty.

"What was gained, not what might have been gained, by the attack?" asked Mr. Churchill. "Was ever any demonstration in the history of the world more potent? The relief to the Grand Duke in the Caucasus was instantaneous. The whole attitude of Bulgaria was changed for the time in our favor. Greece had almost joined us. Lastly, there was Italy. During the progress of the naval attack those negotiations were begun which finally, in the hands of Mr. Asquith, who dealt for all the Allies; culminated in Italy's entrance into the war at the moment when her entrance was most needed and before she could be discouraged by the defeats of the Russians in Galicia, which began a few weeks later. These are the results of failure. Think what might have been the consequences of success. It is a torment to dwell upon them and to think how near was the naval attack to success."

"And now," wrote Lord Fisher in 1919, "we've reached the epoch—prodigious in its advent—when positively the air commands and dominates both land and sea; and we shall witness quite shortly a combination in one structure of the airplane, the airship, the parachute, the common balloon and an aerial torpedo, which will both astound people by its simplicity and by its extraordinary possibilities, both in war and commerce (the torpedo will become cargo in commerce). The airplane has now to keep moving to live—but why should it? The aerial gyroscopic locomotive torpedo suspended by a parachute has a tremendous significance."

HOW THE WAR WAS WON

BY GENERAL MALLETERRE
Military Critic of the *Paris Temps*

THE ups and downs of the war were disconcerting and tragic. Our enemies as well as ourselves frequently experienced complete and surprising disillusion. More than once were hopes raised high on both sides of winning a rapid decision, and more than once the thought of a stalemate was entertained by the keenest of military observers. On September 6, 1914, General Joffre reformed his armies in retreat and called them to the battle on which was going to depend the safety of the country. Eleven days later the fortune of war seemed to have turned. Our victory appeared incontestable, and it was possible to believe that Germany was conquered. But more than four years passed before, after the second battle of the Marne, we were able to do what we could not do in 1914, follow up our successes and force the enemy to evacuate France.

From September, 1914, to September, 1918, on the Eastern fronts as well as on the Western fronts, both groups of belligerents had their successes and their failures. The occasions were more numerous than the public knows when a little more pressure exercised by the army on the offensive would have brought a decisive victory. The first Bagdad Expedition, the attacks against the Dardanelles, the miscarriage of our plans in the Balkans, irresolution on the part of the Russians in the first Galician offensive, a spring instead of summer offensive on the Somme in 1916, the Champagne offensive of April, 1917—these are our "almosts." The Germans, too, had their moments when they failed for want of sustained effort: the Yser in 1914, the Argonne and Salonika in 1915, Verdun in 1916, and the startling last spurt in the spring of 1918.

At the beginning of 1918 who would have dreamed that the Germans would be able to return to the Marne and, after a lapse of

nearly four years, would once more be nearly at the gates of Paris? Similarly, who would have prophesied that a few months after the second battle of the Marne the Germans would be forced to ask for an armistice, and would come to the Peace Conference with our armies occupying the Rhine, the Kiel Canal, and the Baltic ports, the German fleet interned in British waters, and the Kaiser a refugee in Holland?

What has happened is not as miraculous as it seems. It is now my joy and privilege to tell the story of the Battle of Liberation.

BELGIAN INVASION COSTLY TO GERMANS

In default of the triumphal victory which the German General Staff had believed would follow the invasion of France through Belgium, the German armies had to content themselves with maintaining their hold on Belgium and the departments of northern and northeastern France. The ability of the Germans to throw a strong defensive line from Switzerland to the North Sea was the price we paid for our initial military inferiority and lack of foresight. But this very invasion was really the cause of Germany's final defeat. The violation of Belgium's neutrality aroused the world against Germany. The belief that Belgium and the invaded provinces of France must be held as pledges during peace negotiations became a popular dogma which left the German military leaders and statesmen no room for military and political maneuvers. Because Germany felt that she must keep what she had won in the west, she had to hold herself on the defensive on the occidental front for three years, and use her offensive force in overcoming the dangers threatening her on the Eastern front. It was not until in 1917, when she believed herself mistress of Russia and the Balkans, that Ger-



Field Marshal von Hindenburg Studying a Military Map

many regrouped her forces for a final offensive in the west. It was too late, for the United States troops were arriving in great numbers to prevent the Germans from having a superiority in effectives and material. The submarines, which were going to cut off Europe from the American intervention, cost the lives of less than three hundred American soldiers!

The emotions and the anguish of the tragic spring of 1918 are still too vibrant in our

hearts not to leave in our minds a sort of bewilderment, almost anxiety, over a victory so rapid and complete. The change in the military situation was so sudden that we could not grasp it, and none expected the end of the war before the spring of 1919, even while we were going from victory to victory.

The Battle of Liberation, begun on July 18th, followed immediately a blocking of the

third German offensive in the Champagne by the counter-offensive of the Tardenois. It ended on the morning of November 11th. It had lasted exactly one hundred and seventeen days, only one day less than the German battle, which was begun on March 21st and ended on July 16th.

THE "BATTLE OF LIBERATION" BEGINS

Let us compare the battle which started on July 18th with the battle of Ludendorff. In spite of all his material means, in spite of the methodical preparation of the infantry, in spite of the exaltation he instilled into his soldiers by speaking of the Kaiser's Battle, the Battle of Peace (*Friedenschlacht*), the last battle, after which everything would be finished, Ludendorff was doomed to fail in his desperate effort to win a decision by arms. We must render this justice to the Germans, that they fought well. On March 21st, April 8th, and May 27th they marched forward with extraordinary courage. One felt that these soldiers, pushed by their commander, who knew that it was necessary to reach a decision, did all they could, individually and collectively. But how was this effort produced? By blows of a battering-ram. There was something incomplete, something disconnected, which indicated improvisation, exhaustion. And, as is invariably the case with the Germans as soon as there is a surprise, as soon as things do not go according to pre-conceived plans, the mechanism broke down. They had to make a fresh start, and for that time was needed. After June 15th a whole month was necessary to recommence the offensive. In all these lulls there is something extraordinary of which history will speak.

The German success of the Marne in June, which stirred us so deeply, which almost struck France to the heart, was a capital event of the war. It turned the Germans from the Oise and drew them on to the offensive of July 15th, which, from every point of view, was the adventure that brought about their downfall. In fact, the arrival of the Germans for the second time upon the Marne, without serious opposition, after breaking through the Chemin des Dames and crossing the Aisne, made them believe that the French army was worth no more than the British

army, that we were at the end of our rope. The Germans were convinced that they were going to break down our last defenses, and that Paris would fall. As the revenge for the first, Ludendorff conceived a second battle of the Marne which would cut the French army in two, separating Paris from the east. It would be the end of the war. Either Ludendorff had lost his sense of what was possible or the alarming influx of American divisions compelled him to play his last desperate cards.

On July 15th the German offensive met the French army of Champagne, and from the first hour of the battle failure was evident. From now on we were going to see the effect of unity of command, of the leadership of Marshal Foch.


NEW FRENCH TACTICS FOR DEFENSE

In the month of June secret instructions were given to the generals of our army corps concerning the new method that had been decided upon for defensive fighting. These instructions can be resumed in one brief sentence: *No longer hold at all costs your first positions, but carry the fighting back to a principal line of resistance a considerable distance in the rear.* Thus we were going to profit by our bitter experience of having masses of combatants uselessly slaughtered by toxic gases and rolling barrage fire in the effort to keep intact the defensive trench system. Thus we were going to return to the old doctrine, too much forgotten in trench warfare, the doctrine of combat which divides forces on the defensive into three distinct groups—advance-guards and advance posts, troops to sustain the shock of attack, and reserves to strengthen the line at any weak point which might develop. In March, and again in April, the Germans had taught us that trench systems were not inviolable. So our high command abandoned the ideas which had paralyzed both defensive and offensive action on both sides for nearly four years. Our advance guards and advance posts were instructed to limit their activity to getting into contact with the enemy and reconnoitering. The troops to sustain the shock were no longer to be subjected to heavy and continuous shelling before the enemy made his appearance. The bulk of

the reserves were to be kept outside the fighting until it was realized how they could be best used according to the way the battle developed.

General Gouraud was the first to have the chance to try out this happy return to the old doctrine of defensive warfare. How he applied it proves his clairvoyance and his control over his soldiers. To be able to desig-

wasted their artillery preparation against positions the French had decided beforehand not to defend, and they struck their big blow against a mere curtain of troops. When they came on over undefended ground they were surprised by our counter-batteries. They were in disorder and already decimated when they reached the principal line we had chosen to defend. This was the first symptom of Ger-



The Battle Lines As They Were in June, 1918

nate advance posts to hold advance lines, when the units designated know that they will get no support from shock troops or reserves, it is necessary that the chiefs be quite sure of their men and that the men are well trained in a practice which involves the almost certain sacrifice of their life.

GOURAUD'S DEFENSE, JULY 15TH

This is what happened on July 15th, 1918. These tactics were applied. The Germans

man defeat.* It was Nicopolis over again. Foch used a twentieth-century adaptation of the tactics of Bajazet. Did the Kaiser realize this when he mounted a high observation-post to follow the battle which was to be his crowning victory? Our great poet Rostand, who died prematurely, immortalized this memorable night, which at daybreak had turned into the prelude of the German collapse, in an ode: "*Guillaume à sa tour monte.*"

* It was Gouraud's French Fourth Army, with one American division, the 42nd, which met the Germans east of Rheims and defeated them.—Ed.

THE VICTORY OF JULY 18TH

From July 15th to the moment when the signing of the armistice was notified to the contending armies, the battle never ceased. When we look back to these very recent events and draw upon our day-by-day impressions, we are stupefied. On the afternoon of July 18th, three days after the Kaiser launched his last bolt, we learned that General Mangin had attacked in the region between Villers-



General Gouraud

As Commander of the French Fourth Army he checked the German offensive in the Champagne, June 15, 1918.

Cotterets and Soissons. The emotion caused by this bulletin after that of July 16th will always live vividly in my memory. Something appeared to have changed. Although as military critic I divined the turning-point, I did not dare to rejoice. But the indefinable hope which was born again in my heart I found had come also to others who were following closely the battle.


The Germans were fighting in the mountainous region beyond Rheims, and were even still making progress there, pushing back the Italians and the troops of General Berthelot, who were holding desperately north of the

Marne. Suddenly the attack of General Mangin began with extraordinary violence and without preparation of artillery. There had been some preparatory combats, and I was greatly astonished that the Germans did not seem to be paying attention to them. For several days before the attack our troops had been taking back certain ravines. There were encounters between patrols. General Mangin explained to me on the map the reason of these preliminaries. A surprise attack could not be made at this point until wooded basins were secured, in which could be hidden the troops massed for the assault.

In this attack, as accompanying artillery for the troops, we had ready at last our answer to the German portable trench cannon, which wrought havoc in the British lines in the offensive of March 21st. We sprang upon the Germans the surprise of our new tanks. So effective were the tanks that the Germans had to withdraw hastily several kilometers, almost to the gates of Soissons. The army of General Degoutte, supported on the right by the Americans, attacked at the same moment. This sudden menace on the flank of the pocket of the Tardenois showed the Germans the weakness of their position. The offensive mentality of our poilus astounded them. Had they not believed that the French army was on its last legs? The number and quality of the Americans and the deadly effectiveness of our tanks dismayed them. July 18th will remain a date as important in the annals of the war as that of the surprise of the Cambésis.

THE TARDENOIS POCKET

One might have thought that this was only a local battle. The army of General Gouraud was no longer showing activity. The battle was being concentrated in the pocket of the Tardenois. The German reserves were hurried into this pocket. The Germans do not like to let go of what they hold. They held here all the more tenaciously because they believed that they were going to succeed in passing the Marne and marching on Paris. In this pocket they had accumulated enormous material and strong reserves. Perhaps Ludendorff did not realize yet the importance of the aid the Americans could contribute without further waiting. Perhaps he did



A View of Ruined Rheims

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not know that the British army had been reinforced, because the British, in spite of the menace of the last German advance, had remained absolutely quiet since May. Even in France there was an uneasy feeling, and every one was saying: "What is the British army doing? We are fighting in the Tardenois. The Americans are helping us. We must be having heavy losses. And the English are doing nothing to relieve the pressure!"

Yes, the English did not budge. But that was not their fault. Marshal Foch, now the real commander-in-chief, was holding them in his hand. When he thought that the Germans had been tricked into sending into the pocket of the Tardenois a large part of their reserves, and identified Bavarian divisions among the troops of the German Crown Prince, he was ready to attack in turn the Bavarian Crown Prince. He gave the word to the British. Reinforced in men and material, recuperated after a long rest, sustained by an important number of French and American divisions, in the fighting-line and in reserve, the British attacked on the Ancre on August 8th. Just as they had been astounded by the dash and vigor of the poilus on July 18th, the Germans had the painful impression on August 8th—an impression which was the beginning of demoralization for the German General Staff—that hundreds of thousands of unbeaten Tommies were entering into action, and that the new phase of fighting in Flanders was beginning with perfect liaison of British and French and Americans.

ONE ATTACK AFTER ANOTHER

General Debeney, who commanded the First French Army, which was cooperating with the British, told me how the operation started. Here we see still another illustration of the new conception which has given us the victory. Up to this time, in order to have the advantage of the whole day, it was the custom to attack in the morning. The Germans were operating in this way, and we had given them reason to expect the same thing of us. On the day before the date set for the attack General Debeney had made a demonstration in the morning. The Germans said to themselves, "We are forewarned;

we shall be attacked to-morrow morning." In fact, on the morning of the next day the artillery bombarded heavily the German lines, but no infantry attack followed. The Germans held themselves ready. They waited vainly for hours. In the afternoon, as the artillery had died down altogether and there was no sign even of patrols, they relaxed their watch. At five o'clock in the evening, while the Germans were making their soup, our whole First Army advanced suddenly. Farther along, the British and Americans began the offensive. By eight o'clock our First Army covered six kilometers. The Germans were surprised gathering potatoes in fields north of Montdidier. Soup was bubbling on the kitchen fires. When General Debeney told me this story he said, smiling, "I played them a beautiful trick."

Successive British attacks were started, one after the other, up to Flanders. Importunate calls for reserves could not be answered immediately. So we see how the pocket of the Tardenois was the kernel of this extraordinary battle. By his stubborn and continuous attacks, which seemed to indicate a determination to take the Chemin des Dames and to attach an excessive importance to freeing the Marne, Marshal Foch had drawn the German reserves into the pocket of the Tardenois. The German Crown Prince allowed himself to be fooled, and the Bavarian Crown Prince yielded to his call for reinforcements. By this imprudence, in which both had a share and responsibility, the two princes lost their chance of ever becoming kings. For the British army had started an advance which was not to stop until the day the armistice was signed.

THE BRITISH OFFENSIVE OF AUGUST, 1918

In the month of March the British army had received a shock so violent and had been overwhelmed so suddenly that there was not time to call up and throw into the line the forces which could have reestablished the situation. Perhaps the British Government had been hypnotized by the chimerical fear of a disembarkment on English soil. The German superiority in numbers over the British in March and April, 1918, had been due to the unwise disposition of Great Britain's reserves



An Attack by Highlanders near Ypres

From an artist's drawing that passed the British censor. The Ypres salient was formed in 1914, and was the scene of many of the fiercest battles of the war.

in fighting troops. Something had gone wrong also with the disposition of the British artillery and ammunition reserves. The Germans were probably unaware of how strong the British really were, and interpreted wrongly the disaster of March 21st. According to what I have been told, at the beginning of August the British mustered 1,700,000 men for the new offensive. All their lost cannon had been replaced, with something over. The British army entered into line on August 8th with 35,000,000 shells!

The battle spread out northward. As one army advanced and its left was uncovered another army would attack the Germans. Taken anew week after week—or, rather, day after day—on the flank, the Germans had to withdraw on the Somme, give up Péronne, and fall back to the Hindenburg line.

During the month of August the battle developed from the west of the Oise to Flanders against the armies of the German right wing. At the beginning of September the French army entered into line again, repeating the same operation east from the Oise to the Argonne. These successive actions, which increased the continuous attack to a front of hundreds of kilometers, are one of the most remarkable examples in history of coördinated effort, and were, of course, possible only because of unity of command.

A BATTLE WITHOUT RESPITE

Each British army entered into action when its neighbor on the right had gained several kilometers. And precisely at the moment when the left found itself exposed to a flanking counter-attack the neighboring army attacked in turn, thus anticipating a possible German counter-attack. The Fourth British Army (Rawlinson) followed and supported the First French Army (Debeney) toward Péronne and against the Oise. The Third British Army (Byng) followed and supported the Fourth Army in the direction of Le Cateau. The First British Army (Horn) marched against Cambrai, Douai, Valenciennes. The last to move, the Fifth British Army, then entered Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing, and marched toward Tournai. Then the French armies began their attack. Between the Aisne and the Oise General Man-

gin stormed the formidable position of Saint-Gobain, and Generals Berthelot and Guillaumat pushed back the Germans from the Vesle to the Aisne. These two attacks combined took little by little the whole of the famous Saint-Gobain system. General Mangin entered Laon on October 12th. General Gouraud, who had not ceased to press the enemy since July 15th, advanced in turn, and, after heavy fighting, reached and passed the Aisne, between Rethel and Vouziers. While his army was getting into the Argonne by the northwest, the American army, under General Pershing, was operating between the Meuse and the Argonne. The Americans had before them the most difficult ground of all. Their advance was slower, in spite of heavy sacrifices, because the Germans had to defend the Meuse at all costs.

During these two months I was asked several times: "Has Marshal Foch enough men at his disposal? With this unprecedented battle front, is he not going to end up by finding himself without reserves?" I answered: "If Marshal Foch is operating in this fashion, it must certainly be that he has sufficient effectives to keep the battle going. Anyway, it is not so much a question of having troops as of knowing how to use them." The Battle of Liberation, from July 18th on, was a continuous battle, a battle without respite. History will be able to call Foch "*le Maréchal sans répit*."

In the month of October the battle had become general from the Somme to the Meuse. Suddenly, we saw the Belgian army, reinforced by the army of General Degoutte (which had left the Tardenois) and by several American divisions, enter into action. With the Second British Army (Plumer) on the right, the Belgians, French, and Americans, under King Albert, compelled the Germans in several days to evacuate the whole coast of Flanders. Ostend, Zeebrugge, and Bruges were liberated.

During all this time only one sector remained in a sort of mysterious calm, the sector of the east. We asked ourselves why the battle had not continued into the region of Lorraine. This question was all the more reasonable because an offensive here seemed to have been foreshadowed by the magnificent attack of the Americans, which suppressed the

salient of St. Mihiel. But after this success there had been a stop. Rumor had it for a long time that the fighting was going to start also in the Vosges.

THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE

I believe that at G. H. Q. the continuation of the battle front to the Vosges had been a part of the general plan, and that they were somewhat disturbed at not being able to start the offensive in this sector as soon as they had hoped. The delay was caused by the difficulties the Americans encountered in the battle of the Meuse, difficulties due to the hilly ground on both banks of the river, and also, it must be said, to the failure of the Americans to get their transport service working quickly and smoothly. No army seems able to learn from the experience of others, and the Americans were no exception to this rule. A too great concentration of material hindered the free movement of their troops. General Pershing's army had become very large. But he did not enjoy the advantage of lines of communication, with which his men were familiar from years of use in the movement of troops and supplies, as was the case with the French and British. Nor was his staff aware—until the moment arrived—of the many perplexities and complications that had to be confronted, when hundreds of thousands of men had to be moved and fed and kept supplied with ammunition.

Then, too, the resistance of the Germans was much more stubborn on the Meuse than elsewhere. The Germans had foreseen and provided for a retreat on a large scale in Belgium and the north of France, and had started to operate that retreat at the beginning of October. A look at the map will show you why it was essential for them to hold to the bitter end in the regions of the Ardennes and Lorraine. In fighting against the American advance the Germans were defending the threshold of the empire at its weak point. If the defenses on the Meuse were broken through, the retreat of the armies from Belgium and northern France would have been compromised. That is why the Americans encountered a resistance that cost them enormous losses. So long as this resistance was not overcome it was impossible

to launch an attack against Briey and Metz, because our left would have been exposed to a flank attack from the Ardennes.

THE SITUATION IN NOVEMBER

In the first days of November, when the Germans realized that the acceptance of an armistice on our terms was inevitable, the situation of the battle, from left to right, showed that the Germans were on the verge of the greatest military disaster in history.



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French Grenadiers at Chemin des Dames
From an official photograph.

In Belgium the group of armies under the command of King Albert, assisted by Generals Degoutte and Plumer, were on the banks of the Scheldt which the advance-guards had crossed at several places. From Ghent to Courtrai this group of armies was getting ready for a concerted offensive toward Brussels. Difficulties of communications on roads and railway lines that had been blown up, and a period of rainy weather, had caused the advance to slacken. We knew that the Germans were evacuating Belgium, but their rear-guards were putting up a strong resistance.

The British armies, under the command of Marshal Douglas Haig, had arrived, after heavy fighting, at the Belgian frontier. They were advancing along the valley of the Sambre, on Mons and Charleroi, and by Maubeuge toward Dinant.

The First and Tenth French armies, under General Fayolle, crossing the region of Laon, were arriving at the edge of the Ardennes from Fourmies to Anor and Hirson. The Fourth and Fifth armies, under General Maistre, having crossed the Aisne, were also reaching the Ardennes and entering Mézières. The First American Army, having succeeded in passing through the German defenses of the elbow of the Meuse, was crossing the famous river in the neighborhood of Sedan and forming a junction with the Fourth French Army. On the other side of the Meuse the Americans, supported by the Second French Army, were moving on Montmédy.

GERMAN ARMIES IN A SEMICIRCLE

These armies formed a semicircle from Ghent to Sedan and Montmédy, and were threatening to surround the German armies which had delayed their retreat in order to keep unbroken their front in Belgium and northern France. The resistance of the German rear-guard had been stubborn, and had certainly made the victorious advance of the Allied armies slow. But the retreat, although methodical and admirably arranged by Ludendorff, had not been able to free the armies completely and remove the immense material accumulated between the sea and the Ardennes.

The arrival of the French and American armies at Sedan and Montmédy threatened decisively the lines of communication of the Ardennes. Blocked between the portion of Holland which stretches south to Maestricht and the Ardennes, the German armies in retreat were being crowded into the narrow valley of the Meuse between Liège and Givet. There is reason to believe that Marshal Foch was on the point of attacking—later than he had wanted to, but with the greatest violence—in Lorraine with the American armies of the Woëvre and the French armies of Lorraine and the Vosges, under the command

of General de Castelnau. Everything was ready, and it is probable that the results would have been disastrous for the German armies.

It would have been a colossal Sedan, between Liège and the Sarre! Hindenburg and Ludendorff knew this, and resigned themselves to sign an armistice which was equivalent to military capitulation.

UNITY OF COMMAND FELT ELSEWHERE

But the battle was not limited to the Western front. We must remember that Marshal Foch had command of all the Allied armies on all the fronts and that, except in the case of Italy, he succeeded in planning an *ensemble* of operations calculated to strike and demoralize the enemy at every point. What happened in the east, then, during September and October was an integral part of the Battle of Liberation. Whatever resistance the Germans might have been able to make in the west, their military defeat was inevitable after the victories in the Orient over the Bulgarians and Turks.

It was on September 15th that we received the first bulletin from the army of Salonika, which we had grown accustomed to believe had resigned itself to the defensive. During August, in well-informed circles, I heard more than once the opinion advanced that troops would be withdrawn from Macedonia to reinforce General Allenby in Palestine, and, indeed, to maintain the French effectives on the Western front! Day after day the news arrived of startling successes against the Bulgarians in Macedonia. At the same time the British, who had advanced their lines very little in Palestine during the nine months that had elapsed since the capture of Jerusalem, attacked in force. In eight days the Bulgarian army was driven back in disorder from the positions it had held for three years, and the Turkish armies of Syria were annihilated. Bulgaria capitulated, and it was seen that the complete collapse of Turkey could no longer be avoided.

This double decisive victory in the east was the great proof that unity of command had been realized. Marshal Foch is a leader who has a comprehensive vision, developed by years of teaching at the École de Guerre and by a life of study and reflection. He did not for-



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Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria

In 1914, he was in command of a German army in the Vosges, but he achieved his greatest military fame and success in the offensive in Flanders in 1918.

get that the war had begun in the east and kept constantly in mind the repercussions of the eastern campaign upon the military situation of Germany in the west and upon the internal moral situation in the German and Austro-Hungarian empires.

THE VICTORIES IN THE EAST

The rôle in the Battle of Liberation of the Allied armies in the Balkans is little known,

not be saved by the armistice. Cut off in the mountain valleys into which it had been thrown back by the French under General Henry, it was surrounded and captured.

In less than a fortnight, also, General Allenby reaped the reward of the perilous and painful advance he had made from the Suez Canal to Jerusalem the year before. The 197 campaign across the desert of the Isthmus had put to the severest test the traditional qualities of British soldiers. Indomitable will,



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
President Poincaré Visiting the Front

Greeted by the troops and civilians in a village in northern France.

and deserves special mention. Success was so rapid that the tendency was to believe that the Bulgarians had given way almost without fighting. This is far from the truth. For eight days a bitter battle was fought. Victory was due as much to the ardor of the Allied soldiers attacking in mountainous country against terrible obstacles as to the bold and tireless leadership of General Franchet d'Espérey. The Eleventh German Army, composed of Bulgarian soldiers and officered by Germans, could

perseverance, genius in organizing transport service and keeping open lines of communication had brought the British to Jerusalem. The annihilation of the Turkish armies in the battle of September, 1918, was the logical result of the British penetration into Palestine, and cannot be regarded simply as a sudden and brilliant effort or as the result of the utter demoralization of the enemy.

The battle which liberated Serbia and Syria was a decisive element of the war. It broke



Doughboys and Poilus on a French Road

From an artist's drawing.

the links of the chain which bound our enemies. When Bulgaria and Turkey fell the Near East was lost to Germany. Rumania awoke. Austria, maddened by hunger and the threat of invasion, was ready to separate her fortunes from Germany. The end of the drama was at hand.

Who could deny that the two battles on the Western and Eastern fronts, carried on with harmony and continuity, and coming after years of scattered and indecisive effort, were due to the unity of command, and that thus the unity of command was in the final analysis the decisive factor of the war?

FOCH AND PÉTAIN SOLDIERS OF JUSTICE

In conclusion, our praise must go to Marshal Foch, who realized the wonderful things of which I have written, and to Marshal Pétain, whose work cannot be separated from that of Foch. They were both my colleagues at the *École de Guerre*, where Foch was Professor of General Tactics and Pétain Professor of Infantry. I am proud to think that I was associated with them as Professor of Military Geography.

Foch and Pétain are the purest glories of our military history, for they are free from the stains which have so often tarnished great leaders in war, the lust of conquest and personal ambition. Their task was to liberate France, which had been invaded, and small nations, which had been crushed. They have been the soldiers of justice. They have been exemplars of the genius of France.

It must be left to history to tell how Marshal Foch came to be chosen commander-in-chief of the Allied armies. Already, at the first battle of the Marne, he showed his consummate skill in maneuvering. It was he who reestablished the situation at La Fère Champenoise when it seemed that all was lost. On the Marne, the generals of the Ninth Army all told him that they could hold no longer against the pressure of the Germans of von Hausen. He answered them: "You say you can hold no longer? Then attack!"

And to reassure his staff, he asserted that if the Germans were attacking with such fury against the Ninth Army, it must be because things were going with them badly elsewhere. There, on the field of battle, he had one of those flashes of genius which he showed in other days in his interpretative courses at the *École de Guerre*. It was Foch who stopped the German offensive on the Yser. Marshal French wanted to retreat. Foch dissuaded him, invoking the honor of England. The battle of the Yser was fought and the cause of the Allies saved.

AMERICA SHORTENED THE WAR

But in rendering homage to Marshals Foch and Pétain we must not forget the others who played a vital part in the victory, Haig, Pershing, Diaz, Allenby, and the French generals whoso well represented the traditions of France.

I am not sure that we should have had the victory without the aid of the United States. There were those who thought that aid from across the Atlantic in the form of foodstuffs and war material was all we needed. But would material aid from America have sufficed? There can be no doubt that the military intervention of the Americans shortened the war and put the seal upon the moral condemnation of Germany. America came to fight for justice as much as for France. The Americans shed their blood freely in the Battle of Liberation. And now the United States has seen what France has suffered, and has understood what must be the reparation after the liberation, the punishment of the crime after the defeat of those who aspired to the domination of the world.

Placing ourselves purely on military ground, we may claim that French art has conquered German science. But more is necessary, politically and humanly, and the Battle of Liberation must have results that are lasting in order to be a real victory. Military triumphs are temporary. Only by the union of free nations after the war will German barbarism be doomed to powerlessness.



Painting by N. C. Wyeth

The Star of Bethlehem

GERMAN BLUNDERS IN THE WAR

"Psychological Stupidity" Brought Germany to Defeat, According to Philip Gibbs, the Noted War Correspondent—His Analysis of German Mistakes

PSYCHOLOGICAL stupidity."

Thus, in a phrase, Philip Gibbs, the famous war correspondent, sums up the blunders which Germany made in the war; the blunders which were, according to him, responsible for her defeat.

Gibbs followed the war from start to finish. For almost four years and a half he was with the British Armies on the Western front. He saw them advancing, retreating and condemned to the soul-trying inactivity of trench warfare. He had an opportunity given to few men to study the underlying causes of victory and defeat. And he put that opportunity to full use. Several books, collections of the scores of dispatches he sent from the front, bear witness to his energy.

After the war was over Gibbs came to the United States, gave a series of lectures, and wrote some articles in which he emphasized only the salient features of the fighting and sought to present the war as a whole. One of these analyzed the German blunders that led to the ultimate defeat of the Kaiser's armies.

At the outbreak of the war, he says, the generalship and staff work of the Germans were masterly and, for the first two years, remained far better than that of the British and even of the French. In their war colleges at home the Germans had analyzed all possible methods of attack, all possible ways of striking rapidly. They had studied how to destroy enemy armies opposed to them. In the summer of 1914 they felt themselves so superior to their adversaries that they looked upon the war as already won. Why did not they win?

"To answer that question," says Gibbs, "it is necessary to take the whole of the German war plan into consideration, both east and west, and to analyze a little the peculiar psychology of the German mind. In my opinion

they lost the war entirely by reason of their psychological stupidity, which was the overwhelming weakness behind their military technique. In other words, they had manufactured a terrible war machine almost perfect in its mechanism, but guided by men stone-blind to the soul in human nature."

THE RUSSIAN BOGY

It was not only in the realm of psychology, according to the British war correspondent, that Germany erred. Despite her tremendous military machine and her boasted efficiency in all things connected with the military art, she made some egregious military blunders.

For one thing, he says, she made a boggy of Russia. This obsession made the German General Staff sacrifice huge numbers of the finest troops in the German Army on the Eastern front, all for the sake of empty victories.

"Again and again—it is almost certain—the enemy would have broken the Western front and rolled up the French and British Armies," Gibbs declares, "if he had just put in that extra bit of weight needed at the exact moment of great success. That he did not do so was partly lack of men, owing to the adventures in Russia, and partly a military hesitation due to ignorance of our extreme weakness."

THE MISTAKE OF THE CHANNEL PORTS

Another colossal military blunder on the part of the German leaders was the failure to secure possession of the Channel ports in 1914, when their armies were sweeping down in a mighty flood through Northern France, driving the British and French before them.

"Von Kluck's army passed through Amiens in a great tide, . . ." writes Gibbs. "The game seemed easy to him, but in his confidence



Count von Arnim

Military Governor of Brussels in the early part of the war.

he did not trouble to take advantage of one supreme chance which was his, and that was the capture of the Channel ports. For a little while they were at his mercy. . . .

"I saw the last uniformed men—customs officers, firemen, and policemen—leave Boulogne, which lay open to the enemy. Calais and Dieppe were undefended. The British Army had moved its base from Boulogne to St. Nazaire, away down south.

"At that time Germany could have seized the coast for nothing, which afterward she fought desperately and in vain to get. With that coast in her hands her submarine warfare would have been a more terrible and deadly

menace to England, and therefore to France and all of us.

"But von Kluck, acting under the orders of his General Staff, drove steadily down, leaving the coast as fruit to be plucked later, and intending to drive a wedge past Paris, which would then fall into his hands as the best fruit of all.

"Three things upset his reckoning and spoiled his plan. The first was the survival of the little British Army as a fighting force when he thought it was annihilated, and the second (and more important) was the genius of a certain French General named Foch, not then famous in the world; and the third was the spiritual exaltation of French troops, which lifted them suddenly from the despair of their first tragedies and made them certain, with a fine, wonderful faith, that they would turn back the German tide."

On the occasion of the second battle of Ypres, says Gibbs, the Germans failed utterly to realize the weakness of the British forces opposed to them after they had launched their first deadly gas attack. There, too, they hesitated, failed to put in the last extra bit of weight. So the British kept Ypres and never let go of it throughout the war.

After that came one of the worst blunders of all, in Gibbs's opinion.

"The Germans now made a colossal and enduring error in their war plan," he writes, "and by that stupidity lost their supreme chance of victory. They established themselves in trench positions on the Western front and were content to hold the lines in defensive and stationary warfare for more than a year while they devoted their main energies of attack on the Eastern front. That gave England the time to build up a new army on a vast scale, to make guns by thousands, to manufacture high explosives by millions of tons, to rally up the young manhood of all her empire, and to blockade Germany by a world-wide net of sea power."

ENTER AMERICA

That blunder seems bad enough; the next, says Gibbs, was worse—perhaps it was the greatest made by Germany in all her long catalogue of mistakes.

"By this time," he writes, "the war lords




Photo by Hare.

Germany Thought We Wouldn't Fight

The cardinal blunder of the German High Command was their refusal to believe that America would join the Allies in time to render effective service. The photograph shows the embarkation of a regiment of Marines, and the Germans learned to their sorrow that there are no better fighters.

of Germany began to take leave of their senses under the desperate strain of their position. They no longer acted on the laws of military science, but on the gambler's instinct.

"With a most incredible folly they took the risk of adding the greatest power in the world—in numbers of men and in potential energy—to their list of enemies. With almost deliberate carelessness they flouted the United States and forced her to declare war. Their

over great armies to Europe, and the German war lords were wrong again in underestimating the defensive and offensive success of the British Navy and Mercantile Marine against submarine activities.

"By those miscalculations they lost the war in the long run, and by other errors they made their loss more certain."

Another exceedingly serious miscalculation, says Gibbs, was made by Germany with regard



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The Esplanade at Ostend

A view of the famous watering place of Belgium, taken after the war. Ostend was in German possession until after the armistice.

temptation was great. The British naval blockade was causing severe suffering by food shortage to the German people and denying them access to raw material which they needed for the machinery of war.

"The submarine campaign, ruthlessly carried out, would, and did, inflict immense damage to British and Allied shipping, and was a deadly menace to England. But German calculations were utterly wrong in estimating the amount of time needed to break her bonds by submarine warfare before America could send

to the psychology and temper of German soldiers and civilians. The strain put upon them by their war lords was unendurable. As early as the autumn of 1916, he declares, signs of revolt became apparent among German soldiers. They had sensed the uselessness of sacrifice, the futility of the bloody shambles of the Western front. Many prisoners to whom Gibbs spoke said that they no longer had hope of victory. They cursed their commanders. And letters from Germany constantly spoke of the war as "The Great Swindle."

THE FINAL BLUNDER

But the war lords strode on arrogantly to new blunders. They launched the great offensive of 1918, gambling on America's inability to get into the war effectively before it was won by Germany. There, too, they blundered. Ruin followed in the wake of that last error in judgment. That ruin was made patent to the world when Germany signed the armistice on November 11, 1918.

Gibbs sums up his review of German blunders thus:

"Before that morning when German Generals crossed the Allied lines with the white flag of surrender it was revealed to them in a blinding light that they were ruined. They knew that behind the American divisions already in action against them, and proving

heroic quality as fighting men, there was a New World in arms, ready to pour millions of men across the Atlantic in an irresistible tide. They knew also that their own reserves of manhood were exhausted, that they could call up no more youth for gunfodder, and that having failed in their last reckless gamble with fate all was lost.

"The German war lords, in spite of their military science, their skill in generalship, their masterly knowledge of organization, had committed enormous blunders, and in the larger knowledge of life and war had been as blind as bats and as stupid as owls. They lacked material strength in a challenge to the world, and the souls of brave peoples beat them from the time of those early days when all the odds were in their favor. The German Empire had committed suicide."

RUSSIA IN THE WAR

General Gourko, Once Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of Her Armies, Tells of Fatal Shortcomings that Caused Her Downfall

THE war had not been finished many weeks before the military leaders on each side were writing books about it. Viscount French wrote a book. So did General von Ludendorff. So did General Basil Gourko, chief of the Russian Imperial General Staff from November, 1916, until the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in March, 1917, and subsequently Commander-in-Chief of the western Russian armies. Before holding those posts he held other important commands in the Russian Army during the war, which allowed him to see at first hand the fighting in East Prussia, Poland and Galicia. His book, at the time of its appearance, stood alone as an authoritative work regarding the fighting on the Eastern front by one of those who helped direct that fighting from the Russian side. The book was translated into English and published in 1919 by the Macmillan Company.

General Gourko's pages show Russia at her best and worst. Side by side with the heroism of the Russian soldier he gives instances of in-

competence among commanders and neglect in the commissariat. Above all, he describes that acute shortage of munitions and armament which did so much toward bringing the Russian plans of campaign to ruin. He shows how the corrupt politicians who preceded the Russian revolution handicapped the generals at the front, how the revolution engulfed the soldiers in a sea of words and brought dissension and disintegration to the splendid divisions which, under the Grand Duke Nicholas, Brusiloff, Russky, Gourko himself, and many other leaders, had swept into East Prussia, taken Lemberg and Przemyśl, stopped Hindenburg in Poland, fought undauntedly against Mackensen's phalanx, broken the Austrian lines in 1916, and, finally, a full year later, rallied for one last offensive before the fatal virus of Bolshevism did its work.

RUSSIAN STRATEGY

In taking up the strategy that underlay the moves of the Russian leaders in the war



From painting by Mrs. Lessly-Cotton.

General Basil Gourko

Chief of the Russian General Staff, 1916 to 1917.

Gourko points especially to the position of Russian Poland, extending deep into Teutonic territory, thus bringing the Russians, on the one hand, near to the most important cities of their enemies, but, on the other, forming a terrain which could easily be squeezed as by a pincers if Teutonic armies should operate on each side. Only enormous superiority of force, he says, could have made it possible for Russia to take advantage of the Polish salient for an invasion of Germany and Austria-Hungary. For this reason, he declares, the strategic plans of Russia never contemplated the defense of that part of Poland on the west bank of the Vistula. After the Manchurian campaign, in fact, when economy was the cry of the day, the Russian Government even contemplated a line of de-

fense still further east, around Brest-Litovsk. The name of Soukhomlinoff, War Minister, afterwards accused of all sorts of crimes against Russia, bobs up ominously in connection with this pre-war plan, which, says Gourko, aroused much criticism.

Gourko himself protested to the Minister of War about it in 1910. Soukhomlinoff explained that the fortresses of Warsaw, Novogeorgievsk and Zegrje, the so-called fortified triangle, were out of date, and that to bring them up to date would entail vast expense and also compel the inclusion in the new fortified area of Warsaw, a city of a million inhabitants. The solution, Soukhomlinoff pointed out, was to embrace Novogeorgievsk in a new belt of forts dominating Warsaw, which would have rendered nugatory the capture of Warsaw by an enemy before he had captured Novogeorgievsk. Gourko acknowledges that this was sound and practical; he adds, however:

"But why, instead of bringing this plan into effect, they commenced by destroying the Warsaw fortress, even before confirming the line of the new belt of forts round Novogeorgievsk, and, worse still, afterwards destroyed the forts near Zegrje, I never have been and never shall be able to explain. I never got another opportunity of speaking to General Soukhomlinoff about this."

Gourko says that there was much discussion as to the best way of dealing with the German and Austrian foes. Some wanted a Russian concentration against the stronger, Germany; others thought the main blow should be struck at Austria. The advocates of the latter won out and, in 1914, the Russian Armies were disposed in such a way that their main weight would fall upon their Austrian opponents. Says Gourko:

"It is very difficult to ascertain how far the Germans were informed of our plan of operations. But doubtless they were able to judge theoretically that the Russian Army could not strike simultaneous blows against Austria and Germany. Actually Germany was in the same position as ourselves; she had to decide against whom to direct the main blow, against France or against Russia.

"She decided to deliver the main blow against France, as an opponent who would be earlier prepared to deliver a decisive blow. But it can

hardly be doubted that Germany knew the fundamental outlines of our plan of strategic development by studying various signs of our fighting preparations, not to mention the help received through bribery and by traitors and even spies. These conditions made the operations of Germany easier, and gave her a large scope of freedom in directing the main body of her forces against France, whilst keeping a

pected, had not interfered with it. The result was that we and the Austrians came face to face while we were advancing to make our main blow. In East Prussia our advance was due to a considerable extent to the break-through which General Rennenkampf organized with all the means at his disposal, notwithstanding the restraining instructions he constantly received from General Gilinsky."



Photo by International Film.

Russian Royal Children at Play

The Czarevitch and some of his cousins; from left to right: Prince Vasili Alexandrovitch, Prince Nikita Alexandrovitch, Prince Rotislav Alexandrovitch (kneeling at sleigh), the Czarevitch, and Prince Dimitri Alexandrovitch (sitting on sleigh), with the Czarevitch's governess, tutor, and body-guard. The Czarevitch was put to death by the revolutionists along with the Czar and Czarina.

comparatively weak body on her frontiers in East Prussia and almost entirely ignoring her frontiers to the west of the river Vistula. Germany also reckoned on the slowness of our mobilization, therefore stirred up Austria to commence as early as possible her advance into Podolia and Volhynia, and along the right bank of the Vistula for the capture of Warsaw from the east. This plan very probably would have received full realization if our advance, which took place earlier than the Germans had ex-

THE INVASION OF EAST PRUSSIA

At the outbreak of war Gourko was commander of the First Russian Cavalry Division, and was placed under Rennenkampf, who promptly advanced into East Prussia. What they saw in that part of Germany proved to Gourko and those with him how thoroughly the Germans had prepared for war—"they had thought everything out, had foreseen

everything, and had made a large expenditure on the preparations."

Rennenkampf soon felt the lack of organization in the rear and provisioned his men only with great difficulty. In spite of this, his advance and the subsequent raid of Samsonoff seriously alarmed the Germans and made them hurry reinforcements from the Western front to the threatened eastern region. This decision, argues Gourko, had an enormous influence on the future of the whole war.

"In every affair and especially in military operations," he comments, "it is dangerous to abandon a decision already taken, even if changing the plan promises a temporary success."

If Rennenkampf and Samsonoff had moved forward at the same time, thinks Gourko, they might have won a big success, though he is by no means certain of it. But even as it was he emphatically states it as his belief that the Russian invasion of East Prussia had a decisive effect on the battle of the Marne, because it caused the Germans to weaken their forces there. "The Marne battle was lost to them," he says, "because of their lack of fresh reserves and their shortage in artillery ammunition. One must not forget that the fighting in East Prussia used up not only large quantities of German shells, but caused them to increase their local ammunition reserves at the expense of their central stores."

THE BATTLE OF TANNENBERG

Rennenkampf's raid eventually came to a halt on account of trouble with his transport organization. In the meantime Samsonoff advanced with four Army Corps and several cavalry divisions. He held two Army Corps in the center, and one on each of his flanks, about half a day's march from the central body and slightly to the rear. In this formation he marched to the battle which has since become world-famous under the name of Tannenberg. The original plans, says Gourko, were not carried out owing to tactical errors of the commanders of the two flank corps.

Fighting began on the morning of August 28, 1914. Things went well at first in the Russian center, but the Russian flanks soon were involved in heavy and unexpected fighting. Russian Headquarters in the center had

no information of what was happening on the flanks, which were supposed to be holding in check a German turning movement; as a matter of fact, they were retreating. "Probably it is quite natural to ask," says Gourko, "why General Samsonoff did not give orders to compel the flanking corps to stop their retreat, to re-attack and by a single frontal blow strike hard at the front and rear of the German columns which were then beginning to surround the two corps in the center? Failing this, in any case he could have given orders in due time to withdraw from a fight that was fast threatening to become unequal."

Having no information from his two flank corps, Samsonoff lost all power of directing operations, "and thus infringed one of the elementary rules of military strategy, that which provides that the commander of an army shall choose as his headquarters some spot where information can readily be brought to him and where he can communicate with all the forces under his command."

The Germans, in the meantime, had encompassed the doom of the two Russian corps fighting in the center, having penetrated so deeply into their flanks and rear that only an insignificant part of these forces were able to escape. Gourko gives a remarkable and pathetic picture of the flight of Samsonoff, a sufferer from serious heart trouble, on foot, his breathing becoming every moment more labored, until finally he lagged behind his companions in the depths of Tannenberg wood and was lost to their sight.

"Samsonoff's ultimate fate has never been definitely cleared up, although little doubt remains that he died a lonely death during that melancholy flight through the darkened forest.* Much later an artilleryman related that he had seen General Samsonoff sitting alone in the forest. He had spoken to the general and together they continued their way. But with every step Samsonoff grew more and more tired. Daylight came and poor Samsonoff, feeling it quite impossible to move a step farther, sat down on a hillock and ordered the soldier to make his escape without waiting for him. . . .

"Nobody will ever know the terrible gloom which must have entered the soul of General Samsonoff as he sat there on the ground unable to drag one foot after the other. The

* Some writers on the Battle of Tannenberg assert that Samsonoff was killed by a shell during the retreat.

bitterness of defeat was in his heart and no gleam of hope was visible for the future. Who knows that his weakened heart did not rebel under the strain of this awful misfortune and that General Samsonoff did not die, in the most literal sense, of a broken heart?

"In the course of time, after the soldier who had last seen Samsonoff and all the inhabitants in the immediate neighborhood had been closely questioned, we ascertained that in that locality an unknown soldier had been buried and that from his dead body a gold medallion had been taken. We obtained possession of the medallion and found in it the portrait of Samsonoff's wife. There can be little doubt that Samsonoff died and was buried in that lonely forest."

Gourko emphatically denies the reports, circulated after Tannenberg, that the Russian defeat there was due to treachery. He lays the blame on faulty instructions and unhappy circumstances, adding: "The chance of war that day was on the side of the Germans."

THE FLIGHT OF RENNENKAMPF

Gourko states that the Germans, before Tannenberg, not only massed the reserves which they had brought from the Western front against Samsonoff, but actually drew away some of their troops facing Rennenkampf in order to strike a heavier blow at the ill-fated Samsonoff. In this he is corroborated by Hindenburg's own testimony. Relating the Tannenberg campaign, the German commander once told of the uncomfortable feeling that went through him as he thought of what a possible advance by Rennenkampf would mean to the section of East Prussia in front of him, where the German forces were materially weakened in order the better to encompass the defeat of Samsonoff. It was the Napoleonic idea of concentrating against one foe, defeating him, and then settling with another. Hindenburg, probably surmising that Rennenkampf had found difficulty with his transport, ran a big risk, concentrated on his right, destroyed Samsonoff's army, and was then at liberty to deal with Rennenkampf. He went after him, eager to put a second Tannenberg to his credit, and attacked the Russian general vigorously in the vicinity of Lyck. Gourko accuses Rennenkampf of losing his self-control and fleeing into Russia, leaving his staff and army behind.

"He eventually arrived in Kovno, abandoning all power over his forces and leaving them to get through the hazards of the retreat fight on their own account. This step undoubtedly threw the entire blame on to General Rennenkampf, and consequently, in November, on the left bank of the Vistula, when the accusation was made against him that, because of his faulty dispositions, two German army corps had failed to be surrounded, although this had been reckoned on as an accomplished fact, the higher command



General Samsonoff

Commander of the Russian Second Army, who lost his life during the retreat after Tannenberg.

decided to depose him from his position as commander of an army."

FIRST BATTLES IN POLAND

Taking up next the operations in Poland late in 1914, Gourko pays a special tribute to the Siberian regiments, which, charging with the bayonet, saved Warsaw from the first German onslaught against it. The enemy had been so sure that they would take it, he narrates, that the Ceremonial Marshal of Saxony was with the troops, riding in a court motor car in which the King of Saxony intended to make a triumphal entry into the city. The Cossacks captured both the car and the marshal.

He also tells of the successful defense of

the fortress of Ivangorod at this time, but, taking up the subject of Russian fortresses in general, he declares that they were a disappointment in the war. Among the causes for this he cites the following:

"For several years after the Japanese War, as also for years before it, no fundamental repairs were made to these fortresses. . . . Naturally our fortifications and the artillery were

back again. And if any one of them did return it was generally only a small part of those who originally served in the fortress."

Honorable exceptions to the general rule were Ivangorod and Ossowetz.

The great advantage possessed by the Germans through unity of command was as apparent on the Eastern front as on the Western,



Petrograd Celebrates

The Nevsky Prospekt filled with a jubilant throng led by priests following the capture of Lemberg.

far behind the requirements of engineering and gunnery science.

"Another fundamental failing in our fortresses was that two or three years before the war General Soukhomlinoff introduced a reform, the basis of which was the abolition of special bodies of fortress troops. . . . Their place in the fortresses was taken by a formation of militia units made up of elderly men or insufficiently trained troops completely without knowledge of the fortress. In the course of time, when our field forces stood on the lines of the fortresses, it can be safely stated that not one of these strong places received its full peace garrison

according to Gourko—it was, in fact, their greatest factor of superiority, he says. All their moves being guided by one will, their forces were transferred from one front to another without a hitch, whereas the Allies, during the same period, did not in the least co-ordinate their efforts. He says that the invasion of Rennenkampf, which had such a strong influence on the outcome of the battle of the Marne, was not the result of any preconceived plan on the part of the Allies. Later matters improved in this respect; he cites Brusiloff's advance in 1916 at the instance of the Italian

military authorities, who wished the pressure of the Austrian attack through Trentino relieved. Brusiloff, consequently, attacked earlier than had been originally planned, and the Austrians, compelled to meet him, suspended their Trentino operations.

FATAL SHORTAGE OF WAR MATERIAL

Gourko fully corroborates all that has been said of the serious shortage of munitions in the Russian Armies, which hampered and at times paralyzed their movements. The most critical period, he says, was in 1915, the year that the Teutons made their tremendous drive against Russia. For months batteries in action received no more than four shells per gun per day and there were cases where a battery used its last reserve stock. An army corps would get no more than 1,000 shells at one delivery and would not know when it would get any more.

He places most of the blame on the undeveloped state of Russia's industries, which made it impossible to turn out sufficient munitions for her requirements, in direct opposition to Germany, where the number of factories capable of turning out munitions had been greatly developed by the fact that many countries in Europe and America placed their peace-time orders for munitions in Germany. Despite this, he points out, even Germany had her munitions crisis. Another reason for Russia's desperate shortage was that economy had been practiced in this department previous to the war. The result of these combined reasons was at times positively tragic—not only munitions but guns, rifles and all kinds of war material were lacking. Gourko writes:

"Troops receiving fresh supplies of rifles and ammunition from reserve stocks in the first months of the war were quite certain that this would be the case in the future, and consequently made no effort to collect the rifles, etc., from the field of battle. . . . It was only in the spring of 1915 that units were formed in every part of the Army specially to collect rifles, equipments and munitions.

"Already at this time some of the reinforcements had come forward unarmed, and even when they received their arms they were taken from the reserves being trained at the time. Consequently there were not sufficient rifles for teaching the new formations. It was also as-

certain that our government munitions works could not supply enough rifles to cover these huge losses. It was only then that the War Office hurriedly searched for means of placing foreign orders. Offers were plentiful, especially from America. The terms of most of the American offers were first to allow them to prepare for production, and then to begin production *en masse*. As a consequence, the Ministry of War could not determine how much of any order placed would be fulfilled at the agreed



General Yanushkevitch

Former Chief of the Russian Imperial General Staff.

time, and the times of delivery were very distant on account of these terms. The result was that the majority of works with which orders had been placed were not sure to fulfill them. Consequently the suspicion arose that the works accepted the orders with the full intention of not fulfilling them, having already been bribed by the Germans or being pro-German. Neither charge was proved to be justly made, but the orders were not executed in time and are not completed today."

Other measures taken by the Ministry of War served to better matters, but, according to Gourko, the situation was not entirely ad-

justed until the end of 1916—at which time the Russian revolution was already imminent.

"In 1915 there was a great shortage of cartridges, and the troops were smothered with circulars and orders demanding economy in their use. But at this period, on a front of 1,300 kilometers, owing to the proximity of the opposing forces, firing . . . went on nearly the whole of the twenty-four hours. In the course of time . . . we could manage that many of the regiments, during an intense fire from the Germans, observed the silence of the grave, fire being opened by us only when the Germans had begun their attack. When occupying a stationary position we could supply our troops with fewer cartridges, but in case of an engagement, or in beating off a German attack, any shortage of cartridges in the trenches could not but have a bad effect on the *morale* of the troops. . . .

"A crisis not quite so severe existed in regard to machine guns. At the beginning of the campaign all field troops had a section of eight machine guns per regiment, and each cavalry division one section of eight machine guns, but it soon became apparent that our opponent was much better off in this respect. Steps were taken to increase the number of machine guns per regiment. On one hand the obstacle to this was the

necessity of forming new machine-gun sections for the never-ceasing new regiments of infantry, and on the other hand the difficulties met with in having orders executed for two-wheeled machine-gun carriages. The actual machine-gun manufacture was going on very successfully, because at the outset of the campaign our government works were engaged in making machine guns in bulk for completing the stocks calculated for regiments of the next call-up. A considerable addition was also gained in the machine guns captured from the Austrians and Germans. These used to be sent to the rear as trophies; later our workshops remade them to fire our cartridges, after which they were left with the regiments who captured them for immediate use. Some regiments had as many as forty and more machine guns, although such instances were exceptional.

"I must say that a capture of large numbers of machine guns did not always give the regiments the expected advantage, because the supply of ammunition was only in accordance with the number of machine guns available at the time.

THE ARTILLERY CRISIS

"Certainly the greatest and saddest influence on the progress of military events was the shortage in the artillery, and especially in artillery ammunition. At the beginning of the war our Army was armed with guns of types 1900 and 1902, distinguished one from the other only in details. Nothing could be found in construction better than these guns. The quantity of ammunition prepared at the outbreak of the war answered to the quantities which could be required by the number of guns that existed.

"If the shortage of ammunition was in evidence much earlier than the lack of guns, this was due to the fact that guns were capable of firing twice, and even thrice, the quantity of ammunition that theoretically had been provided for. In December, 1914, the replacement of wornout guns met with a certain amount of hindrance. To surmount this difficulty we had to resort to the measure of reducing all our field batteries from eight to six guns per battery, sending back to the rear the guns weeded out, repairing them and forming a park from which we could replace the others as they became worn out. This measure could only afford a temporary relief to the situation. We had to arrange for an organized method of boring out the worn-out guns and refitting them with new steel bores.

"This crisis in the field artillery of the Russian Army lasted right up to the end of 1916,

II—15



Leon Trotsky

As Commissioner of Russia's Soviet government, he was largely responsible for the demoralization of the Russian troops.

gradually losing its severity, but only in 1917 could this shortage in shells be considered in the realm of departed dreams.

"Much more difficult was the question of heavy artillery. At the beginning of the campaign only our field Army Corps were supplied with mortar divisions. But in regard to the supply of long-distance and heavy artillery, especially 6-inch, for our troops, the position was very much worse. It was proposed to make an addition to each field Army Corps of one division made up of three batteries of four guns each, one battery being armed with two long-distance 4.2-inch guns, and two batteries with 6-inch guns or howitzers. During the campaign new divisions were formed on these lines for the field Army Corps, and also for the newly formed Army Corps. The formation of these new divisions could not be finished in time in 1916, on account of the formation of new Army Corps, the number of which were nearly double those of peace times.

"But if the Russian artillery had a shortage in field-gun shells, the lack of shells for the heavier guns was even more pronounced. In 1915, cases were known where heavy batteries were sent to the rear ostensibly for repair, but actually because of lack of ammunition for them. This position gradually got better, but nevertheless it was only in the spring of 1917, while preparing for the coming operations, that the different armies were made happy by being able to reckon on having several tens of thousands of shells for the 6-inch guns, and about 100,000 4.8-inch trench-mortar bombs; and this, in comparison with the hundreds of shells which were supplied in 1914 and even in 1915, might be considered satisfactory.

"By the end of November, 1914, the Germans were using a 12-inch gun in field battles, whilst we had nothing heavier than a 6-inch gun till the spring of 1916."

UNABLE TO HOLD BACK MACKENSEN

Gourko says that, in 1915, before the opening of the great Teuton offensive on the Galician front, the Russians were holding a long line along the Carpathians without the necessary heavy reserves. Furthermore, the supply of barbed wire was short, making it impossible for them to strengthen the positions in this region sufficiently. "It is not surprising, therefore," he writes, "that when Mackensen's phalanxes poured like lava on to one of our Army Corps, it could not withstand the torrent and retreated." Its retreat compelled

the withdrawal of other corps; such a thing as the retreat of a whole army because of the drawing back of a single corps became, says Gourko, a familiar occurrence in 1915. Reserves were lacking throughout the Galician fighting of 1915, he says, and munitions also, so that it was impossible for the retiring Russians to restore the situation by counter-attacks, which need both plenty of reserves and



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A Typical Russian Cossack

plenty of munitions. To have counter-attacked under the conditions that existed, he declares, would have meant the utter exhaustion of their stock of ammunition and that would have made defense against the German onslaught impossible.

Gourko was transferred in 1915 from the region of Warsaw to Galicia, where the Russian efforts to hold back Mackensen were in progress. Near Lemberg he met members of General Ivanoff's staff, from whom he gathered the impression that they and the general himself had lost faith in the possibility of

bringing the Austro-German advance to a stop. Przemyśl fell soon afterwards and the fall of Lemberg was not long delayed. The Russian High Command, foreseeing that the defense of Przemyśl would necessitate throwing several Army Corps into that fortress, decided to abandon it, and thus the great Galician stronghold which had fallen into their hands some three months before, together with more than 100,000 Austrian prisoners, was again occupied by the enemy.

When the Teuton advance veered northward beyond Lemberg and Hindenburg set in motion another avalanche of Germans along the line of the Vistula, the Russians, with their ever-growing shortage of war material, were in a hopeless position. As the field armies fell back they uncovered the great belt of Polish fortresses—Kovno, Grodno, Ivangorod, Ossowetz—which one after the other fell into the enemy's hands without compelling him to lay regular siege to them, the Russians abandoning them for reasons similar to those actuating them in the case of Przemyśl. Novo-

georgievsk, however, was defended by its garrison and taken by the Germans by storm. The militia, older men unaccustomed to warfare, could not withstand the enemy's attack, an illustration of Gourko's already quoted remarks about the lack of regular fortress troops in the Russian strongholds.

In the fierce fighting against the German advance many Russian formations melted away, never receiving reinforcements, until, early in the fall of 1915, there were Army Corps composed of two divisions of a bare 1,500 bayonets each! (an Army Corps has normally something like 40,000 men). The Russian troops, during 1915, were greatly hampered also by the huge exodus of refugees from the towns exposed to the Austro-German advance. Many times the Russian troops had to fight rear-guard actions solely to allow this crowd to get off the roads and make room for the soldiers. When the retreat would be stopped a day or two, the refugees, believing that there would be no further withdrawal, formed great gypsy camps, which were left be-



The Kremlin, Moscow

hind when the Army moved again, to fall into the hands of the enemy. "God only knows what sufferings were endured here," says Gourko, "how many tears were shed, and how many human lives were given as victims to the inexorable Moloch of war."

Finally the Army reached its winter quarters and the pursuit stopped.

BRUSILOFF'S OFFENSIVE

The Russian Army leaped to renewed vigor in the spring and summer of 1916, when, under Brusiloff, it crushed the resistance of the Austrians opposed to it and made the Germans put forth their utmost exertions to save their allies and themselves from a most serious situation. This was the offensive which caused Austria to shift forces from the Italian to the Galician frontier and thus paralyze her Trentino offensive, which was becoming a menace to Italy. Brusiloff launched his attack earlier than he had expected, because of the appeals of Italy, and, therefore, was compelled to rely largely on surprise.

The result of his advance surpassed all expectation, says Gourko. The Austrians apparently did not expect such an attack on so enormous a front and their resistance crumbled everywhere. An interesting point emphasized by Gourko is that, according to the original Russian plan for 1916, the main offensive was not to be in the southwest, where Brusiloff attacked, but to the north. Eventually Brusiloff's impetuous advance put a great strain on the Russian reserves and munition supplies, which were shifted from other fronts, so that no attacks were made on the enemy except in the southwest. Finally, due partially to lack of coöperation from the allies of Russia, Gourko hints, Brusiloff's advance stopped. It was the last Russian offensive of any importance that was to be seen in the World War.

THE FINAL DISINTEGRATION

Gourko tells of Rumania's unfortunate war experience. What he says puts Russia in a better light toward Rumania than some accounts, though he is not quite clear on the campaign as a whole.

Afterwards Gourko was appointed Chief of Staff. From then on his book is a sad tale

of the disintegration of the Russian Army. He tells of the insidious injection of politics into military affairs by Protopopoff, the notorious associate of Stürmer in the Russian Government that preceded the revolution of March, 1917, and he gives a vivid account of the deplorable effect which the revolution itself had on the Army, where the soldiers formed themselves into countless debating societies and quite forgot military duties in the new game of making innumerable speeches. Despite this disintegration, Gourko and other loyal leaders busied themselves with elaborate plans for an offensive during 1917 against the



General Korniloff

Commander of the troops in Petrograd during the early days of the Russian Revolution.

Teutons, but the only result of these was the abortive attempt of July, 1917, in Galicia. Interesting as are the general's descriptions of the revolution and his dealings with Kerensky and others, they do not enter into the domain of the strategy of the war except in so far as they portray the disintegration of the brave Russian armies. So it must suffice to record that Gourko, after being arrested by the revolutionary government and confined for a month at Petrograd, was released and allowed to go abroad. He arrived in England with his wife in October, 1917, a short time before the triumph of the Bolsheviki in Russia. His wife, who had been active as a nurse on the Russian front, took up similar work in France and was killed by a shell. General Gourko dedicates his book to her.

ITALY IN THE WAR

After Capturing Gorizia and the Approaches to Trieste, She Suffered a Severe Setback, Rallied, and Finally Drove the Enemy from Her Soil

I

THE "DAYS OF MAY"

ITALY waged war against Austria-Hungary amid mountain scenes of marvelous beauty and grandeur, which, however, entailed terrible hardships upon the Italian soldiers. The Austrians having secured for themselves the strategic strongholds of the Italian-Austrian frontiers, the Italians, assuming the offensive, were compelled to crawl forward step by step, scaling seemingly inaccessible peaks, laying their trenches along the brink of awful abysses, relying often for supplies on aerial railways strung from peak to peak over yawning gorges. No wonder Lord Kitchener, on a visit to the Italian front soon after the entry of Italy into the war, gazed with awe upon one of the precipitous crags stormed a short time before by the valiant Italians and declared that the feat seemed to him incredible.


Not only was the terrain upon which they fought one of heart-breaking difficulty, but Italy is a country that must depend in peace and in war for the prime requisites of warfare on other lands. She is woefully lacking in the three great essentials for a war-making nation—iron, coal and wheat—and was forced throughout her hard months of fighting to import these from abroad in ever-increasing quantities. She also was compelled to combat a particularly aggressive and successful enemy propaganda behind the lines—fostered by hunger and war-weariness in the rank and file of her army and among the civilian population—which rose at times to most alarming proportions. That she accomplished what she did—that, having succumbed to the Austro-German attack at Caporetto, she recovered gloriously on the Piave and eventually

flung back the Austrians in utter rout—is one of the miracles of the war.

One of the best accounts of the Italian fighting is that of G. M. Trevelyan in *Scenes from Italy's War* (Houghton, Mifflin & Co.). Trevelyan, well-known as the author of *The American Revolution* and *Garibaldi and the Thousand*, served on the Italian front with a British ambulance unit from the very beginning of Italy's participation and had unrivaled opportunities to see the fighting. Gifted with a strong and picturesque style, Trevelyan makes of his book an admirable picture of the early Italian offensives, with their steady advances against fearful natural obstacles, the sudden *débâcle* at Caporetto, and the superb rally of Italy, which first saved her soil from further profanation by the enemy and then drove his armies, a helpless, beaten mob, far from the gates of her threatened cities, and helped bring the Austro-Hungarian empire to the dust.

Trevelyan traces, first, the long struggle between idealism and materialism that culminated at last in the triumph of the former on May 24, 1915, when Italy declared war against Austria-Hungary. On the one side stood Salandra and Sonnino, urging Italy's entry into the war as one of the Allies; on the other stood Giolitti and his adherents, using every argument to keep Italy out of the war. Giolitti was strong and was supposed to have a majority in the Italian Parliament; so, until the very last moment, the issue was in doubt. Trevelyan writes graphically of how the Italian people, tiring of the long parliamentary wrangle, at last took the bit in their teeth:

"The 'days of May' that followed are an ever-memorable event in Italian history. Salandra and Sonnino were resigning because they knew that Giolitti possessed the majority in Parliament, and that that majority would vote at his bidding for neutrality. All seemed lost,



Courtesy of Red Cross Magazine.

The Watch Among the Clouds

The transporting of cannon and ammunition, as well as of food for the troops, stationed high up on these peaks, proved a problem for the engineers, but one that was successfully overcome.

and the advocates of war were for a few hours in despair, thinking that Italy would make her terms as the vassal of the Teutonic Powers. It was at this moment that the people interfered. In Italy the people is, when roused, much more formidable than the Parliament. In ordinary times Parliament administers the country, and divides the spoils of office. But its proceedings do not excite the constant and passionate interest that parliamentary affairs excite in England. The Italians are not a great parliamentary nation, but they are a great democratic nation. And in times of political crisis like 1860

revolution. These monster demonstrations of the whole city population contained all classes—the workman, the clerk, the tradesman, the public employee. It was a union of the same burgher classes as had carried through the national deliverance sixty years before. They were now completing the work. The peasant would not have stirred himself to overthrow Giolitti, any more than he would by himself have made the *Risorgimento*. The politics of Italy since the time of Romulus have been the politics of her cities. Although the peasants form numerically a vast majority in the Penin-



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Italian Machine Gunners on the Alert

An official photograph taken in the summer of 1918 when the Italians, after their reverses, rallied and steadily drove the Austro-German forces back.

and 1915 the people were endowed with remarkable sense and vigor. At such moments, which form the tide in the affairs of men, the '*Popolo*' goes down into the streets and takes things into its own hands, supporting Cavour or Garibaldi, Salandra and Sonnino, as the occasion may require.

"So now, when Giolitti took the negotiations out of Salandra's hands, and Salandra, having no parliamentary majority,* perforce resigned, the people went down into the street in every city of the land and intimated that either Giolitti must be gone or there would be a

* Shortly before the crisis, three hundred deputies had left their cards on Giolitti—a kind of extra-parliamentary vote of confidence in the opposition leader.

sula, no rural class or organism has ever had the importance of the English squires or the American township, or even of Jacques Bonhomme in 1789. The cities of Italy made the war; but the peasant has had to fight it. That difficulty, more and more felt as the lengthening campaign drew out year after year, was not foreseen in the ecstasies of May, 1915.

"The Army was quietly favorable to war, but took no part in the agitation. Soldiers do not dictate to Italy; they serve her.

"It is interesting to remember that during these days of May the Italian people had no knowledge of the secret Treaty of London and its provisions.

"Those who think of the Italians as a passionate, violent, gesticulating 'Latin people' over against the sober English, ought to compare 'the days of May' in Rome or Milan with our own anti-German riots in London of almost the same date. Even in their rioting the Italians preserved sense and dignity. It was rioting with a purpose, and achieved that purpose with the minimum of injury to property (*item*, a few

'to the worst side of the Mont St. Gothard. Giolitti took train for his country seat in Piedmont. Salandra and Sonnino resumed office. The Chamber bowed to the will of the people and decreed the war with unanimity and enthusiasm. On May 24th—the *Ventiquattro Maggio*—now a date in the patriotic calendar along with *Venti Settembre*—the final war of the *Risorgimento* began.



Italy's Claims Under the Treaty of London

The secret treaty with Britain, France, and Russia by which those countries met Italy's demands for territorial expansion as her price for entering the war on the Entente side. The terms amounted to extortion under duress. Not content with them, Italy later exceeded their provisions by taking possession of Fiume and by occupying inland Slav cities by force of arms.

windows), and with no injury to life and limb. Hundreds of thousands of respectable men of all classes walked slowly through the streets of Rome and the other cities of Italy, booming out with a slow, ceaseless iteration, *Morte a Giolitti! Morte a Giolitti!* It was the masterpiece of a people whose oldest political tradition, dating from before Ciceruacchio, Rienzi, and Appius Claudius, is the 'politics of the piazza' (the public square of the city).

"Bülow (the German Ambassador) fled back

"It was during this agitation in May that the poet D'Annunzio came prominently forward and began to surprise those who thought he was a 'decadent'—a view that his conduct in the war has made seem droll indeed. His short orations during the crisis were of classical perfection for political logic, literary art, and imaginative appeal—better, in fact, than some of the dithyrambic utterances of his later style. They were as effective as Mark Antony's less sincere rhetoric in the same city two thousand years ago. They

caused Giolitti and his friends, like Brutus and Cassius of old, 'to ride like madmen through the gates of Rome.'"

THE FIGHTING FOR GORIZIA

The Italians lost no time in seizing the dominating points along their northern Alpine frontier, which safeguarded their left flank while they prepared to launch their principal blow against Gorizia, as a preliminary to opening the road to the coveted city of Trieste, across the Adriatic from Venice. Trevelyan writes of the terrific fighting for Gorizia, when the Austrians, falling back to the left bank of the Isonzo—except in two places, Monte Sabotino and the Oslavia-Podgora ridge—disputed every inch of ground and, amid terrible sacrifices on both sides, sought to keep the dreams of the Italians, nurtured through many decades, from realization.

Despite heroic fighting, the first attempts of the Italians to seize Gorizia were fruitless; the enemy held doggedly to his positions there and the year 1915 closed with the Italians still held at arm's length from their first goal.

The assailants, however, managed to fight their way across the Isonzo at one place, Plava, and maintain a precarious bridgehead there, which they extended to include the hamlet of Zagora—both vastly important to the success of their subsequent operations. At this bridgehead the opposing soldiers were almost face to face in the most literal sense of the word.

"This position, untenable by all the rules of war," says Trevelyan, "was held by the Italians from June, 1915, till it became their base for the conquest of Kuk in May, 1917. There was constant fighting, but neither side was able to dislodge the other, although the Austrians had their trenches only a few yards above the Italians on the almost precipitous sides of Kuk. In the hamlet of Zagora, a mere heap of stones, there was the semblance of part of one house left, occupied as a strong post in the Italian line. From its loopholes one saw the Austrian ruin ten yards away; there was only room for one set of barbed wire in No Man's Land to serve the purpose of both sides. They lived like that for one year and eleven months."

FAMOUS ITALIAN REGIMENTS


The English writer, whose work took him constantly among the rank and file of the Ital-

ian armies, describes interestingly some of the various regiments, the fame of which has gone round the world. Taking up, first, the renowned Bersaglieri, he says:

"They contained many of the noblest Italian types. I select the word carefully, for there is a strain of refinement or 'nobility' of manner found in the best of the Italian common people which is not usual north of the Alps, though sterling qualities may be more universal. I have seen faces among the privates of the Bersaglieri as strong and yet refined as you would see in any society in the world. Their wounded never complained, and I remember how, after a bloody repulse in which certainly 'some one had blundered,' the returning Bersaglieri merely said to us '*è andato male*' with quiet dignity, when every one else was loud-mouthed in ob-jurgation. The discipline of the Bersaglieri is the best in the Italian army.

"Discipline is not the special point of the Arditi. Their merit is fierce and reckless courage, and a gaiety of boyish spirits that is infectious to the rest of the army, and has done much to keep up its fluctuating moral in these last two years of the war, when principally the Arditi have been in evidence. They are *Sturm Truppen*, men 'full of daring,' as their name implies, selected by voluntary enlistment from the more active spirits in the ordinary regiments. They are specially trained, kept in the rear outside the life of the trenches till the day of battle, and then hurried up in the Fiat lorries and sent in to carry the enemy positions. This system was gradually developed in the course of the present war, and reached its full proportions only in the last year, when the Arditi, in their loose, open-necked jackets, with the crest of the dagger and palms on the sleeve, became a sight familiar to all. Some battalions of them are given a special physical and athletic training, and to see the *fiamme nere*, as these are called on account of their black night-caps, march past singing, stripped to the waist, is to see the physical side of man at its best. Skill in flame-throwing, bomb-throwing, and the dagger at close quarters are their favorite arts; holding the trenches by rifle fire after their capture is left to the ordinary regiments of infantry.

"Indeed, the Arditi live in an atmosphere of bombs and flame. To get into the favored corps from a line regiment, the aspirant has to satisfy the authorities in a pass examination which consists of running through a machine-gun barrage, at which a certain percentage of *exam-inées* are actually wounded. At reviews, when



Courtesy of Red Cross Magazine.

A Mountain Stronghold

In such positions as this were the Austrians entrenched in the Alps. In more than one instance the only way in which the Italians could dislodge them was by tunneling under the mountain and blowing it up.

the Arditi oblige with an exhibition of their flame-throwing and bombing tactics, it is frequent for the 'joyous and gentle passage of arms' to end in a few casualties. The Arditi have the reputation of throwing bombs at each other or at passers-by out of sheer high spirits.

"They are the ringleaders of the Army in the constant bickering with the Carabinieri, who carry out so faithfully and, as I believe, justly the disagreeable duties of Military Police. They call the Carabinieri 'aeroplanes,' on account of their wide-winged hats. An army order was issued forbidding any one to call a Carabiniere an 'aeroplane,' in *senso di disordine* ('in a disorderly sense'). A Carabiniere was once found lying bound on a mountain road I knew, with a label attached to him, *Aeroplano nemico abbattuto dagli arditi* ('enemy aeroplane brought down by the Arditi'). In this standing quarrel my sympathies are all with the Carabinieri. But the reckless high spirits of the Arditi were a wholesome tonic to the *moral* of the army in the latter days.

THE FAMOUS ALPINI

"The Alpini, in origin and character, are neither so modern and impressionist as the Arditi, nor so dignified and early Victorian as the Bersaglieri. They date from the period immediately following the *Risorgimento*, when the new kingdom of Italy had acquired a mountain frontier marching with Austria. Raised mostly among the Alpine populations and a few from the Abruzzi, they were a splendid body of men when the war broke out. The taking of Monte Nero in June, 1915, was as fine a feat of arms and mountaineering combined as stands on record in history. I remember, when we were carrying some Alpini who had been wounded near Tolmino in the September of that year, thinking that I had never seen finer men. But on the Alpini, as on the Bersaglieri, the heavy, long-drawn weight of the war fell and rested; the original Alpini were annihilated. Their successors were, indeed, not unworthy; but they were not all recruited from the mountain districts, and they disclaimed, with a true modesty that did them no injury in our eyes, to be the equals of those who had fallen in the first two years of the war.

"Of this second generation, so to speak, of Alpini we saw much in 1918, when some of our cars were working for them at the foot of the *teleferiche*, below the precipices of Pasubio. It struck me that the officers were more in touch with the thoughts, needs and daily lives of the men than in the line regiments. Officers and

men locked up together for months in the snow, as much away from the world as sailors on a voyage, naturally get to understand each other's needs. Willingness and smartness prevailed among all ranks.

"Indeed, in many respects it is a special service, this Alpine warfare, distinct like that of the Navy or the air. It requires men born and bred in the mountains, and then trained to mountain warfare. The British and French troops fought splendidly in the high-raised Asiago plateau and its hills of pine; but, except the French Alps, they could not have been put on Pasubio or any similar rock citadel for six months of snow-bound life, with *teleferiche* for their only communications. They would have been only a little less out of their element than if they had been at sea. It was the Alpini who guarded the hundreds of miles of higher Alps between one valley and the next, quartered in the snow-bound *arêtes* and gullies for three live-long winters of actual warfare, under conditions that would have killed other troops less skilled in snowcraft, less hardy and less patient by inherited instinct to outface all that the high hills can do to drive man down from their summits.

"Besides Bersaglieri, Alpini, and Arditi, mention should be made of yet another *corps d'élite*, the Granatieri, selected for their height. We came across them in the winter of 1915, in the fighting on Sabotino and Oslavia, where they lost very heavily. Transferred subsequently to the Duke of Aosta's Third Army, they went again and again into the desperate fighting on Carso and Hermada, and after the retreat took a leading part in the successful defense of the Lower Piave. Their reputation stands very high, and has been dearly bought."

II

THE CAPTURE OF GORIZIA

AFTER months of patient toil and desperate fighting, the Italians finally wrested Gorizia from the enemy in August, 1916. Before they fought their way into the town tens of thousands of their soldiers had died and some of the most disputed points in the neighborhood, says Trevelyan, had been reduced "to a rubbish heap worthy of the most chosen spots of the Western front."

"The fight was specially fierce for Podgora ridge top, scientifically armed, trenched and cav-




Photo by D. C. Thompson.

First Line Trench Overlooking an Austrian Position

Italian soldiers on the edge of a mountain height, with a town held by the Austrians in the valley below. The troops are of an Italian Alpini regiment, thoroughly at home on the steep slopes. The warfare between Italy and Austria was extremely difficult because most of it was fought at high altitudes and in a rugged country.

erned. It was turned at both ends, and surrounded for some considerable time before it surrendered. Then the Italians plunged across the Isonzo to occupy the town. The foremost man was Sub-lieutenant Aurelio Baruzzi, aged nineteen; his preliminary feat was, with three followers, to capture several hundred Austrians crowded in the famous railway tunnel between Podgora height and river, where he held them captive for a long time till reinforcements came (one end of the tunnel had been solidly blocked up by the Austrians, who were, therefore, trapped in it . . .). He then led a small party across the bridge, entered Gorizia, and raised the Italian flag, that he always carried in his pocket, on the roof of the passenger station, as a signal to his compatriots to follow the daring patrol across the river. He was given the then very rare distinction of the gold medal for his day's work, and found himself suddenly famous."

Though the Italians at last had the much-coveted Gorizia, their position therein was highly uncomfortable, as the enemy still held heights in its vicinity and continually poured shells into the town. In spite of this, the Italian soldiers refused to be dislodged and some of the civilian population stuck to their homes, though life was anything but pleasant under the Austrian sheli-fire. Trevelyan contributes this striking bit on Gorizia in those eventful days:

"One excellent feature of the Italian occupation of Gorizia was the treatment of civilians who still insisted on clinging to their homes in spite of the bombardment. It is arguable that they should all have been removed; there were a fair number of casualties, and almost certainly some who remained were spies. But since it was decided that they might stay, it was well that everything was done to render their life supportable. The Italian military authorities supplied them with food, and enabled them to get down periodically to Udine to market.

"We helped to supply clothes to the civilians, especially to the children; and this first brought Geoffrey Young, who had the matter in hand, into contact with the most notable civilian in Gorizia, Sister Matilda at the convent. Several hundred children came there every day for food and schooling, and some resided there altogether. Their happy child's life went on during day after day of the wrath of man, subterraneously in time of danger, at other times emerging into the courtyards of the gradually

crumbling convent. I never met a finer woman than Sister Matilda, or a wiser. She took her part in this world and was shrewd in her judgments of it, yet she moved 'above the *meîée*.' When finally, late in 1917, they took the children from her and sent them to Leghorn, it seemed a cruel necessity, but necessary indeed it was, for the building was being hit every day. She remained on among the ruins, and we found her there still, serene and practical as ever, when we returned on the tide of final victory in November, 1918."

III

THE CARSO DESERT

HAVING secured Gorizia, the Italians decided to push onward, not only in order to make their hold on the town firmer, but also to capture, if possible, the goal of their fondest ambition, the famous seaport of Trieste, lying a few miles down the coast. To reach Trieste they had to traverse the barren plateau of the Carso—a name that will live forever in history—and several dominating heights, including Monte Santo, from which the Austrian batteries were pouring their shells down upon the Italian armies below. Says Trevelyan:

"The Carso is a world by itself. It is limestone tableland, lying between the Gorizia valley and the sea, and stretching along the coast beyond Trieste. Its sides facing north and west are partly wooded, but the tableland itself has no vegetation higher than grass and stunted brushwood. The earth is red, the limestone white; in winter these are the two colors of the Carso, but in summer an outcrop of green grass completes the Italian tricolor. The sparse villages, all ruined and unroofed by the war, each visible for miles away on that high, flat wilderness, were inhabited in peace time by herdsmen, for the patches of grass are good pasturage in spring. Indeed, our South Africans compared the Carso to the veldt.

"To me, as a North Engländer, the character of the ground at close quarters recalled the top of the limestone scars of Yorkshire and Westmorland, only, instead of being, like Whitbarrow, a mile across and a few miles long, the Carso is seven miles across and more than twenty long. Indeed, the more distant view, with the illimitable desert spaces rising into low hills far away, was like a Scotch or Northum-

brian moor stripped of bent and heather, if such a monstrosity can be conceived.

"But the native peculiarity of the Carso was the *doline*, or cup-shaped hollows, each twenty, fifty, or more yards across, said to have been worn by the action of water collected for ages in the flat limestone surface. In these hollows, which were counted by the hundred, men, huts, and guns were hidden away by both sides, so that when half a million soldiers were inhabiting that uncanny wilderness, it looked more deserted than in peace time, and yet no available cover was to be seen. Nothing, in fact, was

"The Italian advance progressed farthest along the northern edge of the Carso, overlooking Gorizia, till finally, from well beyond Fanti, the rear of the enemy's San Marco position could be enfiladed. But to the south, along the sea coast, progress beyond Monfalcone was well-nigh physically impossible, though it was desperately attempted in the summer of 1917. For here the steep Hermada, or hill of Medeazza, blocked the coast road to Trieste. Across the western approach to Hermada, as if by a prevision on nature's part of Austria's needs in this war, stretched a reedy marshland,



A Market Place in Trieste

visible except the ruins of the villages, the screening of the roads, the stone walls raised by the shepherds, and an occasional car scudding swift and silent across the ominous ambushed desert where Browning's Childe Roland might well have found the Tower.

"Over this terrible land, from June, 1915, to October, 1917, the Third Army, under the Duke of Aosta, won its way, yard by yard. The Carso yields as little shade or water as the Sahara, and its splintering rock doubled the effect of every shell. Those can judge best of Italy's effort who walk over that ground, as they now safely may, viewing line after line of broken wire entanglements, and of trenches blasted out in the rock surface and then blown to pieces by bombardment.

lying between the Carso and the sea, passable only by narrow causeways and long wooden footbridges over the sullen water. Any one viewing the region wonders not why the Italians failed to establish themselves on Hermada, but how they at any time succeeded in crossing the marsh."

ITALY AND AMERICA

Trevelyan describes how Italy's attitude toward the United States changed. For some time after April, 1917, when the Americans joined the Allies, Italians viewed American efforts with polite skepticism. Trevelyan, a firm believer in American earnestness of purpose and capacity to achieve great things,

sought from the start to inoculate Italians with his belief in the new belligerent.

"But I found that my Italian friends did not yet believe in America. The officers had fewer ties with the great Republic than the men, as the Italian emigration to North America is almost wholly of the less-educated class. Neither had America yet declared war on Austria, or shown any interest in Italy. It was mainly to England that the Italian war party still looked. My enthusiastic asseverations that Mr. Wilson and his fellow-citizens were preparing to go *fino in fondo* (to the limit) were received by my Italian friends in kindly but obviously incredulous silence.

"It is interesting to recall this now, because in 1918 America came to loom almost unnaturally large in the Italian eye. But in 1917 it was not so, and when, therefore, the Russians failed again, the discouragement was the greater. Many began to see little chance of winning the war, as week after week during that summer and autumn more and more Austrian batteries and battalions gave evidence of their arrival from the Russian front."

IV

THE CAPORETTO DISASTER

DEBOUCHING from Gorizia the Italians flung themselves with splendid heroism against the Austrian positions barring the way to Trieste. After titanic battles they stormed Monte San Gabriele and planted the Italian flag on the summit of Monte Santo. But further efforts to smash through to Trieste were unavailing. The Austrians held, and the valiant Italians were forced to content themselves with the hard-won Carso and mountain positions.

In the meantime there had been ominous happenings behind the Italian lines. Disaffection had become rife in some regiments; weariness at the prolongation of the war, sedulously fostered by enemy agents, had eaten into the morale of men who had hitherto done excellent work. The Italian army was honeycombed with propaganda, ripe for a disaster. There had been signs of trouble, but the Allied world and most of Italy, filled with enthusiasm by the glorious victories of San Gabriele and Monte Santo, brushed apprehension aside.

In September, 1917, the Italian advance against Trieste stopped. Only a month later came the most startling surprise in a war full of surprises, the German-Austrian breakthrough at Caporetto. Here is Trevelyan's account of it:

THE GREAT ITALIAN RETREAT

"Now followed, as if from a blue sky, that tremendous cataclysm which almost ruined Italy and bade fair to ruin the cause of her Allies, but ended in giving to her a new national purpose and discipline, and to the Allies a closer unity. History, obedient to the popular instinct for the concentrated and the picturesque, has already decided to call the whole sequence of great events by the name of a little Alpine market-town. All the meanings now implied by the word 'Caporetto'—the immense and complicated causes and effects of the disaster of which the military sweep over two provinces and the rally on the Piave were merely the symbols; the mentality and character of a race; the merits and defects of its political and educational system; the relations of the different classes and parties to the war; the enemy propaganda; the grievances of the soldiers at the front; the world-strategy of Ludendorff and the new German tactics; the actions of Cadorna and his subordinates; Rapallo and the coming of the Allies; and all the shifting fortunes of that wide-flung winter battlefield—these things will fill volumes, shelves, and libraries in the generations to come. And, regardless of all this massive learning and controversy, the people's own tradition, told by the peasant at his fireside, will burn itself, deep as the shame and pride of Cannæ and its sequel, into the memory of the oldest civilized race in the world. . . .

"In order to understand the nature of the phenomenon, before inquiring into its causes, it is necessary to realize that there were three distinct categories of conduct among the Italian troops. To confuse any one of these three categories with either of the other two is to misunderstand the whole affair.

"First, there were a few regiments who, in accordance with a previously-formed intention, abandoned their duty, and surrendered on purpose. This was 'Caporetto' in the narrower and more strictly accurate sense, for it was only in that geographical zone that such betrayal occurred; but unfortunately Caporetto was the key to the whole strategic position. The phenomenon of voluntary surrender had been so common in the Austrian army throughout the war, beginning with the early battles round




Photo by J. Hare.

The Italian Counter-offensive

The counter-offensive in the sector near the Capo Sile is famous as the first Italian success which followed the Austrian offensive. The first line of *Arditi* shock troops, shown above, often carried only their lean, sharp knives in an assault.

Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly.

Lemberg, that an elaborate system based on trustworthy machine gunners had been devised to meet it; but it was so exceptional in the Italian army that it took the authorities who might have prevented it by surprise, and struck them with something akin to panic.

"When, consequently, a general retreat had been ordered, the second category of conduct was observable in a much larger number of men. The army of Bainsizza, San Gabriele, and Gorizia, who had no thought of giving way when the enemy offensive began in the last week of October, successfully resisted the attacks made on their positions, until the order came from Cadorna to retreat beyond the Tagliamento. They carried out irreproachably the difficult retirement across the Isonzo gorge and out of the hills; but as they proceeded over the plain, hustled by the victorious enemy pouring down on their flank from Cividale, they were gradually infected by the sense that all was lost. Mainly between Udine and the Tagliamento, they gave way at length to the war-weariness which had so long been at strife with their valor and patriotism, flung away their rifles wholesale, and passed round the word, '*Andiamo a casa*' ('We're going home'). The last scenes of the Second Army were a sad falling from what the same men had shown themselves two months before.

"The third and largest category of all consisted of the troops who did their duty throughout. Most of, though not quite all, the Third Army from the Carso, and the Fifth, First, and Fourth Armies on the Cadore and Trentino fronts, saved Italy by holding fast where required, and retreating in order where necessary, so that the shorter line was successfully established in the early days of November. Many heroic feats of individual companies, regiments, and divisions illumined the worst hours of the retreat. And some of the finest of these were performed by units of the Second Army itself, both in the mountain region of Matajur above Caporetto, and in the plain of Udine.


"I may be regarded as partial, but I believe that the Second Army, though it can scarcely complain if it has been made to bear the sins of the nation, was not really a worse army than any other, except for the untried and undesirable elements whom the authorities had carelessly thrust into Caporetto that autumn. The men at Plava and Gorizia had up till then performed the most brilliant and sustained feats of arms done by any part of the Italian forces, and if at last they gave way worse than the others, that was only in proportion to their geographical propinquity to the break-through on their

flank and rear. Elements in the Third Army suffered the same disintegration for the same reason. The half-million men of whom the Second Army was composed must not be condemned in a mass, nor their previous achievements forgotten. None the less the now established tradition that the Duke of Aosta's Third Army saved the situation by its superior discipline in the retreat from the Carso and by turning to bay behind the Piave, represents an essential truth.

"Such in the main were the phenomena; but their causes are a subject far more diffused and obscure, on which I can only aspire to throw some feeble lights from my personal experience and observation.

"Of the positive treachery at Caporetto itself I can say little, because I was not there, and the cars of our unit had been withdrawn from that zone before the regiments in fault were sent up. It is common knowledge that the ranks of these regiments were filled up with several thousands of the munition workers who had taken part in the recent Turin revolt. To concentrate these men at Caporetto as a punishment was not a very fortunate inspiration. I know from what I have been told by those who were in Caporetto in the last weeks before the disaster, that the soldiers made no secret of their intentions, and that many of their officers lived in fear of their own men, locking themselves up carefully at night. . . . But since there had been so little treachery in the Italian army heretofore, and since Caporetto was regarded as a quiet part of the line, the responsible authorities left matters alone. Possibly the too great isolation in which the Comando Supremo was said to live under General Cadorna's régime is partly responsible for the failure to scent the smoke before the fire. If so, that General, to whom Italy and the Allies owe so much, has dearly paid for the defects of his qualities. . . .

"To me the thing that needs explaining is not why the retreat occurred, but why it did not occur long before, and how the Italian army and nation rallied and reconstituted their *moral*, and imposed on themselves a new and better discipline. These peasant soldiers were neither educated up to understanding the objects and ideals of the war like the English and American soldier, nor terrorized like the soldier in the enemy ranks. It was instinctive patriotism, natural courage, and the peasants' stamina and patience that enabled the Italian to put up so long with such conditions of life, and to endure war losses of 460,000 dead in a population only half the white population of the British Empire. The Italians are magnificent material, and if



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Bombarding the Austrians on the Italian Front

This gigantic 200mm. gun was one of Italy's most powerful weapons. Concealed from enemy observers by the forest, it hurled its projectiles seven miles over the mountains.



only they were given good education, they would respond splendidly in peace as in war to the requirements of their age and their country."

V

THE STAND ON THE PIAVE

THE Caporetto disaster had its good side—it revealed Italy—as by a flash of lightning—her dire peril, the people all united, rich and poor, pro-war and anti-war, in a common resolve to defend their homes from the detested invaders. By a supreme effort the Italian Armies, the same men whose retreat from Caporetto and the positions further south had, in some places, degenerated into a rout, became soldiers again, soldiers of splendid quality. They turned at the Piave—a name immortal forevermore—and there braced themselves to meet the enemy.

Close on their heels came Germans and Austrians. But along the Piave and in the mountain fastnesses to the northward, the invaders met men of a new stamp, regenerated by misfortune, purged of dross by the thought of their motherland, menaced by the hated "Tedeschi," calling upon them for protection. At this new wall of Italian courage, strengthened now by French and English divisions, the enemy met a bloody repulse. Again and again he renewed his onslaughts, but the Piave line held. Shaken and decimated, Germans and Austrians paused, to find strength for new attacks. Italy, for the time being, was saved.

During this time of trial, Americans, too, lent their aid to Italy. Trevelyan writes these appreciative words of them:

"While three British and three French divisions took their share in strengthening the Italian line on the Piave and Asiago, the Americans, who had no troops at hand, devoted themselves with characteristic energy, publicity, and largeness of scope, to fortifying the 'home front.' The American Red Cross did fine ambulance work at the front; but it did not confine itself to the sick and wounded there, or even to the refugees, but also pursued an intensive cultivation of the towns and villages of the north, center, and south, combating want and discontent, the enemy garrison which always threatened the rear of the Italian army. Above all, the sol-

diers' families, with their insufficient separation allowances, received in every village of the Peninsula the aid of the American Red Cross, a fact which reacted most favorably on the tone of the Army at the front.

"Thus the able and distinguished men whom America sent to Italy as chiefs of her Red Cross, backed by unlimited funds, helped Orlando greatly in the work of removing the discontent of the country and spreading a sense that time and victory were on the side of the Allies, because America was coming along. I have said that in 1917 the Italians appreciated but little the power and purpose of America in the war. But in 1918 it gradually became their prevailing idea, until America much more than filled up to them the blank left by Russia, and gave a warm assurance of ultimate victory. It was good to see the Italians taking to these brave newcomers, who spoke our tongue, and were always the best of friends to us."

VI

AUSTRIA'S LAST ATTACK

THEN came the last desperate attempt of the Teutons to smash through into the plains of Lombardy. Trevelyan makes it clear that, in June, 1916, when Austria launched her last blow, her armies were still formidable. It was against no spent foe that Diaz pitted his legions along the Piave; it was against veteran and determined men that the British held their positions on Mount Grappa and the blood-soaked Montello. Says Trevelyan:

"When the Austrian blow fell at last there was no half measure about it. Although the internal condition of the Empire, political and economic, was even worse than we knew, the authorities believed that they could win such a victory as would relieve their almost desperate situation. But for this purpose the victory must this time be decisive. Their generals planned and their army confidently expected to go straight through at the first rush to Treviso, where they had allotted houses for the different regiments and officers. After that they believed that Italy's resistance would collapse.

"The offensive was launched with equal fury along an unbroken line of attack stretching from the Asiago front opposite the British, right round by Grappa, the Montello, and the course of the Piave down to the sea. At dawn on June



Photo by D. C. Thompson.

Only Italians, Inured to Mountain Warfare, Could Fight in Such Surroundings

These hardy troops are scrambling up to an outpost in the mountain heights. Each man had his rifle and about 50 pounds of equipment, which he kept with him always, except when actually charging an enemy position. Then packs were dropped and the men went forward with no impedimenta except arms and ammunition.

15th it began along this great stretch of ground with a bombardment of terrible efficiency. Some of the British officers told me they had never seen better shooting or a hotter barrage in France. The result was that early that morning the Austrians carried with little resistance almost the whole front line of the Allies from Asiago to the marshes at the Piave mouth.

"But their success on the mountains was short lived. The British, furious at losing any ground to the Austrians, drove them out again with fearful slaughter, and pursued them into their own lines, where all resistance ceased. The reaction of the French and Italians on the mountain front was also very rapid. Between Piave and Brenta, on the Grappa massif, the Austrians had begun by storming positions which commanded Bassano and threatened the whole line. But Diaz now knew that the proper reply to the new Ludendorff tactics of 'infiltration' was instant counter-attacks, and these were carried out with magnificent vigor and success.

"By the end of the second day all was well over in the mountain area. But on the low, long 'mound' of the Montello and in the plain of the Piave the battle continued for another week of desperate and uncertain fighting. On the morning of the 15th the Austrians had crossed the Piave. In the north they had taken and held nearly half the Montello, and again farther down the course of the river, on both sides of Ponte di Piave and Santa Dona, they had securely lodged themselves on the further shore. . . .

"The Austrians had brought a few light cannon across the Piave, but generally speaking their excellent artillery had had to stay on the farther shore. And since they had lost the mastery of the air, thanks not a little to the British airmen in the spring, . . . they could not get sufficient information as to how to direct their fire in accordance with the changing phases of the battle on the Italian side of the river. They adopted the policy of plumping big shells on the country lanes, of which they had the accurate range, thereby often blocking them for a time. But the Italians, always careful of their road communications, were quick to fill up the holes. As compared with San Gabriele or Vodice, it was a battle of machine-gun and rifle wounds, at least for the Italians.

"Thus, though the river had been crossed by the Austrian infantry, it was still the Italians' great defense. The midsummer rain fell, the river rose, and the footbridges, always under the fire of the Italian artillery and of aeroplanes, Italian and British, became each day a more precarious means of sending over men, food and

rifle ammunition. Towards the end of the week the enemy prisoners complained of hunger and eagerly ate the loaves shared with them by their kindly captors. As the Italians held their ground more firmly than ever, the Austrians, eight days after they had crossed the river, slipped back across it under cover of night.

"Then we all knew that Italy had been saved, and we rejoiced together. But we did not know that Austria-Hungary had no less surely been doomed, and must now disappear from the category of States. Diaz' defensive victory of June, 1918, may be added to the long list of 'decisive battles of the world.'"

VII

ITALY'S FINAL TRIUMPH

THEN came the last act, the glorious final victory, the rout of Austria's armies, the blow that consummated the downfall of the empire of the Hapsburgs, Italy's hereditary enemies. The Italians and their allies plunged forward; soon the enemy was in complete rout. Trevelyan writes of those days in an elation that sweeps the reader along with him:

"They were wonderful and happy days for every one, those days of the great deliverance, with the barbarian once more fleeing from the soil sacred through the centuries to the Latin race. But only we who had traversed the same roads in such bitterness of spirit twelve months before could feel it to the full. . . . The inhabitants of Veneto and Friuli, after their year of servitude, were going about in happy crowds, hundreds together, men, women, and children, unable to do anything but laugh and talk with their liberators, who, themselves radiant with delight, were many of them wearing evergreen branches in token of victory.

"Every day, as we advanced, we met ever longer columns of weedy prisoners, their hands deep in their gray overcoat pockets, shepherd in thousands at a time by two or three cheerful Tommies, or two or three majestic mounted Carabinieri. Many, I think, had 'bowed the head for bread' rather than remain with a starving army or return to a starving land. On the side of every road and in every market town stood the yellow cannon and lorries, and all the deserted gear of the disbanding hosts. And in the ditches along every high road and lane between the Piave islands and Trieste the soldiers



Photo by D. C. Thompson.

Earth Shaking Shells

The explosion of an Austrian *ohus* almost on the parapet of a first line trench in the Alps. Note the men hugging the ground until the missiles from the bursting shell have passed. Their rifles are in place along the upper part of the parapet. Both sides dragged heavy artillery up almost impassable mountain slopes, and bombarded each other with large-sized shells.

had thrown away their 'Dolly Varden' Boche helmets; sometimes sooner, sometimes later in the flight each man had divested himself of that heavy badge of servitude. So it was given us to see 'proud Austria rammed to wreck.'

"On the night of November 2nd it chanced that I had a long way to walk back beyond the Piave, not wishing to take the car back over the bridge. I was walking under the stars through the scenes of our June battle, ghostly in the starlight. As I went, I became aware of a singing and cheering all around for miles away. I was

quite alone, and could only guess its significance; but when at last I struck our old Treviso main road, I asked the first group of soldiers I met what was the meaning of the still-continued, universal shout. They told me that the Austrians had sent a general to the Comando Supremo to ask for an armistice. I shall never forget the distant and continuous noise of a whole army scattered over the plain, shouting all night in its joy under the glistening winter stars because their warfare was accomplished, and Europe at last was free."

A GERMAN GENERAL'S VIEW

Deductions from the War, Some Good and Some Wide of the Mark, by
Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven, Prussia's Foremost Military Writer

IN the winter of 1917, less than a year before the final collapse of Germany, General Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven, the foremost military writer of Germany, published a book called *Deductions from the World War*, an English translation of which was published by G. P. Putnam's Sons. It is interesting as much for the deductions which the Baron did not make as for those that he did. Though writing in the shadow of the military catastrophe that finally overcame his Fatherland, von Freytag-Loringhoven spoke as if Germany had at least an even chance of winning the war, and, in dealing with the future—with which, in fact, much of the book is concerned—he visualized a Germany strong among the nations, still endowed with commanding military power, still militaristic, unconquered and Prussian through and through.

Despite his curious misconceptions on some points, von Freytag-Loringhoven made some excellent guesses, combated certain theories rife in 1917 when he wrote, which subsequent operations in the war showed to be fallacious. For instance, he warned steadily against the belief that trench warfare had definitely superseded mobility. He looked upon the trench deadlock as purely temporary, induced by special circumstances, sure to yield again to open fighting. The events of 1918 proved him right. Also, he warned against the idea that the usefulness of cavalry was a thing of the

past, in which view he concurred with Sir Douglas Haig, who never allowed the long months of trench fighting and the consequent inactivity of the mounted arm to blind him to the fact that mobile warfare, and with it the prominence of cavalry, was bound to return.

In addition, the Prussian general writes with un-Prussian moderation, with a calm that lends weight to his remarks. All in all, despite all that has happened to Germany since the book was written, which has shown much of it to be the stuff that dreams are made of, the Baron's book is valuable to students of the World War, especially as a means of seeing how its problems looked to those on the inside of the German military machine.

During the war von Freytag-Loringhoven held important offices—he was Quartermaster-General (that office in his day, however, was not the ultra-important post afterwards filled by Ludendorff), and later Deputy Chief of the General Staff. His writings were so well regarded in Germany that he received the Order *Pour le Mérite*, Peace Class, being, so far as is known, the only officer to receive it during the war. This decoration is conferred for excellence in science and arts.

Freytag-Loringhoven has no use for a League of Nations. To him it is a negation of nationalism that can never succeed in the world. When he wrote his book he was still a Prussian Junker; temperate, to be sure, and

showing in the expressions of his opinions none of the brutality usually associated with the type, but a Junker notwithstanding. This quality, more than anything else, is what gives to much of his book its archaic flavor.

For instance, he remarks:

"The World War affords incontrovertible proof that Germany must for all time maintain her claim to sea-power. We need not at present discuss by what means this aim is to be achieved." Those who received the surrender of the German High Seas Fleet after the armistice will agree with him there.

GERMAN NEGLECT OF OUR CIVIL WAR


One of Germany's blunders, says Freytag-Loringhoven, was the failure to learn any lesson at the beginning of the World War from the American Civil War, especially as regards blockade. The Prussian general, who has evidently made a careful study of the great American conflict, says:

"The American War of Secession, like everything else American at that time, attracted little attention from us. Germany was still only a geographical conception; there could be no question of a world policy for its component parts. Moreover, our own wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870-71, claimed all our attention.—Yet, different as were the cause, the development and the other conditions of the American Civil War compared with the present World War, the economic factors which in each case found expression have engendered more than one similar phenomenon.

"The Northern States endeavored, at the outset, by the aid of their imposing fleet, to cut off the Southern States, which had no battle-fleet worth mentioning, from their sea-borne supplies, and, also, on land, from the Mississippi and the corn-growing states of the southwest, and thus paralyze them completely. The value of the Southern troops, who were far inferior numerically, as well as of their generals, and, above all, the distinguished leadership of Lee, for four years rendered impossible the accomplishment of this so-called 'Anaconda plan' until the Southern States finally succumbed to the blockade.

"Things never quite repeat themselves in history. But we may learn from history. . . . The American Civil War might have furnished us many a hint which was left disregarded. . . . But we must confess . . . we found ourselves confronted with the problem of conducting a

war governed by world-economic considerations without immediately comprehending it. To be sure, our opponents, too, only gradually perceived the true situation. The operations which they had begun extracted only little by little the full advantage of the world-economic situation, which was favorable to them and unfavorable to us; they did so only when they met with an unexpected force of resistance in the Central Powers. But, in any case, in our military conduct of the war, we drew the neces-



G. P. Putnam's Sons.

Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven

One of Germany's foremost military writers.

sary conclusions from the world-situation, and were at pains to turn it to account by means of a far-reaching organization."

GERMANY FOUGHT AGAINST "MASS-PSYCHOSIS"

Turning to the actual military operations, the Prussian writer calls attention to the fact that trench warfare never brought any advantage to Germany; that she reaped positive results only from the war of movement. This statement, written in 1917, may have helped bring about the decision to launch the great German offensive of the spring of 1918, which





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Inside a German Dugout

Following their retreat from the Marne in 1914 the Germans dug themselves in, and trench warfare began. Gradually the Germans elaborated their trenches until, by 1916, their underground quarters were furnished like houses.

brought back the war of movement with a vengeance. It also brought advantages to Germany, it will be remembered, but they were temporary and in the nature of a boomerang, for Foch soon showed that two could play at the game of mobile warfare and that, of the two, he and not Ludendorff was the master.

Freytag-Loringhoven deals interestingly with the characteristics of some of the nations who waged the World War and attributes to certain special features engendered in it—"mass-psychosis," for instance—part of the difficulties Germany was compelled to face.

"While the Frenchman has always displayed military aptitude, his training in time of peace

upon the basis of universal military service has only still further developed his good military qualities, and he has never exhibited those failings which formerly and often erroneously have been attributed to French armies, such as lack of endurance in difficult situations, the inability to endure defeats, susceptibility to panic. The effect of universal military service has manifestly been to discipline the whole nation, and to furnish an appropriate vessel for its very strongly developed sense of unity. Those who judged the French nation by the customary standard of former days have been astonished at their conduct in this war."

Turning to the English troops early in the war, the divisions of the "new army" created by Kitchener, the German writer says:

"The English reached a high degree of technical efficiency, but their fighting tactics remained defective. Also, for all that tough courage peculiar to the Englishman, they lacked that spirit which can be engendered only by the consciousness of a lofty national purpose such as that for which the French were fighting. In place of her voluntary army England gradually built up for herself on French soil a national army; but, voluntary army or national army, it served only the ends of English politics and the economic war against Germany. . . .

"In stirring up and working upon the feelings of the masses, England showed no more scruples than France. . . .

"Thus we had to wage war against enemies who were under the influence of a mass-psychosis. This has engendered phenomena such as Europe had not witnessed since the time of the wars of religion."

Freytag-Loringhoven lauds the German soldiers for their "high sense of duty and the power of resistance," and adds that Germans ought not to refuse respect for their enemies, above all, the French, for they, too, were prepared and resolved every one to die for his country. Turning his attention eastward, he says:

"The Russians have afforded us less cause for surprise than the rest of our enemies. True, they brought up their masses earlier than had been anticipated, but these, as was to be expected, proved themselves very unwieldy, so that the superior mobility of our troops helped to restore the balance. Their unshaken resistance to the Russian mass attacks did the rest."

As for Germany's allies, the Austro-Hungarians, Freytag-Loringhoven is inclined to "let them off easily." The blame for the Austro-Hungarian Army's shortcomings, he thinks, was largely due "to the sins and omissions of which the Parliaments of the Monarchy had been guilty during past decades."

Like Foch and Haig, the German writer acknowledges the debt of modern warfare to technical inventions, but does not overestimate their value. Great as has been the technical progress of warfare, he says, it has not been sufficient to overcome war's difficulties. "Now as ever, war is the domain of frictions and uncertainty."

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

Germans, as is well known, do not like to talk about the battle of the Marne. It was ignored in the German *communiqués* of 1914; they spoke of the "strategic retreat" to the Aisne but not of what caused that retreat. But Freytag-Loringhoven plunges quite cheer-



The German Air Raid on Yarmouth
A house in St. Peter's Plain after being hit by a bomb.

fully into a subject so generally taboo across the Rhine. He says:

"The really decisive factor was that the German offensive was no longer strong enough to break through in the face of an enemy country bristling with armaments. The withdrawal of the German Armies after the dazzling successes which had been achieved at the beginning could not but in the nature of things cause bitter disappointment at home. It ought, however, to be borne in mind that, if Moltke was able to achieve a Metz and a Sedan, he none the less had at his disposal forces considerably superior in numbers to those of the enemy. . . . At the beginning of the war of 1914, on the other hand, the armed force of France alone was slightly in excess of the whole mobilized strength of Ger-

many, while, if we deduct the German forces employed in the East and those which were in the first instance kept at home for coast defense, the French, English and Belgians possessed a numerical superiority of something like three-quarters of a million men. In addition to this, when the German Western army engaged in the Battle of the Marne, its original first-line troops had been reduced not only by two Army Corps which had been sent to the East, but also by two further army corps which it had been necessary to leave behind at Antwerp and Maubeuge."

whole host of the enemy is a very difficult matter. In order to accomplish it at the Marne, we should have required yet another army disposed in échelon behind the German right wing."

The Allies, he declares, had a chance to carry out an envelopment of their opponents on a vast scale after the Marne; had they used their railways and motor wagons to hurl strong forces against the German right flank at the proper moment they would have prevented the Germans from digging in along the Aisne



The Kaiser and Five of His Six Sons en route to the Arsenal on the Birthday of William II

Offensives, he continues, wear down those who undertake them, and he quotes Clausewitz's words: "Every attack must lead to defense." On account of this wearing down, the German attack of 1914, he argues, was not, at the beginning of September, 1914, powerful enough to overthrow its adversaries.

"Forces which suffice to achieve victory and even to destroy strong sections of the enemy's forces prove inadequate for the attainment of the complete success which is desired. The individual armies of the enemy may be enveloped—as happened at Tannenberg and later at Hermannstadt* . . . but the envelopment of the

and inflicted upon them a disastrous defeat.

"Since, however, they had not achieved a tactical success at the Marne at all," the Prussian general calmly continues, "they lacked the strength and the capacity for such an undertaking." Whatever may be thought of the second part of that sentence, the first will hardly find many to agree with it except in "Mitteleuropa."

Then came trench warfare. The Germans, says Freytag-Loringhoven, assumed a defense accompanied by offensive tactics; they were not in a position to do more. "It lay with our opponents, when they had forced us to retreat, to give to the war once again the character of a war of movement," he says.

* Where Falkenhayn defeated the Rumanians in October, 1916.

"They did not succeed in doing so." On the other hand, the Germans imposed upon other fronts—the Russian, Serbian and Rumanian—the war of movement.

OPPOSITION TO TRENCH WARFARE

He registers his disbelief in trench warfare thus:

"It would be wrong to maintain that, in the future, entrenched warfare must necessarily play such a dominant part as it has played in the present war. Even King Frederick speaks of an entrenched war against the Austrians only as a consequence of their skill in choosing favorable positions. That, even in his later years, he still conceded the chief importance to decision on the field of battle is evident from his plans for the Bavarian War of Succession, and in spite of the inaction which, as it turned out, marked the course of this armed demonstration—for it was really nothing else—here too he had based his chief hopes upon a 'good battle' in Moravia.

"We shall have to consider how, in future, to preserve for war the character of the war of movement, all the more so since, in the World War, it has only been by the war of movement that we have reaped decisive results. It will, of course, be accompanied by many of the features of entrenched warfare, and, in consequence of the necessity of bringing up and setting in operation the numerous present-day methods of attack, it will be slow. An approximate illustration of this is furnished by the course of the operations in East Prussia and Lithuania and of the Germano-Austro-Hungarian offensive in Galicia and Poland in the summer of 1915, as well as by the campaigns in Serbia, Transylvania and Roumania; and the rapid progress of operations in these instances furnishes convincing proof that the resolute will of a leader, combined with the valor of his troops, is capable of overcoming those difficulties which the bringing up of their numerous weapons of war entails upon a modern army. For this kind of warfare we ourselves had received just the appropriate training, and we were in fact superior to all the other armies. Such a form of warfare is decisive, and will always remain decisive; the years which we have spent in our trenches do not alter this fact in any way.

"That spirit of the offensive which is peculiar to our Army we must study to preserve by every means in our power. It has achieved striking results in this war, and has recently once again proved its effectiveness in the summer of

1917 in Eastern Galicia and in the defensive battles in North France and Flanders. But we must not lose sight of the fact that from time to time, at the beginning, a systematic adherence to offensive tactics, even where the situation rendered it more advisable to make full use of the strength which the effectiveness of present-day weapons gives to defensive tactics, cost us a heavy sacrifice.

"In any case the war has proved that the assertion often made in time of peace that the spade digs the grave of the offensive is not correct. This assertion may be compared with the saying which was current in the Prussian Army, to its very great detriment, before the battle of Jena: 'Skirmishing encourages the scoundrel in human nature.' From the military point of view Goethe is right when he says: 'For it is just where ideas are lacking that a phrase is most welcome.' Catch-words are always prejudicial in their effect, and most of all so when it is a question of the blood of our sons and brothers. It was not only King Frederick who expressed his sense of the importance of selecting strong positions. Napoleon, the representative of the most uncompromising offensive, told the officers of his engineer-corps in 1806 that in the coming campaign against Prussia he intended that a very great quantity of earth should be shoveled up." And Moltke writes:

"The offensive is by no means merely tactical. A clever military leader will succeed in many cases in choosing defensive positions of such an offensive nature from a strategic point of view that the opponent is compelled to attack us in them. . . . A strategical offensive consorts very well with a tactical defense."




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Voting to Intern All Germans

A mass meeting held in the rain on Tower Hill in London for the purpose of dealing with suspected aliens.

HIS IDEAS ABOUT THE FUTURE

There can be no question that, when Freytag-Loringhoven wrote his *Deductions from the World War*, he saw no Germany disarmed and shorn of military and naval power; existing, so to speak, on probation, having the maximum number of her troops determined by the conquering Allies. To him the Germany of the future was essentially the Germany that existed between 1870 and 1914—strong-



© Ullrich, Berlin.

The German Spy Scare in England

"And I ask you again for the last time: have you or have you not a *Zeppelin* concealed about your person?"

er, if anything, for he hoped to see her profit in a military sense by the lessons of the World War. Yet, despite his misconceptions as to the outcome of the struggle, some of his deductions remain excellent, in a purely military sense.

He saw the necessity of equipping infantry with great numbers of machine guns. He advocated more howitzers. He urged increase of cavalry.

"This long entrenched warfare, and the fact that in the course of it this valuable weapon

has only been employed in the same way as the infantry must not lead us to form false conclusions. . . . As soon as the war was carried into the open country, the cavalry at once asserted its importance. It becomes indispensable both as a supplement to aircraft in reconnaissance and also as a mobile defensive weapon. . . . At the same time, in the training of cavalry in time of peace, due attention must be paid to trench-warfare, and far more attention must be devoted to fighting on foot than has hitherto been the case."

He believes that tactics must be studied more in future and strategy less; that the important thing is not to "spin out great strategic theories, but to develop the power of forming a just conception of purely tactical situations on a simple plan, and to practice the technique of command."

He is far from typically Prussian in what he says of the relationship that should exist between officers and men. He does not approve of officers who are but scolding task-masters, and, contrary to the belief in many quarters, he declares that the World War established cordial relationships between German officers and the rank and file of the German Army. However, he remarks that "good relations between officers and men must not be such as to be prejudicial to the authority of the superior officer."

The unrepentant Junker speaks in these sentences:

"The spirit of German militarism, which has enabled us to stand the test of the World War, and which we must preserve in the future, because with it our world-position stands or falls—which, moreover, is 'every whit as monarchical as it is aristocratic and democratic'—rests ultimately on the building up of an officers' corps which shall be thoroughly efficient for purposes of war. For this purpose a sound aristocratic tradition is of the highest value. . . .

"Only under the absolute command of a war lord can an army achieve a really vigorous development."


He dismisses the idea of World Peace, of a League of Nations, of an end of all wars, in these genuinely Prussian phrases:

"WAR WILL CONTINUE TO EXIST"

"War has its basis in human nature, and as long as human nature remains unaltered, war

will continue to exist, as it has existed already for thousands of years. The often quoted saying of Moltke that wars are inhuman, but eternal peace is a dream, and not even a beautiful dream, will continue to be true. . . . A long peace, such as that which preceded the World War, had frequently caused us to overlook the fact that it was not the fine phrases about international bliss and brotherhood uttered on every occasion at public meetings which preserved us from war, but the might of our sword which was only fully revealed on the outbreak of

universal league for the preservation of peace remains a Utopia, and would be felt as an intolerable tutelage by any great and proud-spirited nation. Here, too, let us heed Treitschke's warning when he says: 'The idea of one universal empire is odious. The ideal of a State co-extensive with humanity is no ideal at all. In a single State the whole range of culture could never be fully spanned.' The fact that it was precisely the President of the United States of North America who advocated such a brotherhood of nations must in any case



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In Memory of the Victims of Zeppelin L-2

The arrival at the Garrison Church, Kaiser Friedrich Platz, Berlin, of the Kaiser and Kaiserin (left), Admiral von Tirpitz (walking), and on the extreme right, the sons of the German Emperor and their wives.

war. And it will only be by this might that we shall be able to safeguard our peace in the future.

"We misconstrue reality, if we imagine that it is possible to rid the world of war by means of mutual agreements. Such agreements will, in the future, as in the past, be concluded from time to time between States. The further development of international courts of arbitration, and the elimination of many causes of dispute by their agency, lies within the realm of possibility, but any such agreements will after all only be treaties which will not on every occasion be capable of holding in check the forces seething within the States. Therefore the idea of a

arouse our wonderment. America's behavior in the war has shown that pacifism, as represented in America, is only business pacifism, and so at the bottom nothing else than crass materialism. This truth is not altered by the fact that it is wrapped in a hazy garment of idealism and so seeks to hide its real significance from unsuspecting minds. Nor is the truth altered by the appeal to democratic tendencies, for precisely this war is showing that those who at present hold power in the great democracies have risked in irresponsible fashion the future of the peoples entrusted to their guidance. In any event, as regards us Germans, the World War should disencumber us once and for all of any vague

cosmopolitan sentimentality. If our enemies, both our secret and our avowed enemies, make professions of this nature, that is for us sufficient evidence of the hypocrisy which underlies them.

"No one can foresee future developments, least of all while such a war as the present is still in progress. Hence it is not impossible that pacifist tendencies, based upon motives of utility, may gain currency to a certain degree, but they will not conduce to the betterment of humanity. We find it impossible to believe in the realization of genuine pacifist ideals, such

as are cherished by well-meaning sentimentalists. Only a spiritual transformation of the human race could bring this about, and how far we are from any such transformation has been revealed by the War. Therefore, in regard to this question, we should pay less heed to the phrases of present-day prophets than to the views of old and truly wise men. We must not put might before right, but equally little shall we and can we dispense with might.

"In the future, as in the past, the German people will have to seek firm cohesion in its glorious army and in its belauded young fleet."

THE ZEPPELIN'S FAILURE

Its Vulnerability, Unwieldiness and Delicacy of Mechanism, Together with the Efficient Anti-Aircraft Devices of the Allies, Soon Overcame Its Terrors

THE Zeppelin was a failure in the World War. It proved useful for reconnaissance work, but the fond hopes harbored by the Germans of destroying great cities like London and Paris and spreading desolation and panic in the lands of the Allies by means of the aerial monsters were rudely shattered. It was found that a Zeppelin was altogether too good a target for hostile anti-aircraft gunners, that it fell an easy victim to daring airmen in the far lighter and speedier aeroplane, that its unwieldiness was rivaled by the delicacy of its mechanism and its infinite capacity for getting out of order. Despite the various Zeppelin raids on London and elsewhere, with their heavy toll of death and destruction, it soon became clear that Count Zeppelin's famous invention was not what he and his coadjutors anticipated.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ZEPPELIN

Two airmen, Claude Graham White and Harry Harper, contributed an article to the *Fortnightly Review* during the progress of the war from which all interested in the why and wherefore of Zeppelin failure can draw valuable information. First, the two authors tell just what Count Ferdinand Zeppelin, in his many years of tireless work, sought to develop:

"The Zeppelin has a long, rigid, tubular hull, blunt at the bow and slightly more tapering at the stern, which is constructed of aluminum and covered by a strong, weather-proof fabric. This hull has increased in length from 416 feet in Zeppelin No. 1 to 540 feet in Zeppelin No. 18. Inside the hull are the gas-containers which, when they are filled with hydrogen, give the airship its power of ascent. They are placed one behind the other in a row, take the form of small separate balloons, and number from fifteen to twenty, according to the size of the airship. These balloons possess the advantage from the point of view of war that, if one or more are pierced, the remainder are unaffected. Why Count Zeppelin should have given his craft a rigid outer hull, which necessitates raising into the air so much dead weight, may be explained non-technically by the fact that, if non-rigid gas-containing envelopes are made in very large sizes, a difficulty presents itself—not the only one—in maintaining their shape against the pressure of the air, when they are driven through it rapidly, and in preventing them, say, from kinking in at the bow, or buckling in the center. It has been stated by experts, specially conversant with this problem, that the practicable limit of size for a non-rigid airship is represented by an envelope containing approximately 400,000 cubic feet of gas; whereas the containers of a Zeppelin, a machine of the largest type, hold a total of more than twice that quantity.

"Immediately below the hull of the airship, and attached closely to it, is a hollow V-shaped keel, enclosed by an outer covering of fabric. At a point which is approximately in the center of the airship, this keel is enlarged to form a cabin for the crew; while it forms also a passage-way, by which the members of the crew may reach the two cars containing the motors and other gear of the ship which are attached to the keel at points about one-fourth the length of the machine from bow to stern. The propellers which, actuated by the motors, drive the machine through the air, and of which there are usually four, are carried on frameworks of steel tubing which slope outward and downward from the sides of the hull. Motive power is transmitted to them from the cars by bevel gearing. At the rear of the hull, operated from the cars, are the controlling planes—a series of vertical and horizontal surfaces which, when moved respectively from side to side or up and down, act as rudders and elevators. There are fixed planes also at the stern, which exert a stabilizing influence on the craft as it passes through the air.

"The first Zeppelin, launched in 1900, was almost identical, in its principles of construction, with the craft used in this war. Where improvement has been effected mainly, in each successive model, has been in regard to size, speed, and general efficiency. . . .

"The aim in the construction of Zeppelins, from the point of view of war, was to provide Germany with an aircraft which should carry a heavier load than that of any other nation, and fly also for longer distances; and in both these aims success was achieved. The Zeppelin was, when the war came, the most powerful aircraft in the world, being able to raise into the air an effective load—crew, fuel, ballast and explosives—equaling five tons."

VULNERABLE TARGETS FOR ARTILLERY

Zeppelins were used in the war for two main purposes: strategical reconnaissance over land as well as sea, and bomb-dropping raids. In both these tasks they were promptly subjected to artillery fire from the Allies, which made it quite apparent that the Zeppelins were very vulnerable, especially in daylight and when flying low. It also became clear that the danger of an involuntary landing was always imminent, especially in bad weather. The losses of Zeppelins in the early months of the war, when the total number of them possessed

by Germany is borne in mind, were exceedingly heavy.

Continuing their description of the Zeppelins in war, the two aviators say:

"Zeppelin pilots made the mistake when they came first under fire, as did aviators in aeroplanes, of flying too low; though it should be stated, in fairness to some of the Zeppelin pilots, that the craft they controlled—being machines several years old and of a comparatively early type—could not be induced, when loaded with fuel for a long flight, to maintain any



Count von Zeppelin

Original designer of the type of airship that bears his name.

high altitude. A realization of the power of high-angle land guns, firing shrapnel shell, came first in regard to the aeroplane. It had been thought prior to the war that such a machine, flying fast and offering a small target, might be considered fairly safe from gunfire—as safe, at any rate, as an aviator can hope to be when he is scouting in war—at 3,500 or 4,000 feet. But aeroplanes were, during the first weeks of active service flying, struck frequently by shrapnel when at 6,000 feet, and it was soon recognized that a pilot should, unless an urgent reconnaissance in misty weather compelled him to fly low, strive to maintain an altitude, when over hostile territory, of, say, 8,000 feet.

"If an aeroplane, presenting a mark to gun-

fire that is approximately 30 feet in length, and moving at perhaps 100 miles an hour, is in danger from gunfire at 6,000 feet, the risks of a Zeppelin may be imagined when she passes over a hostile country at a height of only 2,000 feet—remembering that she offers a target many times longer than the aeroplane, and one moving probably at less than half the speed. Yet on several occasions, in the early part of the war, a Zeppelin was caught by gunfire when flying at no more than 2,000 or 2,500 feet. In one case, for instance, which is authenticated, a Zeppelin crossed above a road in France at a height estimated to be only 2,400 feet, and had the rear of her hull so damaged by the fire of a field-gun that she was brought to the ground.

"On the Russian front, too, even when near hostile positions, Zeppelins flew at elevations which were dangerously low. It is safe indeed to assume that, at the outbreak of hostilities, there was a general underestimate, by those in charge of Zeppelins, of the risks they would run from gunfire. . . .

DANGER IN FLYING LOW

"It has been declared that the ideal height for a Zeppelin when on a long non-stop flight, having regard to economy in the consumption of gas and ballast, is about 2,000 feet; and if this statement is accepted—and it is a fact that, in flights made before the war, this was about the height most usually attained—it explains why Zeppelins on many occasions, even when near danger zones, have been found to be flying low. The war has, especially in operations by air, introduced conditions so novel that theories which served their purpose in times of peace have had to be abandoned without compunction; yet it is only a recognition of the weakness of human nature to suppose that, after having flown normally at moderate altitudes, in their pre-war tests, the Zeppelin pilots were some little time, as were in fact the pilots of aeroplanes—though with less serious results—before they realized the vital necessity of flying always at a maximum height. . . .


"Had the tactics been adhered to by which the Zeppelins were operated at the beginning of the war, it is evident that, far from being able to increase the number of their fleet, with the idea of delivering massed raids, the Germans would have been left soon without any such airships at all. Even when she is at a high altitude for such a machine, 6,500 or 7,000 feet, and granted that it is daylight and with the air fairly clear, a Zeppelin is by no means free from dan-

ger by artillery. A powerful anti-aircraft gun will throw a shell to a height of approximately 20,000 feet; and a Zeppelin, owing to her size, slowness, and inability to maneuver quickly when she comes under fire, provides a gunner with a far better target when she is at, say, 7,000 feet than would a high-speed aeroplane at less than half that altitude. And it must be remembered that a Zeppelin, having a comparatively small margin of effective 'lift' after she has raised the dead weight of her hull, cannot be armored so as to resist gunfire. The motors of a Zeppelin are protected as a rule by a belt of thin armoring; but the craft herself—and particularly her long, frail, lightly-built hull—is vulnerable in the extreme. There is no possibility with her, as with the warship, of resisting the penetration of shells. One well placed missile from a powerful high-angle gun, and a Zeppelin may be reckoned out of action.

ZEPPELIN TACTICS CHANGED

"The disasters that befell one after another of their Zeppelins during the first period of the campaign compelled the Germans to arrange for these craft, in the subsequent stages of the war, a far less ambitious program. They were forced by bitter experience to recognize that, whenever such a craft flew by day over hostile country, even at her best altitude, she ran a constant and heavy risk of being destroyed. This risk she could minimize by avoiding defended positions or the localities held by armies, but if she did this her value as a scout was impaired. And there was, besides, a ceaseless risk to be run from the fire of hidden guns. It is impossible for aviators, when flying from point to point across country either in airships or aeroplanes, to detect when they may be passing over concealed artillery—assuming that the work of concealment has been skilfully done. With the Zeppelin, too, when she flew by day over an enemy's land, there was another serious risk apart from the fire of guns, and this was from the attack of hostile aeroplanes, whose pilots, in all the patrol flights they made, were constantly on the look-out for enemy airships, and were prepared to attack them without hesitation immediately they came in sight.

"What happened when those in control of the German air service realized the vulnerability of their Zeppelins was that these machines vanished from the air almost entirely during the hours of daylight. And this was a serious curtailment of their activities, permitting them to steal from their sheds only at dusk and fly like night-birds during the hours of dark-



How Zeppelins Were Guided Home

A lighthouse in Germany, whose keepers are signaling to the crew of a passing airship.



ness, returning again to their shelters before the dawn.

"It is quite possible to make observations from the air by night. A large movement of troops by train may be detected from above, for instance, even if it is dark, though it is difficult as a rule to obtain more than a general impression of what is being done. Remembering that aerial reconnaissance by day has to be made with the utmost care and by skilled observers, if a headquarters' staff is to rely upon its accuracy, one may imagine what difficulties present themselves during the night-time in gaining news as to an enemy's movements that is important or trustworthy. As a matter of fact, the Zeppelins, when condemned to night flying, lost much of their significance as scouts, though they were still used in reconnaissance.

"But what they were reserved for largely, and it may be said of necessity, as soon as the risks of day flying became too great, was the making of night raids—using the darkness as a cloak for the approach of a coast-line or city, and then dropping their bombs as quickly as possible and making off again through the night. Not a glorious rôle, certainly, following on the stories circulated by the Germans to terrify antagonists; and one even in which, inglorious though it was, they were unable, through the limitations imposed by darkness, to obtain any real measure of success.

"It should be stated in justice to the Zeppelins that in the first stage of the war, while the armies were mobilizing, and before active measures were in force to combat airships, they did valuable work in strategical reconnaissance; and this work they continued, as the war progressed, by their long journeys above the North Sea and their patrol flights near German naval bases.

"Zeppelins might have been formidable as weapons of destruction had it not been for the defensive measures of those whom they attacked. These defenses, even at the beginning of the war, nullified very largely the powers given the Zeppelins by their ability to raise heavy loads.

"Over Antwerp, the most important city to be attacked by air during the first month of the war, a Zeppelin appeared one night, flying at not more than 2,000 feet. Having to make only a comparatively short flight from one of the nearest air stations on German soil, she had been able to load herself with heavy bombs of high power. The city had not been darkened; the attack came as a surprise. The opportunity was, indeed, an excellent one for the airship. But before her marksmen could release


their bombs effectively she was detected by searchlight from the ground, and so violent a gunfire directed upward that, though she was not hit, her pilot was obliged to take her quickly to an altitude of more than 4,000 feet; and her bombs, when they fell, did so at random and with results which were, from a military point of view, quite insignificant."

ANTI-ZEPPELIN DEVICES

The Allies went at the work of defending themselves against the Zeppelin with vigor and ability. It soon became apparent that the defenses against them on their bomb-dropping raids were such as to make these most hazardous. Searchlights soon revealed the giant air monsters to the watchers below and gave the signal for murderous gunfire. An additional precaution which fully justified itself during the war was the darkening of cities exposed to Zeppelin attacks. To navigate the air at night, even guided by lights below, is difficult enough; when airmen have no lights from cities to guide them, their task becomes doubly difficult. Graham White and Harper thus narrate what were some of a Zeppelin pilot's troubles while on one of his raids:

"Apart from searchlights and guns, when he attacks by night, a Zeppelin pilot needs to remember that aeroplanes may be sent up against him from a defended position; and though an aeroplane pilot, when he ascends in search of an airship at night, is faced by more than one difficulty in the navigation of his craft, the mere fact that there is the menace of this counter-offensive by aeroplanes, coupled with a concentration of fire by high-angle guns, has taken, so to say, the 'sting' out of the Zeppelin attacks, and has made the airships waste bombs over undefended tracts of land.

"Take, for example, the attacks on the English coasts. In these, besides the fact that the Zeppelin pilots have been in great haste to make off seaward, staying for the shortest period only over the coast-line they have attacked, the districts selected for bombardment have had, as a rule, practically no strategic or military value, and have been chosen, indeed, almost in all cases, not with the intention of striking any really decisive or important blow, but for the reason that included in them there were no areas defended heavily against aircraft, or from which aeroplanes might be expected to rise promptly in a counter-offensive. It is impossible—or it has been impossible at any rate in this war—



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The Eiffel Tower Searchlight

It was constantly employed at night in spotting enemy bomb-throwing dirigibles and sky scouts which made frequent excursions over the French capital.



to defend against an air raid every town on a long stretch of coast-line; places can be selected only which have a naval or military significance. And if an airship pilot, not daring to fly near such defended positions, wanders more or less aimlessly above unimportant towns and villages, dropping bombs that fall among cottages and farmhouses, his attack is not easy to cope with from the point of view of the defense, and he may repeat such raids at night, avoiding the fire of land-guns, and escaping

hostile gunfire. This necessity for flying high, coupled with the fact that they must carry a heavy load of fuel—as in the case, say, of a flight across the North Sea to the English coast—limits very definitely the weight and power of their bombs. . . . When crossing the North Sea to attack England the Zeppelins have, it is clear, been obliged to fly light, and they have done so in order to be able to maintain a high altitude. When a Zeppelin is described as having a radius of action of 1,000



Photo by Hare.

After the Zeppelin Raid at Ramsgate

The streets were filled with excited people, mingling with members of the Liverpool Rifles, who were on duty there. Residents of these coast towns kept their heads pretty well, considering the constant peril by which they were threatened.

seaward before aeroplanes can find him in the darkness. But such raids, though possible, accomplish nothing—the German hopes of terrorizing a countryside with random attacks by airship having failed completely; while the pilot of an airship, even if he escapes guns and hostile craft, runs the risk of a sudden change of weather that may prevent him from regaining his starting point. . . .

"There is a technical problem of importance, and one adverse to the Zeppelins, which arises when such craft make a long-distance raid, and need to maintain a high altitude so as to avoid

miles, fully loaded, it means she can only make such a flight when traveling at a low altitude. If such a machine is given the task of carrying explosives, as well as her normal burden, and also of reaching a high altitude, either her radius of action is lessened or her load of bombs must be reduced. Flying, say, at about 2,000 feet, a Zeppelin might, even on a long journey, carry several tons of bombs. But if she is to reach a height of from 6,000 to 8,000 feet, and make a long voyage under such conditions, then her load of bombs may need to be reduced to a weight of less than a ton. As part

of her armament, it must be remembered, when she makes a journey over hostile territory, a Zeppelin must carry machine guns with which to repel hostile aeroplanes, and the weight of these reduces her load of bombs. . . .

"The airship suffers in a flight with aeroplanes, as she does when subjected to land fire, from her vulnerability: one accurately

gium after a night flight, was sighted at 3 a.m., between Ghent and Brussels, by Sub-Lieut. Warneford, of the Royal Naval Air Service. Profiting by the speed of his machine, a monoplane, the aviator rose above the Zeppelin and passed over her, dropping six bombs at her hull. Whereupon, in the wording of the Admiralty report, 'the airship exploded, fell to the ground,



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Zeppelin Pilot and His Staff in Midair

From an "Air Number" of the *Leipzig Illustrated Gazette*, picturing what the artist called "an attacking cruise over England."

placed incendiary bomb striking her unprotected upper surface may send her earthward to destruction, her hull ablaze owing to the ignition of its gas.

WARNEFORD BOMBS AND DESTROYS A "ZEP"

"It was a single-seated aeroplane, carrying incendiary bombs, which succeeded in destroying a Zeppelin in an encounter on June 7, 1915. The airship, returning towards her shed in Bel-

gium after a night flight, was sighted at 3 a.m., between Ghent and Brussels, by Sub-Lieut. Warneford, of the Royal Naval Air Service. Profiting by the speed of his machine, a monoplane, the aviator rose above the Zeppelin and passed over her, dropping six bombs at her hull. Whereupon, in the wording of the Admiralty report, 'the airship exploded, fell to the ground,

France during the first two months at Verdun was saved by her artillery; one artillery projectile was fired for every three shots fired by the infantry.

“AMERICA DID IT”

The Adoption of Submarine Warfare, Which Led to America's Entry Into the War, Sealed Germany's Fate, According to a German Military Expert

THE adoption of unrestricted submarine warfare was the arch mistake of the German war leaders, according to Colonel Gädke, one of the most prominent military writers of Germany. Shortly after the armistice of November, 1918, he wrote a review of the World War in which he stated that the inception of submarine ruthlessness sealed Germany's fate because it caused the United States to join the Allies.

Gädke's attitude throughout his article is philosophic and his language temperate. Germany, he writes, was superior to any one of the nations arrayed against her, but, taken together, they were irresistible.

“Our idea was, first of all, to defeat the French while we defended ourselves against Russia. But the forces at our disposal against the French were not sufficient for a decisive victory; we suffered a setback on the Marne which forced us to remain on the defensive for a considerable period. On the other hand, the Russians proved to be much better prepared for war and stronger on the Eastern boundaries of the Central Powers than we had anticipated. This fact and the military weakness of Austria and Hungary, in addition to the gradual internal disruption in their States, resulted in an extremely dangerous and menacing situation, which forced us to dispatch increasingly strong units of our army to the East. In this way the English first gained time to create a large army and to make preparations for a tremendous output of war material of all kinds, so that they might be in a position to take a chief part in the war on the Continent.

“At the same time all the attacks of the Allied English and French armies during 1914-15 were victoriously repulsed by us, and after the glorious battle of Gorlice we drove the armies of the Czar back into the interior of Russia. The attack on the part of Italy against the Central Powers prevented us from completing our victory in the East, as we were obliged to send

troops to strengthen our allies on their southwest borders.

“In the meantime the badly planned and clumsily executed attack by the French and English against the Dardanelles had been a complete failure; Bulgaria joined us and succeeded in conquering Serbia and Montenegro during the latter part of the autumn of 1915. But the enemy Dardanelles army which had been hurriedly dispatched to Salonika remained in a very inconvenient position for us on the southern borders of Bulgaria, and finally succeeded in forcing Greece into the ranks of our enemies.

“In the spring of 1916 the Central Powers thought that the time had arrived to attack once more in the West. But the German attack on Verdun failed, as well as the Austro-Hungarian assault undertaken from the mountains on the borders of the Tyrol.

TERRIFIC FIGHTING OF 1916

“In the meantime the tremendous preparations made by the Russians, the French, and the English had been completed, and about the middle of 1916 our enemies made a terrific attack in the East as well as in the West, which brought about the second serious crisis of the war. We only succeeded in mastering this crisis with great difficulty and also by ceding a certain amount of territory. When towards the end of August, 1916, the Rumanians thought that the time had come when it would pay them to join the ranks of our enemies, the downfall of the Central Powers seemed certain.

“But the skill and energy of our leadership, which in the meantime had been placed in Hindenburg's hands, once more averted the threatened crisis. The Rumanian Army was completely beaten, the greater portion of the country, including the most fertile area, was conquered and furnished us with extra supplies. Unfortunately all our attempts to initiate peace negotiations towards the end of 1916 and the beginning of 1917 failed. At that time we could have had peace without losing anything, and we




Photo by Raishonne.

Over the Top at Cantigny

Doughboys of the American 1st Division of Regulars advancing in the early morning behind a barrage in the first American offensive.

Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly.

should have been glad now if it had come to a 'peace of renunciation' then. Instead of which, on January 31, 1917, the unrestricted submarine war was declared.

"This undertaking, by which we hoped finally

badly informed and far too self-confident—underestimated America's resources. And this underestimation of the enemy continued until the summer of 1918, until we realized the truth—too late.



Photo by Kirtland.

Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly.

Where the Bridge Stood at Château-Thierry

Here on the banks of the Marne was fought a fierce battle continuing for four days in June, 1918. The French supported by American machine-gunners of the 3rd Division fought off the foe and prevented a break-through to the road to Paris.

to bring England to her knees and to force her to negotiate, sealed our fate. For it was the actual cause of the entry of the United States of America into the ranks of our enemies. With America's aid, the pressure brought to bear upon us became so heavy that even the great power of the German Empire and the magnificent heroism of her brave armies were not able to hold out permanently. Just as in the case of Russia, and that of England herself, we—

GERMAN SUCCESSES IN 1917

"And yet fortune favored us once more. In Russia the Revolution which had long been ripening broke out and the throne of the Tsars was swept away in the twinkling of an eye. It very soon corrupted the spirit of the Army, which was no longer willing to shed its blood for a cause which was foreign to it. Gradually the troops disbanded and went home in order

to secure land and peace. The repulse of a new offensive under Brusiloff, some fortunate German enterprises in Galicia, against Riga and against the islands in the Baltic, brought the Bolsheviks to the helm on November 7th. They immediately gave evidence of their desire for peace at any price. After many vicissitudes the peace treaty with Russia was signed on March 2, 1918. This treaty brought us great but insecure gains.

"In other ways the year 1917 was not unfavorable to us. After we had withdrawn a part of our West front to the Siegfried position we victoriously defeated all the attacks of our numerically far superior enemies, and the French especially sustained fearful losses on the Aisne to no purpose. In the midst of all this fighting we were sufficiently strong on October 24th to proceed with our allies to a second attack on Italy, which led in a few days to an almost complete collapse of the enemy's army, which had to be hastily reinforced by French and English troops. This brilliant stroke did not suffice, however, to force our enemies to negotiate for peace."

AMERICA TIPS THE BALANCE

Then came the spring of 1918, Germany's great offensive on the Western front, and the tardy realization of American strength:

"In the spring of 1918, we felt strong enough for a third attempt in the West, for which, however, the whole strength of the German Army was not available. Considerable sections were tied down in the East, in the Balkans, and in

Asia, and were unable to cooperate in the decisive theater of war. We won many victories in the spring battles, but could not break the strength of the enemy, whose numbers were so superior. At last, on the Marne, our offensive came finally to an end for the second time. From that time things took a downward course.

"More than one and a half million Americans were now assembled on the soil of France; in Turkey and in Bulgaria the longing for peace was increasing; in Austria-Hungary racial strife loosened the bonds of the State more and more, while the fearful casualties of the Germans and Hungarians crippled the strength of their armies. Our enemies also were able to utilize their superiority in Asia and in the Balkans for annihilating blows; one after another our allies collapsed and betrayed us. Germany had to face a world of mighty enemies single-handed.

"When Foch advanced with his very superior numbers, his thousands of tanks and his innumerable bombing squadrons in a surprise offensive, he placed the German Western army in a most unfavorable position. It is true that he was not able to break through, for the lion-like courage of our army warded off defeat; but step by step we had to yield to the superior enemy, and in the end the High Command lost confidence in a happy issue of the war.

"We still remained far superior to any individual enemy nation, but *en masse* they crushed us. In this way also our heavily afflicted people lost confidence and the will to continue the fight. The third and heaviest crisis of the war, provoked by the appearance of the American armies in Europe, overpowered us. The end had come!"

DID THE TANK WIN THE WAR?

The Wonderful Contrivance Which, by Affording Protection to Infantry, Nullified German Superiority in Machine Guns

By Major-General E. D. Swinton, C. B., D. S. O.

THE Chief Army Command have been compelled to make a terribly grave decision and declare that according to human possibilities, there is no longer any prospect of forcing peace on the enemy.

"Above all, two facts have been decisive for this issue. First, the tanks . . ."

According to the German General Staff ver-

sion of the events which led up to the armistice, as published in pamphlet form by Colonel Bauer, Chief of the Artillery Department, this statement headed the report on the situation submitted by the representatives of German Military Headquarters to the leaders of the Reichstag parties on October 2, 1918 (*Daily Telegraph*, June 21, 1919).

The *London Times* correspondents with the Russian Generals, Diterichs and Denikin, writing on June 17 and June 25, 1919, respectively, gave expressions of opinion from another and more recent theater of war: "The Bolshevik *moral* has been completely broken by the appearance of the British tanks, of Russian soldiers in British uniform and by the stimulating effects of General Denikin's liberal proclamations." "It is a thousand pities we have not some light tanks and armored cars. 'Whippets' could easily capture a vil-



Major-General Swinton, "Father" of the Tank

lage, and armored cars hold it against all comers. Tanks have rendered invaluable service to General Denikin. No effort should be spared to send out tanks immediately to this front."

An article in the *Orient News* of Constantinople of July 11, 1919, stated that the cry of the Russian Volunteer Army under General Denikin was "Tanks and more tanks."

Of the many previous tributes from enemy—and therefore not specially favorable—sources, it is sufficient to recall the statement of General von Wrisberg, speaking for the Minister of War, in the German Reichstag, that the reasons for the British success on Au-

gust 8, 1918, was in the massed employment of tanks, and the article by *Fabius* in the *Neue Freie Presse* of September 15, 1918, in which the critic gives his deliberate opinion that the best way of breaking through a modern defensive line is by tanks.

Space does not permit of more quotations, though such unsolicited testimony on the part of those who have had the best of reasons to be able to pronounce an authoritative judgment on this latest weapon is not out of place in face of the prejudice against it and the lack of true appreciation of its value on the part of some of those who had its services at their disposal. In some quarters it is not even now realized how much the tanks have done, nor what they might have achieved had full advantage been taken of their potentialities and due regard paid to their natural and obvious limitations.

There is still room for a word—though by no means a final word—about these machines.

THE ORIGINAL IDEA


In July, 1914—before the war—a British engineer engaged in endeavoring to discover a solution of the everlasting problem of providing economical and efficient transport for mines located in roadless and railless country visited Antwerp. There he witnessed the trial across country of an agricultural tractor propelled on the caterpillar system. He was so much impressed with its climbing performances that he straightway informed the writer of its existence, in case its remarkable powers might be of service to the Government in coping with the difficulties of transportation in various parts of the British Empire. The machine referred to was the Holt tractor made in Peoria, Ill., and Stockton, Cal., in the United States. This information was passed on purely in reference to transportation, and not with a view to the creation of an engine of war. War was not then contemplated—except by the Central Powers. Nevertheless, the knowledge of the existence of this agricultural machine and what it accomplished at Antwerp in July, 1914, was the germ which when fertilized resulted in the birth of the thing with the homely monosyllabic name now known all over the world.

MACHINE GUNS VERSUS TANKS

War broke out. As the whole world knows, the British nation was unprepared. And possibly in no particular of armament or material equipment, not excluding guns or shells, was the British Army at a greater disadvantage as compared with its first and chief opponent than in the matter of machine guns. The machine gun had proved its power in the Russo-Japanese war; but neither had its value been appreciated nor its use fully developed by the British. Not so with the Germans. So much faith, indeed, had they in the fire power and man-stopping capabilities of Hiram Maxim's invention that by August, 1914, they had manufactured thousands of machine guns in preparation for "The Day." And with their usual cunning, knowing that they had a good thing and not wishing to give a lead to their future enemies, they concealed this fact as carefully as they did the existence of their 42-centimeter howitzers and poison gas. Moreover, they not only provided themselves with a great reserve of machine guns. They took good care that the very perfect instrument upon which they rightly set such store should be handled by experts and not wasted. They also elaborated the tactics of the employment of this weapon into a fine art. In her Machine-gun units Germany possessed at first a unique, and right up to the end of the war a most efficient and powerful arm, which rendered inestimable service to her own cause and possibly inflicted more loss on her enemies than any other.

This is not an essay on the value or use of the machine gun. But cause should precede effect, and the German machine gun was the direct cause of the appearance of the tank. Experience of its terrible efficacy was the fertilization of the germ—the knowledge of the existence of the Holt tractor and an appreciation of the possibilities for fighting purposes inherent in that type of machine. Looked at in another way it was a case of disease and cure. The first symptoms of the disease were felt in the retreat to the Marne, when the Germans made a very bold and extensive use of their machine guns, sending them forward with their advanced troops, often rushed right to the front in motors. The experiences

gained during the period when the Germans were fighting on the defensive on the Aisne led in the minds of some to a diagnosis of its nature. By the time a few attempts had been made to force a way through the enemy's line in Northern France and Flanders towards the end of 1914, it was clear to anyone who could ascertain facts and was possessed of reasoning powers that the scourge of the British Army, the pestilence which was taking such awful toll of its infantry whenever they made their heroic but futile attempts to move forward, was the same machine guns. It



© International Film.

A French Tank

One of the St. Chamond type, armed with a 3-inch cannon and several machine-guns.


was equally obvious that some cure had to be found.

One palliative, but not a cure, would have been the liberal employment of artillery, by which means the machine-gun nests of the enemy could to some extent have been destroyed and a way blasted through his defenses by high explosives. The British Army had neither the guns nor the gun ammunition, and most of the latter was shrapnel.

CONDITIONS OF TRENCH WARFARE

Meanwhile, as the Germans "barnacled and festered" on the line to the sea selected by them for the winter of 1914-15, the edge or crust of the territory they held solidified and hardened. Always industrious, they burrowed and constructed cunningly devised and elaborate defenses. They also had time to

install the one thing complementary to the machine gun, the one thing essential to the development of its full power, the one thing necessary to form the combination which constitutes the strongest known form of defense against infantry, and where it exists renders cavalry employed as such a suicidal anachronism. This was wire. Barbed wire entangle-



Courtesy of Scientific American.

One of the First Tanks to be Built

ments began to grow up, first in strips, then in belts, then in groves. Against troops ensconced in deep trenches, with innumerable skilfully placed and bravely fought machine guns firing from concealed emplacements through and along this obstacle, even a prolonged bombardment with shrapnel shell from hundreds of field guns is ineffective. The expenditure of the few rounds which were available to the British was literally futile for the purpose of shaking the enemy or damaging his defenses sufficiently to give our assaulting infantry a reasonable chance.

One thing was certain, or should have been certain, by October, 1914, that since we had so little artillery and no ammunition of the type necessary, some other method of counter-acting the German machine guns had to be evolved if the whole of our incomparable infantry were not to be squandered in fruitless attacks, unprepared by artillery.

EVOLUTION FROM A TRACTOR

So impressed was the writer with this that, having knowledge, as has been mentioned, of the capability of the Holt tractor in the way of cross-country travel, he conceived the idea of

developing or of evolving some engine working on the same system—of caterpillar propulsion—for the express purpose of climbing over trenches and forcing a way through barbed wire. This machine would be motor driven and encased in bullet-proof plate, so as to be itself impervious to rifle or machine-gun fire, and would carry guns firing explosive shell sufficiently powerful to destroy machine guns. It was, in short, to be a destroyer of the latter, capable of searching out its prey through wire and across trenches and then knocking them out by shell fire or crushing them flat, and so disposing of the thing that was devouring the British Infantry. Its *raison d'être* was, first, last, and all the time, to help the unfortunate infantry soldier in the unequal and hopeless fight in which he was engaged. By the writer the first proposal to experiment in this direction was put forward in October, 1914.

The idea of providing mobile protection for advancing infantry was not new. As has frequently been pointed out, there have been equivalents in ancient and medieval warfare. A classic example so often referred to is the suggestion put forward by Leonardo da Vinci, who wrote on the subject in 1482. Moreover, in England a suggestion for a somewhat similar machine, based on the Hornsby-Ack-



A Camouflaged Tank

royd caterpillar tractor, had been made in 1908 by a military officer. This, a farsighted attempt to meet betimes a probable future want, and not a belated effort to cope with some evil which had already made itself felt, was not proceeded with. In 1903 Mr. H. G. Wells wrote a story which was a marvelous prediction of the employment of tanks. The

conception beforehand that such a machine might ever be required called for high powers of imagination in the direction of the *tendencies* in the development of warfare. From anyone who knew what was happening at the front during the first year of the war the appreciation of what was needed did not demand the same powers. It was not a case of anticipation. There are indeed more than one who claim to have thought of or suggested the idea of a climbing armored motor towards the end of 1914 or the beginning of 1915.

THE MOTHER TANK

During the year 1915 the problem of constructing "landships" or "land-cruisers," as they were called until the word "tank" was in December of that year deliberately applied for purposes of secrecy, was seriously taken up in England. Some of those concerned favored the construction of a machine with very large wheels. Others pinned their faith to the employment of coupled steam road rollers. Trials were also made with certain existing tractors propelled on the caterpillar principle. Amongst the machines of the latter type experimented with as they stood, or of which certain parts were tried separately, some were of American manufacture. Neither the entire machines nor the separate parts of them, however, were found to be suitable for the purpose required, and all idea of making use of them was dropped. The final machine evolved—"Mother"—the prototype of all the British tanks, which was officially tested in February, 1916, was, save for its source of inspiration and the adoption of the known system of caterpillar propulsion, the product of the brains of British engineers, both in regard to the general design and mechanical details. With the exception of certain small fittings, also, the machines were made entirely by British workmen, of British material, in the British Isles.

In regard to production, partly owing to the secrecy then necessarily surrounding the whole subject, the nature of the task achieved by the promoters, the designers, and the manufacturers and workmen engaged in making the first instalment of tanks, has never received due credit. After the military authorities had seen "Mother" perform and come to the conclusion

such machines might be of service, it was decided that some should be made. In February, 1916, the order was placed for 100, shortly after being increased to 150. The execution of this order entailed the layout, the making of special tools for the construction of a machine of hitherto unknown type, the manufacture of special armor-plate, guns, gun ammunition, engines and gearing, the adaptation of certain machine guns, and the manufacture of various minor fittings, most of which were the subject of searching experimental work. By September, or just over six months later, a number of tanks were in action. The manufacture of a new and complicated machine, of which neither the type was sufficiently established nor the demand sufficiently large to enable output to be properly standardized, at a time when British factories were congested with other war work, was a *tour de force*. Moreover, the necessity for maintaining secrecy as to what was going on complicated efforts and handicapped progress. And the way that the secret was in fact kept by the thousands of men concerned is not the least remarkable feature of the whole business of the first production of this new weapon, which was a triumph of British patriotism, industry and organization.


During 1916 the French were also busy inaugurating a similar weapon. It was known in England during that year that our Allies were constructing armored climbing motors, the idea for which, according to M. Abel Ferry, writing in the *Petit Parisien* of August 22, 1918, was initiated in the summer of 1915. The lines upon which the French machines were developed were somewhat different from those adopted on the English side of the Channel.

FIRST TRIALS AT FRONT

To turn to the operations of the British tanks, it is only possible to touch upon the high spots of their achievements. There is no doubt that their employment in September, 1916, in small numbers was a mistake, a mistake comparable to that made by the Germans on April 22, 1915, when they launched gas on a very limited front and so gave away prematurely the invaluable effect

of surprise of a new form of attack, instead of exploiting it in a great effort to obtain a really decisive result. The inauguration was really in the nature of an experiment, since the new machines were not only untried in the field, but were the very first of their species, and were bound, under the acid test of actual service, to develop defects such as are inevitable in the infancy of every new invention. Their crews, also, had been trained in great haste, and were not fully practiced,

held up by their usual and hitherto unconquered enemies—machine guns and barbed wire. This event, it will be remembered, was signaled back to Headquarters: "A tank is walking up the High Street of Flers, with the British Army cheering behind." This little message will not only be historic because it marked an epoch in tactics, but is remarkable because it accentuated a very important point—the moral effect produced on the infantry soldier by the first appearance of his steel-clad



© Underwood and Underwood.

King Albert of Belgium Inspecting a British Tank

while the tactics evolved for their operation, though carefully thought out and many months later justified, had not been established by experience. Moreover, the "crumpled," otherwise crater-pitted, ground over which they had to advance was almost impassable, even for them. And yet the results of this first essay were considered so satisfactory as to justify a continuation of the employment of the new arm, its expansion and the expediting of every effort to remedy the defects that had been brought to light.

On September 15, 1916, the most dramatic episode was the capture of the village of Flers by tank at the time when our infantry had been

brother. So far the immense psychological influence of the tanks upon the troops against whom they were employed and upon infantry of the side using them has not gained the attention it deserves. On this day also, two other tanks performed feats worthy of record. One got astride a German trench and enfiladed it with its fire, so causing the surrender of 300 Germans, while the other silenced a hostile battery single-handed. Ten days later, during the same battle of the Somme, at the attack on the Gird trench, when our infantry were again held up on a front of nearly a mile owing to the same cause, one tank came up and waddled along the barbed wire, destroying it, and so

enabling our riflemen and bombers to follow. The trench was captured, many Germans were killed by fire from the tank, and eight German officers and 362 other ranks, who had "bunched" away from it, surrendered. The casualties on our side amounted to five. During the battle of the Ancre, in the following November, 400 Germans surrendered to two

unfavorable, being absolutely honeycombed with craters, they again proved their value.

The third battle of Ypres, which commenced on July 31, 1917, and lasted for many weeks, was fought under weather conditions and over ground absolutely impossible for the new arm, which, indeed, had no chance of showing what it could perform. Yet, amongst



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An Artist's Impression of a Tank in Action

The tank marked a new era in land warfare, giving the protection of a power-driven machine armed with guns to infantry advancing in face of the murderous fire of enemy machine guns. It also smashed barbed-wire entanglements.

machines which at the time were actually ditched and incapable of movement.

At the battle of Arras in April, 1917, the machines again operated, on ground which snow and heavy rain had rendered extremely unfavorable for their action. They assisted the infantry in many cases in ways similar to those described, and their performances were such as to earn the congratulations of the Commander-in-Chief. Later, at the battle of Messines, though the ground over which they had to maneuver was again particularly

many failures, most of which were due to the mud, there were some instances of highly successful action. On one occasion one male tank, which had knocked out a German machine-gun emplacement and by its fire enabled our infantry to seize a farm bristling with machine guns, became ditched and was left isolated by the subsequent enforced retirement of our infantry. So soon as they had withdrawn it was surrounded by the enemy and attacked with machine-gun fire and bombs. For 68 hours the crew re-

sisted all the efforts of the Germans, and only on the third night, upon the approach of our own infantry, evacuated their machine. This incident is not given as an illustration of tank tactics, but as an example of the gallantry and devotion which have been consistently shown by the members of the Tank Corps.

TRIUMPH AT BATTLE OF CAMBRAI

So far, on every occasion, including their *début* in the previous year, the new machines had been thrown into the fight under conditions adverse to them. It was not until the battle of Cambrai, November 20, 1917, that they were used on a favorable terrain. This was also the first time that the new arm was employed in the manner intended by those who conceived and created it, and according to the plan evolved 21 months previously. As is well known the battle opened by a surprise, brought about by the sudden launching of a mass of tanks without the usual preliminary and tell-tale artillery bombardment. The preparation for this, entailing as it did the careful coöperation of all arms, the accurate movement and secret concentration of large numbers of these slow-moving and bulky machines, was a piece of good organization, followed by thorough and determined action which produced astonishing results. Our troops assisted by tanks broke through the boasted Hindenburg line, made an advance of four miles depth on a front of over six miles, and captured in one day 8,000 prisoners and 100 guns. One striking and very important point of this advance was the small cost of life with which it was executed; infinitesimal, indeed, in comparison with the casualties incurred by us in previous offensive actions of a similar scale, which had not even resulted in success. As a minor but important point it may be mentioned that all the gun ammunition usually expended in artillery preparation was saved. Later, in defense against the German counter-attack on November 30th and subsequent days, the tanks assisted to stem the onrush of the triumphant German infantry, not the least feature of their intervention being the encouragement it gave to our own men.

After this, during the winter, there was a

lull in the fighting generally, and it was not until the great effort of the Germans to break through between the British and French, which started in March, 1918, that the tanks again played a part. From the 21st of that month onwards they were thrown into the fight at many points to coöperate in fighting rear-guard actions, in counter-attacking and recapturing lost villages and strong points, and generally to assist to delay, if not to stop, the advancing avalanche of the enemy. In this rôle they proved as useful as they had been on November 30, 1917. The moral effect of their appearance upon the German infantry was again most marked. On the 26th the new smaller machines, known familiarly as "Whippets," first took the field, with the success which was expected from their special qualities, *i. e.*, speed and handiness. An amusing incident was that many of the German infantry took them for their own tanks, of whose existence they had heard but which they had not seen, and cheered our machines as they advanced round the village of Colincamps.

SUCCESS OF THE WHIPPETS

There again ensued a short lull in tank activity till April 24th, during the second phase of the great enemy offensive, when the momentum of the attack had spent itself and the Germans had reached the high-water mark of their advance to the east of Amiens. On this day the Whippets distinguished themselves in an isolated action which deserves special mention. Seven of these machines, sallying forth from the village of Cachy, bound on an operation of their own, arrived at a ridge, not four miles from their starting point, and found it strongly held by the enemy, with many light machine-gun groups ensconced in shell-holes. Darting from one crater to another, they engaged the machine-gun nests successfully and then proceeded over the brow of the hill, where they discovered three battalions of German infantry in the open, apparently forming up to attack. Without hesitation they at once charged this body, shooting right and left at close range, into the huddled mass of men, and by their unexpected onslaught caused panic amongst the surprised Huns. Some fought where they stood and were run down. Others,



Painting by N. C. Wyeth

An English Tank in the Streets of Jerusalem





throwing away their arms and attempting to bolt, were shot or were chased and run down. Others surrendered. It was the Whippets' day out, and they literally ran amuck. After having thus broken up the enemy's formation, spoiled their contemplated attack, and inflicted not less than 400 casualties, the little pack of Whippets returned to their starting point, having themselves suffered a loss of one machine and five officers and men killed and wounded.

The next action of importance in which tanks coöperated was on July 4th, when they contributed greatly to the highly successful surprise attack carried out by the Australians and Americans at Hamel. They were specially useful in nosing out and squashing the numerous machine-gun nests hidden in the standing crops, which would otherwise have caused us terrible loss. The invaluable assistance given by them on this occasion attracted great attention to their value when correctly employed. On the 18th the French launched the magnificent counter-offensive which formed the turning point of the war. It was assisted by both French *chars d'assaut* and British tanks, and to the action of these machines many of the German authorities attribute their defeat. Five days later the tanks of the two nations coöperated near Montdidier. The prisoners captured in this fight attributed the failure of their side to the same cause.

BATTLES OF AMIENS AND CAMBRAI

On August 8th it was the turn of the British to bring off an offensive on a large scale. This battle of Amiens started on this morning with a surprise attack carried out by tanks. It lasted for three days, and the Germans lost thousands of men captured, and hundreds of guns. But its most important effect lay in the blow it gave to the confidence of the enemy, who after this defeat lost hope of winning the war by force of arms. During the battles of Bapaume and the second battle of Arras, which were fought in the devastated area from August 21st to September 2nd, tanks were employed with great effect. The Germans during this period again lost thousands of prisoners and hundreds of guns, and

their strong Drocourt-Queant line was broken. In the fighting round Epehy, which continued from the 18th to the 24th of September, with further great loss to the enemy, tanks coöperated.

They again played a leading part in that great and decisive attack against the famous Hindenburg line, the second battle of Cambrai, which was launched on September 27th and continued till October 10th. The British offensive resulted in the capture of a very large number of prisoners and guns, but again far more important than material gain to



In Foch's Counter Offensive

The French "baby tanks," known as "*chars d'Assauts*," entering the woods of Villers-Cotteret, southwest of Soissons.

the Allies was the moral shock delivered to the enemy. By their striking and sudden success the panic was engendered at German Headquarters, which ended finally in the proposals for an armistice. From that time till the signing of the armistice on November 11th, tanks assisted in the pressure applied to the enemy in open warfare which took place after the breaking of the German defensive system, the chief fighting being at Selle and Maubeuge.

It was a strange coincidence that during the second battle of Cambrai some of the "Elders" of the tank family found themselves where they had battled ten months before near Bourlon Wood. September 29th was the first oc-

casion on which British tanks were manned in action by Americans—members of the "Treat 'em Rough" Corps. A striking example of the brute force action of the machines was given at the attack at Hamel on Independence Day, 1918, already referred to. After the fight, in one stretch of the German position, 26 machine guns were dug up out of the ground into which they had been crushed. And in this connection it must be admitted that the German machine gunners as a rule fought with the greatest bravery. On numerous occasions they stuck to their guns to the

real entry of the tank into battle was in July, 1918, and that the true conquerors in the fighting around Amiens and Montdidier were the French and British machines. According to him the increasing demand of the soldier in the front line for tanks and more tanks is logical; and the Queen of Battles is now the mechanic, and no longer the infantry. He points out finally that the Germans have always been great believers in the employment of mechanical means of fighting, but that in this war they have, as regards such means, been wrong three times out of four. They



A Tank Approaching the Gates of Gaza

very last moment and were crushed alongside their weapons.

THE FRENCH TANKS

Of the action of the French tanks, it is not within the province of the writer to say much. They had their vicissitudes, as had ours. According to the article by M. Abel Ferry already quoted, the new arm was mishandled at the great French offensive on the Aisne on April 16, 1917, when any chance of a surprise was prevented by a nine days' preparatory bombardment. And the resultant discredit of the machines led to great delay in their development. He is of opinion that the

were correct in believing in poison gas. They were wrong in believing in the Zeppelin and the submarine. They were also wrong in disbelieving in the tank.

WHY THE GERMANS DID NOT IMMEDIATELY ADOPT TANKS

And how is it that the Germans did not do more to install for their own use this machine which for two years took part in operations so much to their loss and detriment? Partly owing to the state of their own industrial resources and partly to the changes in their estimate of the value of this weapon as exhibited by our employment of it, there was

no continuity in their policy, so far as we know. Startled and impressed by the results attained by the British tanks at their first appearance at the battle of the Somme, they during that winter initiated certain experiments in the construction of similar machines, but did not prosecute the enterprise with energy. The offensive operations, in which tanks coöperated during the first half of 1917, were not, so far as these machines were concerned, of a nature to show their real value or to cause any alarm to the Germans. The German General Staff did not realize that their lack of success on a large scale was not due to any inherent fault, but was attributable to the breakdown of imperfect mechanisms wrongly used under almost impossible conditions. Our tank operations during the summer of 1917 probably discounted the original impression produced by the machines, misled the enemy as to their potentialities, possibly caused him to doubt whether we should continue to have recourse to them, and generally confirmed him in a false security in regard to them. It was this that enabled us in November, at Cambrai, to bring off a second successful surprise attack with a weapon the existence of which had been known for over a year. The subsequent failure of this offensive had nothing to do with the tanks, which carried out their task with a completeness and celerity which apparently surprised the side using them as much as it did the enemy. This second lesson was not lost upon the Germans, and they set to work again in haste to equip themselves with *Panzer Kraftwagen*, and also to elaborate their counter-measures to meet future attacks of this nature.

As to their actual employment of tanks, they intended to make use of a few captured British machines in their great assault on March 21, 1918, but for some reason did not do so. About a month later, however, some of their own manufacture were ready, and in their attack near Villers Bretonneux to the east of Amiens, they used six. They were all of the so-called "male" type, and each carried a .75 gun. And on this day there occurred the first battle of tank *versus* tank—a historic event, possibly the precursor of what will be a normal occurrence in the future warfare of monsters. One of their machines

encountered and knocked out two British "females" by shell. It then came up against a British "male" and was itself put out of business by gunfire—which encounter is typical of the struggle for life between animals since primeval times.* Details of these machines have already been published. An insight into the opinion of the Tank Service held by the enemy is given by the fact that every member of a German tank crew is awarded the Iron Cross. The Germans in 1918 not infrequently made use of captured British machines. One of their attempts to do this, in a counter-attack on October 8th on the Cambrai-St. Quentin battle front, had a curious sequel, for the British tanks manned by Germans were put out of action or dispersed by German anti-tank rifles fired by the British. These rifles were one of the measures introduced by the enemy to meet the tank attacks.

IN FUTURE WARFARE

Now we come to the most pertinent and possibly the most interesting part of what there is to be said about the new arm, though it can only be touched on. Sufficient experience has been gained to enable some analysis to be made of its action from an economic or business side. By "business" side is not meant the narrow financial aspect only, but the common-sense point of view, from which the conduct of the war is regarded as a business proposition in the broadest sense of the word.

As regards economy in fighting man-power, a comparison of tanks with ordinary artillery in terms of the amount of fire-power given by either arm for the same number of personnel shows that they provide the fire-power of four light guns and seven machine guns for the same number of men as are required to keep in the field one field gun or 60-pounder gun. Again, when the tanks are employed in a surprise attack to replace the usual artillery preparatory bombardment, the work formerly done by the guns is replaced as efficiently, if not more so, by the action of the tanks with about 4 per cent. of the number of men. An approximate comparison between the num-

* A male tank is a machine-gun destroyer and carries guns.

A female tank is a man killer and carries machine guns only.

ber of men necessary in an offensive executed by infantry and tanks, and by infantry alone, is that in the former case the same fire-power can be furnished with about one-third the number.

Perhaps the most important feature connected with tanks is the saving of life effected by them. Experience has shown that by their intervention the rate of loss of attacking troops

is launched—are obviated. In this connection it may be mentioned that in one such prepared offensive our casualties due to this cause incurred before our infantry advanced amounted to several thousand. To assess the increase in losses caused to the enemy by the tanks is almost impossible, but an idea may be gained from the few examples given of hundreds of Germans surrendering to one



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A Trench Guarded by a Barbed-Wire Gate

The barbed-wire gate was found to be an effective slower-up to an assaulting party when they tried to rush a trench.

is about halved. This, of course, is mostly due to the mastery obtained over the machine guns and barbed wire. When it is remembered that this reduced rate is applicable to a total force of only about one-third of that which, without tanks, would have had to be thrown into action to give equal fire-power, the net economy in man-power due to diminished casualties is striking. Further, when a tank offensive is carried out without preliminary artillery preparation, the losses caused by the enemy counter-battery work—in reply to the preparation before the actual assault

or two machines, and from the total of prisoners and guns gained in the later operations. Finally the moral effect on our own and the German soldiers was tremendous.

At the Cabinet meeting of the 17th Oct., 1918, General Ludendorff expressed the hope that the German infantry would get over their Tank Terror [*Tankschrecken*].*

ECONOMY OF MATERIAL

The employment of tanks results in economy of material in various directions. To specify

* "*Vorgeschichte des Waffenstrands*," Berlin, 1919.

only a few: Wherever the artillery preparation is replaced by a modern tank advance, thousands of tons of shells that would have been fired are not expended. This implies a saving in money, a corresponding saving in the labor necessary to make that ammunition, the transport of the raw material of which it is composed, the tonnage to convey it overseas when made, the transport to carry it up to the guns, and the wear and tear of guns and on roads, etc. In regard to the saving of labor in manufacture, the difference between the man-hours required to make the gun ammunition fired away in the preparatory bombardment for a previous battle, and the man-hours expended in constructing the tanks which were lost at the battle of Cambrai, in November, 1917, has been estimated to amount to many millions, and the difference in cash value to some millions of pounds sterling. In another direction, that of maintenance, the cost of the continuous supply of fodder for horses (for mounted troops or horse transport) is enormously greater than the intermittent supply of petrol (gasoline), etc., to an equivalent number of tanks. One more factor is that of time. The saving of time between that required to attain a break-through accompanied by success on a large scale—such as that at Cambai in 1917—and that required for the long-drawn actions, with days of preliminary artillery preparation, needs only to be mentioned to be recognized. In ordinary life it is said that

“Time is money.” In war, time is more. It may mean something which money cannot buy—Victory. A tank costs so much, but only takes a few weeks to produce; to breed good draught horses requires at least six years; to breed fighting men needs nineteen.

THE WAR OF MACHINES

It is a platitude, though even now—as has been said—neither generally understood nor acknowledged, to state that the introduction of the tank marked the commencement of a new era in land warfare—that of fighting with power-driven machines and steel instead of with naked human bodies—the threshold of which we have now crossed. Its object and the chief benefit so far derived from its use has been the power of meeting and establishing movement in the face of that terrible and murderous combination, the machine gun and barbed wire. In its present form this arm is still in its infancy, as is the whole question of the adaptation of the principle of caterpillar transport and traction to warfare, and it is capable of much improvement and great development. It is, however, endowed with qualities which, though not always sympathetically or fully exploited, have enabled it to fulfill the object of its creators of defeating the weapon in which the German correctly placed so much trust, and upon which, as the best man-stopper in the world, they relied to hold back the tide of advance of the Allies.


OPEN WARFARE FROM 1914 TO 1918

Some of the Outstanding Characteristics of Open Warfare When the Germans Were Triumphant in 1914 and When They Retreated in the Fall of 1918

TRENCH warfare may really be called modern warfare, for it brings into use all manner of more or less new devices never used in previous wars. Open warfare is not very different today from what it was several decades ago; in fact, the early battles of the World War might as well have been battles

of the Civil War, in so far as methods of fighting are concerned; infantry, cavalry, and light artillery were employed in the approved manner. The Germans were so preponderant at first that the Belgians, British and French could do little but retire, fighting desperate rear-guard actions in order to keep

the enemy advance guards from becoming too intimate. One of the great surprises was in the form of Germany's preparedness; none of the Allies realized the tremendous war machine which Germany had been preparing during the years of peace until that machine got into action in August, 1914. Another surprise was the mobile artillery of tremendous hitting power. This enabled Germany to make short work of the most powerful fortresses in existence at the time—Liège, Namur, and Antwerp—fortresses which the Al-



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A Belgian Scouting Party in Flanders
Wearing their new protectively colored uniforms.

lies had banked on in stopping the German onrush.

ADVANTAGES OF THE GERMANS

Every advantage was with the Germans in those fateful days. To begin with, the Germans had made in secret all the necessary uniforms in field gray for their front-line troops. On the other hand, the Belgians and French were fitted out in ridiculous uniforms of brilliant hues. The blue coats and red trousers of the French and a similar getup of the Belgians made perfect targets for the German riflemen and artillerists. Indeed, the valiant French and Belgians more than once were dismayed at this handicap. Only the British, with their khaki uniforms, were properly dressed on the Western front. The Russians, on the Eastern front, wore gray uniforms for the most part which served effectively against the Germans.

Now the French long before the war had gone into this matter of protective coloration. Years ago they had conducted numerous experiments with various colored fabrics with a view to adopting a suitable military cloth. The khaki of the Americans and British was seriously considered, but on the colorful fields of France it did not prove as satisfactory as a peculiar grayish blue known as "horizon" blue. Again, the pre-war French uniform with its baggy trousers and awkward coat was recognized as being out of date, and the French had their leading military men and tailors confer about an improved and up-to-date uniform. So when Germany threw herself at the very heart of France, the great Republic had her plans very well formulated but had not had the time to put them into execution. Hence the French *poilus* had to fight in the ridiculous uniforms; still, that did not prevent them from defeating the Germans with all their superior uniforms and equipment and numbers at the battle of the Marne.

In desperation, most of the French infantrymen deliberately soiled their scarlet trousers in order to darken them. Whenever possible these trousers were dyed with whatever materials were at hand. The story goes that Joffre even sent an order to the United States for several hundred thousand pairs of overalls, which were used by the *poilus* over their scarlet trousers.

By May, 1915, or when the war was ten months old, the French troops up front were beginning to appear in their new, snappy horizon-blue uniforms. All the equipment was materially altered where it could be improved upon. The heavy knapsack was replaced by another knapsack found more suitable for the requirements of trench warfare. The kepi or cap was replaced by a steel helmet while in the danger zone, and a cap of the general design of our doughboy's overseas cap when in the rear areas. The heavy boots were changed for heavy trench shoes and spiral leggings. One of the few things carried over from the old uniform was the cut of the overcoat, with its button back flaps, and for a very good reason. While on ordinary duty, such as sentry work, the soldier wants a long coat to keep him warm; but when running forward to the attack the soldier does not want to be hampered. Thus in

the case of our own men the majority of them found their long overcoats to be a serious obstacle in actual fighting, and went to work with knives or bayonets cutting a foot or so off the bottom. The French, on the other hand, merely arranged their long coats so that they could be pinned back to leave the legs free when necessary.

From the most ridiculous uniform of all the French private's uniform became one of the best. In fact, a leading American Army officer remarked in the course of a talk on the equipment of the various armies, that the *poilu's* uniform and equipment was the most sensible of any, while the British officer's uniform was the best.

THE FAMOUS "SEVENTY-FIVE"


Just so long as armies fought in the open, the most efficient artillery was the field type. Here again Germany had the advantage of numbers; but, fortunately, France had the advantage of excellence. The French 75-millimeter field piece, referred to as the "seventy-five" by the French, soon proved to be a far better gun than the German 77-millimeter field piece. The French 75-millimeter gun has a firing speed of 15 to 18 shots a minute when handled by a well-trained crew, whereas most other field guns except the improved United States Army type are limited to 12 shots a minute. In fact, it was due to the high firing rate and deadly precision of the French field guns that the Germans did not come nearer to winning than they did in the first six weeks of the war. At the battle of Nancy the Germans were led to believe that the French were defending the town in great numbers, because of the torrent of shells fired by the well-handled French seventy-fives.

GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN FAITH IN BIG GUNS

While the British and French placed their greatest reliance on huge fortresses and highly mobile troops accompanied by light artillery in fair quantity, the Germans and Austrians placed most of their faith in large guns even up to 11-inch caliber, so designed and constructed as to be transportable in the field. These huge guns served to good effect in reducing Liège, Namur, Maubeuge, and Ant-

werp in quick order, as well as several fortresses on the Eastern front. But when it came to using these guns against troops in the field, they were of little consequence. Indeed, by impeding their movements because they must take these heavy and slow-moving guns along with them, it is believed that the Germans lost the first phase of the war which ended with their rout and retreat from the banks of the Marne.

At any rate, the British and French and Russians had figured on the open warfare or war of movement, and accordingly had equipped their forces with the requisite amount of field artillery and a very small amount of



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Captured Austrian Guns

Artillery pieces, captured by the Italians, in their Gorizia drive.

heavier artillery, as well as putting up the necessary amount of munitionment for a protracted campaign.

The field gun using shrapnel is preëminently the most murderous weapon in open warfare. Field guns shoot at a high rate of speed, and deliver a perfect storm of shrapnel bullets with deadly precision on troops in the open. Larger guns, on the other hand, are only effective in open warfare if they fire shrapnel. The shrapnel shell, as may be learned from reading another section of this volume, is a steel case filled with bullets, and itself on explosion designed to burst into a large number of fragments. These bullets and fragments, upon the expiration of the time which is controlled by the fuse setting, or upon concussion, are discharged over a wide area known as the cone of dispersion. Shrapnel kills and

maims troops over a large area, hence the marksmanship does not have to be as exact as when using shell which must strike the actual object to inflict harm.

The high-explosive shell, on the other hand, is a steel case filled with a highly-explosive compound which is set off by a contact fuse or detonator. In other words, the shell has to strike to explode, and then the force of the explosion, while considerable, is a very powerful local effect. Against troops in the open the high-explosive shell does not begin to compare with the shrapnel, although it has a certain psychological effect because of its terrific noise as well as the huge craters which it makes in the field of battle.

Now when it comes to trench warfare, where troops are installed in deep and covered trenches, shrapnel has little effect except when the opposing troops come out for an attack. In this kind of warfare high-explosive shell must be used to shatter earthworks and reach the occupants. It was the lack of high-explosive shell which placed the British and French at a handicap at the opening of the war.

Thus, while the Germans and Austrians were decidedly handicapped when it came to the open warfare of the early days, in so far as artillery was concerned, their blunder turned out to be a tremendous advantage when both sides settled into trenches. Overnight, as it were, the Germans and Austrians found themselves in possession of large stocks of big guns and high-explosive shell, while the Allied forces had little more than field guns up to six-inch bore, and very small supplies of high-explosive shell. The Central Empires also had the necessary materials and plants at hand for the production of large guns and their munitionment, while the Allies, with the exception of France, had practically nothing. France, having several fortresses to keep supplied with guns and shell, had built up her arsenals for just such work, and it was for this reason that France was able to make big guns for herself and Russia in fairly short order. Still, it was not before the summer of 1916 that the British and French on the Western Front were able to dispute Germany's absolute preponderance of heavy guns and high-explosive shell, which had been giving Germany such a tremendous advantage during all those months of slaughter.

THE RÔLE OF MACHINE GUNS

And while the huge number of machine guns which Germany had on hand were not so serviceable in open warfare, they proved invaluable in the newly-developed trench warfare. A machine gunner, installed in a shallow trench behind a few strands of barbed wire, was able to take the place of 200 skilled riflemen as far as killing efficiency was concerned—and presented a very small target indeed to the hostile artillery. So here again Germany's miscalculations as regards open warfare proved to be the very thing for the unexpected trench warfare.

The story of the four long years of trench warfare is told elsewhere in this volume, with each side advancing a few hundred yards at a time at a terrific expenditure of blood and treasure. It is also explained elsewhere why these advances were by yards instead of miles, and why under such circumstances neither side was able to bring about a decision until the latter part of 1918.

If the Allies were unprepared for the unexpected turn of the war in September, 1914, they were certainly prepared for the unexpected turn in the campaigns of 1918, when the war was suddenly taken out of the trenches by the Germans and a new war of movement set in operation. Indeed, the Germans, whose early miscalculations had turned out to their advantage, were this time rather unfortunate in their blunder. They figured on getting the British and French out of the trenches and disposing of their armies before the American Army could come into the fight.

It was with this object in view that the Germans launched their great attack of March 21, 1918, which smashed up one of the British armies. Falling back mile by mile, the British fought a stubborn rearguard action, and with the aid of such French troops as were spared from other parts of the front, they finally absorbed the shock of this German onslaught and brought it to a standstill. Then the Germans tried a similar drive in Flanders, and again won much ground. Finally, they launched an attack in the Aisne region, against the French, also winning much ground and capturing numerous prisoners. By these great attacks the Germans succeeded in overrunning most of the trenches in those



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"Now Come On, Fritzies"

This picture taken in 1918 shows a British barricade erected in a street to check the German advance into a small French town.



theaters and driving the forces out into the open.

But when the time came for the Germans to exploit these offensives, they were not prepared. Their equipment was built for trench warfare and was hardly suitable for the new fighting in the open. Meanwhile, the Allies had never given up the idea of open fighting, and were still ready in the form of numerous field guns and even heavy guns mounted on rubber-tired wheels and hauled by fast motor trucks. What is more, the Allies had developed faster tanks of the two-man variety, suitable for open warfare.

THE NEW WAR OF MOVEMENT

The British and French were ready to take advantage of the new warfare, as soon as American troops, arriving in France at a rate never before dreamed of, restored the numbers to something like equality. By the summer of 1918 the Germans were smashed and pushed back to where they had started their great drives. Then the trenches into which the

Germans had attempted to settle down were overrun by precisely the same means and preponderance of forces as the Germans had used against the Allies earlier in the year. And once the Germans were driven out of their trenches and into the open, the cavalry so long held in readiness came into action, together with two-man tanks and motor cars.

Then there was the matter of transportation. As long as the Germans remained in their trenches the transportation problem was not so difficult, but once they took up the war of movement their transportation problems rose by leaps and bounds. Suffering from a lack of this and that and the other thing, they were not able to maintain huge fleets of motor trucks such as were being used by the Allied forces. In the rapid retreat of the Germans during September and October, 1918, they were relentlessly pursued and destroyed by the British and French forces, who had ever been looking forward to the day when the troops would leave the trenches, as well as by the American troops, who were eager to meet the Germans in the open.

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY


The Story of the World-Famous Line Which Embodied the Pangerman Berlin-to-Bagdad Idea and Helped Bring On the World War

THE largest single contributing factor in bringing on the war." That is what one historian calls the Bagdad Railway. Be this as it may, it certainly leaped into the limelight in 1914 and bulked ever larger as the meaning of Pangermanism dawned on the world, as the Berlin-to-Bagdad scheme appeared, shorn of its commercial raiment, panoplied with all the trappings of military conquest.

Much of the strategy of the great conflict had to do with the Bagdad Railway. The British armies that sweltered in Mesopotamia and fought their way through Jerusalem to Damascus, the Russians who swept over the Caucasus to Erzerum and Trebizond, the Turks who held the lines at Gallipoli and those who scattered before the victorious advance of Allenby and the Grand Duke Nicho-

las and Sir Stanley Maude, all marched and counter-marched and thirsted and died largely because the Bagdad Railway had sprung into being years ago, bringing with it a cluster of international ambitions and apprehensions.

The author of the phrase quoted at the head of this article was Morris Jastrow, Jr., Professor in the University of Pennsylvania, who made a close study of the lands through which the railway passes and of the history of the diplomatic clashes to which it has given rise. He made that estimate of its importance in his book, *The War and the Bagdad Railway* (J. B. Lippincott Co.), the most thorough discussion of the subject that has appeared, wherein he gives clearly and concisely the comparatively innocent origins of the scheme, its gradual political entanglements and its



From Berlin to Bagdad.

Map of the Dardanelles Strait and Gallipoli Peninsula

German ambitions for domination in this region led to the fierce campaigning that, though it failed at times, eventually made the Berlin-to-Bagdad railway project only another exploded dream of empire.

identification with the German plan for world-domination.

The study of the major strategy of the World War is inseparable from the history of the Bagdad Railway. Professor Jastrow traces that history through its various phases—each one kept many a European statesman awake of nights—to the days when Briton and German and Turk fought for the mastery of Bagdad and Basra, and, through them, of this vital railway line. The Germans who led the

Turks in Mesopotamia fought with the ever-fascinating mirage of German domination over India before their eyes. Their British adversaries fought to ward off a mortal blow at the British Empire. And the British won.

THE BIRTH OF THE GREAT SCHEME

The Bagdad Railway project goes back to 1871, when a German engineer, Dr. Wilhelm von Pressel, began building a railway from

Haidar Pasha, opposite Constantinople, to Ismid, on the Sea of Marmora, in order to give the Sultan Abdul Aziz easier access to his shooting-box. This line, about 57 miles in length, was taken over by another German company, known as the Anatolian Railway Company, which, in 1883, obtained a concession from the Turkish Government to build a railway from Haidar Pasha to Angora, in Asia Minor. This line, about 360 miles long, was begun in 1889 and completed in 1893, and an extension to Konia, from the junction of Eskişehir on the Angora line (another 280 miles), was finished in 1896.

The company then planned to extend the line through Cæsarea and Diarbekr to Bagdad. But a much more ambitious scheme suddenly arose, brought forward as a result of a visit of the German Emperor to the Sultan of Turkey in 1898. This scheme was for a line transversely across Asia Minor from Konia over the Taurus range, into the plain through the Cilician gates, and thence to Mosul and Bagdad.

In 1902 the Turkish Government approved the plan, arousing great enthusiasm in Germany. The Anatolian Railway found the project too much for it to carry out unaided, so it formed itself into a syndicate with the high-sounding title of "La Société Impériale Ottomane du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad" and made an agreement with the Turkish Government in 1903 for constructing the railway. That was the first official appearance of the name "Bagdad Railway."

The agreement had claws—of that there was no doubt—and as soon as it was celebrated, the railway scheme leaped at once into the arena of international complications.

By the terms of the agreement the Bagdad Railway Company was granted a concession to build its main line beyond Bagdad to Basra,* an additional 360 miles, and to build several branch lines, the most important being: from Sadijeh on the Tigris to Hanikin, in the direction of Persia; from Muslimiya to Aleppo, connecting with the Syrian and Hedjaz railroads to Damascus, Medina and Mecca; and from Zubeir, on the way to Basra, to some point on the Persian Gulf. The total length of the projected main trunk, from Constan-

tinople (or rather Haidar Pasha, opposite Constantinople) to Basra, was to be 1,875 miles. Including the branches, the scheme, when completed, would have put under German control over 2,375 miles of railway, connecting with other lines in Asia Minor, Syria, Palestine, Arabia and (eventually) Persia.

Clash of interests between the great European Powers in Asia Minor might have been averted, says Professor Jastrow, if the Germans had stuck to their original plan of running the railway to Bagdad across northern Asia Minor, i.e., from Angora via Diarbekr, instead of over the Taurus and via the Cilician gates and Mosul.


"Had the northern route to Bagdad been followed by the German syndicate," he writes, "and left a southern route for a second line in the hands of England or France, the railway projects of Asia Minor might have remained purely commercial undertakings of great cultural value, marking the economic progress of contact between East and West. The political aspect of railway plans in the Near East might have been permanently kept in the background. . . ."

RUSSIA AND BRITAIN PROTEST

Russia, he says, was the first obstacle in the path of the German project to run the railway through northern Asia Minor, from Trebizond toward Diarbekr. But an opposition far more serious was that aroused in Great Britain when the precise terms of the agreement between the Bagdad Railway Company and the Turkish Government became known. When the British learned that the agreement not only extended the concession to the Germans from Bagdad to Basra, but also implied the building of a further extension to some point on the Persian Gulf, and granted to the Germans the right of navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab and the Tigris—until then an exclusively British privilege—the British were up in arms. From that time the Bagdad Railway question grew ever acuter until, in 1914, it became one of the big issues of the World War.

The German heads of the syndicates invited British and French participation in the enterprise, but, says Prof. Jastrow, "this move

* The line, Bagdad to Basra, was completed by January, 1920.



Route of the Bagdad Railway

Tunnels through mountains were completed in 1919, the line being open to Nisibin. By January, 1920, the line from Bagdad was completed to Basra, 60 miles north of the Persian Gulf.

was generally regarded as due to an anxiety on the part of the German syndicate to obtain foreign capital to aid them." It was claimed that the control was so arranged that it would always remain in German hands. There was a storm of protest against the project both in England and France, and the voice of the Pan-germanists, who even then were stirring in Germany, was heard in loud jubilation. English capital refused the invitation to join; so did French capital at first, but eventually there was a compromise whereby some French interests shared in the project. The British served notice of their opposition by blocking the extension of the railway to Kuwait on the Persian Gulf, forcing the Germans to turn their attention to the less advantageous terminus of Fao. Says Professor Jastrow:

"British policy was determined that the railway should not reach the Persian Gulf under German control. . . . The Bagdad Railway, if extended even to Basra, would destroy the trade that English merchants and English capital had painfully built up in the most important center between India and the Suez Canal. With Germany pushing English commerce at every point . . . the English prospects for retaining the commercial supremacy in the East were not bright, but over and above this was ever the political danger involved in seeing Germany standing behind the railway project, entrenched at a port on the Persian Gulf—with nothing intervening between that sheet of water and the ports of India. The Bagdad Railway was indeed a short cut to India—but a short cut from Berlin, not from London. The Suez Canal, which was the English "short cut," would be brought into rivalry with the Asia Minor route, which was the shorter cut, to the disadvantage of the former in almost every respect."

GERMANS REACH OUT TOWARD BAGDAD

In the meantime, the Germans proceeded with the building of the first new section of railway, that from Konia to Bulgurli, which was opened for traffic in October, 1904. When the war broke out in 1914 another section, from Bulgurli to Adana, was finished except for a small stretch of some 26 miles. The section from Bagdad to Samara, 75 miles, was also finished; and, while the war was on, the Bulgurli-Adana section was com-

pleted and the rails pushed on 30 miles beyond Nisibin, less than 100 miles from Mosul. When Dr. Jastrow wrote his book all that remained to be built, he says, on the entire line from Haidar Pasha (Constantinople) to Bagdad, was the uncompleted part from beyond Nisibin to Mosul, and the stretch from Mosul to Samara, a total of about 265 miles.

"The opposition to the scheme continued and many things happened in Turkey to change the face of things. The Turkish revolution of 1908-1909 brought a different set of men to the helm. The growing complications in Morocco, which had not been simplified by the conference of Algeiras, constituted another factor suggesting to Germany to proceed cautiously. The agitation for an increase of the Navy had also become more active during this period in Germany, occasioning further fears in England and Russia of Germany's future designs, while, on the other hand, the *rapprochement* between England and France, which received a strong impetus from the visit of King Edward to Paris in May, 1903, was a forecast of the complete reconciliation between England and Russia, and had its natural reaction in making Germany feel that she was being encircled by Powers that wished to repress her ambitions.

"The archives of the chancelleries of Europe, no doubt, conceal many negotiations and diplomatic conversations that took place during these years, which have not as yet found their way to the public and perhaps never will. They would afford further explanations for the delay in the resumption of the project. Germany, more particularly, would be prompted to proceed slowly for fear of arousing a European conflict before she was ready for it. But while other issues in Europe and elsewhere were thus coming forward which contributed still further towards changing the political atmosphere until the storm of 1914 broke out, the most serious problem, though occasionally receding into the background, was ever that created by the suspicion of Germany's ambitions in connection with the Bagdad Railway.

"The growing influence of Germany in Turkey, strengthened if anything after the Turkish revolution,—for Turkey needed a powerful support for the two Balkan wars,—made England fear for the safety of the Suez Canal as well as for India. Russia realized that her hold on eastern Asia Minor and on lands beyond was threatened by Germany's plans.

EFFORTS TO SMOOTH OVER MATTERS

"Negotiations followed which at one time looked as though the European powers might avert the conflict which publicists and men of affairs felt was coming. To counteract the political influence of the Bagdad Railway, the general policy was advocated of building other railways in the disputed territory, which through Russia's energetic policy in Persia had extended to that country.

"The French scheme of a Euphrates Railway from Damascus-Homs to Bagdad with connections to Tripoli, Beirut and Haifa, was taken up. This railway in French hands would offset Germany's ambition for a complete control of the highway of Asia Minor, since it would cut into this highway at a most important point. In case of war, French and English troops could be transported from three ports on the Mediterranean into Mesopotamia and secure that end.

"England was to be accorded the Bagdad-Basra stretch as her possession, while Russia was to be urged to carry out plans for railways in Persia which would include a line from Teheran to Bagdad. It is interesting to see in these plans their convergence towards one point—the Persian Gulf. Fully in accord with what we have seen to have been the primary factor in a control of the Near East, it was recognized that with the one pole of the wire stretching from Constantinople via Bagdad and the Gulf in the hands of England and her allies—France and Russia—Germany, holding Constantinople in her grasp through her alliance with Turkey, could never carry out her ambitions in the Near East, except by a military success over the Triple Entente of so decided a character as to force England, France and Russia out of the East entirely."

In December, 1910, the English and French plans were laid before the Turkish Government. But Russia continued her opposition to the building of railways, and Germany refused to give up the Bagdad-Basra section of the Berlin-Bagdad line to England, so the new plans failed.

After that, says Prof. Jastrow, there was a period of hopefulness, when it looked as if matters in Asia Minor might be smoothed over. England felt sufficiently assured of her ability in the end to prevent German railway control beyond Bagdad that she undertook an elaborate investigation of Mesopotamia for

the purpose of introducing irrigation to bring the land back to its ancient fertility. This investigation was carried on by Sir William Willcocks, who formulated ambitious plans, some of which were realized. Another impor-



"Kamerad. . . . Pardon!"

It was by this cry and by throwing their arms up and opening their hands that the German soldiers showed that they surrendered; others cried "Pas kaput" (don't kill me), or "Kaptif!"

tant happening was the abandonment by Russia of her hostile attitude to the Bagdad Railway. Negotiations were also instituted in that year regarding the crucial Bagdad-Basra section of the railway, but no agreement could be reached with Germany, and the negotiations

were still in progress when the war broke out in August, 1914. Prof. Jastrow speaks of a report that, in July, 1914, Germany and England had actually come to an agreement whereby England was to preserve her free scope on the Persian Gulf and have her preponderance in that zone fully recognized. This report was confirmed by the full account of the negotiations between England and Germany, based on official records and published in the *Monthly Review*, October, 1917. But the outbreak of the war naturally upset any agreement that may have been in progress.

THE PANGERMAN MENACE

Prof. Jastrow states that the question as to exactly when the German Government, egged on by Emperor William, involved the Bagdad Railway project in the meshes of Pangerman politics is difficult if not impossible to answer. He writes:

"In a general way the policy of expansion for Germany was an inheritance of the Bismarck period. It took on a larger aspect with the growing prosperity of the country, and no doubt was stimulated by the restless energy of the young Emperor—who was as progressive in everything that concerned Germany's advancement as he was aggressive in his whole attitude. The two traits are generally found united. But such aggression, taking on the formulation of plans for acquiring a foothold in the East, was entirely in line with the general policy of European nations, who from the beginning of the nineteenth century had gathered like hawks around a carcass, to divide up as much of the Turkish Empire as they could snatch. No doubt this appropriation has worked great benefits for the lands thus absorbed. Witness Algiers and Tunis and, more particularly, the marvelous transformation that England has worked for Egypt through her splendid and tactful régime, but the absorption, albeit beneficent, involved taking away the liberty of peoples to choose their masters. Germany was, therefore, in her policy, merely following the example set by others, and she had determined like Shylock to 'better the instruction.'

"She did so, and seized upon the magnificent project of a railway that would form the shortest route through the Near East to the Far East and, connecting on its way with all the veins of the region marked by railways con-

structed or projected, would give her a dominant position among European powers. We may assume that some such idea was in the Emperor's mind when on his visit to Damascus in 1898, he proclaimed himself to be the 'friend and protector of the three hundred millions of Mohammedans.' He had a vision of the glorious future in store for his country, extending its influence over the entire East—even to distant India where there are large numbers of Mohammedans, and naturally to Egypt. Utterances of such a mystic character, coming from the Emperor, and given under a dramatic setting, did much to arouse suspicion of Germany's ulterior designs in the Near East, and when such delphic sayings were translated into language of unmistakable clearness by boastful Pangermanic publicists, intoxicated with enthusiasm over their far-reaching schemes, the natural result was to arouse all Europe to the menace involved in a control of the historic highway, dominating the East by the strongest military power in the world, and which was fast becoming also one of the strongest naval powers. The terms of the convention when made public in the two forms in 1902 and 1903 clinched the situation, and left no doubt of the decidedly political character that the enterprise had acquired through the backing of the German Government.

"Even then we need not assume that the German syndicate was in league with the Pangermanic movement. Capitalists—even though they be patriotic Germans—are not apt to be carried away by political visions. They realize the advantage of large enterprises for their country, but their point of view for all that is apt to remain financial rather than political. To the credit of leaders of finance in Germany, like Dr. von Gwinner, it should be said that they did all in their power to 'internationalize' the undertaking with the perfectly natural limitation of not wishing to see the project pass out of Germany's hands. Dr. von Gwinner was handicapped by the conviction that grew stronger year by year that, whatever the attitude of the German syndicate as business men might be, the German Government was behind the plan with political ends in view."

GERMANY'S MISTAKE

German political ambitions soon became only too clear. The voice of the Pangerman grew ever louder. The purely commercial aspect of the Berlin-Bagdad scheme vanished steadily into the background; there was alto-

gether too much of the smack of *Deutschland über Alles* about it for other Powers to view it with calm. By the summer of 1914 it had reached a point where it could rightly take its place as a contributory *casus belli*, in company with other manifestations of the Pangerman spirit. Says Professor Jastrow:

"From the historical point of view there are thus two aspects to the Bagdad Railway. It represents, on the one hand, the last act in the process of reopening the direct way to the East which became closed to the West by the fall of Constantinople in 1453, and which began to be reopened with the loosening of Turkey's hold on one end of the historic highway stretching across Asia Minor. On the other hand, the conflict to which the railway gave rise illustrates once more the crucial rôle this highway has always played in determining the fate of the Near East from the most ancient days down to our times. The opposition of the European Powers to the Bagdad Railway, used as a political scheme for the aggrandizement of a particular country, registers the instinctive protest of the West against the domination of the East by any one power—no matter which. . . . The fatal error of Germany was to conceive of such a domination, for with the reopening of the Near East to the West, the logical plan, the one dictated by the verdict of history, was to keep the world's highway open for the entire West—and for the East. The Bagdad Railway in the hands of Germany, stretching from Constantinople via Bagdad to the Persian Gulf, would have meant the practical closing of the highway to all other nations—as effectively as the taking of Constantinople accomplished this in 1453.


"The history of Asia Minor gives the verdict that the highway *must be kept open*—if the world is to progress peaceably, and if the nations of the West are to live in amicable rivalry, while once more passing through the period of an exchange between Orient and Occident—such as first took place in the days of Alexander the Great. This verdict suggests 'internationalization' of the highway as the solution. . . ."

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Enlightened international action is the panacea, according to Prof. Jastrow, for the Near East in the future. Germany's error, he says, was in making everything else subordi-

nate to the political end in her Bagdad Railway project; through this error she transformed what would have been an inestimable blessing into a dire curse.

"The West should seek the *coöperation* of the East. It should come as an awakener, not



Enright in Harper's Weekly.

For Future Generations

as a conqueror. The aim must be to bring to the East the best that the West has to offer, but not to attempt to make the East merely a profitable adjunct to the West. Nor should we go so far as to dress up the East in western clothes and produce a misfit. . . . The story of the Bagdad Railway points the way out. Had the 'internationalization' of the project been carried out at the start before an ambitious Emperor, arousing Pangermanic dreams, succeeded in attaching to the undertaking political aims which soon overshadowed the commercial and industrial aspects, there would have been no clash among European nations over the historic highway. That highway would have been opened up to the entire West, and the process begun by Napoleon completed to the benefit of the world—to the benefit of the East as well as of the West. . . ."

Under such conditions, says Prof. Jastrow, the resurrection of the East will proceed slowly but surely.

VON LUDENDORFF'S OWN STORY

From Which He Would Have Us Learn That the Germans Lost Because
the "People At Home" Failed in Spirit

THE armistice had been in effect only a short time when General von Ludendorff published his memoirs under the title *Ludendorff's Own Story* (Harper and Bros.). The book appeared in this country in the autumn of 1919, being received with the keenest interest alike for its great historical value, and for the light it shed on German military and political points of view at the critical stages of the war.

Reading this highly important work, one gets the impression of a resolute effort for self-aggrandizement, and an incidental purpose to persuade the world that Germany, in going to war, was actuated by the noble motive of defending herself against implacable enemies determined on her destruction. Directly or by indirection, General von Ludendorff appropriates to himself the military strategy and whatever of political wisdom entered into the conduct of the war on the side of Germany. We are told in understandable terms that the popularly idolized Hindenburg owed his soldierly reputation and success in the numerous campaigns from Tannenberg to the Somme to his faithful execution of the carefully elaborated plans presented to him by Ludendorff. In terms no less exact we are instructed that the failure of Germany to triumph over her foes and terminate the war as absolute victor was due to the refusal or neglect of the Civil Government to adopt and enforce the judgments of Ludendorff;—that, in short, Germany was unwittingly betrayed to ruin by the dullness and self-interest of her politicians.

In attempting to answer satisfactorily the question why this book was so hurriedly got ready to launch in the critical period of political and commercial readjustments between the nations the easy conclusion is that it was intended as propaganda to justify the war

conduct of Germany and restore her to honorable estimation through the sympathetic emotions of the civilized world. The character of the book, its adroit dealing with facts and circumstances, and its constant reiteration of the charge of "free aggression" on the part of enemies "bent on our destruction," strongly warrant the imputation and detract from the apparent soldierly candor of the narrative. But those who urged the suppression of the book were frightened by shadows and a slighting opinion of the intelligence of the American people.

That General von Ludendorff has prepared an interesting statement need not be denied; that it will serve a reactionary purpose, with others than those already disposed to condone Germany's assault on all that civilization holds sacred, may be hopefully doubted. In so far as it deals with the military strategy and the conduct of campaigns, the whys and wherefores and the results of the great battles, on the Eastern and Western fronts, and in its survey of the general aspect of the four years' war, the book will prove a valued as well as an entertaining contribution to war history. The cleverly managed apotheosis of Ludendorff will not escape admiration. But if an attempted vindication of Germany from world censure and condemnation for the instigation and continued sanction of the most atrocious war measures in the experience of the race, the book must utterly fail where moral sensibility governs human conception.

It is neither practicable nor desirable to review this book sequentially, but there are many outstanding features that invite attention, and these will be noted, and as far as possible reproduced in Ludendorff's own words. As a source from which to derive a clear idea of German policy, the book occupies a unique place.



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Field-Marshal Von Hindenburg and General Von Ludendorff

Ludendorff in his memoirs says of his relations with Von Hindenburg: "For four years the Field-Marshal and I worked together like one man, in the most perfect harmony."



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The Funeral of an English Air-Raid Victim

"With an iron will Clemenceau and Lloyd George enrolled their peoples in the service of victory," says Ludendorff in his book. He might have added that their task was made easier by the fury aroused in French and British hearts by German methods of warfare.

I

WHERE HINDENBURG GOT HIS IDEAS

PERHAPS no better index to the spirit that animated the author can be found than in the following paragraphs, in one of which he ingeniously wrests from Hindenburg to himself the supreme honors while seeming to confirm them to the aged Field-Marshal. Here is the truly illuminating excerpt:

"For four years the Field-Marshal and I worked together like one man, in the most perfect harmony. With the most profound satisfaction I saw him become the German national hero of this war, the very personification of victory for every German.

"The Field-Marshal permitted me to participate in his glory. At the celebration of his 70th birthday on October 2, 1917, he expressed this sentiment in particularly touching words.

"The Commander-in-Chief bears the final responsibility. He bears it before the world, and, what is harder, before himself, his own army and his own country. As Chief of Staff and First Quartermaster-General I shared this responsibility to the fullest extent, and have always been fully conscious of the fact. I am ready to answer for my actions at any time.

"Our strategical and tactical views were in complete agreement, and harmonious and confident coöperation was the natural result. After discussion with my assistants I used to lay my ideas for the initiation and conduct of all operations briefly and concisely before the Field-Marshal. I have the satisfaction of knowing that from Tannenberg to my resignation in Oc-

tober, 1918, he always agreed with my views and approved my draft orders.

"Our conceptions of the character of this war of nations and the necessary measures it involved were also identical, and so were our views on the peace question. Like me, he strove to secure the life of the German people against fresh aggression. He put the whole weight of his personality behind these views.

"Those to whom the authority of General Headquarters was, or might be, an obstacle in the attainment of their own selfish ends sought to drive a wedge between the Field-Marshal and myself. They dared not attack him, so they thought it politic to strike at me. They invented differences between his view and actions and mine. According to them he personified the good principle, I the evil one. Those who spread such notions should at least have made him jointly responsible for all the alleged mischief. Otherwise they undermine his position and obviously present him as a man who could not possibly possess all the great qualities they ascribe to him, qualities he does most certainly possess.

"The reputation of the Field-Marshal stands secure enough in the hearts of the German people.

"I have always held him in honor and served him faithfully, and I esteem his noble qualities of mind not less highly than his devotion to his King and his readiness to assume responsibility."

An appropriate supplement to this suggestive laudation of self by indirection is the following extract from another section of the book, in which the practical results of the Ludendorff plans, as executed by Hindenburg, are glorified:

"The campaigns of 1914, 1915 and the summer of 1916 in the East were tremendous achievements, equal to the greatest military feats of any age. They made the highest demands both on commanders and troops. The Russians were then greatly superior in numbers to the allied German and Austro-Hungarian armies opposed to them.

"But, indeed, the operations which Field-Marshal von Hindenburg and I had to conduct from August 29, 1916, the day we assumed supreme command, rank among the most formidable in history. Nothing more awe-inspiring and destructive has ever been seen on earth.

"Germany, inferior in numbers and weak allies, was contending against the world. De-

cisions of the highest importance had to be taken. They were the inevitable and logical result of the situation, our general conception of war, and the particular circumstances of this war.

"The armies and fleets fought as they had fought in days past, even though numbers and equipment were mightier than ever before. What made this war different from all others was the manner in which the nations supported and reinforced their armed forces with all the resources at their disposal. Only in France, in 1870-71, had anything of the kind been seen before.

"With big battalions it is neither difficult nor very risky to wage war and fight battles. But in the first three years of the war the Field-Marshal and I never found ourselves in that enviable position. We could but act according to our duty and conscience, and adopt the measures we deemed necessary to gain the victory. And during this period success crowned our efforts."

AN INCOMPETENT GOVERNMENT

That success did not crown their efforts throughout General von Ludendorff ascribes unsparingly to the civil authorities—the government at Berlin. No small part of his book is devoted to criticism and complaint and sometimes bitter censure of the government's failure to approve the views of the Field-Marshal and the First Quartermaster-General. He says:

"The government had welcomed our appointment to the supreme command. We met them with frank confidence. Soon, however, two schools of thought, represented by their views and ours, began to come into conflict. This divergence of view was a great disappointment to us and vastly increased our burden.

"In Berlin they were unable to accept our opinion as to the necessity of certain war measures, or to steel their wills to the point of magnetizing the whole nation and directing its life and thought to the single idea of war and victory. The great democracies of the Entente achieved this.

"With an iron will Gambetta in 1870-71, and Clemenceau and Lloyd George in this war, enrolled their peoples in the service of victory. Our government failed to recognize this inflexible purpose, and the definite intention of the Entente to destroy us. They should never have doubted it.

"Instead of concentrating all our resources and using them to the utmost in order to achieve peace on the battlefield, as the very nature of war demands, the authorities in Berlin followed a different path: they talked more and more about reconciliation and understanding, without giving our own people a strong war-like impetus at the same time.

"In Berlin they believed, or deceived themselves into believing, that the hostile nations were longing to hear words of reconciliation and would urge their governments toward peace. So little did they understand the mind of our enemies, both people and governments, their strong national feeling and unbending will.

"Berlin had learned nothing from history. They only felt their own impotence in face of the enemy's spirit: they lost the hope of victory, and drifted. The desire for peace became stronger than the will to fight for victory. The road to peace was blocked by the will of the enemy, whose aim was our destruction; in seeking it the government neglected to lead the nation by the hard road to victory.

THEIR SLIPPERY WAY

"Reichstag and People found themselves without that strong lead which, generally speaking, they longed for, and slid with the government down the slippery way. The tremendous questions arising out of the war were more and more thrust on one side, for people's minds were occupied with questions of internal politics and thoughts of self. This meant the ruin of our country."

Philosophising on this situation he says:

"In this war it was impossible to distinguish where the sphere of the Army and Navy began, and that of the people ended. Army and people were one. The world witnessed the War of Nations in the most literal sense of the word. The great powers of the earth faced each other in united concentrated strength. And not only between the armed forces did the combat rage along those huge fronts and on distant oceans; the very soul and vital force of the enemy was attacked in order to corrode and paralyze them.

"This world-wide war of nations made enormous demands on us Germans, on whom its whole overwhelming burden fell. Every individual had to give his very utmost, if we were to win. We had literally to fight and work to the last drop of blood and sweat, and with it all maintain our fighting spirit and, above all, our confidence in victory; a hard but imperative

necessity, in spite of the dearth of food which the enemy inflicted on us, and the onslaught of his propaganda, which was of amazing force, if unobtrusive.

"Our Army and Navy are rooted in the Nation, as is the oak in German soil. They live upon the homeland, and from it they draw their strength. They can keep, but cannot produce, what they need, and can only fight with the moral, material and physical means which the country provides. These means make possible victory: faithful devotion and unselfish self-sacrifice in the daily contest with the miseries of war.



Herr Georg Michaelis

He succeeded von Bethmann-Hollweg as German Imperial Chancellor in July, 1917, after the resignations of Ludendorff and Hindenburg had forced the downfall of von Bethmann.

"They alone could secure Germany's final success. With them our country waged the titanic conflict against the world, even allowing for the assistance of our allies and the exploitations of occupied territories as far as the laws of land warfare permitted.

"The Army and Navy had thus to look to the homeland for its constant renewal and rejuvenation in morale, numbers and equipment.

"It was essential to maintain the morale and war spirit of those at home at the highest pitch. Woe to us if they should fail. The longer the war lasted, the greater were the dangers and the difficulties, and the more imperious grew the demands of the Army and Navy for spiritual and moral reinforcement.

"The very last resources, both in men and material, had to be made available and devoted to the prosecution of the war.

OBSSESSED CHANCELLORS

"Hard work and an unflinching determination, helped by the Russian Revolution, had enabled us to relieve the military situation in 1917. But meanwhile, as had already been the case in Austria-Hungary, the breaking up of the united will of the German people, under pressure of this upheaval and of economic privations, combined with the growing influence of enemy propaganda, was to bring about events which steadily lowered the fighting strength of both the allied states and jeopardized our military gains.

"From this time onwards the hope of the Entente for the inner collapse of their enemies was continually fed. Peace would be immeasurably more difficult, and the end of the war was postponed.

"Chancellor von Bethmann and Count Czernin were both completely obsessed by the influence of the Russian Revolution. They both feared a similar catastrophe in their own countries and they thought of nothing but possibilities of peace, which had unfortunately receded into the dim distance, whereas until peace had been attained they should have taken energetic measures to prosecute the war.

"They ought to have raised the morale of the nation by creative activity, just as G. H. Q. had succeeded in improving the army's fighting strength in a desperate struggle against a powerful adversary. As it was, their policy led to perpetual concessions at home, and they gave up the task of leading the nation. The whole tendency of their ideas made them overlook the unspeakable harm they were doing to the strength of their respective countries, which ought to have shown a united front to the enemy, and they did not realize how they were prejudicing the conduct of the war.

TOO SMALL FOR THEIR JOBS

"Neither of these men whom destiny had placed at the head of their people at this terrible crisis, possessed the strong character that events demanded. . . .

"Instead of harping ever more and more on the idea of a peace of reconciliation which was always out of the question, he [von Bethmann] ought to have knitted the nation together, and pointed out to it the great tasks before it and the objects to be attained, and then have given us

in the army a free hand. The German people ought to have been shown again and again what they were fighting for, and what the enemy in his heart of hearts really wanted. The majority would then have followed him as they had done in 1914.

"There are always some who can never be taught. . . ."

II

PEACE FEELERS AND SUBMARINE WARFARE

AS he no longer believed that a change would take place under that Chancellor, Ludendorff tendered his resignation, as did Hindenburg, at the same time. The Kaiser soothed them, but they forced the ultimate downfall of von Bethmann, who was succeeded by Michaelis.

THE LONGING FOR PEACE

"The enormous responsibility I had to bear made me long for the conclusion of hostilities; how could it have been otherwise? I often expressed myself in that sense. But unless we got a peace which safeguarded the existence of our country, the war would be lost. I could not see how peace was possible unless the enemy also was ready for it. I thought it very dangerous for us to be alone in announcing a desire for peace.

"I was fully aware that nations do not get peace merely by talking about it, or even heartily longing for it. The pacifist idea of a peace by understanding was for many a weapon against us. Many others sincerely believed in it, being moved by that spirit of exalted idealism which has not yet been realized in this world of strife. But did these idealists know whether the enemy thought as they did, and if he did not, was it not clear that by spreading the notion that we could obtain such a peace, at any time, they were leading the way to irreparable disaster, because, since human nature is made that way, they were inevitably weakening our war spirit, which should at all costs have been strengthened?

"This confidence and strength should have been fostered by the statesmen, to keep the will to victory alive in the country, and preserve it from the immeasurable disaster of defeat. The determination of our enemies being what it was,

there could be no middle course. Our will in the matter was of no account. That of the enemy was not yet broken. When this had been effected by military victory the diplomats might talk about reconciliation—IF THEY STILL WANTED TO."

ANY MEANS TO THE END

Ludendorff admits, regretfully, that, in consequence of "extraordinary dilatoriness on

determinedly engaged as were their own. The situation in 1917 with its pregnant peace talk made this more than ever imperative. Then came considerations of an intensive warfare, the employment of every means that could be devised to offset the steadily increasing strength of the Allies, so that the "enormous industrial areas of the enemy should not continue to work undisturbed under what were virtually peace conditions."



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Wilson's War Dance

John Bull—"I don't care whether he's neutral or not, so long as I pull the strings."

(Germany's idea of our war preparations with a sarcastic thrust at Britain's supposed control over our policy.)

the part of the Berlin authorities" (he complains that replies to important questions often did not arrive for weeks), the tone of his and Hindenburg's correspondence became "somewhat acrimonious" because the authorities "failed to grasp the necessities of the war." Great emphasis was laid on the vital importance of keeping up the morale of the fighting men by making them conscious that government and people were a coöperating unit behind them, that home energies were as

"The supreme army command had to bear in mind that the enemy's great superiority in men and material would be even more painfully felt in 1917 than in 1916. It was plainly to be feared that early in the year 'Somme fighting' would burst out in various points on our fronts, and that even our troops would not be able to withstand such attacks indefinitely, especially if the enemy gave us no time for rest and for the accumulation of material.


"Our position was unusually difficult, and no way of escape was visible. We could not contemplate an attack ourselves, having to keep our reserves available for defense. There was no hope of a collapse of any of the Entente Powers. If the war lasted, our defeat seemed inevitable.

"Economically we were in a highly unfavorable position for a war of exhaustion. There was weakness at home. Questions of the supply of foodstuffs caused great anxiety, and so too did questions of morale. We were not undermining the spirits of the enemy populations with starvation blockades and propaganda. The future looked dark, and our only comfort was to be found in the proud thought that we had hitherto succeeded in defying the enemy superiority in numbers, and that our line was everywhere beyond our frontiers.

PLANS FOR THE "STRATEGIC RETREAT"

"The Field-Marshal and I were fully at one in this anxious view of the situation. Our conclusion was no sudden one, but had gradually grown upon us since we took over our posts at the end of August, 1916.

"As a result of our opinion the construction had been begun as early as September of powerful rear positions in the west; the Siegfried line, running from Arras, west of Cambrai, St. Quentin, La Fère, Bailly-sur-Aisne, to flatten the wide salient from Albert, Roye, southwest of Noyon, Soissons, Bailly-sur-Aisne, in which the Somme fighting had made a large indentation, and the Michel line, which lay to the south



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Our Answer to the Challenge

In discussing the new American formations beginning to arrive in the spring of 1918, Ludendorff writes: "In what numbers they would appear could not be foreseen; but it might be taken for granted that they would not balance the loss of Russia."

of Verdun and in front of the line Etain-Gorz, to cut off the salient of St. Mihiel.

"These strategic positions had the great advantage of shortening the front and economizing forces, and their occupation was prepared



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William Hohenzollern

Ludendorff definitely establishes the Kaiser's responsibility for the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in the course of his memoirs in the following statement: "The emperor commanded that the (submarine) campaign should open on February 1st" (1917).

in detail. Whether we should retire on them, and how the positions would be used, was not, of course, decided in September, 1916; the important thing then was to get them built. This made comprehensive measures necessary, and I demanded heavy labor supplies from home. These, however, only sufficed for the west, and

corresponding positions in the east had to be left unbuilt.

"The construction of positions, the training of the army for defensive warfare and the enlistment of the civilian population for war work constituted weapons of war of the greatest importance. They were capable of postponing the decision if the government once succeeded in bringing the people whole-heartedly into support of the war, but they could never lead to victory.

SUBMARINE DECISION LAY WITH THE KAISER

"The future was thus full of obscurity, and the soldier could not reckon on chances, so that the questions of peace and submarine warfare became of the highest importance. There was the problem of obtaining peace, the chance of defeat without unrestricted submarine warfare and the possibility of victory by means of such a campaign, accompanied by an attack by our surface fleet and a defensive war on land.

"At the beginning of October we had discussed the question of adopting this weapon [the submarine] with the Chief of the Naval Staff. In the course of the correspondence with the Chancellor on the matter, we again urged him on October 5th to settle the question of responsibility. He replied on the 6th, with the statement that the decision really lay with the Emperor, as the war lord of the empire, but that it was also a question of foreign policy, owing to its effect on neutrals; the Chancellor accordingly was, constitutionally, the only person responsible, and could not transfer the burden to any one else; but the attitude of the Field-Marshal to the matter would naturally have the greatest weight with him.

"This standpoint was unexceptionable. The Field-Marshal was not in a position to take any of the Chancellor's responsibility, and had never even thought of doing so; I quite agreed with him. The Chancellor's declaration was, however, a substantial change of front when compared to his earliest statements, which had been made on the assumption that we were opposed to th submarine warfare."

But "the time was not yet ripe for it," as there were considerations of a peace movement. The Chancellor was occupied with the idea of negotiation for peace through President Wilson. Ludendorff was sceptical of success, "owing to my view of the enemy's desire for our destruction." Instructions to

Count Bernstorff "to induce the President at the earliest possible moment to make a proposal of peace to the powers" not having had the speedy results hoped for, "Count Burian then came forward with the proposal that the Quadruple Alliance should make a direct offer of peace to the enemy." "I was equally sceptical as to the success of this scheme," says Ludendorff, but he thought it should be tried, with avoidance at all costs of "any display of weakness," as that would encourage "the Entente to redouble their efforts for our destruction." The rejection by the Allies of the proffer left no doubt in Ludendorff's mind "of their intention to annihilate us." It is his opinion, too, that "their objection that the tone of our offer had from the first made any acceptance impossible, was quite unsound." His explanation of the unsoundness of the objection is rather naïve. He says:

"Our whole position compelled us to adopt a tone of confidence. I advocated this from the military point of view. Our troops had done marvels; how would they be affected by our adopting any other tone? It was essential that the peace offer should not impair the fighting quality of the army; and it did not do so, for it was only an episode and the morale of the troops was still good."

The actual decision to resort to unrestricted submarine warfare was arrived at January 9, 1917, after the receipt of the Allies' "answer to our peace offer." The Chief of the Naval Staff "advised that the campaigns would be decisive in a few months and urged its adoption. The Field-Marshal reported our views of the situation and also advised its adoption."

"The Chancellor stated the effect that the use of this weapon might have upon neutrals, and in particular upon the United States. He thought it possible, and indeed probable, that the United States would enter the war, and anticipated difficulties with regard to the provisioning of Belgium by the Entente. He regarded our offer of peace as having failed; he saw no other possibility of achieving peace, not even by a new attempt on the part of Wilson (the note of the 18th December had already failed); he had no hope of a separate peace; and he did not anticipate any improvement in our position

through the collapse of one of our enemies, such as subsequently happened in the case of Russia.

"The likelihood of this happening would, of course, have altered the whole situation, and would have had the greatest weight in the formation of our opinions. The Chancellor's judgment as to our military position was the same as our own.

"While we felt compelled resolutely to draw the inevitable and serious inference, and act on it, the Chancellor, as his nature was, remained undecided, but came to such conclusions as: 'The decision to embark on the campaign depends on the effects which are to be expected from it,' and 'if the military authorities regard it as essential, I am not in a position to withstand them,' and 'if success beckons, we must take the step.'

KAISER ORDERS RUTHLESSNESS

"However, with a full sense of his political responsibility, the Chancellor did advise the adoption of the campaign, as did His Majesty's other advisers. The Emperor fell in with their views, and commanded that the campaign should open on February 1st; he directed, however, that time should be given to neutral vessels in the blockaded area to leave it, and to neutral vessels on their way to the area to complete their voyages.

"The Chancellor then prepared, in coöperation with the Chief of the Naval Staff, the notes to neutral powers as to the declaration of the blockade area around England, along the west coast of France and in the Mediterranean. These were to be delivered on the 31st January."

General von Ludendorff seems to have had an idea of lessening the moral gravity of the German decision when he took pains to write the incidental paragraph: "The description 'unrestricted warfare' is not wholly apt, any more than is 'submarine warfare without regard of consequences';" nevertheless, some pages later he says without modification: "Unrestricted submarine warfare was now the only means left to secure in any reasonable time a victorious end to the war. If submarine warfare on this scale could have a decisive effect—and the Navy held that it could—then in the existing situation it was our plain military duty to the German nation to embark on this form of warfare."

But 1918 came in, and though, as a con-

sequence of the Russian collapse, "numerically we had never been so strong in comparison with our enemies," the submarine war, ruthless as it was, "had not produced those economic results which the Chief of the Naval Staff had expected, and which I, relying on the opinions of the experts, had hoped for;" still,—"it would be a mistake to underestimate its effect on the whole economic life of the Entente and to disregard the extent to which it eased the strain on the Western front. It will be the task of History to clear up these questions and to pursue the complicated problem further. The achievements of our submarine crews will remain heroic deeds for all time, and the country and the Navy may be proud of them."

Nevertheless, although the Navy was as optimistic as ever, Ludendorff "had become more sceptical, and felt obliged to count on the new American formations beginning to arrive in the spring of 1918. In what numbers they would appear could not be foreseen; but it might be taken as certain that they would not balance the loss of Russia; further, the relative strengths would be more in our favor in the spring than in the late summer and autumn, unless, indeed, we had by then gained a great victory."

SHAKEN BY HIS RESPONSIBILITY

The dormant interest of the book for the general reader centers in what Ludendorff has to say of the conditions preceding and attending the decisive battles of 1918. The fighting on the Western front, which began with the battle of Flanders July 30th and spread over large portions of the Western front, had been more severe and costly than any the German Army had yet experienced.

"In spite of this, the Western armies could not be reinforced from the East, for there, at last, heavy work was to be done. Russia and Rumania were to be defeated, in order to enable us to force a decision in the West in 1918 by means of an attack on France combined with the submarine war, in case the latter should not achieve the desired result by itself. The situation required that I myself should undertake a great responsibility, so great that it shook even me. However, I had to do it, for in 1918 the dangers

might otherwise become too much for us. It was, of course, obvious that the G. H. Q. did not withhold from the armies of the West a single man who was not urgently needed elsewhere. During the further course of events, the German Crown Prince often told me not to let the tension on the West become too great. I knew well that G. H. Q. in imposing this enormous strain on the Western front, had in view the possible situation of 1918. I saw what the danger would be if the submarine war did not work at all. But I am not one of those who give way in the face of dangers: I was put in my position in order to overcome them and to employ every means to prevent a great misfortune overtaking my country."

III

1918—THE GREAT TASK BEFORE THE GERMANS

THIS was the spirit in which preparations were made for a contemplated spring drive that was to bring the war to a close before the Allies could establish an impassable front. During January and February, 1918, the divisions that were intended for the attack were taken out of line and put into training. "In the meantime, we had gradually got up everything that could be thought of as required for the attack." Some divisions now released from the East were still on their way to the Western front.

"We hoped that the forces we were collecting from all quarters would enable us to attack on a continuous front of over thirty miles, allotting twenty or thirty batteries without trench mortars to each kilometer of front. We had at that time twenty-five to thirty divisions more than the enemy on the whole Western front. But this was not the actual measure of our superiority, which was reduced by the numerous specialist arms and territorial troops of the enemy, of which we had not such large numbers. Even so, our superiority was greater than it had ever been, and afforded prospects of success. We thought of carrying out the attack with fifty or sixty divisions.

"We were well supplied with all stores for carrying out operations in the West; but our recruiting situation was serious. Our representations had had no result. As a matter of fact,



The First Unit of American Telephone Operators

"I tried to extend the system of replacing men by women, and a female auxiliary telephone corps was to be started," writes Ludendorff in his war book. When the United States went to war American telephones with crews, managers and operators were sent across.

in the autumn of 1918, under the influence of recent events, the War Ministry did release men of the home army and the garrison troops who could have joined the field army sooner. I also tried to extend the system of replacing men by women, and a female auxiliary telephone corps was to be started. The recruiting situation need not have been so bad.

GERMANS DESERT THE COLORS

"The loss by desertion was uncommonly high. The number that got into neutral countries—e. g., Holland—ran into tens of thousands, and

a far greater number lived happily at home, tacitly tolerated by their fellow citizens and completely unmolested by the authorities. They and the 'skrim-shankers' at the front, of whom there were thousands more, reduced the battle strength of the fighting troops, especially of the infantry, to which most of them belonged, to a vital degree. If these men could have been got hold of, the recruiting difficulties would not have been so great. More recruits could have been raised if only the fighting spirit had been stronger at home. It was on this spirit that the ultimate decision depended—but it failed.

RECRUITING DIFFICULTIES

"War consumes men; that is its nature. The modern defensive battle is more costly than the attack, one reason the more in favor of the latter. The months of August, September and October, 1918, cost us far more than did March, April and May of the same year. In the earlier months our losses consisted mainly of slightly wounded men, who came back. The prisoners we lost in the defense had to be struck off as lost for good. That the large masses that were led into battle would suffer heavy casualties, in spite of all tactical counter-measures, was unfortunately a matter of course.

"The recruiting difficulties were not removed by March, 1918, although a few hundred thousand more men were available. They continued to be an uncertain factor in the tremendous contest. England and France had similar difficulties to contend with. In the autumn of 1917 the English divisions still had twelve battalions; now they were reduced to nine, since the Aisne-Champagne battle. France had disbanded far more than one hundred battalions, as well as territorial and territorial reserve formations. The new American formations, which could not have much fighting value, had not yet arrived. [Ludendorff had not yet corrected his estimate of the fighting quality of the American soldier.]

The submarine war had continued to be effective; we could not estimate the amount of tonnage the Entente would set aside for transport work.

"The army had thrown off the depressing effects of the previous year's fighting in the knowledge that it was passing from the defense to the attack. The morale appeared completely restored, but in March it could not be denied that secret agitation was making progress here and there. When the 1919 class reached the recruiting depots, we began to receive complaints about its general quality and spirit. Moreover, many recruits seemed to have a great deal of money, which must have greatly embittered the older men, who had been a long time in the field.

SUPINE CONDITIONS AT HOME

"Nothing had been done to strengthen the war-time spirit at home. The abuses in the various departments of war administration had become more flagrant than ever. The generally improved spirit of the army had a temporary influence on that at home, and blinded us to a good deal. But the large mass of the people was unaffected, caught in the toils of enemy propaganda, wrapped up in its own interests and cares, and utterly unconcerned about the doubtful issue of the war. The nation could



Photo by Hare.

Helping to Recruit in England

Ludendorff reveals the recruiting difficulties that faced his country. "Nothing had been done to strengthen the war spirit at home," he complains in discussing the dark days of 1918. Great Britain soon learned that voluntary service alone could not be a success. This picture shows a detachment of British soldiers marching to a recruiting meeting.

no longer brace the nerves of the army, and it was already devouring its marrow.

"The government itself, although taking energetic action against the strikes, failed to see the signs of the times in them, as they had in the naval mutiny in the autumn of 1917. Everything turned more and more on maintaining order in Germany by energetic action, even at the risk of a falling off in the manufacture of the war stores. Otherwise it was to be feared that the revolutionary movement would do even more harm. The Imperial government was acquainted with this view of General Headquarters. During those days the revolution was decisively advanced in Germany. It was at that time, as I have just heard, that the first German Soldiers' and Workers' Council was formed at Reinierndorf. Thus a further element of weakness had developed in our own body while we were in the midst of a struggle for our very existence. At that time I did not attach vital significance to these symptoms. My belief in the German people as a whole was then still unshaken."

February 13th he had an audience with the Kaiser, and frankly expressed his view of the forthcoming event. The task in the West was represented as the greatest that had ever been imposed upon an army. The more the responsible men thought about it the more they were impressed with its magnitude. The undertaking could be successful only "if the authorities who conduct the war are relieved of all intolerable shackles, if the very last man is employed in the decisive conflict, and is animated, not only by love for his Emperor and his native land, but by confidence in the strength of the military leadership and the greatness of our country. We must not imagine that this offensive will be like those in Galicia or Italy; it will be an immense struggle that will begin at one point and continue at another, and take a long time; it will be difficult, but it will be victorious."

The Kaiser seems to have approved.

MARCH 20, 1918—THE OPENING DRIVE

There was much discussion at General Headquarters to determine the point of attack. It was finally decided to strike between Croisilles, southeast of Arras, and Moeuvres, and, omitting the Cambrai re-entrant, between Villers-Guislain and the Oise, south of St. Quentin. There was sup-

posed to lie the enemy's weakest defense. It was regarded desirable to make the fullest possible use of the resources of the group of the German Crown Prince.

"Moreover," says Ludendorff, "it was a personal satisfaction to the Field-Marshal and myself, since the strategical position required it, that His Imperial Highness the Crown




© Brown Bros.

Frederick William Hohenzollern

"It was a personal satisfaction to the Field-Marshal (Von Hindenburg) and myself," writes Ludendorff, "since the strategical position required it, that His Imperial Highness, the Crown Prince, would take part in the first great offensive battle in the West."

Prince would take part in the first great offensive battle in the West. Dynastic interests did not influence me. Though profoundly loyal to my King, I am an independent man and no courtier."

Hindenburg and Ludendorff went to Avesnes with the augmented Operation Branch, March 18th. It is obligingly explained that the place was chosen because having been an army headquarters before, the



Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly.

The Fight for Amiens in 1918

This was one of the crucial battles of the war; here the British fought with their "backs against the wall," but, says Ludendorff, "the enemy's resistance was beyond our strength. We must not be drawn into a battle of exhaustion."


telephone communications would need only slight additions. Next day the Kaiser came. He "lived in his court train, which was side tracked in a neighboring station." We are not told that the train was ready to roll on to Paris.

March 20th "along the whole front of the attack, the guns and trench mortars, with their ammunition, were in position behind and, in places, even in front of the foremost trenches. It was a remarkable achievement, and at the same time a marvel that the enemy had neither seen anything nor heard any movement at night. At times our batteries were subjected to harassing fire, and ammunition dumps went up here and there. All this must have attracted the enemy's attention. But he observed it all along the front,

and could therefore obtain no certain indication." [There has been much wonderment over the failure of the Allies' observers to detect this important movement.]

The divisions, forty or fifty, had been concentrated unobserved by the enemy, nor had the procedure "been reported to him by his highly developed secret service." Ludendorff rather rubs it in when he adds: "The marches took place at night, but the troops sang as they passed through the villages. Such masses cannot be concealed. But no more did the airmen discover the railway transports that had been taking place behind the front of attack since February. Nor did the enemy discover anything by other means. I must assume this, otherwise his defensive measures would have been more effective, and his re-

II—20



Making a Citizen Army in America to Fight Overseas

One of the wonders of the war was the swift mobilization of America's man power. The draft registered the names of more than 24,000,000 men between 21 and 45 years of age. Between June, 1917, and November, 1918, over 2,000,000 were sent overseas, of whom more than 1,000,000 had battle experience. Says Ludendorff: "I expected strong forces of Americans to come. But the rapidity with which they actually did arrive was surprising."

serves would have arrived more quickly. In spite of all efforts to the contrary, the essence of war is an uncertainty; that is our experience, and the enemy's, too."

The attack was planned for March 20th; but the artillery relied on gas for its effect and the use of gas depended on the direction and strength of the wind. Weather conditions did not seem favorable, and as late as 11 o'clock of the morning of March 20th, there was doubt if the attack would be undertaken next day. But delays increased difficulties, and at noon it was announced that the attack would be according to program. The battle began the next morning, March 21st, just before 4 o'clock a. m., "with a tremendous crash on a front of forty-five miles between Croisilles and La Fère." At 9 a. m. the infantry advanced to the assault.

Ludendorff does not go much into the details of the battle, nor was it important to the purpose of his book that he should. Of the divisions engaged the 17th reached the second line; the 2nd penetrated to the second position. The next day the 2nd advanced further and the 18th gained considerable ground. March 25th the 17th and 2nd had passed the Bapaume-Comblès line; the 18th had taken Nesle; the 17th was exhausted, having lost heavily "because it had fought in too dense formation." On March 27th the 18th took Montdidier. "The enemy formed a fresh front north of the Somme, which was sure to be difficult to overcome." "Enemy resistance seemed weaker" in the direction of Amiens, and the original battle plan was modified to throw the main weight of the attack against that point.

"The enemy's line was now becoming denser, and in places they were even attacking themselves, while our armies were no longer strong enough to overcome them unaided." Attacks between Montdidier and Noyon March 30th and at Albert and toward Amiens on April 4th were so indecisive as to establish the fact that "the enemy's resistance was beyond our strength. We must not be drawn into a battle of exhaustion. In agreement with the commanders concerned, G. H. Q. had to make the extremely trying decision to abandon the attack on Amiens for good."

THE FIRST PUSH STOPPED.

The battle was over by April 4th. Although strategically the Germans had "not achieved what the events of the 23rd, 24th, and 25th had encouraged us to hope for," and had "failed to take Amiens, which would have rendered communication between the enemy's forces astride the Somme exceedingly difficult," Ludendorff is satisfied that "it was a brilliant feat, and will ever so be regarded in history."


"Our losses were not inconsiderable; we had been fighting with larger numbers for a long time. The percentage in the 17th army was too high; the losses in officers had been heavy throughout. But besides rich booty we had taken some 90,000 unwounded prisoners, and in addition the enemy's battle casualties had been heavy. We had been attacking and had come off well, even in the matter of casualties."

An intimate personal touch here is worth reproducing:

"The battle cost me a great deal also. My wife's youngest son fell on the 23rd. He was a flying officer, and was at first reported missing. On the battlefield we found a grave with the English inscription, 'Here rest two German flying officers.' I had the sad task of identifying my son. Now he rests in German soil. The war has spared me nothing."

Propos the situation politically prior to the battle, it may be well to revert to what Ludendorff has to say of the attitude of the Imperial Chancellor and the Government itself. It is in refutation of the subsequently circulated report that a peace before this battle could have been negotiated but for Ludendorff's obstinacy. He says:

"The Imperial Chancellor was perfectly acquainted with our intention of attacking in the West. He knew the enormous importance we attached to this offensive. Further, I had informed him of the date it was to begin. Germany could make the enemy inclined to peace only by fighting. It was first of all necessary to shake the position of Lloyd George and Clemenceau by a military victory. Before that was done peace was not to be thought of. All the world, including the Entente, knew we were going to attack in



① *Underwood and Underwood.*

American Soldiers Listening to a Military Lecture

Discussing the situation in the spring of 1917, Ludendorff says, "Lloyd George urgently demanded help from Wilson, and sent all available shipping to America to fetch the new formations." Following our entrance into the war, France and England also sent to this country hundreds of experienced officers to give our troops special instruction in modern warfare.

the West. Clemenceau declared himself decisively, I think, on March 6th, in favor of continuing the war, in spite of events in the East, and in spite of our imminent attack.

"At that moment I could not possibly believe in a just peace. Up till now the enemy had invariably rejected a peace of understanding. Should we, in the actual situation, have offered him Alsace-Lorraine, parts of the province of Posen as an indemnity?"

"Nor did the Imperial government mention the possibility of peace. Secretary of State von Kuhlmann, who was supposed to be conducting the whole of our foreign policy, was first at Brest and then at Bucharest. Neither he nor the Imperial Chancellor had been able to open up any negotiations which might have led to peace without further fighting. They probably continued their endeavors in that direction, in spite of the Entente's refusal of the invitation



The First Americans on French Soil

"England utilized the shipping taken from neutrals," says Ludendorff, "for bringing over the American masses, crammed tight in the transports to France. The men carried only their personal equipment. . . . The whole operation was a *tour de force*, uncommonly effective for a short time, but impossible to maintain for a long period." Ludendorff's sources of information were at fault. The United States landed more than 2,000,000 men overseas, and 2,000,000 more would have been ready to go had they been called for.

to Brest. It was their duty to spare the people and army further fighting, if possible. Count Hertling's declaration of February 25th in which he took his stand on President Wilson's four (sic) points of February 11th, had met with no response from the Entente.

"Colonel von Haefton had just been visiting foreign countries, in order to discuss questions relating to propaganda. Without my knowledge, he established communication with a subject of one of the enemy countries, who was acquainted with the objects and intentions of the authorities in London and Washington, and made me a verbal report on the subject. The terms then demanded of us were so severe that only a defeated Germany could have acceded to them. The colonel further informed me that the then Reichstag Deputy, Conrad Hauszmann, who has since confirmed this statement, and Herr Max Warburg-Hamburg had also tried to negotiate peace, but without success. The government never informed me of these events, though it must have known of them. I am all the more surprised that it did not contradict the rumor that a peace would have been arranged in March if I had not insisted on attacking. I personally requested the Imperial Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor to do so. They both of them refrained, without ever giving me any reason for it."

WAR LESSONS FOR LATER VALUES

Ludendorff's judgment of the effect of the thirteen days' fighting, March 21st-April 4th inclusive, was that of an overwhelming impression on the Entente, and yet "in spite of my request we did nothing in the diplomatic sense to utilize it. France trembled. It wanted to be sure of the military support of England and America. Clemenceau appealed to the Allies. In England tens of thousands of miners and munition workers were enrolled in the army, and yet some ten divisions could not for the time being be brought up to establishment. . . . Lloyd George urgently demanded help from Wilson, and sent all available shipping—regardless of whether England would suffer or not—to America to fetch the new formations. What did we do? Did we give all? It is well to draw comparisons so that the lessons of this war may later be taken to heart by the German people. Only the greatest energy is any good in war."

The application of that energy by the

United States and its successful issue did not, however, receive the encomium reasonably to be expected from an advocate of energy to the utmost. He says:

"For the sake of victory England and the United States violated the neutral European countries by political and economic pressure, and requisitioned their tonnage in order to reduce the strain on their own. In the long run the submarine war had proved unpleasantly effective after all, and produced a severe transport crisis on land and sea. 'In April the German submarines were so successful that England would have been ruined in nine months if the sinking had continued at the same rate.' This was the declaration made by an English statesman in the House of Commons in November, 1918. England utilized the shipping taken from neutrals, and whatever else it could make available, for bringing over the American masses, crammed tight in the transports, to France. The men carried only their personal equipment. What they needed in Europe they were given by England and France, but also by the neutral countries, especially Spain. The whole operation was a *tour de force*, uncommonly effective for a short time, but impossible to maintain for a long period. Had the war lasted longer a reaction must have followed."

LUDENDORFF AND THE KAISER

It is not unfair to infer from a digressive paragraph concerning an incident of the morning of April 9, 1918, that Ludendorff believes that, had the characters of the Kaiser and himself not been "too different," there would have been a triumphant Germany. He says:

"Colonel Bruchmuller inspected the preliminary arrangements and reported that all was in order. On the morning of April 9th, the attack at first went ahead very well. The reports which came in up till noon were favorable. This was a different birthday from the one I had passed the year before, the day of the heavy defeat at Arras. His Majesty listened to the report on the military situation of Avesnes and stayed to lunch. He remembered me in a few words, and also my two dead sons, and presented me with an iron statuette of himself by Betzner. There were many things which formed a barrier between His Majesty and myself; our characters were too different. He was my Imperial Lord and I served him, and my country

in his person, with the most loyal devotion. The statuette will remain a sacred memento of my Emperor and Supreme Commander, who loved his soldiers, desired only the best for his country and his people, and whose whole inmost nature was averse to war—of a man whose nature was typical of the German of post-Bismarckian times. The monarch on whom such enormous responsibility lay did not, like his Imperial grandfather, find men who were, like Roon and Bismarck, in the time of the constitutional struggle, resolved to demand from the country everything needed for the prosecution of the war. That is what proved fatal to the Emperor and the country in this war.

"By the end of April the offensive begun on March 21st had come to an end. Local attempts at improving our positions and counterattacks by the enemy prolonged the fighting into May. The main centers were Mount Kemmel and Bailleul, Albert, and the country south of the Somme as far as the Luce.

"We had achieved great successes, that we must not allow later events to make us forget. We had defeated the English Army. Only a few British divisions were still intact. Of the fifty-nine English divisions, fifty-three had been engaged, twenty-five of them several times. The French had been obliged to engage nearly half their divisions. The enemy had lost large quantities of stores. Italian troops appeared in the Argonne, while the English and French troops that went to Italy the previous autumn stayed there. In Macedonia, English troops were relieved by Greeks.

"How many Americans had got across by April we did not know. In the middle of the month, between St. Mihiel and the Moselle, the first more important engagements took place against United States troops, who had already been a long time in France. The individual American fought well; but our success had nevertheless been easy.

SURPRISED BY AMERICA'S TROOP MOVEMENT

"The effect of the submarine war had ceased, but enterprises by the English Navy against the submarine bases of Ostend and Zeebrugge proved how painful it had been. It was uncommonly difficult to estimate its probable influence on the food supply of England and on the transport of the Americans to France. From our previous experience of the submarine war I expected strong forces of Americans to come. But the rapidity with which they actually did arrive proved surprising. General von Cramon, the German Military Plenipotentiary with the Im-



perial and Royal Headquarters, often called me up, and asked me to insist on the sinking of American troopships; public opinion in Austria-Hungary demanded it. Admiral von Holtzendorff could only reply that everything was being done to reduce enemy tonnage and to sink troopships. It was not possible to direct the submarines against troopships exclusively. They could approach the coasts of Europe anywhere between the north of England and Gibraltar, a front of some fourteen hundred nautical miles. It was impossible effectively to close this area by means of submarines. One could have concentrated them only on certain routes; but whether the troopships would choose the same routes at the same time was the question. As soon as the enemy had heard of submarines anywhere, he could always send the ships fresh orders by wireless and unload at another port. It was, therefore, not certain that by this method we should meet with a sufficient number of troopships. The destruction of the enemy's freight tonnage would then have been undertaken only spasmodically, and would have been set back in an undesirable manner; and in that way the submarine war would have become diverted from its original object. The submarine war against commerce was therefore continued with all the vigor possible. According to the information available, the enemy's remaining tonnage and his food supply were so reduced that the hope of attaining our object by this means was justified. The shortage of cargo space, at any rate, was established.

"The suspension of our offensive had, of course, the most far-reaching results. The enemy grew stronger at the same time we did. Owing to lack of drafts our losses made themselves unpleasantly felt. In April I again approached the War Ministry with the request that the withdrawal of reclaimed men from munition work might be carried out more strictly.

"The only increase in drafts that I received in the future was furnished by prisoners of war returned from Russia. General Headquarters now fell back on its own reserves of men, and prepared its own drafts from the troops of the Eastern Army and Rumania, as well as from among the technical arms and line of communication troops. But these could not suffice unless the government released the reclaimed men and took energetic action against deserters and skirmishers."


PUNISHMENTS NOT "SEVERE" ENOUGH

In this connection Ludendorff laments the fact that in the first half of the war "the

Reichstag had made the penal laws more lenient. The commanders responsible for maintaining discipline were deprived of the most effective punishment, in that a sentence of "severe arrest" no longer involved being tied up to a stake. "No doubt this punishment was extraordinarily severe, and its execution should not be left to juvenile and inexperienced company commanders, but to abolish it altogether was fatal. The alleviation may have been justifiable at the time, but now it proved disastrous. The frequent declarations of amnesty also had a bad influence on the men. . . . Many offenses were committed in order to escape regimental duty and fighting while undergoing punishment. We eventually took to forming punishment companies, which were employed on work in the front trenches. That is a sad chapter. . . ."

"During this time, on the occasions of exercises, I had many conversations with officers of all ranks, and they all complained of the tired and discontented spirit which was being brought into the army from home. The leave men had been exposed to the influence of agitators, and the new drafts had a bad influence on discipline. All this was lowering the fighting value of the army. Among a number of drafts very serious irregularities had occurred, particularly among those from Bavaria and the East. There were also strong complaints about the spirit of the men trained at the Belgian training camp of Beverloo. The units attached all the more importance to getting back to the greatest possible extent men who had already served in their ranks, and who belonged to them territorially. As far as possible I met their wishes, but could not always get it done. Afterwards I heard that somebody in an office at home had been systematically opposing these measures. There were those who were working to undermine the army.

"I repeatedly spoke about the spirit of the people at home with the authorities concerned. In these days I was for the first time met with the reply that men were also returning from the army discontented and tired of the war. They seemed surprised at this; but at some time or other the army was bound to echo back what was so constantly being shouted into it from home; every part of the army at the front was bearing heavy burdens, heavier by far than ever the people at home did. The man who joined the army after being embittered and worked on by agitators at home, and then had to suffer



American Student Officers at Fort Oglethorpe

Ludendorff is somewhat patronizing regarding the stand made by American troops at Château-Thierry. "At Château-Thierry," he writes, "Americans who had been a long time in France had bravely attacked our thinly-held fronts; but they were unskillfully led, attacked in dense masses, and failed." American success in this battle and in subsequent engagements altogether refute the slur on American leadership.

great hardships, could not help causing more ill-feeling when he got home again. But, in spite of these disintegrating influences, and in spite of the decay of discipline, the mass of the army was enthusiastically confident of victory. It has always been an article of my creed that army and people have but one body and one soul, and that the army cannot remain sound for ever if the people is diseased."

THE GERMAN DRIVE TO THE MARNE

Ludendorff says:

"The second great German attack in France, as well as the attack in Italy, 'were in their



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Propaganda by Air

A notice dropped by British airmen, among Germans in the trenches, assuring them that all prisoners were well treated.

main features carried out as intended.' On May 27th, the second French attack began between Vauxaillon and Lapigneul. Once more it proved a brilliant success. I had thought we should succeed in only reaching the neighborhood of Soissons and Fismes. By the second and third days these objectives had in places been left far behind. We had gained ground especially beyond Fismes, not so much beyond Soissons. It was most regrettable that our Headquarters did not perceive the favorable situation at Soissons, and that we did not push ahead with the same energy as at Fismes, although it would have been possible. Otherwise our situation would have been considerably better, not only at Soissons, but on the whole front of the attack. It would have been more than doubtful whether the French would have held their positions between the Oise and the Aisne any longer. This

was another case where in a few moments much might have been achieved which was left undone. The commander-in-chief sits and thinks, and can make all preparations, but the execution of his plans is no longer in his hands. On the battlefield he must make the best of the *fait accompli* . . .

"In spite of a few unavoidable temporary crises, our troops remained master of the situation both in attack and defense. They proved themselves superior to both the English and the French, even when their opponents were assisted by tanks. At Château-Thierry, Americans who had been a long time in France had bravely attacked our thinly-held fronts; but they were unskillfully led, attacked in dense masses, and failed. Here, too, our men felt themselves superior. Our tactics had proved sound in every way, our losses, compared with those of the enemy and the large number of prisoners, though in themselves distressing, had been very slight. Again, the cessation of the attack did not take place early enough at all points. Here and there it was continued where defense was already indicated. With a few exceptions the troops had everywhere displayed good conduct and endurance.


"On the whole the impression had been very favorable. The group of the German Crown Prince had gained a great tactical victory in the offensive. The enemy had been forced to put in more of his reserves than the troops we had expended. Paris once more received the impression of defeat, and many inhabitants left the city. In the session of the Chamber early in June, which I awaited with interest, there appeared, indeed, no sign of weakness. Clemenceau's words were full of pride and exemplary strength: 'We are now giving ground, but we shall never surrender.' 'We shall be victorious, if the public authorities are equal to their task.' 'I fight before Paris, I shall fight in Paris, I shall fight behind Paris.' 'Remember the fate of Thiers and Gambetta; I do not long for the difficult and thankless task of Thiers.'

"Even after this second great defeat in one year the Entente was not yet ready for peace."

IV

THE DEFEATS OF JUNE AND JULY, 1918

IN June, 1918, the morale of the German Army was at a tenuous point. A distinctly mutinous spirit had begun to manifest itself. Ludendorff gives many reasons for this, in



Courtesy of Red Cross Magazine.

Device for Dropping Propaganda

This tin frame, strung with a long fuse, was attached to a small balloon and sent over the enemy lines. As each loop of the fuse burned it dropped a message.

addition to the brooding discontent with the long war. Among the demoralizing influences were the siftings of Prince Lichnowsky's book which made so clear the facts that England strove to avert war, while the Kaiser and the Military Staff were using mendacity and duplicity to force war. Ludendorff professes to have found incomprehensible the declaration that the fault for the outbreak of the war was chargeable to the German Government, "while His Majesty and the Imperial Chancellor continually explained that the Entente alone was responsible for it." Ludendorff tried very hard to have Lichnowsky punished. He urged that it was "a military necessity on account of the troops that must be ready to continue to fight and to die for

our good cause." He made that plea to the Kaiser. "But nothing happened."

Other disaffecting influences were "the enemy's propaganda writings, the grave danger of which was everywhere recognized. The Army was literally overwhelmed with them. General Headquarters set prizes for turning them in, but they could not be prevented from poisoning the hearts of our soldiers beforehand." Then too, "It certainly had a depressing effect that the two big attacks that lay behind us had not brought about a decision. Yet the men could see that we had been successful."

There was a threatening discontent among the Bavarians who had come to the conclusion that "they had been placed too often in

the forefront of attacks so as to save the Prussians." Indeed the Bavarians and Saxons "began to look upon the war as a purely Prussian war." Altogether Ludendorff found much tribulation, the inaptitudes of the Reichstag furnishing not by any means the least. But when Foreign Secretary von Kuhlmann declared his conviction "that the war could not be decided on the battlefield" Ludendorff secured his dismissal from office. Then Bolshevism began to play the deuce "in a way that the Entente, in spite of blockade and propaganda, could never have done" in shaking the war efficiency of the German people. It systematically prepared the revolution. It laid hold on men on leave or going to the front. Ludendorff says:

"The rankest propaganda was worked in railway trains. The soldiers who were going on leave were moved not to return to the front; those who were on their way to the front, were appealed to to assume a passive attitude or to desert the flag and to mutiny. About the end of June and the beginning of July there was much that was still invisible but silently, inexorably, working. . . .

"I will not speak of the ambitious members who now robbed our weak government of the last vestige of respect nor even of how from every side there were those who endeavored to shake my position and trust in me because I represented the support of authority; I am thinking only of the organized work against the army officers.

"That was a crime on the part of the Democratic party and the Majority Socialistic party; no, it was, to use the words of Talleyrand, worse than that—it was a blunder. A blunder of such colossal weight and short-sightedness that nothing can hush it up. . . .

"The process of disintegration at work in many parts of the army, with all its serious consequences, was as incomprehensible to me as the disintegration of the nation, which revealed itself in such a surprising fashion on November 9th, was to millions of Germans.

"I communicated my anxiety again and again to those gentlemen who, with me, were called upon to diagnose these symptoms and provide a remedy. But I spoke to deaf ears. The German nation, itself not without guilt, has now to pay the penalty with its very life."

This was the spirit and state of mind with which the fighting demands of July, 1918, were to be met.

THE JULY OFFENSIVE

Originally planned for July 12th, the attack was postponed until the 15th "in order to make thorough preparation possible. On the 11th or 12th while the preparations were in full swing, a deserter brought news that a big tank offensive from the forest of Villers-Cotterets was imminent, and this report gave an additional reason to re-examine and perfect our defensive measures. At the most critical point, southwest of Soissons, we had placed a division that had fought with special success in the East and which had always met the demands made upon it in the West. This division had not taken part in the May battles, and was therefore as much rested as could be given to any division."

Especial note may be given to this defense of the "most critical point," for it was there that on July 18th the Americans (1st and 2nd Divisions) made their deepest advance, and Ludendorff has a way of intimating that the

EXPLANATION

- Position until German attack on July 15, 1918.
- Direction of German attack.
- - - German line reached by the attack.
- ⌘ Army frontier.



From Ludendorff's Book.

The German Drive on the Marne and in the Champagne, 1918

Americans owed their successes to luck in going against weak positions.

The plan was for the Seventh Army to cross the Marne east of Château-Thierry and advance on both sides of the river in the direction of Épernay, while the First and Third attacked in the Champagne from east of Reims, with Chalons-sur-Marne as the principal objective. This was to be kept secret, but, says Ludendorff, "while the commanders were doing their utmost to keep these secrets, the love of talking and boasting that is inborn in Germans betrayed to the world and to our enemies things of the greatest weight and significance." So through captured officers and others taken prisoners and through "the most irresponsible discussion throughout Germany" the Entente came to be fully informed of the proposed attack on Reims.

The attack began July 15th and "Our crossing of the Marne was a remarkable achievement, which succeeded although the enemy were fully prepared for it."

(Incidentally, the fact may be recalled that, though the Germans crossed the Marne on the whole front of that river, they only made good their possession of the hills to the south of it on the French half of the defense. Americans of the 3rd Division, east of Château-Thierry, had been held back from the river during an eight-hour bombardment and then their front line was driven back in the assault. On their right the French gave way and the Americans were told by the French Army group commander to retire and keep the line. Here the American general sent the famous message that our flag had been driven back, that it was "intolerable" and: "We are going to counter-attack." The American attack pushed the enemy back on



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Fère-en-Tardenois

A street in Fère-en-Tardenois, which was recaptured from the Germans in the second battle of the Marne.

the river with huge losses. Our forces thus planted themselves on the rear of the Germans across the Marne further east. Ludendorff ordered the retreat of these forces next day, but they were unable to obey because of the rain of fire on the bridges.)

Stopped in the Champagne by General Gouraud's army, the conclusion was reached by Ludendorff by noon of the 16th that "a continuation of the offensive would have cost us too much. We had to content ourselves with the improvement of our position, brought about by acquiring possession of the heights we had lost in the spring of 1917, and we had even secured a deep forward zone."

Ludendorff's curiously perverse mental attitude toward the Americans, whom he delighted to ignore, has illustration in his reference to the march through the "critical point" by the 1st and 2nd American Divisions, July 18th, which he ascribes to the French. He had gone the night before to the headquarters of Crown Prince Rupprecht's group and during the discussion on the morning of the 18th, "I received the first news that by means of an unexpected tank offensive the French had pierced the line southwest of Soissons." (See Vol. III for American participation in this action.)

He says "unexpected," though he had already stated that six days before a deserter had told him of an imminent tank offensive, information taken into account in the defensive preparations. He says "pierced" the line, but omits to state that the penetration exceeded five miles in some places.

Ludendorff posted off to Avesnes to confer with Hindenburg. The Field-Marshal met him at the station. "We immediately retired to the office. The position of the left wing of the 9th Army and the right of the 7th had become serious."

ADMITS THE SURPRISE ON JULY 18TH

The simple fact, not acknowledged by the First Quartermaster, is that Ludendorff was outwitted here by General Foch, who struck at the Soissons position with two American divisions and one French when Ludendorff evidently expected the blow to fall on the Amiens salient. One does not applaud the sagacity of Ludendorff's explanation. He says:

"I inquired into the reasons for our failure on the 18th. The men no longer believed in the possibility of an attack. A divisional commander with whom I was acquainted told me that he had been to the front lines on the 17th, and had seen not the slightest sign of activity on the part of the enemy.

"As a matter of fact, the French troops only received the order to attack a few hours before they came up. Information which was coming through to our lines until immediately before the battle began no longer reached us.

"The rapid movement of the numerous fast tanks in the high-standing corn increased the ef-

fect of the surprise. To all this must be added the diminished strength of the divisions, the result partly of influenza and partly of the monotonous diet. In the sector into which the two weak divisions had been put there had been somewhat of a lull after the earlier battles. All these things helped to heighten the effect of the enemy surprise. When it had worn off on the 19th the troops held well."

That, however, was the end of the German offensives, the finish of their drives and the beginning of their anxious retirement, in spite of much determined fighting in the following months.

WITHDRAWAL FROM THE MARNE

The troops on the south of the Marne effected their withdrawal to the northern bank the night of July 20th-21st in good order, chiefly because the French did not attack on the 20th. "Their thrust early on the 21st found everything already evacuated." There was a lull in the fighting on the 22nd. "The enemy, though, was definitely held up," and, Ludendorff adds laconically, "the crisis had terminated in our favor. G. H. Q. was at this time faced with momentous decisions."

One of these decisions was to withdraw troops from the Marne to the Fère-en-Tardenois-Ville-en-Tardenois line, the night of July 26th-27th. Another was to abandon the offensive in Flanders. Still another was the withdrawal behind the Vesle to a straight line between Soissons and Reims—that to be done the beginning of August after getting necessary stores from the Vesle valley.

"In the night of the 26th, the withdrawal of the front north of the Marne was accomplished according to plan and in perfect order. In the next few days General Foch made further violent but unsuccessful attacks which cost the loss of some small strips of high ground, northwest of Fère-en-Tardenois.

"According to reports from the troops the enemy had suffered bloody losses. Of course very heavy demands were made on us, too. As had been the case in previous defensive battles, constant relief by new divisions was continually necessary.

"The evacuation of the salient went on steadily, thanks to the splendid organization of the Army Group of the German Crown Prince and of the First and Seventh Armies. The second



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Generals von Hindenburg and von Ludendorff

On August 28, 1918, a telegram from General von Lyncker, Chief of the German Military Cabinet, summoned von Hindenburg and von Ludendorff to meet the Kaiser in Pless. General von Lyncker informed Ludendorff that Hindenburg had been appointed Chief of the General Staff and that Ludendorff was to be second chief.

railway line was now completed, and made the work considerably easier.

"In the night of the 1st and 2nd of August the front was withdrawn behind the Vesle, where troops in hastily prepared positions were ready for the enemy. The enemy followed close on our heels, and made a sharp attack on the line of the Vesle. He was everywhere repulsed. Our defensive battle of movement between the Marne and the Vesle was at an end.

"The battle was a brilliant achievement on the part of the leaders and men concerned. The shadow cast by the events of July 18th had passed. After that day, in spite of the heavy demands made upon him, the German soldier had fought well, and felt himself a better man than his enemy. In some divisions there had certainly been unpleasant revelations. Among other things, I subsequently received a report which threw a very grave light on the spirit of one of these divisions; I sent it to the Seventh Army for further inquiry.

LOSSES VERY HEAVY

"As in every other engagement the losses we had suffered since July 15th had been very heavy. The battle on July 18th and the defensive battles arising with it had in particular been very expensive, although we got our wounded back and did not lose any considerable number of prisoners.

"The losses through the battle had been so heavy that we were compelled to break up about ten divisions, and use their infantry as reserves for others. The other arms were, generally speaking, not broken up. Those divisions that had been withdrawn from the battle, and other troops, were distributed behind the whole West front.

"I had not succeeded in getting any clear idea of the enemy's losses since July 15th, but, considering the massed tactics of the Entente, they must have been high, and in no way less heavy than ours.

"The armies of the Entente had also suffered; the battle had cost the enemy as much as it had cost us. The French had sent into action a remarkably large number of Senegalese and Moroccans, and had endeavored to spare their own people.

"The six American divisions that had taken part in the battle had suffered particularly severely without achieving any successes.

"One division appears to have been broken up in order to bring them up to establishment. Notwithstanding the gallantry of the individual American soldier, the inferior quality of the

American troops is proved by the fact that two brave German divisions were able to withstand the main attack made by very superior American forces for several days; and these two divisions, the 4th Ersatz and the 201st, I had up till then considered no better than the average."

NO "SECOND CHIEF" FOR HIM

On August 28, 1918, a telegram from General von Lyncker, Chief of the Military Cabinet, summoned von Hindenburg and von Ludendorff to meet the Kaiser in Pless, and they departed that afternoon "never again to return to the Eastern front. Behind us lay two years of strenuous, united work and mighty victories."

"General von Lyncker received us on our arrival in Pless, about ten o'clock in the morning of August 29th. He informed me that Field-Marshal von Hindenburg had been appointed Chief of the General Staff of the field army, and that I was to be second chief. The title 'First Quartermaster-General' seemed to me more appropriate. In my opinion there could only be one Chief of the General Staff; but, in any case, I had been expressly assured that I should have joint responsibility in all decisions and measures that might be taken.

"When His Majesty received us he expressed the hope that the crisis at the front would be overcome, and the Imperial Chancellor, who was present in Pless at the time, spoke to the same effect. The subject of peace was not touched on by him. The gravity of the situation must have often brought it to mind. The enemy's intentions prevented any steps being taken.

"My position was a thankless one, as I fully realized. I entered on my duties with a sacred desire to do and think of nothing that did not contribute to bring the war to a victorious end. For this purpose alone had the Field-Marshal and I been called upon. The task was perfectly enormous. The awful feeling of responsibility did not leave me for a single instant. The field of action was in many respects entirely new and uncommonly comprehensive. The amount of work involved was quite unprecedented. Never has Fate before suddenly placed so heavy a burden on human shoulders. With bowed head I prayed God the All-Knowing to give me strength for my new office.

"The circumstances in which the Field-Marshal and I had been summoned to take supreme command were extremely critical. Whereas we had hitherto been able to conduct our great war

of defense by that best means of waging war—the offensive—we were now reduced to a policy of pure defense.

"The Entente had gathered up all its strength for a mighty and, as they thought, last great blow, thrown us on the defensive, and brought Rumania into the field.

"It was to be expected that the attacks on the Western front, in Italy, Macedonia, and south of the Pripet would be intensified, while the Rumanians, reinforced by Russians, would burst into Transylvania on our exposed right flank, or invade Bulgaria from the Dobrudja. Somewhere or other we were to receive our death-blow. . . .

SIX MILLIONS AGAINST TEN MILLIONS

"The longer the war lasted, the more acutely we felt the overwhelming superiority of the enemy in numbers and war material.

"On our side the first two years had exacted a heavy toll; the flower of our fighting strength lay under the sod. But the Army was still strong

and resolute, and had been able to preserve or liberate, not only the frontiers of the Fatherland, but also those of its allies in the European theater.

"Only on the Eastern front had we now suffered a reverse, and that because the fighting power of the Austro-Hungarian Army was still on the decline.

"We had succeeded in calling a halt to our retreat there. We were to retain our power to do so, but it demanded further German help. Austria-Hungary continued to be a drain on German blood and German war industries. Her most pressing needs were coal and railway material.

"The same was true of Bulgaria and Turkey, although the demand for troops was not so great, but their concern was for money, military equipment, and transport material. Germans had to help everywhere. We did so, in many cases without the necessary return.

"The burden on us was certainly directly relieved by our allies. Without them the war would have been unthinkable; they did their



Photo by James M. Beck.

A Girl Mmunition Worker

"The equipment of the Entente armies with war material had been carried out on a scale hitherto unknown," writes Ludendorff in his memoirs, adding, "the battle of the Somme showed us every day how great was the advantage of the enemy in this respect."



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German Prisoners Coming In

Ludendorff pays the following reluctant tribute to the Allies that opposed him on the Western front: "The enemy infantry, coming up behind their barrage, got into the trenches and villages before our men could crawl out from their shelters. A continuous yield of prisoners was the result."

share valiantly, but considered they had a natural right to approach us with a constant succession of demands, although their efforts in no way equaled ours. The longer the war lasted the more detrimental these constant allied claims on Germany became to the Quadruple Alliance as a whole. The whole gigantic burden of this war lay on our shoulders.

"The enemy had been constantly adding to their numbers since the beginning of the war. Italy had come in. All the Powers had created new formations and summoned all their auxiliaries to arms. Now Rumania came in against us with 250,000 men. So, despite the adhesion of Bulgaria and Turkey to our cause, and the constant additions to and changes in our war machinery, we were still greatly inferior in num-

bers. We had six millions at the front against ten millions of the enemy.

"The equipment of the Entente armies with war material had been carried out on a scale hitherto unknown. The battle of the Somme showed us every day how great was the advantage of the enemy in this respect.

"When we added to this the hatred and immense determination of the Entente, its starvation-blockade or strangle-hold, and its mischievous and lying propaganda, which was so dangerous for us, it was quite obvious that our victory was inconceivable unless Germany and her allies threw into the scale everything they had, both in man-power and industrial resources, and unless every man who went to the front took with him from home a resolute faith in victory

II—21

and an unshakable conviction that the German Army must conquer for the sake of the Fatherland. The soldier on the battlefield, who endures the most terrible strain that any man can undergo, stands, in his hour of need, in dire want of this moral reinforcement from home, to enable him to stand firm and hold out at the front.

"In the situation in which the Field-Marshal and I found ourselves, and in view of our whole conception of the character of this war and the enemy's determination to destroy us, we considered it essential to develop the economic, physical, and moral strength of the Fatherland to the highest degree. . . .

"The Field-Marshal and I intended, as soon as conditions allowed, to go to the Western front to see for ourselves how matters really stood there. Our task was to organize a stiffer defense and advise generally. But before we went there some divisions were got ready for Rumania, and His Majesty the Emperor was induced to give the momentous order for the cessation of the offensive at Verdun. That offensive should have been broken off immediately it assumed the character of a battle of attrition. The gain no longer justified the losses. On the defensive we had only to hold out in a battle of attrition forced upon us."

ALLIES' POWER GREATER THAN HE ANTICIPATED

Verdun had exacted of the Germans "a very great price in blood" before they gave over the offensive, and the battle of the Somme "was raging with unprecedented fury and without a moment's respite," the Entente having "a tremendous superiority both on land and in the air."

"The Entente troops had worked their way farther and farther into the German lines. We had heavy losses in men and material. At that time the front lines were still strongly held. The men took refuge in dugouts and cellars from the enemy's artillery fire. The enemy infantry, coming up behind their barrage, got into the trenches and villages before our men could crawl out from their shelters. A continuous yield of prisoners to the enemy was the result. The strain on physical and moral strength was tremendous, and divisions could be kept in the line only for a few days at a time. They had to be frequently relieved and sent to recuperate on quiet fronts. It was impossible to leave them behind the line—we had not enough men. The

number of available divisions was shrinking. In view of the shortage of artillery, it was now kept in the line, even when the divisions were relieved. Divisions which were released by battle-worn divisions had, in turn, to leave their artillery behind them and come up behind the battle front. The result was that units were hopelessly mixed up.


"The shortage of ammunition increased daily. General Headquarters received the ammunition from the War Office in the form of ammunition-trains, which I myself distributed daily among the armies. I was always hearing what they required, and knew how little I could give them. Mine was indeed a sad and harassing task.

"The situation on the Western front gave cause for greater anxiety than I had anticipated, but at that time I did not realize its full significance. It was just as well. Otherwise I should never have had the courage to take the important decision to transfer still more divisions from the heavily engaged Western front to the Eastern in order to recover the initiative there and deal Rumania a decisive blow."

THE DEFECTION OF BULGARIA

Incidentally, considering the late collapse of Bulgaria and the consequent peril to Germany in the East, Ludendorff is emphatic in denial of the charge that Germany had broken a treaty obligation. He says:

"The suggestion, put forward by the Bulgars to cloak their defection, that I was informed that soldiers' councils had been formed among their troops, is untrue. It is equally untrue to say that we had broken a treaty obligation to leave six divisions on the Bulgarian front, for this obligation was confined to the Serbian campaign of 1915. When I came to General Headquarters in August, 1916, there was about one division in Macedonia. The obligation must also have lapsed on the formation of the German Supreme Military Command for the Quadruple Alliance in September, 1916. This Supreme Command did not in any way neglect Bulgaria. The forces opposed to each other there were of about equal strength. The Greek troops with the Entente had had no military experience, and their choice of sides was not based on conviction. The Bulgarian Army had had a long rest. They had had the opportunity to strengthen their forces, and ought rather to have helped us in the West than to have sought aid from us. We knew well that the Bulgarian Army was, in fact,



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The Kaiser During a Visit to the Western Front

"His Majesty the Emperor was Supreme War Lord. In him resided the ultimate authority over the Army and Navy. The Commanders-in-Chief of the land and sea forces were responsible to him."—From Ludendorff's memoirs.

in a bad state; but there was ground for the hope that it would be able to withstand the attack which we expected, as, indeed, was the case wherever the men were still willing to fight. We anticipated now as previously, as did the German chiefs in Bulgaria, partial failure, but we did not expect the complete collapse of their army. The rumors which had circulated in Sofia, to the effect that the army would not continue fighting after September 15th, found only too terrible confirmation. We could not answer every single cry for help. We had to insist that Bulgaria must do something for herself, for otherwise we, too, were lost. It made no difference whether our defeat came in Macedonia or in the West. We were not strong enough to hold our line in the West and at the same time to establish in the Balkans a German front to replace the Bulgarian, as we should have

had to do if we were to hold that front in the long run.

"The Bulgarian Government did nothing whatever to keep up the morale of the troops and the population or to maintain discipline. It gave free rein to enemy influence, and took no steps against any of the anti-German agitations. Entente bribery was the finishing stroke, even the troops that streamed back to Sofia being well supplied with enemy money. These were the true causes of the defection of Bulgaria from the Quadruple Alliance.

THE KAISER IN ULTIMATE COMMAND

"When the Field-Marshal and I arrived at Pless the question was just being mooted of the establishment of a single command for the Quadruple Alliance in all tactical and strategi-

cal matters. I warmly advocated it and had the pleasure of seeing it carried out. The final decision lay with His Majesty, who gave permission to the Field-Marshal to do everything 'By Order of His Majesty.' In practice the actual control was limited; we had no definite knowledge of the quality of our allies' troops, and were thus unable, for example, to direct that only so many troops should be retained on Austria's Italian frontier. In practice we generally came to some mutual arrangement, but the directions issued by the German General Headquarters carried with them a certain authority which proved to be of great utility.

"The Field-Marshal and I had, accordingly, the conduct of operations in the West, and in the East as far as the Dobrudja in the South.

"His Majesty the Emperor was Supreme War Lord. In him resided the ultimate authority over the army and navy. The commanders-in-chief of the land and sea forces were responsible to him.

"Subject to His Majesty's pleasure, the Chief of the General Staff of the field army had full control of the direction of operations. Decisions of the first importance required His Majesty's approval. He had no executive authority.

"The Emperor was thus the head of the General Staff. I may mention that, when I use this latter expression in these memoirs in the narrower sense as referring to the General Staff of the army in the field, I do so in accordance with the current, though incorrect, practice."

V

AUGUST 8TH—WHEN DESPAIR SET IN

WHAT Ludendorff regards as Germany's "blackest day," next to that of Bulgaria's defection, was August 8, 1918, signalized by the German defeat in the Amiens pocket and the disaster to the Second Army. This produced something of a panic among the officers of Berlin and Vienna. Kaiser and Emperor hastened to confer with Ludendorff and Hindenburg, and finding the condition of the army—the disaffection of the soldiers, their disheartedness, their sullen spirit of semi-revolt against their officers, etc., in addition to exhaustion—to be most grave, the Kaiser ordered that peace proposals be prepared for presentation through the Queen of Holland. But Foch kept on hammering and smashing

with such industry that the ordered proposals were not got into operation. Ludendorff was urgent of propaganda. "I again emphasized the necessity for speeches by our Ministers calculated to make an impression abroad, and the importance of inaugurating even now a propaganda department for educating public opinion. . . . The Field-Marshal took a more optimistic view of the military situation than I did."


Fighting continued between the Somme and the Oise, and Ludendorff anticipated an attack between the Oise and the Aisne to be launched about the middle of August. The British began an attack south of Arras, between Boisleux and Ancre, August 21st, the first of a series of attacks on Rupprecht's sector that continued almost uninterruptedly to the end of the war, "and made the heaviest demands on the Grand Headquarters and their armies."

"On the 22nd, the Seventeenth Army, by permission of G. H. Q., counter-attacked on its whole front. They were successful, but it would have been better not to attempt it.

"Immediately afterwards the English offensive spread southwards. On both banks of the Somme there was heavy fighting, the main weight of the attack being directed between Albert and Bray; the Australians had no success. . . . During the following days, however, the English, who had but few fresh reserves at their disposal, gained ground towards Bapaume after very severe fighting.

"The characteristic of their tactics was narrow but deep penetration by tanks after short but extremely violent artillery preparation, combined with artificial fog. Mass attacks by tanks and artificial fog remained hereafter our most dangerous enemies. This danger increased in proportion as the morale of our troops deteriorated and as our divisions grew weaker and more exhausted.

"As the offensive developed, the enemy succeeded on the north in pushing us back from the Ancre. At this point a Prussian division, known to be a poor one, it is true, and for that reason given a sector covered by the river, had refused to fight. This threw the whole line into confusion. The natural difficulties of fighting in the shell-hole area of the Somme battlefield, east of Albert, were increased by the fact that, owing to bad railway communications, it was very hard to get reserves up in this region. The situation there became extremely critical about August



Defensive Battle Between the Somme and the Oise, 1918

25th. It was certain that the enemy offensive would continue."

(Ludendorff in retreat suffered from the devastation he caused in 1917, for he found it hard to move his troops and supplies over the blasted region.)

THE AUGUST RETREAT

Steadily pushed back, on August 17th, the advance troops were back onto the main line of defense, and then, August 20th, between the Aisne and the Oise the great French attack succeeded. "The nerves of the Army had

suffered. In some places the men would no longer stand the tremendous artillery barrages and tank attacks, which had become still more severe. Again we had suffered heavy and irreplaceable loss. August 20th was another black day, literally compelling the enemy to continue the offensive."

Accordingly a wide retreat was ordered,—a front of 35 miles—practically a retirement onto the "Siegfried System" as the reserve line. (Ludendorff avoids reference to this system as the "Hindenburg line.") This retirement was made the night of August 26th



Painting by N. C. Wyeth

English Troops Descending the Mount of Olives

17



and 27th. It was calculated that the high ground around Peronne and the position taken on Mt. St. Quentin could be held against the advance of the Allies; but the Australians—so cavalierly flouted in the above quotation—assisted by American troops (27th and 30th Divisions) rudely disturbed the calculation.

Haig was meantime extending his offensive and on September 2nd he made a strong assault with tanks on the "Wotan System" and "overran obstacles and trenches in this line and paved the way for the infantry." Here, too, there was prompt retirement into the Siegfried line. In this period the Americans had engaged in a series of powerful attacks, smashing back the German line north of Soissons.

Back of the German front there were feverish preparations of positions on which to retire, and where retreat was forced, demolition of railroads, roads, mines, etc., was to accompany it under orders, all available loot being seized for transportation to Germany.

TO BURN LONDON AND PARIS

Hard driven, desperate in the field, the harassed army was visibly going to pieces, while more and more Americans were coming into action to increase the hopelessness of the German situation. In a state of mind apparently corresponding to these conditions, Ludendorff could only think of peace and rack his brains to devise a means to force it. With true German logic his thought turned to schemes of ruthlessness, frightfulness and kindred pleasantries, and the idea of raining incendiary bombs upon London and Paris "to force the enemy to make peace" was considered. But German cities had learned from experience that air-raiding is a game at which two can play, and Count von Hertling, the Chancellor, requested G. H. Q. "not to use these new incendiary bombs on account of the reprisals on our own towns that would follow." Moreover, Ludendorff concluded that "our position was now so serious that G. H. Q. could not hope that air-raids on London and Paris would force the enemy to make peace." So it was not von Hertling's plea nor any high-minded scruples, but "my views of the general military situation were the real

ground for the decision" not to undertake the wholesale incendiarism.

VICTORY NOW IMPOSSIBLE

"There was, however, no longer any chance of a victorious issue. On September 3rd we answered to this effect an inquiry from the Chancellor, which was prompted by his representative at G. H. Q., Count Limburg-Sturum, after he had been informed of our intention to withdraw to the Siegfried line. Count Limburg-Sturum was invariably kept informed of all events.

"What I had gone through would leave no man unmarked. I had been appointed to G. H. Q., not to make peace, but to win the war, and had thought of nothing else. Like Clemenceau and Lloyd George, I had wanted to call up the entire nation, but I was not, as has so often and so falsely been stated, a dictator.

"Lloyd George and Clemenceau had the control of the Parliaments which ruled their countries, for they were 'their' Parliaments. At the same time, they stood at the heads of the entire administrative and executive governments; I, on the other hand, had no constitutional power directly to influence the German Government in order to enforce my views as to the steps necessary for the conduct of the war, and I was frequently confronted with the lack of understanding and energy of the departments whose duty it was to take these steps.

"Peace not being obtainable, I had striven to carry the war to the successful issue which alone could save us from the fate we now suffer.

"I understand now that this successful issue was impossible, and I saw the approach of the disaster which it had been my life's work to prevent."

THE TROOPS DEMORALIZED

He had summoned divisional commanders and officers from the line to discuss in detail the events of August 8th and following days.

"I was told of deeds of glorious valor, but also of behavior which, I openly confess, I should not have thought possible in the German Army; whole bodies of our men had surrendered to single troopers or isolated squadrons. Retiring troops, meeting a fresh division going bravely into action, had shouted out things like 'Black-leg' and 'You're prolonging the war,' expressions that were to be heard again later. The officers in many places had lost their influence and allowed themselves to be swept along with the rest."



Courtesy of Red Cross Magazine.

German Prisoners Serving as Stretcher Bearers

Ludendorff in discussing the defeat of the German Second Army in August, 1918, says: "I was told of deeds of glorious valor, but also of behavior which I should not have thought possible in the German Army; whole bodies of our men had surrendered to single troopers or isolated squadrons."

The Emperor told him later that after the failure of the July offensive and after August 8th, he knew the war could no longer be won.

THE FINAL PHASE

There was from now on steady fighting on the entire front, and hardly any abatement of the pressure of the Allied offensive. As Ludendorff says:

"Everywhere the enemy followed close on our heels. . . . On September 18th and 19th particularly severe attacks were launched on the Moeuvres-Holnon sector; the left wing of the Second Army was pressed back several kilo-

meters on to the Scheldt-Oise canal, north of St.-Quentin, the Eighteenth Army being forced to withdraw its extreme right to conform with this retirement. Otherwise the line was held, severe local fighting continuing up to September 25th and 26th. The French extended their offensive farther toward St.-Quentin. It goes without saying that these days, too, took heavy toll of our entire army. . . .

"In Champagne and on the western bank of the Meuse a big battle had begun on September 26th, French and American troops attacking with far-reaching objectives. Westward of the Argonne we remained masters of the situation and fought a fine defensive battle. Between the Argonne and the Meuse the Americans had

broken into our positions. They had assembled a powerful army in this region, and their part in the campaign became more and more important. We held their push, however, the 27th being in the main a day of success for us, while on the 28th, too, we held our lines, apart from certain modifications of our front which were carried out in accordance with our plans. . . ."

It was obvious from the fighting on September 29th and following days that "the enemy had to be asked for peace and armistice. The military position, which could only get worse, demanded this. We were not yet bound to surrender unconditionally."

But he urged an immediate peace. The October proceedings in Berlin have been reported elsewhere in this article.

Ludendorff would have been glad to have had an immediate peace before the end of September, while there was still the indication of a powerful resistance to insure better terms. But his prestige had suffered and both the people and the Army were disgruntled. That was when he was accused of having published misleading, if not false, *communiqués*. Feeling himself in disfavor with the Kaiser as well, he was for resigning, but was dissuaded, and subsequently held to the opinion that fighting should go on and that the German people should sacrifice the last of their strength to the Army, and by mid-October he was urgent against capitulation. October 20th, when the answer to the Wilson note was drafted, abandoning the submarine campaign and preparing the way to capitulation, he and the Field-Marshal "refused to take any part in drafting such an answer. The War Cabinet became very excited at this; why, I do not know." He "proposed a rallying-cry to the people," but—"The Cabinet had thrown up the sponge."

HINDENBURG ON "UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER"

Rumors filtering through had greatly disquieted the soldiers, and to counteract the effect, on October 24th Hindenburg prepared a proclamation order in which he said:

"Wilson's answer is a demand for unconditional surrender. It is thus unacceptable for us soldiers. It proves that our enemy's desire for

our destruction, which let loose the war in 1914, still exists undiminished. It proves, further, that our enemies use the phrase 'Peace of Justice' merely to deceive us and break our resistance. Wilson's answer can thus be nothing for us soldiers but a challenge to continue our resistance with all our strength. When our enemies know that no sacrifices will achieve the rupture of the German front, then they will be ready for a peace which will make the future of our country safe for the broad masses of our people."

This order was handed to Ludendorff by Major von Payer at Spa for his signature.

"Usually all documents for signature by the Field-Marshal were submitted to me first to be countersigned. This order was not consistent with the answer sent to Wilson on the 20th. I was surprised, and asked the major whether the tone of the order was really in harmony with the views of the government. He said that it was, and that the order was wholly consistent with the explanations given to the representatives of the press in the Foreign Office by Colonel von Haeften and Privy Councillor von Stumm. I became hopeful again, and added my signature. It appeared later that the view that the wording of the telegram corresponded with the views of the government was incorrect, and Colonel Heye stopped the publication of the order. From Kovno, where revolutionary organizations already controlled the telephones, it came to the knowledge of the Independent Socialists, and thus to that of the Reichstag. It was further, in the usual course, given out confidentially in the press discussion. At the Reichstag meeting on the 25th at noon a storm of indignation burst over General Headquarters. The government did not move a finger to protect us, although we were still the head of a mighty army. It was not until late on the evening of the 25th that I heard of this incident or I would have discussed it with von Payer. Later the history of the creation of this order was explained in all its context to the government. Meanwhile, however, the distortion of the facts had achieved its end and I was dismissed.

"The discussion on the 25th in the Ministry of the Interior lasted about an hour and a half or two hours. General von Winterfeldt and Colonel von Haeften waited for me below. I was deeply moved and could say no more than: 'There is no hope. Germany is lost.' These two were greatly touched.

"In the German note of October 27th we capitulated.

LUDENDORFF RESIGNS

"Colonel Haeften reported to me October 26th that the government had succeeded in persuading His Majesty to dismiss me, the ostensible reason put forward being the order above mentioned. His Majesty would shortly send for me to the Bellevue Castle. I was no longer capable of astonishment, and had no anxiety about myself suddenly called at this unusual hour to attend His Majesty.

"On the way from the General Staff Office to the Bellevue Castle I told the Field-Marshal what I had just heard. Later I heard it stated that Prince Max had put the question of my dismissal forward to His Majesty as a Cabinet question.

"The Emperor seemed wholly changed. Speaking to me alone, he spoke especially against the army order of the evening of the 24th. There followed some of the bitterest moments of my life. I said respectfully to His Majesty that I had gained the painful impression that I had

no longer his confidence and that I accordingly begged most humbly to be relieved of my office. His Majesty accepted my resignation.

"I went back alone. I did not see His Majesty again. After my return to the General Staff Office, I said in bitterest grief to my officers there, among whom was Colonel von Haeften, that in a fortnight there would be no longer an Emperor in Germany. They held clearly the same view. On November 9th Germany and Prussia were republics."

He gave up his post at once and in the evening went back to Spa "to say farewell to my officers with whom I had shared joys and sorrows through so many years, and to put my personal affairs in order."

"On the morning of the 27th I was at General Headquarters. In the afternoon I said good-by. I was much moved. It was very hard for me to leave my officers and the Army at this anxious time, but, however hard it was, I



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A Group of German Aviators

All German aviators were volunteers; and, although this was one of the most perilous branches of the service, the youths of the best families were anxious to get into it. They were not allowed to go to the front until they had undergone vigorous training.

could do nothing else, in my view of my position as an officer over against the supreme head of the Army.

"In my life as a soldier I have trodden but one path, the straight path of duty. One and only one great thought has moved me, the love of my country, of the Army, and of the hereditary ruling house. For them had I lived, even in these last four years. My one aim was to break the enemy's desire for our destruction and to secure Germany's future against new hostile attacks.

"On October 27th I stood in Spa, in the prime of my life, at the end of a military career which had brought me infinite work to do, and at the same time a responsibility such as falls to the lot of few men.

"In the evening I left Spa. In Aachen I sought out my first war billet. I thought of Liège. There I had found my manhood, and had not altered since. My muscles stiffened. I went back home."

THEY CONTINUED FIGHTING

Governmental notes and negotiations did not affect the fighting to the extent that insubordination and slackness affected it. "Our war machine," says Ludendorff, "was no longer efficient. Our fighting power had suffered, even though the great majority of divisions still fought heroically. August 8th put the decline of that fighting power beyond all doubt, and I had no hope of finding a strategic expedient whereby to turn the situation to our advantage. . . . Leadership now assumed the character of an irresponsible game of chance, a thing I have always considered fatal."

LUDENDORFF BELITTLES AMERICANS

It must ever be a severe reflection upon Ludendorff's soldierliness and fidelity as a historian that he was so reluctant to acknowledge the work done by the Americans; and his slighting reference to notable events, not to say his erroneous reports concerning them, detract from the reputation for greatness he attempts to establish for himself. He writes of the American break-through in the Argonne and says, "We held their push." He does not say, however, that the Americans had advanced seven miles over a labyrinth of trenches and obstacles that made the most

formidable defense on the Western front (one that had stopped the French), that they took twelve towns and Mt. Sec, and captured 5000 prisoners, and that they were "held" only because they had to wait for supplies, ammunition, etc., before resuming the advance. In like manner he dismisses the feat of the Americans and British in breaking the Hindenburg line—the system the Germans thought impregnable—including that feat in the generalization: "On September 29th and days following there was further fighting, bringing the usual difficulties, but not compelling us to sudden momentous decisions." He was even more ungenerous concerning the American performance in wiping out the St. Mihiel Salient, for that he originally falsified by pretending the salient was evacuated by pre-arranged plan in a satisfactory manner, "this being facilitated by the enemy not following up." He grudgingly admits that the facts did not warrant his "too favorable *communiqué*."

"The strain on the nerves of the leaders at the front increased steadily, and they had a heavy task; but they never lost their proud courage or their clear perception of their country's needs. Nothing could break them."

"While its right wing held firm on the Yser, below Dixmude, and its left wing held round Armentières, the main body of the Fourth Army was forced back on Roulers and Menin in continual fighting in the early part of October. It developed into a series of local engagements which passed off without important events. On October 14th the enemy renewed his attack. In the direction of Roulers he gained ground beyond the town. Kortemarck, too, we lost. On the other hand, he could not advance much toward Menin. Near Wervicq we beat him off. Local successes also attended the enemy on the 15th, causing our army to fall back to the line Dixmude-Thourout-Ingelmunster-Courtrai. The divisions of the Fourth Army were numerically weak, and the only explanation of the enemy not obtaining successes greater against them, apart from the admirable leadership of the army, lies in the fact that the enemy had no longer much stomach for the fight."

Nevertheless on October 17th, the Army retired to the Hermann line, which "involved the abandonment of the Flanders Coast." At the same time the Seventeenth Army had difficulties of its own as a consequence of



"the enemy break-through at Cambrai on September 27th," and the Eighteenth and Second Armies were compelled to fall back on the Hermann line—"a great disappointment to us. I had hoped that the Siegfried line would have held for much longer." . . . During the following days up to the 17th, there was new fighting on the front of the Second and Eighteenth Armies, which, on the whole, were successful for us."


"In the West events, from October 17th on, took the following course: the Fourth Army completed its rearward movement into the Hermann line, in the closest contact and in constant fighting with the pursuing enemy. Bruges, Thielt, and Courtrai were evacuated on the 19th. On the 20th there was fighting on the Lys, the enemy taking the eastern bank around Deinze. He attempted to force us to leave the Lys by strong pressure between the Lys and the Scheldt. On the 25th the fighting again took the form of a battle, in which the enemy, attacking the Scheldt, slowly gained ground toward Ghent-Oudenarde. Between the Lys and the Scheldt the fighting also implicated the Sixth Army.

"The Sixth and Seventh Armies had aban-

doned Lille and Douai on the 17th, and had fallen back, in touch with the Fourth, behind the Deule canal, in the direction of Avelghem, Tournai, and Valenciennes. On the 20th the enemy was approaching these towns. The civil population again took part in the fighting.

"The southern wing of the Seventeenth Army and the Second and Eighteenth were in heavy fighting, the enemy attacking heavily on the 17th and 18th between Le Cateau and the Oise. We were forced to withdraw the front behind the Sambre-Oise canal, from the district to the southwest of Landrecies as far as the Oise. After a pause on the 19th, the enemy attacks extended from the 20th onward toward the north. The enemy pressed on past Solesmes and Le Cateau, in the direction of Landrecies. Our losses were heavy, and the troops did not fight well at all points. Other troops, however, conducted themselves magnificently. It was the same as ever.

"At first the army group of the German Crown Prince had left the wing of the Eighteenth Army in its position down the Oise as far as La Fère. The enemy's efforts to cross the Oise were defeated. On the 20th the Hermann line, between the Oise and the Serre, was occupied. The enemy attacked this line in force, and violent battles developed.



From Ludendorff's Book.

Battles in the St. Mihiel Sector, 1918



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Frederick William, Germany's Last Crown Prince

Ludendorff pictures gloomily the downfall of Germany's former idols: "The Emperor was confronted with a *fait accompli*. On the advice given to him in General Headquarters at Spa, he went to Holland. The Crown Prince followed him after Berlin had refused his unconditional offer of further service. On November 9th Germany, lacking any firm hand, bereft of all will, robbed of her princes, collapsed like a house of cards."

"The Seventh and First Armies were attacked between the Serre and the Aisne. In the main they maintained their positions, and on the 25th they threw back a powerful enemy attack with heavy losses.

"Again, on the Aisne, as far as Vouziers-Grand Prè, in the Aire valley, and toward the heights to the left of the Meuse, the enemy was applying strong pressure. The fighting was heavy and costly, but did not lead to any important changes in our line. As before, the battle extended to the eastern bank, without producing any essential alterations here, either. Further southeastward, as far as the Swiss frontier, the line was quiet."

THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR

Those last memorable days, just before the armistice, are sketched rapidly by Ludendorff as follows:

"On the evening of the 25th the Western front was in a position of the greatest strain. There was fighting from the Dutch frontier to Verdun. No help was coming from home. Every encouragement was absent. It was miraculous that the troops should fight so heroically.

"The work of evacuation went on, in spite of the terrible condition of the railways.

"From the end of October events followed one another at an increasing pace. In the West, on November 4th, the German Army was withdrawn in good order to the Antwerp-Meuse line under the pressure of the enemy from Verdun upward. The Alsace-Lorraine front, well-organized, awaited an enemy attack.

"The Austro-Hungarian Army was completely dissolved as a result of the fighting in upper Italy from October 24th to November 4th.

"Hostile troops were moving on Innsbruck. General Headquarters took comprehensive measures for the protection of the southern frontier of Bavaria. In the Balkan theater we held the Danube.

"We stood alone in the world.

"At the beginning of November the revolution, brought about by the Independent Socialists, broke out, starting in the Navy. The Government of Prince Max had not the strength to nip in the bud the outbreaks which, at first, on the Russian pattern, were only local. It was incapable of leadership, and let things run their course.

"At noon on November 9th, Prince Max, of his own initiative, announced the abdication of the Emperor. The old government gave orders to

the troops which amounted to a prohibition of the use of weapons, and immediately afterward it disappeared.

"The Emperor was confronted with a *fait accompli*. On the advice given to him in General Headquarters at Spa, he went to Holland. The Crown Prince followed him after Berlin had refused his unconditional offer of further service. The princes of the states abdicated.

"On November 9th Germany, lacking any firm hand, bereft of all will, robbed of her princes, collapsed like a house of cards."

It would be difficult to imagine a gloomier state of mind than Ludendorff's when, after lamentations over Germany in true Jeremiah vein, he wrote such a sentiment as this:

"The present fate of the German people is concluded by the peace. The future lies dark before us, the only bright spot being the acts of the men of Scapa Flow."

VI

THE RUSSIAN COLLAPSE—1917

OF the Russian collapse and Revolution, Ludendorff says:

"The outbreak of the Revolution threw a strong sidelight on conditions in Russia. The army and nation were rotten to the core or it would never have taken place. In Russia, as with us, the army was part of the nation; there, too, nation and army were one. How often had I not hoped for a revolution in order to lighten our military burden! But my desire had been merely a castle in the air. Now it had come as a surprise. I felt as though a weight had been removed from my chest. At that time I never contemplated the possibility that it might later on undermine our strength also.

"It was impossible to tell to what extent efforts in the East would be relaxed, and for the moment attacks had to be expected. Nevertheless, the Revolution was a serious blow for the Entente, as it inevitably entailed a diminution of Russia's fighting capacity and brought considerable relief to us in the extremely difficult position in which we were placed. For General Headquarters this consisted first of all in the saving of troops and munitions in the East; and the exchange of worn-out divisions from the West for fresh troops from the East was undertaken on a large scale.

"Orders were given for propaganda to be set on foot at once to encourage a strong movement for peace in the Russian Army.

"The outbreak of the Russian Revolution was a factor in the war upon which no general could dare to count with certainty. Now at last it was no longer a hope, but a reality with which I could deal as a soldier. Our general position had considerably improved, and I could look forward with confidence to the battles in the West. . . .

"The United States declared war on us on April 5th. The collapse of Russia, the success of our submarine campaign, and the desire to use their forces to combat the U-boats must have been factors in their decision. On February 3rd America had broken off diplomatic relations with us, and I doubt whether it would have been possible to come to terms with her in the meantime without disturbing the basis upon which the submarine campaign was being conducted. The attempt on the part of our Foreign Office to establish military relations with Mexico strengthened public opinion against us in the United States. In spite of my warnings, the Foreign Office had used an antiquated and easily decipherable secret code.

"Soon after America's declaration of war, the whole world was ranged against us, only a few states, including the Argentine and Chile, preserving their neutrality in face of enemy pressure.

"... Under the pretext of the submarine campaign America entered the war against us at a period critical for the Entente. Whether, without the excuse afforded by the U-boats, she would have done so in time to prevent our winning the war in 1918 is open to doubt. But it is impossible to say how events on land would have turned out if the submarine campaign had never been opened. . . .

"As a matter of fact, on January 9, 1917, no one could have foretold the collapse of Russia and nobody calculated upon it. With the help of our submarines we reckoned on a decision in our favor, at the latest before America, with her new armies, could intervene in the war; without them we calculated that the Quadruple Alliance must be defeated in 1917. As it was, the history of this year took a completely different turn: the Western front held firm, but the submarine campaign brought no decision, and Russia collapsed.

THE SITUATION IN THE WEST—APRIL, 1917

Turning his attention to the conditions on the Western front in this period, Ludendorff



Harding in the *Brooklyn Eagle*.


On His Mind

Ludendorff says in his memoirs: "The attempt on the part of our Foreign Office to establish military relations with Mexico strengthened public opinion against us in the United States."

perceived the imminence of "a great British offensive at Arras." On April 9th, "after a short but extraordinarily intense artillery preparation," the "powerful attack" came, led by tanks, on both sides of the Scarpe. "Several of our advance divisions were overcome. The neighboring divisions which stood firm suffered heavy loss. The enemy succeeded before noon in reaching our battery positions and seizing heights which dominated the country far to the east."

"The counter-attacking divisions were not there to throw the enemy back; only portions of the troops could be brought up by motor transport. The situation was extremely critical, and might have had far-reaching and serious consequences if the enemy had pushed farther forward. But the British contented themselves with their great success and did not continue the attack, at least not on April 9th.

"On that day I celebrated my birthday at Kreuznach. I had looked forward to the expected offensive with confidence, and was now deeply depressed. Was this destined to be the result of all our care and trouble during the past half-year? Had our principles of defensive tactics proved false, and if so what was to be done? I was not at that time able to get a



Presenting Colors to a Canadian Regiment about to Entrain for France

Here are some of the men who later became heroes at Vimy Ridge. Ludendorff in his memoirs merely refers to the "evacuation" of this stronghold, quite ignoring the gallant action which resulted in the defeat of the Germans at that spot.

clear view of all the details of the battle. I sent for officers who had taken part in the conflict in the front line, and by means of conversations with them and telephonic communications gained the impression that the principles laid down by General Headquarters were sound. But the whole art of leadership lies in applying them correctly. Moreover, a division had failed here which had previously enjoyed a high reputation. The battle of Arras on April 9th was a bad beginning for the decisive struggle of this year.

"April 10th and the following days were critical. The consequences of a break through of twelve to fifteen kilometers wide and six or more kilometers deep are not easy to meet. In view of the heavy losses in men, guns, and ammunition resulting from such a break through, colossal efforts are needed to make good the damage. It was the business of General Headquarters to provide reserves on a large scale. But it was absolutely impossible, with the troops

at our disposal and in view of the military situation, to have a second division immediately behind every division that might possibly fall out. A day like April 9th threw all calculations to the winds. Many days had to pass before a new line could really be formed and consolidated. The end of the crisis, even if the troops were available, depended very largely, as it generally does in such cases, on whether the enemy, after his first victory, would attack again, and by further success aggravate the difficulty of forming a new line. Our position having been weakened, such victories were to be won only too easily.

"The British attacked again at the same spot from the 10th onward in great strength, but not really on a grand scale. They extended their offensive on both sides, especially to the south as far as Bullecourt. On the 11th they took Monchy, and during the following night we evacuated Vimy Ridge. April 23rd and 28th and May 3rd were again days of severe fighting, and in

the intervals sharp local engagements took place. The battles continued; we launched minor counter-attacks, which were successful, but also suffered slight losses of territory here and there."

It is worth while noting here the complacent brevity with which Ludendorff refers to the "evacuation" of Vimy Ridge, quite ignoring the gallant action by which the Germans were driven from that important position.

The French offensive on the Aisne and in Champagne while the battle of Arras was at its height; the capture of the heights of Moronville; the smash through at various points of the Chemin des Dames, etc., seem not to have been of any advantage to the Entente, as "the new offensive came to grief with heavy loss." And "although France was obliged to celebrate it as a victory, it caused great depression."

"Changes were also made in the French high command. General Nivelle was replaced by General Pétain. Both had made their reputation at Verdun, General Pétain by his defense in the spring and summer of 1916, General Nivelle by his offensive of October to December. The tactics which had succeeded then were expected to lead the French Army to final victory in the spring of 1917."

THE FLANDERS BATTLES—JUNE-JULY, 1917

There followed a period of inactivity; then, on June 7th, the great Flanders battle began with the sudden and wholly unexpected explosions of the mines at the heights of Wyt-schaete and Messines, the effect of which "was simply staggering," and the Allies broke through. "June 7th cost us dear, and, owing to the success of the enemy attack, the price we paid was very heavy. But the British Army did not press its advantage." But it improved the position. The real battle began July 31st. This was the Entente's "bid for final victory and for our submarine base in Flanders." The fighting which "spread over large portions of the Western front became more severe and costly than any the German Army had yet experienced." That is the period of which the responsibility was so great "that it shook even me," Ludendorff confesses, as already quoted in section I of this article.

"From July 31st till well into September was a period of tremendous anxiety," before the Germans "succeeded in checking the hostile success." Not particularizing dead and wounded, Ludendorff says of the Entente success:

"Besides a loss of from one and a quarter to two and a half miles of ground along the whole front, it caused us very considerable losses in prisoners and stores and a heavy expenditure of reserves."

But even now, Ludendorff, at Kreuznach, wrestling with the "actual conduct of the war" and "many other duties," relieved only by moments of exercise and refreshment in the "beautiful rose-garden above the town," was filled with anxious misgivings because of the attitude of the people at home. Something decisive was imperatively demanded. That something was the forlorn hope embodied in the spring drive of 1918. We have seen how it ended.

VII

THE WAR'S BEGINNING

AN exceedingly discursive writer, General Ludendorff distributes the values of his narrative over such ranges of opinion, deduction and diffuse criticism or explanation that it is difficult to separate the important from the unessential, without omitting much that has interest as revelation of the mental workings of the man supposedly the guiding intelligence of the German campaign. It will have been evident from the quotations already made that Ludendorff is rather more an attorney for the defense than a restrained historian of the war. He has given us the story of a virtuous and industrial Germany suddenly compelled to strike in self-defense against a world of malign foes leagued for her ruin and hastening to her extinction, and whose devoted armies failed of their righteous purpose because of a lethargic Government and a dispirited people behind them. General Ludendorff says this in effect, not once but repeatedly in the course of his voluble narrative. The following is one instance of his self-exculpation:

"I am neither a 'Reactionary' nor a 'Democrat.' All I stand for is the prosperity, the cultural progress and national strength of the German people, authority and order. These are the pillars on which the future of our country rests. During the war this was our aim—to develop the greatest energy in its prosecution and so secure our military existence, and with it our equally important economic existence, both during and after the war.

"The inertia of the Imperial Government in so many matters had unpleasant consequences for me, in that ill-wishers, and sometimes even overzealous friends, dragged me into the strife of parties, although I was in no way concerned and never put myself forward in any way. What I did was misrepresented and criticized without reference to circumstances. My actions and statements were misinterpreted. Vague and totally unfounded assertions were spread broad-

cast. At first, my frank and soldierly way of thinking prompted me to dismiss all this with a shrug of the shoulders; it was not worth notice in view of the great work on which I was engaged. Later on I regretted these occurrences, but was unable to do anything to prevent them. I repeatedly asked the press to leave me alone. Beyond that, I was too busy to take any action myself. Besides, I had no platform from which to speak, and, above all, I gave the German nation credit for more sense of the stern reality. But it suited the government to have discovered a lightning-conductor. Instead of protecting me they gave free rein to the agitators, represented me as a dictator, put everything down to General Headquarters, and so embittered the feeling against me. That was the position, broadly speaking. The two Chancellors, Doctor Michaelis and Count von Hertling, were far above any such intrigues, but the irreparable mischief



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Belgium Under German Rule

"Nobody believed in Belgium's neutrality," says Ludendorff, thereby putting his stamp of approval on Bethmann-Hollweg's notorious "scrap of paper" declaration at the outbreak of the war. The above picture shows German soldiers visiting the Art Museum at Brussels on the day of the opening, February 7, 1915.



© Underwood and Underwood.

Barbed Wire Entanglements in an Antwerp Street

"The roads had been systematically destroyed and barricaded, showing that a great deal of work had been done beforehand."—Ludendorff in his discussion of the German invasion of Belgium.

—and, in view of my military position, it was nothing short of a national disaster—was already done.

"It became more and more the fashion to hold General Headquarters—which in this case meant myself—responsible for our troubles and miseries. For example, my name was associated, not only with the unavoidable hardships, but even with some of the abominations of the home-rationing system. Indeed, I was represented as their author and blamed accordingly. Neither the Quartermaster-General nor the Intendant-General, nor I, had anything to do with the food-supply at home, which was entirely in the hands of the War Ministry and the Food Control Office."

At the outbreak of war Ludendorff was only a brigade commander, at Strasburg. Therefore his was not the plan of campaign that was inaugurated in August, 1914. That was conceived by General Count von Schlieffen, "one of the greatest soldiers who ever lived" of whom Ludendorff says:

"It was planned by him, in the event of France not respecting Belgium's neutrality, or of Bel-

gium joining France. On this assumption the advance of the German main forces through Belgium followed as a matter of course. Any other plan of campaign would have been crippled, owing to the danger from Belgium to the German right flank, and would have precluded a quick and decisive blow at France, which was essential in order to meet in time the great danger of a Russian invasion into the heart of Germany. In the assumed military situation, as countless war-games had abundantly demonstrated, an offensive against Russia, with simultaneous defensive operations in the West, implied, as a matter of course, a long war, and was, therefore, rejected by Count von Schlieffen.

"When there was no longer any doubt as to the attitude of France and Belgium, Count von Schlieffen's scheme was carried into execution.

"As to how far General von Moltke conferred with Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann on the question of a march through Belgium, I do not know. In any case, no such negotiations were ever conducted through my department, as it was not a matter with which it was concerned. Whether the question had been delegated to the General Staff is also unknown to me. We were all convinced of the soundness of

this plan. Nobody believed in Belgium's neutrality.

JUSTIFYING THE INVASION

"In our unfavorable military-political position, in the center of Europe, surrounded by enemies, we had to reckon with foes greatly superior in numbers, and prepare ourselves accordingly, if we did not wish to allow ourselves to be crushed. It was well known how Russia pressed for war and continually increased her army. She was intent on humbling Austria-Hungary once and for all and becoming mistress of the Balkans. In France the thought of revenge had revived with renewed vigor; the old German Reichsland was to become French again. Among many other events in France, the reinstatement of the three years' compulsory service left no doubt of that country's intentions. England contemplated our economic ascendancy, our cheap labor, and our restless industry with distinct uneasiness. Moreover, Germany was the greatest land power in Europe, and, at the same time, she had a good fleet in course of expansion. This is what made England fear for her world hegemony. The Anglo-Saxon felt his ancient supremacy threatened. The English government concentrated its fleet, which had had its base of operations until recently in the Mediterranean, in the North Sea and English Channel. Lloyd George's menacing speech on July 21, 1911, threw a vivid and sudden light on England's intentions which had hitherto been concealed with great skill. It became increasingly certain that war would be forced upon us and that it would be a struggle the like of which the world had never seen. The fact that in non-military circles the probable strength of the enemy was underestimated constituted a real danger."

Ludendorff pressed for three additional army corps as a means of bringing the army nearer to the strength of the French in point of numbers. This proposal was given no consideration.

"The failure to provide these three additional army corps was dearly paid for later on. I was transferred to Düsseldorf, as commanding officer of the 39th Fusiliers; I attributed the change partly to my having pressed for those three additional army corps."

"August 4th the advance over the Belgian frontier began, while in Berlin the Reichstag, in a patriotic demonstration, voted its support to the government, and the party leaders, after the

speech from the throne had been read, vociferously proclaimed their unconditional allegiance to the Kaiser, come what might. The same day I had my first experience of fighting in an engagement near Visé, close to the Dutch frontier. It was evident that Belgium had long been prepared for our advance. The roads had been systematically destroyed and barricaded, showing that a great deal of work had been done beforehand. No such obstacles could be found on the southwest frontier of Belgium. Why had Belgium not taken similar precautions against France?

"The question as to whether we could secure the bridges at Visé intact was one of special importance. I went on to visit von der Marwitz's cavalry, which was then on its way to the town, but was able to advance only slowly, because one barricade after another barred the way. At my request a cyclist company was sent to reconnoiter. After a short while a cyclist returned with the news that the company had entered Visé and had been completely annihilated. I went with two men to see for myself, and to my joy I found the company intact with the exception of the leader, who had been badly wounded by a shot fired from the opposite bank of the Meuse. This little episode was useful to me later on, for it taught me to be more skeptical of such canards, or, as they were subsequently called, *Etappen* rumors.

"The beautiful Meuse bridges had been destroyed; Belgium was ready for war.

HIS IDEA OF ATROCITIES

"I was in Hervé the same evening, my first headquarters on enemy soil. We spent the night at an inn opposite the station. The whole town was intact, and we went to bed with a quiet mind. During the night I was awakened by brisk firing, some of which was directed on our house. The *franc-tireur* warfare of Belgium had begun. It broke out everywhere the next day, and it was this sort of thing which aroused that intense bitterness that during those first years characterized the war on the Western front, in contrast to the feeling prevailing in the East. The Belgian government took a grave responsibility upon itself. It had systematically organized civilian warfare. The *Garde Civique*, which in the days of peace had its own arms and special uniforms, were able to appear sometimes in one garb and sometimes in another. The Belgian soldiers must also have had a special civilian suit in their knapsacks at the commencement of the war. In the trenches near Fort Barchon, to the northeast of Liège, I myself



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Belgian Soldiers on Skirmish Duty

Ludendorff gives a vivid description of the effective work of the Belgian sniper, of which he was an unwilling witness. He says at one point in his narrative, "I started out at the head of a column and took the wrong road. We were immediately fired at, and men fell right and left. I shall never forget hearing the thud of bullets striking human bodies."

saw uniforms which had been left behind by soldiers who had fought there.

"Such action was not in keeping with the usages of war; our troops cannot be blamed if they took the sternest measures to suppress it. It is true that innocent persons may have had to suffer, but the story of 'Belgian atrocities' are nothing but clever, elaborate, and widely advertised legends, and the Belgian government can alone be held responsible. For my part, I had taken the field with chivalrous and humane conceptions of warfare. This *franc-tireur* warfare was bound to disgust any soldier; it caused me personally bitter disillusionment."

HIS FAVORITE RECOLLECTION

Writing of the Battle of Liège, Ludendorff says:

"The favorite recollection of my life as a soldier is the *coup de main* on the fortress. It was a bold stroke, in which I was able to fight just like any soldier of the rank and file who proves his worth in battle.

"The advance brigades had, indeed, a difficult task to accomplish before Liège. It was certainly an extraordinarily bold plan to penetrate the girdle of forts right into the heart of a modern fortress. The troops felt nervous; from conversations with the officers, I gathered that their faith in the success of this undertaking was only slight.

"In the night of August 5th, the advance on Liège through its fortifications began. The action in all its details has already been described by the General Staff in a pamphlet published by Stalling of Oldenburg. It is not my intention to go over this ground again, for I wish to set down my personal experiences only.

"THE THUD OF BULLETS"

"Toward midnight of the 5th, General von Emmich left Hervé. We rode to Micheroux, about two or three kilometers from Fort Fléron, where the 14th Infantry Brigade, under Major-General von Wussow, was assembling. Under cover of the darkness the troops, taking with them the unfamiliar but invaluable field kitchens, were collecting in a very unsoldierly manner on a road, which could easily have been swept by the guns of the fort. As it was, they were shot at from a house to the south of the road. A regular battle ensued, but the fort itself did not open fire, which was a miracle. About one o'clock the advance began. It was to take us north


of Fort Fléron via Retinne through the line of forts, and then on to the heights of La Charreuse, on the outskirts of the town. We were due there early in the morning. The other brigades which were to break through the girdle of forts at other points were to reach the town at the same hour.

"General von Emmich's staff was almost at the end of the column. Suddenly it came to a standstill. I pushed my way to the front. There was no apparent reason for the halt, which proved to have been due to a most regrettable misunderstanding of the situation. I myself was really only a spectator, and had no authority to give orders. I was there only to report on the operations at Liège to my army command, which was to arrive later, and also to coöminate General von Emmich's plans with General von Bülow's anticipated scheme. I put the column in motion again and remained at its head. In the meantime we had lost touch with the troops in front. We had considerable trouble in finding our way in the pitch darkness, but at length reached Retinne. We were still out of touch with the others. I started out from the village at the head of the column, and took the wrong road. We were immediately fired at, and men fell right and left. I shall never forget hearing the thud of bullets striking human bodies. We made a few attacks on the invisible enemy, but the firing became more intense. It was not easy to take our bearings in the dark, but there was no doubt that we had taken the wrong turning. The essential thing was to get out of range, and this was unfortunate, because the men could only think that I was afraid. But there was nothing else to be done—higher things were at stake. I crept back and gave my men the order to follow me to the outskirts of the village."

TAKES THE CITADEL OF LIÈGE

As darkness fell the evening of August 6th, Ludendorff found the German troops in an increasing nervous condition, so he "went up and down exhorting them to keep steady and hold fast. The battle-cry, 'We shall be in Liège to-morrow,' restored their spirits." But the general was not without anxiety.


"I shall never forget the night of August 6th. It was cold, and as I had left my kit behind, Major von Marcard gave me his cloak. I was very anxious and listened feverishly for the sound of fighting. I still hoped that at least one brigade had broken through the girdle of forts.



Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly.

A View of Dinant

A panorama of the Belgian city of Dinant from the citadel. There were whole blocks where not a building escaped ruin. The Germans had not, at the time when this picture was taken, mounted any guns on the citadel. Dinant dates from the sixth century and has frequently felt the horrors of war.



A Pentagonal Brialmont Fort

This type of fortification was considered impregnable by military men before 1914. When Germany invaded Belgium, however, the 42-cm. howitzers made short work of these supposedly indestructible defenses, as Ludendorff relates.

But all was quiet, though every half-hour or so a howitzer shell fell into the town. The suspense was unbearable. About 10 p. m. I ordered Captain Ott, with a Jäger company, to seize the bridges over the Meuse, in order to make them available for our farther advance, and also insure the safety of the brigade later on. The captain looked at me—and went. The company reached its objective without any fighting, but no reports came back.

"Morning broke. I went to General von Emmich, and discussed the situation with him. We adhered here to our decision to enter the town, but the general would not at that moment fix the time. His order to me to enter the town reached me soon after, while I was doing something to improve the position of the brigade and trying to reach the road by which the 11th Brigade was to advance. Colonel von Oven was in charge of the advance-guard; the rest of the brigade, with the prisoners, followed at a certain distance, headed by General von Emmich with his staff and myself with the brigade staff. As we entered, many Belgian soldiers who were standing about surrendered. Colonel von Oven was to occupy the citadel. As a result of the reports he received, he decided not to do this, but to take the road toward Fort Loncin, on the northwest side of the town, and take up a position at that exit from Liège. Thinking that Colonel von Oven was in possession of the citadel, I went there with the brigade adjutant in a Belgian car which I commandeered. When I arrived no German soldier was to be seen and the citadel was still in the hands of the enemy. I banged on the gates, which were locked. They were opened from inside. The few hundred Bel-

gians who were there surrendered at my summons.

"The brigade now came up and took possession of the citadel, which I immediately put in a state of defense."

HIS GREAT PIECE OF LUCK

He then set out for Aix-la-Chapelle, where he was received as one risen from the dead, and got his clothes off for the first time in ninety hours.

"I understood that General Headquarters in Berlin had been entertaining the gravest fears for our safety.

"The situation of the troops in the citadel was certainly critical, and I was very anxious about them, but the tension relaxed as the enemy remained inactive.

"The chronicle of the subsequent events at Liège is the province of official history. I may mention, however, that I happened to assist at the capture of Fort Ponsse, on the north front, and arrived at Fort Loncin just as it fell. It had been hit by a shell from one of our 42-cm. howitzers. The magazine had been blown up and the whole work collapsed. A number of dazed and blackened Belgian soldiers crawled out of the ruins, accompanied by some Germans who had been taken prisoner on the night of August 5th. All bleeding, they came toward us with their hands up, stammering out, '*Ne pas tuer, ne pas tuer*' ('Don't kill, don't kill!'). . . . We were no Huns, and our men brought water to refresh our enemies.

"I have always regarded it as a great piece

of luck that I was able to be present at the taking of Liège, if only because I had worked on the plan of attack in peacetime, and had always been impressed with the importance of the operation. His Majesty bestowed on me the Order *Pour le Mèrite* for my leadership of the brigade. Of course General von Emmich received it, too, as general officer in command, for his was the responsibility. Besides, the taking of Liège was not a one-man feat, but the result of the co-operation of a number, and the glory of reducing the fortress must be divided among them.


CALLED TO THE EAST

On August 21st he was present at the crossing of the Sambre, by the 2nd Guards Division, west of Namur. He says:

"The preliminaries of the great collision were carried through with perfect calm. It was wonderful to see the magnificent men of the Augusta Regiment go into battle."

On the morning of August 22nd he received his call to the East, letters from General von Moltke and General von Stein summoning him to General Headquarters at Coblenz. He had

been appointed Chief of Staff to the Eighth Army in East Prussia. General von Moltke's letter ran:



Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly.

The Ruined Cathedral of Arras

Ludendorff says of one of his interviews with the Kaiser, "His Majesty spoke seriously of the Eastern situation, and deeply regretted that part of the German Fatherland should suffer invasion by the enemy. He was mindful of the sufferings of his people." The above picture shows the sort of warfare that was being waged during the same period by the Kaiser's armies in Northern France.



© Photo by Kirtland.

A Gun Behind the Lines

Russian soldiers on the Eastern front with a gun that dealt destruction to the Germans.

"You have before you a new and difficult task, perhaps even more difficult than that of storming Liège. . . . I know no other man in whom I have such absolute trust. You may be able to save the situation in the East. You must not be angry with me for calling you away from a post in which you are perhaps on the threshold of a decisive action, which, please God, will be conclusive. This is yet another sacrifice you are called upon to make for the Fatherland. The Kaiser, too, has confidence in you. Of course, you will not be made responsible for what has already happened, but with your energy, you can prevent the worst from happening. So answer this new call, which is the greatest compliment that can be paid any soldier. I know that you will not belie the trust reposed in you."

General von Stein, who was at that time Quartermaster-General, and later became Minister of War, concluded his letter by saying:

"You must go, therefore. The interests of the state make it imperative. Your task is a difficult one, but you are equal to it."

Ludendorff digresses here with more than usual interest, in that he gives a needed touch

of personal revelation that has to do with the man instead of the soldier. The studied worship of Bismarck explains, too, a phase of his character,—impatience of opposition. He says:

"I was proud of my new task and of the trust placed in me, as revealed by the two letters. I was exalted at the thought of serving my Emperor, army, and Fatherland, and in a position of great responsibility at a most critical juncture. Love of country, loyalty to my sovereign, appreciation of the truth that the duty of every one is to devote his life to his family and the state, these were the inherited principles which accompanied me into the world when I left my parents' roof. My parents were not wealthy; their long and faithful work had brought them no material reward. Our happy and harmonious family life was conducted on very economical and simple lines. Both my father and my mother sacrificed their all in providing for their six children. I take this opportunity of thanking them before the whole world.

"I had a hard struggle to make ends meet when I was a young officer, but my enjoyment of life did not suffer on that account. Much of my time was spent in my simple subaltern's apartments in Wesel, Wilhelmshaven, and Kiel.

reading works on history, military history, and geography. I extended and developed the knowledge I had acquired as a boy. I learned to be proud of my Fatherland and its great men, and ardently worshiped at the shrine of Bismarck's powerful and passionate genius."

HE MEETS HINDENBURG

After his session with von Moltke at Coblenz he reported to the Kaiser.

"His Majesty, who was very calm, spoke seriously of the Eastern situation, and deeply regretted that part of the German Fatherland should suffer invasion by the enemy. He was mindful of the sufferings of his people. The Kaiser decorated me with the Order *Pour le Mérite*, which had been awarded me for my work at Liège, and spoke appreciatively of me. All my life this occasion will be a proud, if sad, memory.

"At nine o'clock in the evening I left Coblenz in a special train for the Eastern front.

"Shortly before my departure I learned that General von Hindenburg had accepted the post of Commander-in-Chief, and would board the train at Hanover at four o'clock in the morning.

"The general was on the station at Hanover, and I reported to him. It was the first time we had met. All other versions belong to the realm of fiction.

"I explained the situation shortly, and we then went to bed.

"About two o'clock in the afternoon of August 23d we arrived at Marienburg, where the army command awaited us. The situation had changed and the decision to retire behind the Vistula had been abandoned. It was intended to hold the line of the river Passarge. General Grünert, Chief of Staff of the Eighth Army, and Lieutenant-Colonel Hoffmann were responsible for this change of plan.

"Our reception at Marienburg was anything but cheerful. It seemed like entering another world to come into this depressing atmosphere after Liège and the rapid advance in the West. But things soon changed, and the general atmosphere improved."

THE TANNENBERG BATTLE

He gives various details of the movements and actions of the armies engaged in the Tannenberg preliminaries, including the attack on Usdau, where the Narew army "was

broken through," and might have been annihilated but that "the forces at my disposal were insufficient." Apropos of the by no means smooth conditions Ludendorff makes this digressive but illuminating comment:


"A general has much to bear and needs strong nerves. The civilian is too inclined to think that war is only like the working out of an arithmetical problem with given numbers. It is anything but that. On both sides it is a case of wrestling with powerful, unknown physical and psychological forces, a struggle which inferiority in numbers makes all the more difficult. It means working with men of varying force of character and with their own views. The only quantity that is known and constant is the will of the leader.

"All those who criticize the dispositions of a general ought first to study military history, unless they have themselves taken part in a war in a position of command. I should like to see such people compelled to conduct a battle themselves. They would be overwhelmed by the greatness of their task, and when they realized the obscurity of the situation, and the exacting nature of the enormous demands made on them, they would doubtless be more modest. Only the head of the government, or statesman who decides on war, shoulders the same or a bigger burden of responsibility than that of the commander-in-chief. In his case it is a question of one great decision only, but the commander of an army is faced with decisions daily and hourly. He is continuously responsible for the welfare of many hundred thousands of persons, even of nations. For a soldier there is nothing greater, but at the same time more awesome and responsible, than to find himself at the head of an army or the entire armed forces of his country."

One does not discover in Ludendorff's account of the battle the inspiration of the almost idolatrous popular acclaim of Hindenburg, by the Germans, as the master spirit of that determinate campaign. On the contrary, the impression gained is that Ludendorff's was, in fact, the magisterial mind. He does not particularize Hindenburg as being entitled to any special distinction. Here is his summary:

"The number of prisoners taken and the amount of booty captured are already well known.

"The enemy losses in killed and wounded, too, were extremely heavy. The widely circulated report that thousands of Russians were driven



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As the Target Looks to a Bomb-Dropping Scout

Far below the plane the ground stretches out like a huge map—everything is very small and very far away. The scout must drop his bomb in the direction of his target, making all allowances for his own speed and that of the wind.

into the marshes and there perished in a myth; no marsh was to be found anywhere near.

"One of the most brilliant battles in the history of the world had been fought. It had been the achievement of troops which had been fighting for weeks, sometimes unsuccessfully. To the training of our army in peace-time, alone, did we owe this feat. The battle was a glorious triumph for the generals and their troops, indeed, for every officer and man, and the whole country.

"Germany and Austria-Hungary rejoiced—the world was silent. At my suggestion, the battle was named the battle of Tannenberg, in memory of that other battle long ago in which the Teutonic Knights defeated the united Lithuanian and Polish hosts. Is any German, as then, ever going to let the Lett, and more especially the Pole, take advantage of our misfortune to do us violence? Are centuries of old German culture to be lost?

"I could not rejoice whole-heartedly at our

mighty victory, for the strain imposed on my nerves by the uncertainty about Rennenkampf's army had been too great. All the same, we were proud of this battle. The victory had been brought about by a break-through, an encircling movement, firm resolution to win, and intelligent limitation of aims. Despite our inferiority on the Eastern front, we had succeeded in assembling on the battlefield a force nearly as strong as that of the foe. I thought of General Count von Schlieffen and thanked him for his teaching.

"In the Protestant church at Allenstein General von Hindenburg and I rendered thanks to Almighty God for this victory.

"I had not a moment to spare for relaxation. I had to work out the regrouping of the army for further operations. It was an uncommonly difficult task simultaneously to finish one battle and make plans for the next. Innumerable other matters had to be attended to betweenwhiles.

One urgent matter was the removal of the prisoners. Having regard to the uncertainty of the situation, their numbers alone was a heavy burden.

"I was decorated with the Iron Cross, Second Class, of which I was exceedingly proud. Even now, when I think of Liège and Tannenberg, my heart swells with pardonable satisfaction. The value of the Iron Cross, Second Class, dwindled in the course of the war. That is quite natural, though regrettable. But the Order should be worn with pride by any one who has honorably won it."

GENERAL SAMSONOFF'S SUICIDE

We have this reminder of one tragic episode of the battle so disastrous to the Russians:

"General Samsonoff shot himself and was buried near Willenberg without being recognized. His widow, who was in Germany in connection with matters concerning prisoners of war, was able to trace his grave by a locket which had been taken for identification purposes from the body of the fallen general when he was buried.

"The Russian generals who were taken prisoner arrived at Osterrode and reported to General von Hindenburg."

THE DRIVE ON RENNENKAMPF

Ludendorff says of the advance against Rennenkampf's army, which began September 4, 1914:

"This operation also was extraordinarily daring. To begin with the Russian Niemen Army, with its twenty-four infantry divisions, was very much stronger than the Eighth Army, with its fifteen to sixteen divisions. Moreover, the Russian divisions consisted of sixteen battalions, and ours, at that time, of twelve. The Russian fighting strength was further increased by from four to six divisions, which were being assembled round Osowiec and Augustovo. This immense superiority could be concentrated against us at any moment and at any chosen point. Our right wing, in particular, was in danger to the east of the lakes. It might be overwhelmed. Even in such a situation as this, we did not hesitate for a moment to venture on a battle. Our superior training was in our favor. Tannenberg had given us a great advantage.

"The army command would have liked the right wing to have been stronger, and a division


of the 20th Army Corps, west of the lakes, had been kept ready to be placed at our disposal. But this division had to be returned to the corps. The front of fifty kilometers, on which the four corps attacked the enemy, was certainly too long. Further, the staff of the Guard Reserve Corps feared a Russian attack, and had therefore concentrated its unit. The north wing had to stand firm on the Pregel, otherwise the Eighth Army might be outflanked there. The attack of the enveloping wing must be stronger than had originally been calculated. We had to wait and see whether our main attack would succeed or fail. Hard fighting would be the decisive factor here. We could only do everything in our power to insure the result for which we were striving.

"On the morning of September 10th we received the decisive news that during the night of the 9th the enemy had given way before the 1st Reserve Corps to the north of Gerdauen—probably in consequence of the continuous attacks of the 1st and 27th Army Corps. It was said that the corps had occupied their position, and intended to march on. The rejoicing at headquarters can be imagined. A great success had once more been achieved, but still nothing decisive. The Russian Army was not yet beaten, by any means. Northeast of Lötzen we had had only local successes. It was important to carry out a frontal attack with all our strength, and throw ourselves on the receding enemy while the enveloping wing advanced east of Rominten Woods toward the Wirballen-Kovno road. In this way we intended to drive the Russians as far as possible toward the Niemen.

"It had also to be taken into account that Rennenkampf, who was now in touch with the reinforcements arriving farther south, would be able to make a vigorous attack in any direction. Our lines were very thin everywhere, though the two northern groups, which had hitherto been separated by Lake Mauer, had joined up again. The situation was extremely critical and the tension was great.

"The troops had a fresh task before them. Keeping in close touch with one another, they had to pursue the enemy unceasingly by forced marches, and attack him whenever he made a stand. At the same time they had to wait for the coöperation of neighboring columns before making local enveloping movements, so as to minimize the losses. . . .

"The results of the battle were not so obvious as those of Tannenberg. There were no operations in the enemy's rear, for they were not possible. The enemy did not make a stand, but with-



London Times History.

An Encounter Between Russian and German Outposts

Ludendorff discredits some of the sensational reports that were printed concerning the Tannenberg battle. "The widely circulated reports that thousands of Russians were driven into the marshes and there perished is a myth," he writes, adding, "no marsh was to be found anywhere near."

drew, so that they could be forced back still farther only by frontal and flanking attacks. While at Tannenberg we took over 90,000 prisoners, we could now count only 45,000. But whatever could have been done under the circumstances had been accomplished.

"As a matter of fact, Rennenkampf does not

seem to have ever intended a serious stand. At any rate, he began his retreat very early in the operations and marched at night. Our airmen did certainly note the course of some retreating columns, but their reports were too vague. The Russian knew how to conduct retreats and move masses of troops without using the highroads.

"Our continuous movements, combined with the ever-present menace of envelopment, drove the retreating Russian Army before us so quickly that they crossed the Niemen in a state of dissolution. For the next few weeks they need not be regarded as first-class fighting material, unless the Russians should reinforce them with fresh troops. . . .

"Many of the Russian troops behaved in an exemplary manner in East Prussia in August and September. Wine cellars and provision stores were guarded, and Rennenkampf kept strict discipline at Insterburg. But the war brought with it endless hardships and terrors. The Cossacks were rough and cruel. They burned and plundered. Many inhabitants were killed, women were outraged and civilians sometimes carried off. These actions were for the most part quite senseless, and one sought in vain for any reason for them. The people had not offered the slightest opposition to the Russians; they were docile and had not taken part in the fighting, in accordance with our wishes. The Russians alone must bear the responsibility for their misdeeds.

"The Russian Army had been a heavy burden on East Prussia. Now we felt proudly that we had rescued German soil from the enemy. The joy and gratitude of the people were very great.

"This province was not rescued only to come under a foreign yoke. Heaven preserve us from such a humiliation!

SURPRISED TO BE TRANSFERRED

"On September 14th we were at Insterberg, enjoying to the full our satisfaction over our victory and splendid achievements. All the greater was my surprise at my appointment as chief of staff of the Southern Army, which was being formed under General von Schubert at Breslau.

"On the evening of September 14th I took leave of General von Hindenburg and of my comrades. I did not find it easy to leave the commander-in-chief and the staff after two victorious battles. General von Hindenburg had always agreed to my suggestions, and gladly accepted the responsibility of consenting to them. A fine sense of confidence had grown up between us, the confidence of men who think alike. Among the staff there was complete unanimity of view in all military matters.

"I left Insterburg on the morning of September 15th, traveling by car through Graudenz and Thorn to Breslau, my destination. I knew absolutely nothing about my new sphere of action.

It seemed to me more limited than my previous one, but I soon found that I had a great and important field for my activities.

"The journey to Breslau was not exactly cheerful. I went through Allenstein and had dinner at the same hotel in which I had lived. Life had already resumed its old course as in times of peace. I was in Graudenz by the afternoon, and traveled through wind and rain, via Bromberg, to Posen, where I arrived in pitch darkness and spent the night.

"I was connected in many ways with the province and town of Posen. My father, who was descended from a family of Pomeranian merchants, lived there until after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. I myself had been stationed at Posen, and was glad to see it again. I was there from 1902 until 1904, as senior staff-officer of the corps command of the Fifth Corps. While holding this position (and also my previous one of senior staff-officer of the 9th Division at Glogau) I had an opportunity of seeing the difficulties that surround the administration of this province. I had been in the district of Jarotchin and Pleschen for maneuvers. Poland has shown us no gratitude for what we have done for her. Those who had repeatedly warned Germany against her aspirations were quite right. With deep grief I see my native province faced with a period of much difficulty and sorrow. . . .

"On September 17th General von Hindenburg arrived at Breslau with some of the staff. Once more we had been called upon to work together in an important military position."

JAPANESE REVENGE

Ludendorff's curious habit of divagation is well illustrated in the following excerpt from his reference to General von Conrad's proposed offensive against the Russians in the early October. He says:

"The main body of the Russian armies was still to the East, with weak forces on the west bank of the San. The groups which had been defeated in East Prussia were behind the upper Narew and the Niemen. The Siberian Army Corps had not all arrived on the western frontier of Russia. Some of them were still on the way. They were particularly good, and gave us a great deal of trouble.

"It had been a bitter disappointment that our diplomacy had not succeeded in keeping Japan from joining our enemies. That was the result

of our unfortunate policy in pulling the chestnuts out of the fire for Russia after the peace of Shimonoseki in 1895 and preventing Japan from seizing Port Arthur. Russia never gave us any thanks for this, and it did us infinite harm with Japan. She naturally could not understand what interest we had in weakening her position.

"The ultimatum handed to us by the Japanese government in August, 1914, is said to have corresponded word for word with our ultimatum of 1895. We spoke at that time of the restoration of Port Arthur; now Japan spoke of the restoration of Kiaochau. The Japanese knows how to take his revenge!

"As regards prospective operations, it was to be expected that the Russians would pursue the Austrian army, in spite of all the difficulties an advance involved. The space south of the Sandomir-Cracow stretch of the Vistula was indeed much too narrow for the Russians. An invasion of Hungary was out of the question for them at that time, as they ran the risk of being defeated north of the Carpathians. It could be

taken for granted that the Russians would also advance below the confluence of the San; in what strength and on what extent of front depended essentially on whether they knew of the new German reinforcements and how they had taken their defeat in East Prussia."

MENTAL AND SPIRITUAL STRAIN

The details of operations on the Russian front rather more tax patience than gratify interest. They are more in the character of a labored official report than in the form of an informing narrative. But "the tactical results of the winter campaign in Masuria were important: 110,000 prisoners and many hundred guns. The Russian Tenth Army had been annihilated, and Russia's strength was once more perceptibly reduced"; "the Austrian army's offensive for the relief of Przemyśl had been unsuccessful"; March 9th to 11th following "witnessed a great success, for the



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Japanese Artillery Advancing on Tsing Tao

Japan's alliance with the Entente was a great disappointment to Ludendorff, who blamed German diplomacy during the Russo-Japanese war for Japan's decision. "The ultimatum handed to us by the Japanese government in August, 1914, is said to have corresponded word for word with our ultimatum of 1895," he said. "The Japanese knows how to take his revenge!"

newly formed Tenth Russian Army suffered defeat"; early in March he was "able to regard all danger east of the Pissa as past"; "up to March 7th the Russians attacked incessantly between Mlawa and Chorshela, and suffered very heavy losses, but in vain." "There was fighting on the whole of the eastern and southern front of East and West Prussia"; "from the end of March and beginning of April onward the troops on the whole of the Southern front could at last enjoy the rest they longed for"; "on March 21st Memel was freed, and on the 22nd three thousand people who had been carried off were recovered from the enemy"; "Taurögen fell on March 29th"; "East Prussia was once more free, and henceforth was spared any further enemy invasion." "It was now possible to begin the work of reconstruction."

"Since the middle of February our headquarters had been at Lötzen. These were hard days for me until the beginning of April. I had to abandon the hopes I had entertained of making immediate strategical use of the advantages gained by the winter battle. Tactically this battle had been successful, and that filled me with satisfaction. It was comforting to know that the Grand Duke's heavy attacks had been shattered and that we stood everywhere on hostile soil. But we had taken but one step toward the final decision against Russia, and it was with that goal that my innermost thoughts and feelings were most concerned. The fearful waste of Russian strength in East and West Prussia ought, later on, to help the operations in Galicia. The Russian losses had been extraordinarily heavy in comparison with ours. Even Russia's enormous resources in man power could not stand such a drain indefinitely.

"Each of the successive tactical situations had made the fullest demands on my mental and spiritual energies. It is simply impossible to put it all on paper—the proud hopes, the despondency, the disappointments, the heart-searchings before a decision, the annoyance caused by one thing and another. I cannot describe the differences which had so often to be overcome, nor can I portray how deeply I felt for the troops who had to bear the privations of a winter campaign in such inclement weather.

"Later on I had happier times at Lötzen. Our quarters and the office were small, but I liked them. I look back with pleasure on that time in the friendly little East Prussian town.

"WILL GERMANY SUICIDE AGAIN?"

"About this time General Headquarters ordered the number of regiments to a division in the West to be reduced from four to three, so that a division now had nine battalions instead of twelve. We did the same on our front. In this way a larger number of strategical units was formed. Operations were thus facilitated, and no doubt this was a great advantage. But a division of nine battalions is too weak, tactically, while the staff and administrative services are too large. After the war I should most certainly



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Italian Neutrality

Italy's neutrality was indeed a series of question marks to the Central Powers from the outbreak of the war. In fact, Ludendorff, writing in his memoirs of the 1915 summer campaign in Russia, says, "It became more and more certain that we had to reckon on Italy entering the war on the side of our enemies."

have advocated the reestablishment of the larger divisions.

"It remains to be seen what will now happen to our proud and splendid army, which, assisted by allies of not very high military value, has kept its head above water for the last four years, defied the world, and preserved its homeland almost intact from the horrors of war. Shall such an army vanish completely? Will Germany commit suicide once more? I cannot and shall never believe it. The seventy to eighty millions of Germans will some day come together and think things over. When they remember the overwhelming military achievements of this war, they will not forget what a really united army can do."

EASTERN 1915 SUMMER CAMPAIGN

Though the attacks against German territory east of the Vistula abated early in April, the Grand Duke continued his offensive against the Austrian army with the express purpose of descending on Hungary from the Carpathians and putting Austria-Hungary out of the war. The Headquarters Staff at Teschen considered the military situation of the Dual Monarchy to be extremely grave. Italy's attitude had become increasingly doubtful. She had refused all Austria-Hungary's extensive concessions, the necessity for which Ludendorff had urged on General von Conrad, and was fairly caught in the net spread by the Entente. "In spite of their superiority in numbers," says Ludendorff, "the latter needed additional forces to enable them to master us. It became more and more certain that we had to reckon on Italy entering the war on the side of our enemies. Austria-Hungary realized that she had to reinforce her troops on the Italian frontier considerably. The Serbian Army also seemed to require watching again."

Ludendorff continues:

"The more the Austrian army was obliged to weaken itself in Hungary and Galicia, in favor of other fronts, the more severely would it feel a Russian attack. Feeling at Teschen became ever more despondent. The Austrian liaison officer, acting on instructions from General von Conrad, described the situation to us as one of the utmost gravity. Judging by my knowledge of the Austrian-Hungarian army, this was certainly true. We forwarded these serious reports and our interpretation of them to General Headquarters.

"About the middle of April the situation in the Carpathians became still more critical. General Boroevic's army was thrown back over the ridge, while farther east the German Southern Army stood firm. The moment had arrived when help was absolutely necessary. We despatched the 25th Reserve Division, which was with the Ninth Army awaiting the order, by rail. They arrived just in time to avert the worst disaster.

"We reported the measures we had taken to General Headquarters, who fully concurred in our view of the situation. They raised the Beskiden Corps under General von der Marwitz, who had hitherto commanded our 38th Reserve Corps. The commander-in-chief in the East also gave up the 4th Division and a newly former division to reinforce the Carpathian

front. But, in spite of all this, the situation there continued to be grave. We had to send reinforcements to the Serbian front at the same time. These reinforcements afterward joined General von Linsingen during his attack in May.

"The German General Staff now resolved to try to obtain a decision against Russia. The plan was an ambitious one, and the very idea of weakening our forces in the West in spite of the critical situation there was a proof of their readiness to accept responsibility."

He describes the movements and positions of the German and Russian forces, and recounts a number of minor engagements in the next two months, particularly commending "a well-prepared attack brilliantly carried out by the troops" when General von Mackensen broke through the Russian front on the middle Dunajec in the early hours of May 2d, after which the Russians withdrew from Hungary northward over the ridge of the Carpathians, greatly to the relief of the Austrian army.

"It was high time," he says, for Italy entered the war at this time with an army of 600,000 men besides numerous second line formations.

The Germans pushed their advance on the San until the difficulties of keeping up communications with the rear forced them to stop. Those difficulties were overcome early in June, and the advance was resumed. "The heaviest fighting always fell to the German troops." The Russians were forced to retreat still farther towards the Bug. The Russians also withdrew troops from Galicia.

"The withdrawal of the Russian front in Galicia, however painful it was for them, did not result in any decisive military victory. They withdrew, fighting all the way, just as far as we could venture to advance, having regard for our communications. They were not yet fighting on their own soil, and until that stage had been reached they could afford to abandon large areas. Moreover, in these frontal engagements our losses were not inconsiderable. It remained to be seen whether other plans would not hold out better prospects. We could add nine or ten divisions to Gallwitz's Detachment, which had now developed into the Twelfth Army, for a concentrated offensive in the direction of the Lower Narew, but we had no great hopes of this. It was to be assumed with certainty that Russians, at the best, would offer resistance, and then withdraw as they had done in Galicia.

DISAGREES WITH GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

"In theory the operations which we had contemplated after the winter campaign seemed more promising; that is, press forward along the Osowiec-Grodno line, and perhaps also past Lomza. Such a movement might have had decisive results. It was by far the shortest way to the rear of the Russian forces which were retreating from East Galicia between the Vistula and the Bug. We reconnoitered the swamps on either side of Osowiec in the hope of finding some way across, but, as we had foreseen, the results were unsatisfactory. The condition of the ground put all thought of crossing there out of the question. We had to reckon on strong resistance on the Osowiec-Grodno line, a very strong tactical position in itself and presumably strongly held. We could not expect to overcome this resistance and the other difficulties which lay before us. It was with the deepest regret that I felt myself unable to agree to such an offensive, even at the suggestion of General Headquarters.

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"It seemed more advisable, in the first instance, to take Kovno by a direct attack of the Tenth Army from the west, and a simultaneous enveloping movement by the Niemen Army from the north. Once this fortress had fallen, the corner-stone of the Russian defense on the Niemen, the road to Vilna, and to the rear of the Russian forces would be open. They would then have to retreat with all possible speed. If the Niemen Army and the Tenth Army could receive even small reinforcements at the right moment and be supplied with sufficient transport, it was to be hoped that they could fall on the northern flank of the retreating host via Vilna, with such force that the summer campaign of 1915 would end in a decisive defeat of the Russian armies. The harder we pressed our advance from East Galicia into the area east of the Bug, the more likely were we to achieve this success.

"In pursuance of this idea the Niemen Army was reinforced by the 41st Infantry Division, 76th Reserve Division, and the 4th Cavalry Division of the Eighth Army.

"The preparations for the operations against Kovno were just about to be begun when His Majesty commanded the Field-Marshal and me to go to Posen for July 1st. Here, at the suggestion of the Chief of the General Staff, and after having heard the Field-Marshal's proposals, the Kaiser decided that the Polish offensive should be continued, and, in particular, that the

Twelfth Army should break through the enemy line facing them and push on to the Narew, while the Ninth Army and General von Woyrsch should advance toward the Vistula. The allied armies were also to continue the advance between the Bug and the Vistula.

"Our General Staff believed that in these operations part of the Russian forces still in the bend of the Vistula could be annihilated. I



Field-Marshal von Hindenburg

Ludendorff bears witness to the overwhelming popularity of Hindenburg. "With the most profound satisfaction," he writes, "I saw him become the German national hero of this war, the very personification of victory for every German."

had to keep my views to myself and hope that the movement I wanted would be carried out when General von Gallwitz had reached the Narew and found that he also could make progress only by means of frontal attacks. I thought that even then there would still be time to put it into execution. The advance of our line in Lithuania and Courland by the troops already there might serve as a favorable introduction to the operation. But we had to abandon any idea of getting the reinforcements hitherto earmarked for Courland, and taking Kovno.

HIS PLAN STILL HELD UP

"In accordance with the instructions from General Headquarters, preparations for the crossing of the Narew were now begun on an extensive scale. Not only the Twelfth Army, but the right wing of the Eighth Army also were got into position, so that the Twelfth Army should advance between the Vistula and the Schkwa with Pultusk-Roshan as their objective, and the Eighth Army should reach the river between the Schkwa and the mouth of the Pissa.

"Both armies began the attack on July 13th. Thanks to the careful organization by the Army Headquarters Staff and the excellent spirit of the troops, it was entirely successful.

"Far from the great battlefield in Poland, the Niemen Army had also started an offensive in the middle of July, and made great progress eastward."

Ludendorff says:

"I was now quite convinced that the time had come to initiate the movement I had recommended, a movement on the lower Niemen against Kovno, followed by an attack in full

force in the rear of the Russian armies. The troops could be taken from Woynsch's Detachment and the Ninth, Twelfth, and Eighth Armies. We had delayed quite long enough already. The taking of Kovno would take time, and the Russian retreat in Galicia was already far advanced. But it seemed still possible to achieve great things, at any rate something bigger than could be effected by the operations then in progress. These could end in nothing more than a pure frontal west-east retirement to the enemy.

"General Headquarters stuck to their point of view, and still preferred their movement over the Vistula and Narew. We were not allowed to weaken the armies engaged in that operation for the benefit of the Tenth and Niemen Armies. A new division from the West was assigned to both the Twelfth and the Eighth Army by General Headquarters. Whether our General Staff, for reasons connected with the general military situation, no longer wished to embark upon such an extensive and far-reaching plan as that we had suggested, it is impossible for me to say."

He assures us that "the Russians were certainly kept on the move." They frequently



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German Soldiers Having Their Mid-day Meal at a Field Kitchen on the Eastern Front

Ludendorff gives a clear-cut picture of the sufferings of the German soldiers on the Eastern front. He says in one part of his memoirs: "Clothing and boots were in rags and tatters. Supply was difficult. It was almost impossible to find billets, as the Russians systematically destroyed or burned stores and villages."

made fierce counter-attacks with strong forces, sometimes offering prolonged resistance, then they moved on again. Ludendorff explains why the Germans did not push on with greater vigor and so compel the Russians to go to pieces. Continuous movement during many weeks over bad roads in bad weather had imposed a tremendous strain on the troops. "Clothing and boots were in rags and tatters. Supply was difficult. It was almost impossible to find billets, as the Russians systematically destroyed or burned stores and villages. They drove the cattle before them and left them to die on the highroad."

Supply and transport conditions became more unfavorable from day to day. So the movement "slowed down and lost its sting." Officers and men did everything in their power to knock to pieces the retiring Russians; but "when perfect discipline, the greatest enthusiasm, and the most strenuous efforts on the part of every individual cannot stave off the stage of exhaustion, the will of the commander is equally powerless."

The Russians withdrew from Warsaw early in August, and the Germans took possession.

"The capture of Warsaw gave us special satisfaction. We had fought so hard for it in the autumn of 1914. In that campaign were laid the foundations of the present successes, of which the occupation of Warsaw was the sign and symbol."

DID NOT HAVE FREE HAND

Though his ideas were not as influential with General Headquarters as he believed they should have been with reference to various actions, Ludendorff had no notion of playing the rôle of Achilles. Disapproving at times, he never sulked. For example:

"The plans for the capture of Novo Georgievsk, the direction of the Eighth and Tenth Armies, the attack on Kovno, and the situation in Lithuania and Courland made further great demands on myself and my staff. Although we had not the same free hand in conducting the operations of the summer campaign of 1915 as in previous campaigns, but followed the plans laid down by instructions of General Headquarters, there still remained an enormous amount of work for me to do, and the necessity of forming and executing a number of decisions, both great and small. Added to this

there were differences of opinion with General von Falkenhayn, such as are only too likely to occur between men of independent views, but which made it more than ever incumbent on me to carry out most punctiliously the plans of General Headquarters, which were opposed to mine, rather than my own or those that coincided with mine.

"The capture of Novo Georgievsk, August 19th, did not directly affect the progress of the operations. It was an independent operation, taking place in the rear of the armies pushing on eastward. General von Beseler, the conqueror of Antwerp, and Colonel von Sauberzweig, his extremely energetic Chief of Staff, guaranteed that there should be no question of a so-called siege with all its attendant complications. A mere investment of Novo Georgievsk would be enough to bring about its fall. The garrison of eighty thousand could not hold out for long. It is astonishing that the Grand Duke should have let it come to this, whereas, later on, Brest-Litovsk and Grodno were evacuated. He ought to have told himself that it was impossible to hold the fortress, and that the condition of the fortifications was not good enough to withstand heavy high-angle fire.

"The troops released by this event were sent to the Tenth Army, with the concurrence of General Headquarters, and this force thus received the reinforcements it required, unfortunately very late in the day. The heaviest batteries were to be sent against Gordon. Kovno had already fallen.

The attack on Kovno had been eagerly anticipated by Ludendorff as a feature of the deferred plan he had urged upon General Headquarters. He describes the storming of Kovno as "an intrepid stroke." It was the more notable as a success because the Germans had a lack of heavy howitzers. The capture was the more satisfactory for the reason that, with the exception of the factories, which had been burned down, "the town of Kovno was saved." But the population had fled, and Ludendorff "had an opportunity of seeing how difficult it was for troops to find billets without the coöperation of the inhabitants."

Apropos of various actions in East Prussia and referring to the taking of certain fortified towns, Ludendorff says casually, in a tone that may be appreciated:

"For some time past we had had a squadron of bombing aeroplanes at our disposal in East Prussia. The forts in which an enemy corps

or. army staff had its quarters were often bombed. Splendid results had been reported; but when I was able to have the damage inspected it was impossible to verify it. In the interest of the troops I was glad of this, as they were able to use the forts as billets. It was only later that our bombs became effective,



German Field Cannon for Defense Against Aeroplanes

Ludendorff mentions the presence of German squadrons of bombing aeroplanes on the eastern front, which were evidently not much of a success at first, for he adds, "It was only later that our bombs became effective, when the airmen took more interest in bombing work."

when the airmen took more interest in bombing work."

THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN ENDS

September 9th the Germans began a drive to force the Russian front back through Vilna to Dvinsk, cavalry divisions to advance on Polotzk-Minsk. The attack, however, hardly attained the momentum of a drive. In addition to the deterring effects of bad roads, unfavorable weather and other difficulties that "imposed a tremendous strain on the troops, but the Russians had realized the danger which threatened them, and had brought up reinforcements." Ludendorff says:

"The great retreat along the Russian front from Poland into West Russia had, unfortunately, progressed so far that their troops which had been brought up north were able to reach the Cilia in time. The German enveloping movement came to a standstill here. Its strength was insufficient to overcome the enemy resistance. The Russians, for their part, crossed the Vilia north of Molodetchno for a counter-attack, but were also unable to make progress. In the meantime the German frontal attack had made but slow progress. The Russians were not able to hold Vilna against this pressure, and retired slowly, fighting along the whole front. The German front at Busswee had still enough force in it to reach the region west of Smorgon, the western Beresina and the neighborhood of Baranovici and Pinsk.

"During the gradual advance from Vilna on Smorgon I saw clearly that the operations would have to be broken off. A continuation of the movement was out of the question. . . . Therefore at my desire the operations were stopped."

Moralizing on the end of the summer campaign Ludendorff indulges in the following mixed reflections:

"The Russians had been defeated and their front forced back. The operations round Kovno had not met with any great success, as they started too late. That was the principal reason. The enemy had been able to thwart the enveloping movement with which they were threatened on the Vilia. If they had been a few days' march farther west they would not have been in a position to do so.

"Throughout the whole war we never succeeded, either on the Eastern or Western front, in exploiting a big strategical break-through to the full. The one between Vilna and Dvinsk was nearest to succeeding. It showed that a strategical break-through yields its full reward only when it is followed up by a tactical envelopment. It was left for the Bulgarian Army in September, 1918, to show to the world the momentous consequences of such an operation. These consequences, however, were possible only because of the utter collapse of that army.

"The great anxiety of those September days had once again resulted only in a tactical success. We had had an unusually critical situation to contend with. The action fought by the 1st Cavalry Division near Smorgon on the enemy's line of retreat was immensely tragic. Just before the arrival of the infantry it was forced to retire with heavy losses. The situation on the south wing of the Niemen Army also con-

tinued to be precarious, and the rearward movement of the Tenth Army extremely dangerous. All this, however, was nothing to the nerve-racking suspense; could the infantry get forward fast enough on the bad roads to complete the envelopment which had been so skilfully begun by the cavalry division? Such suspense can be understood only by those who have actually experienced it.

"We had brought the final overthrow of Russia one step nearer. The Grand Duke, with his strong personality, resigned, and the Tsar placed himself at the head of the army.

"Our troops and their leaders had done their duty everywhere and the German soldier was justly convinced of his unquestionable superiority over the Russian. Numbers no longer had any terrors for him."

ANCIENT ROME AND MODERN PRUSSIA

By GUGLIELMO FERRERO

The Distinguished Italian Historian

UNDER the pretext of relating past events men have used history in all ages to justify the present. The method is simple and the number of historians who more or less consciously have used it is very large. Selecting an episode famous in the history of the past, they relate it in such a way as to make it resemble as closely as possible the modern situation which they are seeking to dignify by means of the parallel. Often it is necessary to falsify the facts, but as it is extremely difficult to distinguish between truth and error in history, the public does not notice the manipulation. Men read, become enthusiastic about the suggested parallel, are easily carried along and believe finally that they have learned something new from the teaching of Clio, whereas in reality they have only attributed their own ideas and feelings to the muse of history.

Roman history, because it is perhaps the most famous in Western civilization, has most frequently served as a means of glorifying the present. Especially in the last century, warlike nations out for conquest used it for their own purposes: the French and the English, and later the Germans. Rome had conquered and governed a great empire. The French, the English, and the Germans desired likewise to found empires: therefore they all related Roman history in such a way as to convince themselves that they were repeating in modern times what Rome had done in the past. The books which have compared Roman imperialism with English imperialism

are innumerable. And what is Duruy's *History of the Romans* but an apology for Napoleonism? One of the books which contributed most to turning the minds of the Germans to Pangermanism is Mommsen's *Römische Geschichte*. But all the comparisons made by these writers are arbitrary and fantastic, and those which attempt to establish an imaginary resemblance between Roman imperialism and Prussian Pangermanism are the most fantastic of all. It will be easy to prove this statement if we compare the two impartially and, so to speak, *sub specie aternitatis*.

THE DOCTRINE OF DIVINE MISSION

The spiritual source of Pangermanism is the doctrine of a divine mission. According to it, God has chosen the Germans to be masters and rulers over all other peoples, and has entrusted to them the mission of conquering the world because they are the wisest, most efficient, most valiant, and most virtuous of all peoples, and it is natural that the fittest nation should rule and teach all inferior nations. But this conception is merely a disguised form of the Biblical doctrine of a chosen people amplified, and applied to modern life—a doctrine quite foreign to the spirit of the Romans. The Romans never for a moment thought they had received from the gods a mission to conquer and govern the world; and still more remote from their way of thinking would have been the idea that they had been delegated such a mission be-

cause they were the first nation of the world, the chosen people.

Not that Roman imperialism was what might be termed lay imperialism. The religious idea, in a civilization like that of the ancients, never was and never could be separated from the events of such a long and wonderful political life as theirs. It was one of the official doctrines of the Republic that the Romans had won all their many and glorious victories in the past because the gods had so willed it; but they also believed that the gods might any day change their minds and reverse such good fortune suddenly, since the favor they had shown Rome was not a permanent transference of their own power to the Romans, but a gracious gift which they could revoke at will. Wherefore the Romans were to be prudent and modest in triumph and were not, by misusing their power and victory, to irritate the gods who were quick to take umbrage at the presumption of men. Above all they were not to be deluded into thinking their rule eternal. On the contrary, in the mystic conception of their mission held by the Pangermanists, the highest privilege of a chosen people is continuance in power. God has chosen them forever, and God does not belie Himself.

The only reference in all Latin literature to a mission, if not actually divine at least historic, of the Romans with reference to other nations, is Virgil's famous line so often repeated by all modern imperialists: *Tu regere imperio populos Romane memento*.

NO SELF-EXALTATION AMONG ROMANS

But a single line, even though written by a very great poet, is not enough in itself to give evidence of the spirit of a political policy lasting through so many centuries when it is in opposition to all other historical documents. Nor can you find in the political history or literature of Rome any example of that arrogant assertion of their own superiority over all other peoples so frequent among modern nations, and which in the case of the Germans before the war had reached a veritable mania of self-exaltation, and contributed so much to the diffusion of the doctrine of Pangermanism among the masses.

The Romans had fought and conquered many nations both civilized and barbarian, from the Athenians to the Lusitanians, from the Egyptians to the Pannonians, from the Carthaginians to the Gauls. They knew how to distinguish among them, and they were aware that if they were superior to the Gauls and Spaniards in every respect they were, excepting in war and political life, inferior to the Greeks, Egyptians and the Hellenized states of Asia. So true is this that, after conquering Greece and the Orient, they humbly went to school to the conquered. Such a recognition of inferiority is the best proof of their modesty, and is very different from the self-assertiveness of modern imperialism, especially of Pangerman imperialism.

Closely connected with this modesty of the ancients and the overbearing arrogance of the moderns is another difference between Roman imperialism and Prussian Pangermanism. Roman imperialism was strictly political and military. Pangermanism is, at once, political, military, financial, intellectual, moral, and artistic. It is, in a word, an ambition for world domination. The Romans never thought that it lay within their duty or right to impose on other nations their language, their gods, their customs, their doctrines of life, or their own code of morals. They contented themselves with exacting tribute and obedience, with preventing revolts against their own authority and wars against their subject peoples, and in every other respect they allowed the people to live as they pleased. Only occasionally did they persecute religion in the conquered country, as in the case of Druidism, for example. And when they did so it was only because the cult served to foster a spirit of independence and rebellion. The religions which did not menace the authority of the Romans were left free to go to any extremes in the countries where they originated. The Romans took care only that too extravagant cults or too alien doctrines should not be permitted to contaminate the spirit of Italy and Rome with immoral superstitions. The idea so dear to the Pangermanists of wishing to force people to change their languages would have seemed to the Romans inconceivably strange, and, indeed, quite impossible.



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General Diaz

Commander of Italian armies on the Austro-Italian front.

SUBJECT NATIONS RETAINED THEIR LANGUAGE

Of the numerous peoples who were for so many centuries subject to the Romans, some, like the Gauls and the Spaniards, adopted the language of the Romans and speak it to this day; others, like the peoples of the Balkans, adopted it and then forgot it, when they became Slav nations in the Middle Ages; and still others, and this class includes nearly all those in the Orient, kept their own languages. But *all* of these nations retained their languages or changed them because they wished to do so. Rome did nothing to encourage them or to dissuade them. The same thing was true of their customs and ideas. In the Western provinces, such as Gaul, Spain, and northern Africa, which Rome had conquered and which were still uncivilized, the aristocracy that grew up during the first two centuries of the Empire adopted the language and the political and moral ideas of the Roman aristocracy. Rome was their model and Latin literature,—Livy, Virgil, Horace, and Cicero,—their school. As a result of this training in the second century this new aristocracy was ready to replace the exhausted old Roman aristocracy in the dominion of the world, and to continue this dominion according to its ancient traditions for another century. Trajan and the great emperors of the second century came from the Romanized aristocracy of the Western provinces. The Eastern provinces, on the contrary, took little or nothing from Rome; and that little—the gladiatorial contests for example—certainly did not represent the best part. In these provinces the old Græco-Asiatic stratum remained intact and unchanged. But, in either case, it is clear that the Roman State did nothing to compel the Romanization of the provinces, since it regarded without disapprobation or fear the fidelity of the Eastern provinces to their ancient civilization and their own traditions.

Roman imperialism, in short, resorted only to armies; it did not add to armies that other weapon on which Pangermanism has relied so heavily—the school. No real system of public schools existed until late in the history of the Empire, and even then it was a very rudimentary one compared with that by means of

which the Pangermans flattered themselves they could Germanize Europe and half the world. The schools which were opened throughout the Empire were, especially in the first centuries, almost all private schools. Greeks and Latins, in order to earn a living, went to teach the languages of Homer and Virgil to the children of rich families in Spain, Gaul, and even in Great Britain; but they went independently, without government aid or supervision. They were missionaries bearing the culture of two civilizations, not the political agents of a state which was endeavoring to expand, as were certainly many, if not all, of the Germans who before the war established themselves in so many countries of the world as teachers, professors, merchants, and workmen.

MODERN IMPERIALISM IS AGGRESSIVE

All these differences between the two kinds of imperialism were bound to result in a capital difference: the aggressive spirit. Modern imperialism, and especially Pangerman imperialism, the latest exaggerated form of it, is aggressive. It considers the expansion of a people, the territorial aggrandizement of a state or empire, the acquisition of a new province, whether inhabited by civilized or savage peoples, whether located in the Arctic circle or tropics, as advantageous in itself; a glory always to be desired, an obligation that every intelligent and efficient government owes to its own people. In this very coalition of world powers which has fought and defeated Pangermanism, have we not seen all of the European states in the Peace Conference ashamed to return from the war without some rich territorial spoil?

Roman imperialism, it is to be noted, after it had conquered Italy and come to the front in actual world politics, was much less aggressive and much more cautious, more distrustful of conquest and additions of territory than is modern imperialism and Pangermanism. Most people imagine that Rome conquered all her innumerable provinces with the sword, but this opinion is erroneous, for diplomacy aided force in building up the Roman Empire much more than is generally

believed. One of the decisive advances made by Rome in the direction of world empire was the acquisition of the Kingdom of Pergamos at the time of the Gracchi: for with this province Rome secured a foothold in Asia and became a power in the East. Now this acquisition, which was to change the history of the Republic, was obtained without war, through the will and testament of the last of the Attalides, who, dying without heirs, left his Kingdom to Rome! *Vice versa*—Rome, while receiving such vast provinces without fighting for them, refrained from taking possession of whole kingdoms which she had conquered after long wars, and rich territories of which she could easily have become mistress. In the war against Macedonia, which broke out at the close of the second Punic war, Rome had conquered Macedonia and Greece and a few years later she conquered Syria in the war against Antiochus. But she did not keep even a square foot of territory. She freed Greece, left Macedonia and Syria as they were, merely imposing certain restrictions which would keep them from becoming dangerous to Rome and to their neighbors. Among the Roman aristocracy there was always a party which we should call anti-imperialistic. This party tried to hinder and limit conquest, and almost always enjoyed greater authority in the state than was accorded the opposing party. The arguments which this party used would make the modern imperialists and especially the Pangermanists lift their hands to heaven in astonishment. We have the speech which Cicero made in 65 B. C. to combat certain projects of Crassus and Cæsar aiming at the conquest of Egypt. Do you know the chief reasons urged by the great orator? Egypt was so rich that it would not be good for Rome to conquer it. Too many people would emigrate from Italy to such a rich and fertile land and the metropolis would become depopulated. Rome was always afraid of conquering very rich countries for fear that with the influx of wealth there might spread in Italy a disease called by the ancients "moral corruption"! It would have been fortunate if the Pangermans had professed the same doctrine and had applied it in the case of Belgium, Northern France, and Poland. Unfortu-

nately Pangermanism occasioned the direst calamity just because in this important point it was diametrically opposed to ancient imperialism, and had as its characteristic principle that the richer a country the more ardently a powerful and wise state should desire to appropriate it.

STRONG AVERSION TO EXPANSION

This latent aversion to expansion was strong, and explains the slow process by which the Roman Empire was formed; it explains a certain disconnectedness, irregularity, and oscillation observable in Roman policy during the last two centuries of the Republic. The development of the Roman Empire was due to the fortuitous combinations of experiences through which it passed and by which it was shaped rather than to any definite plan like that of the Pangermanists. Whenever a really aggressive imperialistic impulse shook the policy of Rome, it came from public opinion rather than from senatorial circles and the governing classes. So it was in the first Punic war. In the wars with Carthage Rome was not attacked; when she decided to interfere in Sicily in the conflict of the Mamertini at the cost of provoking her ally of centuries to mortal war she took the offensive. The senate was opposed to intervention; the matter was decided by the *comitia* and, even before the *comitia* acted, by public opinion, which in an outburst of belligerent fury accused Carthage of being too powerful in Sicily and of threatening to stifle Italy, and demanded war.

At first sight these hesitations, this reluctance and moderation on the part of Rome, seem incomprehensible to a generation that has had to listen to the doctrines and be the witness and even the victim of the ambitious undertakings of Pangermanism. Many have suspected Rome of insincerity, and have thought her averse to conquests in claiming to want nothing and then, if possible, seizing everything. But any one who investigates the question no longer entertains doubts as to Rome's sincerity; he discovers the very simple and human reason for this moderation. It would be vain to seek in Roman imperialism the aggressive spirit and the rage for unlim-

ited conquest characteristic of Pangermanism, because the Romans lacked the means and instruments, which the Pangermans have unfortunately possessed in such abundance—soldiers and officers.

Pangermanism is the last and most dangerous offspring of the military institutions created by the French Revolution, in other words, of the conscripted army and of military service, taken not in the sense of a special profession, but as the duty of every citizen. It is well known that of all the European nations Prussia, in spite of her very conservative political institutions, adopted in most thoroughgoing fashion the revolutionary principle of conscription, extending military service to all citizens of every rank, and reducing the time of service as much as possible. She set all Europe the example of three and two years' military service; she was also the first nation to abolish the system of exemptions and substitutes, by which a part of the population in the rest of Europe had escaped army service, until 1870. This revolutionary system of conscription adopted by a country in which the population was increasing rapidly gave first to the King, and later to the Emperor of Germany, armies which increased in size each year, until it finally supplied the mammoth army which during the World War fought for four years and a half against the Russians, the French, the English, the Belgians, the Serbs, the Rumanians, the Italians, the Portuguese, and the Americans.

ORIGIN OF PANGERMANISM

Pangermanism did not originate merely in the doctrines of philosophers; it sprang also from the almost unlimited possibility of increasing the military force of Germany. Pangermanism has been the expression of German ambitions which kept pace with the increase of her military forces and which after gaining from 1866-70 the hegemony of Europe, began to dream of the hegemony of the world, and in 1914 attempted to obtain it. But in the history of Rome we find just the opposite phenomenon. In the first century of our history Rome, like modern Europe, had a conscripted army. Military service was first a duty of all free citizens who held property

and then gradually, as the need for soldiers increased, it became the duty of all citizens, property-holders or not. However, this conscripted army, after the second Punic war, began to degenerate and to disintegrate for many reasons which it would take too long to explain here. The free citizens, especially the well-to-do, were no longer willing to serve; every year the quotas grew smaller and discipline became laxer. Finally Rome was forced to replace her conscripted army by a professional army of volunteers, recruiting men who had nothing, and who in order to make a living were willing to enter the army as a profession for the rest of their active lives. The man who brought about this reform was Marius, the conqueror of Jugurtha, the Cimbri, and the Teutons.

This reform produced the same result in Rome that it has caused in all epochs and in all countries. It gave a better, more disciplined and able army, but a much smaller one. The number of men who are ready to follow arms as a profession for pay has in all times and in every generation been quite limited, because military life is hard, especially for the common soldier. This fact explains how nations have inevitably resorted to conscription when it has been necessary to form a large army: note England and America in the World War. This military crisis which brought about the change to a nonconscripted army came in Roman history in the second century B. C., or in the very century in which the political sway of Rome, henceforth irresistible, was extending over the whole basin of the Mediterranean. But while events were compelling Rome to increase her Empire, the military forces of which she could avail herself for this policy of expansion were limited by the military and social difficulties of the moment which obliged her to substitute a regular army for a conscripted one.

Nor is this all. An army needs not only soldiers but officers and generals. And to found and extend an empire besides armies there must be diplomats, executive officers, statesmen, and a whole government personnel. The more an empire expands, the greater the number of provinces and the armies necessary to conquer and defend them, and the greater the political and military staff



Painting by N. C. Wyeth

The Walls of Jerusalem

needed by the government. But again in this respect Rome was in a position quite different from that of modern Germany. Rome was governed by an aristocracy consisting of about a hundred families. All the political and military officials of the Empire had to come from this little group, which, although not so exclusive and restricted as a Hindu caste, was, like all ancient aristocracies, renewed and extended slowly and with difficulty. In Germany, on the contrary, there was before the war a limited aristocracy like the Roman, but it furnished only a small part of the political and military staff; a far larger part in Germany as in all other European states was drawn from the educated classes of the *bourgeoisie*. This class, as in other civilizations of the West, is not exclusive. It is very easily enlarged and constantly renewed, for to make a *bourgeois* from the son of a workman or a peasant all that is needed is a little money and a little education.

INFLUENCE OF BOURGEOISIE ON PANGERMANISM

The spirit of moderation of the Roman Empire was, therefore, inspired by the foresight of an aristocracy, which would not and could not extend itself too much, understanding as it did that if the empire were to become too large its forces would not be sufficient to maintain its former supremacy. One of the weaknesses of which the Roman Empire never succeeded in ridding itself, even in its most flourishing epochs, was just this lack of proportion between its size and the means that the state had at its disposal for governing it. The aggressive spirit and the aspirations for world government of the Pangermanists were, however, fed by the ambitions of the *bourgeoisie*, a class which, as it grew continually in numbers and in ambition, would naturally regard as perfect and glorious a policy which steadily increased the Empire, its wealth, its power, the number of its functionaries, and the officers and honors to be distributed. Thus it is obvious that Pangermanism in Germany had its origin not with the aristocracy which before the war had supplied the officers and the backbone of the army, but with the upper, middle, and lower

bourgeoisie—the professors, journalists, intellectuals, and those engaged in industry and commerce. The German aristocracy, a restricted class like the Roman, realized the perils of too great expansion on the part of Germany more easily than did the *bourgeoisie*—a class continually increasing and developing.

To state briefly the important difference between Roman and Pangerman imperialism, one might say that Roman imperialism was an ambition for limited power; Pangermanism an ambition for unlimited power. The former admitted that the powers of human nature in general, and consequently those of the Romans, were limited; that worldly wisdom as well as respect for the gods bade them not to desire or try to attain a greatness beyond their forces, but to be content even in their politics with what was possible. But Pangermanism considers that the powers of human nature and of the fittest nations, especially the powers of the nation which is the most fit of all, the German, are unlimited or almost so; that a great people must dare to brave the greatest dangers, not merely to surpass other nations in every respect, but to surpass themselves continually, to strive to accomplish something ever greater and better.

In the limited imperialism of ancient Rome we find again that profound pessimism, which was characteristic of all ancient civilizations, and of all Christian civilizations that followed the ancient ideal. The ancients believed that human nature was bad; that it easily misused power and prosperity; that riches and power, the two gifts most desired by men, were in reality the two dangers most destructive to happiness and virtue; that life is full of unexpected changes, reverses, and misfortunes from which man's only defense is wisdom, which teaches him to repress the evil passions which harass human nature. Nations as well as individuals must therefore distrust fortune and her insidious favors, must be able to curb their own desires and ambitions, all the more when it is easy or seemingly easy to satisfy them; and to be content with little even when much is offered. This spirit explains the slow formation of the Roman Empire.

PANGERMANISM A NATIONAL RELIGION

Pangermanism, on the contrary, has been the most dangerous manifestation of the delirious optimism of modern civilization. This modern civilization which is dominated and even tyrannized over by the idea of progress, or the indefinite betterment of everything human, is convinced that every increase in power and wealth is a good thing; that the more perfect a man, the greater his ambition, his activity, his energy, his control over other men, over the earth and nature. This ideal of limitless power, this illusion that fortune will favor eternally, was bound to result from this optimistic conception of human nature and life. Germany was the nation in which this ideal and this illusion came to be a kind of national religion. Pangermanism represents the most violent and exalted form of this new national religion. It may seem a paradox but it is a truth: the World War, which has cost the lives of ten million men and which has shaken the equilibrium of Western civilization for perhaps a century, is the result of a profoundly optimistic conception of human nature.

In short, if one compares the Pangermanism of Prussia with the imperialism of Rome one can measure at a glance the immense revolution which has taken place in the history of Western civilization in the last two centuries. The very foundations of society and of morality have been overturned by the change from a pessimistic to an optimistic conception of human nature. All the centuries down to the eighteenth had said to man: "Respect traditions; all that is old, just because it is old, is presumably better than the new." The nineteenth century said: "Be-

lieve in progress; everything new, merely because it is new, is presumably better than the old."

DANGERS OF MODERN OPTIMISM

All the centuries down to the eighteenth had said to men: "Moderate your desires, limit your needs, be content with little! Man is the more perfect the more simple and austere he is." The nineteenth century said instead: "Increase your needs and your expenditures as much as you can; man is more perfect the richer he becomes and the more he demands of life."

All the centuries before the eighteenth had said to men: "Obey the King and the State without question; do not call them to account for their desires and acts; government is a divine thing." The nineteenth century said to men: "You are free, you have the right to judge those in authority over you, call them to account for every thought and act; government is a human thing—you can make and unmake it."

The new doctrines which have prevailed in all Western civilization, thanks to this overturning of the fundamental principles of life, have produced many good results. They have given an impetus to the energy of Europe and America which in a century has transformed the entire face of the earth. But from these new doctrines and from the trust in oneself and in fortune which they have generated in our time has sprung also the World War. Would this fact not lead us to believe that the optimism of the moderns is too absolute and that the moderns can learn something from the pessimism of the ancients?

THE LAST POST

Walter Lightowler Wilkinson, Lieut. 8th
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. Killed
at Vimy Ridge, April 9, 1917.

Come home! Come home!
The winds are at rest in the restful trees,
At rest are the waves of the sun down seas,
At home—they're home—
The wearied hearts and the broken lives—
At home! At ease!

WAR ACHIEVEMENTS OF FRENCH LABOR

The French Workingman During the War

By ALBERT THOMAS

Leader of the Socialist Party in The Chamber of Deputies.

BEFORE the war France was a metallurgical country whose production, all considered, was mediocre, in spite of the steady development of the Briey Basin and Longwy. If she was rich in iron ore, she was deficient in coal; labor, too, was lacking. While the United States, Germany and England in 1913 were producing 60,000,000 tons of pig-iron out of a world production of 78,000,000, France was producing about 5,200,000 tons.

Yet this is the country that during the war organized manufactures and *matériel* which were the admiration of the world. France reached the point of producing 212,000 75 mm. shells, filled and made into cartridges, in a day; she reached the point of producing at the same time 45,000 155 mm. shells. Again a figure enables one to measure her production of war *matériel*: 35 gun-barrels of 75 mm. caliber a day.

To attain this result intelligent effort on the part of the administrative services, and initiative and daring on the part of the manufacturers were, of course, essential; but essential, too, was the application, the willingness of an entire working population conscious of laboring for the defense of the country.

It is the organization of the whole of this immense army of workers in the war factories, its life and its spirit, that in a few rapid strokes we would attempt to describe here.

IMMENSITY OF PRODUCTION UNFORESEEN

The war was a great war of *matériel*. It was, according to a happy definition, "the war of copper and nitrogen." The Germans, who had prepared methodically for this war, who had accumulated an enormous store of *matériel*, and munitions in quantity, had not

themselves foreseen the immensity of consumption which was reached during the war. Towards April, 1915, they were themselves reduced to using iron shells, steel shells being exhausted.

France committed a similar error. The General Staff had estimated that with 1,800 rounds per gun of 75 mm., provision was adequate. It had considered that with a production of 13,600 75 mm. shells a day, guaranteed by certain state plants, it could meet the needs of all guns. The register of mobilization stated that powder would not be manufactured during the war. No large-scale production for the duration of hostilities had been foreseen.

MOBILIZATION TAKES WORKMEN

Also, on the day of mobilization the factories, even the state factories, were practically emptied of their entire personnel of an age for service in the army. Moreover, in France the sentiment of military equality is strict. Equality before the tax of blood is sacred to every citizen of our democracy. That is a feeling which has dominated the entire history of our war manufactures to such a point indeed as even to conflict with the necessities of production.

On the day of mobilization it was estimated that, whether in state factories or in privately-owned industry, a total of 47,000 operatives should suffice for all war production.

Almost immediately after the battle of the Marne, when for the first time consumption rose to 100,000 75 mm. shells in a day for all the French armies, it was evident that the estimated production would not suffice. The state plants could not for the moment do more. On September 20, 1914, the Minister

of War of that time, M. Millerand, called together at Bordeaux all the manufacturers who seemed capable, either independently or in auxiliary groups, of making 75 mm. shells. He asked them to push production as rapidly as possible to the point of 40,000 a day.

MEASURES TO OBTAIN LABOR

But the factories were empty. Only the very old workers or the very young remained at their machines. Successive dispatches ordered the recall for each factory of men from the territorial army or from the reserve of the territorial army who were qualified operatives, tool-makers, turners, etc. Each factory recalled its own men; and as it was likewise necessary to fill the gaps left by the men who belonged to the active army or to the reserve of the active army, certain measures were taken to direct to the reopened factories men from small workshops or from plants which, ill-supplied with machinery or deprived of their managers, were unable to coöperate in production for national defense. Then since it was essential to act promptly, and since individual recalls necessitated long delays, the decision was quickly reached to permit the manufacturers to visit the depots, to see the men who were listed as metal-workers, and to enroll them in their establishments, always provided they were of the territorial or the reserve of the territorial army.

NOT ORGANIZED MILITARILY

From then on there was discussion as to whether it would not be better to recall the workers *en bloc*, organize them militarily, making them work as soldiers without reference to their previous associations or ties, or whether it was necessary, on the contrary, to send them back, as far as possible to their own shops. The prevailing theory was that of sending each back to his shop of before the war. In this way the best work could be done. It simplified the question of lodging and feeding, a large proportion of the workers thus returning to their homes. The matter was promptly settled once and for all. The circular of September 27, 1914, stated that the mobilized workingmen thus sent back to the

factories should receive the wages they had had before the war and should provide their own lodgings and food.

In this way was assembled the first effective force of operatives for the war factories. The manufacturers were urged henceforth to recruit among civilians all whom they might chance upon.

CHOOSING YOUNG MEN FROM THE ARMY

But immediately another problem lifted its head. The strict rule of not calling for any save soldiers of the territorial or its reserve was untenable. There were young workmen who were specialists, there were, especially in the large establishments such as the foundries or machine shops, organizations of engineers, overseers, foremen, and also, occasionally, draughtsmen or clerks, who were indispensable for the normal functioning of the business. All those whom the factories accounted youthful spirits full of initiative, all those who constituted their solid framework, must be recalled. But the rule of equality before the tax of blood was strict. If the General Staff consented to some exceptions, they were rare. It saw with alarm the departure from the front of men whom it declared indispensable. It is easy, after all, to understand this. This specialized workman, skilled adjuster, expert mechanic who belonged to a unit of aviation, or of engineering, or of artillery, at the front, who made repairs there, or adjusted instruments, was relinquished with difficulty by the little workshops of the fighting army.

When the author of these lines, from October to May, 1915, made the rounds one by one of all the factories of France, to complete their organization, one of the most important of his tasks was constantly to judge the necessity for the recall of such or such a man, to insist to the General Staff upon his return, to intervene in the depots or with the army in order to make intelligible the necessity of giving up the men who were indispensable for the development of war manufactures.

ANTAGONISM OF ARMY

The heads of the army experienced some difficulty, indeed, in comprehending the ne-



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In Rural France in War Time

Resuming the old tradition of the wars of the Revolution, the French government called upon the women during the World War. As a result the French women worked in almost every occupation while the men were away.

cessity for sending back these men. If for the routine work, the manufacture of munitions of 75 mm., the personnel had become just about adequate, if the factories in the months of April and May, or thereabouts, were beginning to produce shells interesting as to quantity (about 30,000 to 40,000 of a quality, also, sometimes defective), the more complicated forms of production, the recasting of cannon, the manufacture of *matériel* for heavy artillery, the manufacture of new engines, the technical researches—in short, everything that the war, more and more industrial in character, made urgent and indispensable—could not be realized in half-reconstructed factories. What was necessary was, in spite of the resistance of the army, to restore the factories at least to the state in which they were before the war; it was necessary, instead of a slackening production, to build up intensive production along all lines, if need be. For that the factories required their entire personnel without exception, including the men of the youthful classes.

GOVERNMENT ORDERS RECALL OF MEN

The government realized it, and by two imperative dispatches to General Headquarters, June 9 and 11, 1915, it ordered the recall of the men.

This recall was effected through various forms. On the one hand the manufacturers were authorized to formulate demands by name; that is, to require the return of the men they had formerly had with them, specifying their particular capacity and their own need of them for army production. But as the number of qualified workers was, in France, very inferior to pre-war needs; as, moreover, the manufacturers were not sure, after the first months of war, of recovering all their men, many of them dead, prisoners, wounded or missing, it was decided that they might at the same time make numerical demands, that is, requisition so many turners, so many machine-fitters, so many tool-makers, or even draughtsmen, or unskilled workers. Censuses were taken at the front and in the depots. A central service was created known as the *Direction de la Main d'Oeuvre*, at the Under-Secretariat of the Artillery Staff. It was as-

certained how many turners, how many workmen of various specialties, could be disposed of, and, beginning with the oldest classes, with exemption for the workers of the regions which were occupied by the enemy, the men experienced in various forms of specialized work were sent to the factories.

If one wishes to grasp the extent of the withdrawals to which the army was thus from time to time subjected, it will suffice to recall the following figures:

Down to December 31, 1915, 344,847 men had been sent either to the state factories or to those privately owned.

On December 31 of the year 1916, there were 540,607. From that time on the figures varied little. After having reached 549,000 on May 31, 1917, it showed rather a tendency to diminish until the end of the war.

WOMEN COME TO THE RESCUE

Considerable as this addition to the working-army was, its insufficiency soon become evident in view of the unimaginable immensity of war manufactures.

It was not enough to make an abundance of 75 mm. munitions, grenades and bombs. From the end of 1915, when the withdrawals from the front had become formidable, it had been necessary to plan grotesque quantities of munitions for the heavy artillery. At the outset of the war it was judged necessary to make 600 155 mm. shells. The Commander-in-Chief demanded 50,000 of them. Everywhere new plants must be erected. The cannon were wearing out. The heavy guns were seen to be insufficient in quantity. Their production must be organized.

How were all the demands for labor then arising, to be met? All the ingenuity of the administration must be strained to seek in every direction for recruits. Recourse must be had to all sources. First to the civilian labor supply: in special bureaux established in the big cities the men relieved of military obligations were asked to come for enrolment; mutilated men were sought out. Down to January 1, 1918, 35,187 men were thus recruited.

But that was still not enough. Routine work did not require a long apprenticeship.

The men were claimed by the army. Resuming the old tradition of the wars of the Revolution, the government called upon the women. Hitherto there were but few of them in the state factories, particularly in the powder-mills. Before the war there were some 4,800. On January 1, 1918, by the efforts of the *Service Ouvrier*, 22,676 had been placed. And, acting upon the advice proffered them, the manufacturers for their part had called upon feminine labor. The women employed in war manufactures, whose total number had stood at about 13,000, in April, 1917, numbered 400,000. From that time the figure showed relatively slight variation.

It was not merely in the comparatively simple work of routine processes that women were employed. One saw them in the smelting works, carrying the ingots which were to become 155 mm. shells. One saw them operating the controls in the great rolling-mills. One saw them manipulating the cocks of the presses. One saw them engaged in the lighter work needed on aviation motors. And finally one saw them, and by thousands, in the powder mills, handling the delicate particles, making the containers, or in the great shops for making machinery, employed on fuses or sheathing for fuses.

COLONIAL AND FOREIGN LABOR IMPORTED

But, many as they were, from day to day needs multiplied. It had not sufficed, according to a famous phrase, "to take the women"; recourse must be had to still other auxiliaries: foreign and colonial labor.

Certain circumstances favored recruiting from these sources. At the most difficult stage of organizing workshops, when labor was everywhere lacking, the dwindling means of transportation between Greece and America and the sufferings of certain Greek populations drew to us a fortunate immigration: that of 12,400 Greek workingmen, besides the women and children; 6,000 Portuguese, 3,000 to 4,000 Italians and a number of Spaniards also lent their aid.

Finally, in spite of hesitation, in spite of apprehensions caused by the American experience, France under stress of need came to an understanding with the Chinese syndicate and

imported into France about 20,000 laborers.

She herself had, moreover, her colonial domain. The diminutive Annamites, to the number of about 15,000, worked at light tasks in the powder factories or in the machine-shops. Certain of them were used in the automobile services. The Kabyles, to the number of about 30,000, supplied heavy labor in the powder mills. The Malagasy and the Senegalese lent their assistance also. Finally, in the measure permitted by the rules, that is to say, in the works for developing water-power, for building railroads, for everything which did not bear directly on the production of war *matériel*, the prisoners of war were utilized. On January 1, 1918, 34,200 were thus being utilized.

Thus from these various sources of recruiting was built up the formidable laboring army of which France stood in need. It was about August-September, 1917, that it attained its greatest number of effectives, about 1,700,000.

HOUSING AND FEEDING THE LABOR ARMY

It is easy to imagine the multiplicity of problems resulting from an organization of workshops achieved under such conditions.

Even where the factories existed before the war, many new operatives must find lodgings outside of the dwellings already existing. But in many centers the factory had been created at one stroke. At the same time barracks or dwellings for the workers must be improvised. Very often at the outset housing conditions were truly horrible for the workers. The cupidity of proprietors or of the local trade was scandalous in certain cities. At Bourges, at St. Etienne, old industrial cities of France, population had doubled. Many operatives huddled together as they could in unwholesome lodgings. Lodgings must be provided. Sometimes public buildings had to be requisitioned. In certain cities the problem of new construction was boldly attacked. But it was not enough to lodge these masses of workers. Provisions must also be made for their food-supply. Promptly the Controllers of Labor who had been charged by the Minister with supervision at one and the same time of the recruiting, the discipline and the welfare of these workmen, received instructions to attend

to food requirements. Canteens, after the military practice, were organized in a certain number of centers. But, anxious on the one hand to act in consonance with democratic ideas, and, on the other, to create durable institutions even under the strain of war, the Minister of Armament insisted, as well in dealing with the state establishments which were under his control as in dealing with private owners, on the constitution of genuine

COÖPERATIVE SOCIETIES

The Minister devoted especial attention, as we have noted, to developing the coöperative institutions. He urged the state establishments as well as the manufacturers to make contracts with these societies. The owners or the state paid the initial expenses of establishment. The coöperative controlled its own management.



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French Soldiers' Wives

Waiting in long lines for their allowances to be given them.

coöperative societies, in the administration of which the workers might participate. As a matter of fact the manufacturers, anxious to retain their exclusive authority and to profit by sacrifices which they had acquiesced in, preferred to found private societies, stewardships (*économats*), as the French law terms them, rather than veritable coöperative societies. It was in this way that during the war 932 coöperative institutions (restaurants or distributing stores), 45 canteens in the state plants, and 328 privately-owned institutions were created.

But it was necessary to go further. When the manufacturers did not come forward to furnish the necessary funds, assistance must nevertheless be provided for the establishment of coöperative organizations. The Minister created the "coöperative fund" for the purpose of receiving the money and supplies from individuals or associations who were willing, from a philanthropic or patriotic motive, to promote the welfare of factory operatives. And, on the other hand, as the coöperative societies or the proprietorial institutions often experienced some difficulty in obtaining the provisions

which there were to distribute, an *Office d'Alimentation des Usines de Guerre* was created, which had as its mission, by an understanding with the Minister of Public Works, the securing of the necessary means of transport for carrying the supplies and also the purchasing of these supplies wholesale. In July, 1918, the *Office d'Alimentation* was transacting about 7,000,000 francs of business a month. By this unified organization some improvement could be effected in the conditions under which the army of the factories was provisioned.

But still other problems confronted the men responsible for all of this organization.

PROTECTION FOR WOMEN

The necessity of national defense had summoned to the factory women who hitherto were living at home. The laws for protection, the laws for inspection, had been violated under the pressure of necessity. Was this not endangering the race? For the sake of the country's immediate safety was not its future being endangered? Numerous orders were sent to the Controllers of Labor. In 1916 special measures were suggested for the protection of young girls from sixteen to eighteen years old who were enrolled in the powder factories. There were circulars against night work and for maintaining the wage-level. In 1917 there were circulars concerning the weekly rest and special leaves when husbands in the army were on furlough.

The most serious problem was that of protecting the working women who were mothers. Increases in wages were ordered to encourage the mothers to nurse their babies. Nursing-rooms were requisitioned in the various factories. A *Comité du Travail Féminin*, established at the Ministry, watched over the execution of these orders. Day-nurseries and *crèches* were instituted in the state factories or in those privately owned.

THE MILITARY LABORERS

It must be admitted that this effort was very inadequate. In many centers protection might have been improved upon. The excuse for the Controllers of Labor lies in the

enormous number of obligations with which they were charged. Their duty was not only to supervise the living conditions of civilian labor. They must also control the work and the life of the military laborers. These were not, properly speaking, relieved of military obligation. They were detached soldiers in factories, subjected to a certain discipline, performing there a function similar to that which they would have performed at the front. The Controllers were also charged with supervising the utilization of this class of labor. The army needed its effectives. From year to year in spite of the calling-up of new classes, the regiments were reduced, weakened by the enormous losses which they were undergoing. On the other hand, the factory was demanding more and more power of every kind, even man-power. Between the army and the factory there was continual conflict. The French idea of equality was involved in it. Protests were heard against the presence at the rear of young workmen belonging to the classes of 1914 and 1915. The military authority demanded them. The Chamber of Deputies, in which representatives of the agricultural regions are in a majority, sustained these protests in the name of equality. The government, anxious to maintain continuity of production, resisted. It called attention to the extent to which the constant disorganization of the working shifts might injure the quality of the product. Between the army and the factory the government was constantly called in to arbitrate.

LABOR'S NEW ATTITUDE

Transformations, which it is still somewhat difficult to discern in their whole range, have been worked in the mental attitude of the French working class. The workers thus recruited, coming from all points of the compass, did not constitute a homogeneous body, but one and all were sustained by the thought of national defense, by the consciousness of maintaining a just struggle for right and justice.

Thence, two results: the first, that on the part of the French working class concern for production is affirmed today in all declarations of congresses, in all resolutions of unions.

Before the war the idea of sabotage was popular. In the organizations a struggle was carried on against piece-work, against bonuses for extra work. Today these methods of payment are accepted by French labor with the reservation that precautions be taken to prevent the exploitation of the worker. Moreover, the leaders of the movement extol the development of production, the transformation of methods, the rational organization of work, the increased use of machinery. That is a consequence of the war effort.

A COUNTRY OF NO STRIKES

A second result is that this French working class which before the war was so often excited, which congratulated itself on showing statistics of strikes higher than those of any other country, which jeered at foreign organizations because of their anxiety to avoid strikes—of all the working classes of the countries at war this class has been the one that has made the greatest sacrifices, the one that has subordinated most completely its special interests to the preoccupation of national defense. One may say that for more than two years France was a country of no strikes; for more than two years in the war factories there was not a single disturbance. It was, to my recollection, in July, 1916, only that in order to protest against a real and patent injustice some women went on strike just outside of Paris. It was in January, 1917, only that a first movement, somewhat extensive and lasting, occurred.

Alarm at that moment was very intense. The working class and the country at large were confronted with a serious problem: Was it possible to permit strikes in the factories working for the army? The question could not arise in the case of the military workers. They were subject to discipline. The refusal to work was equivalent in principle to a refusal of obedience. Moreover, the military workers had scrupulously held aloof from this first movement. But in the case of the others, the civilians, the women? The reply made by decree was explicit: if the manufacturers should decline all understanding, all attempts at conciliation, they must see their factories requisitioned. The operatives would them-

selves be requisitioned and obliged to furnish their labor. But if the government were compelled thus to intervene, it must, on the other hand, give assurance of equitable conditions for the workers, and impose on the manufacturers respect for these conditions. It was decided that committees of conciliation and arbitration should be established, that wage schedules should be fixed, and that the government should be charged with imposing them on the factories. The situation was simplified by the fact that the state, being at this moment the chief and very often the only purchaser, could therefore enforce respect for the wage-schedules and proper conditions of labor from its purveyors. In fact it was never necessary during the war to make use of the repressive clauses of the decree of January, 1917. Never, from that date to the armistice, was it necessary to requisition factories or to coerce the operatives. On the contrary, the wage-schedules were observed in most parts of France, advantageous conditions were assured to the workers, and the system seemed so good that in the majority of related industries, in clothing (for military equipment), among the miners, etc., committees of conciliation and salary schedules became the constant rule.

STATE INTERVENTION ESTABLISHED

Thus, as a result of the war, the right of the state, that is to say, the right of collective society, to intervene between owners and operatives was definitely acknowledged. Perhaps this very flexible system, which readily became a matter of custom, might have made it possible to reach the end of the war without a great crisis, and to establish in the working population sentiments altogether new, entirely different from pre-war sentiments, a conception of social progress and even of the class struggle very different from the old conceptions, if other circumstances had not intervened. One can never, to my thinking, overemphasize the conditions in which the wartime workers lived. An essential circumstance, which must be taken into account, is that even if the operatives were assured (as was not always the case) of fairly tolerable conditions of working and living, there re-

remained always the fact that they were uprooted men. The sight of the workers who had returned to their homes excited to a higher pitch the bitterness they felt in being far from their own, and this bitterness was keener, perhaps, in the interior than at the front, where special living conditions altered the current of thought. Add to this all the anxiety concerning the fate of those they had left at home, the changes in habit, for example, the condition of the miners from the north transferred to the central region, or that of the metalworkers of the invaded regions transplanted to the south, and all the ferment of unhappiness which settled in these masses will be understood.

GROWTH OF SYNDICALISM

Particularly there resulted a sort of spontaneous need of uniting, of forming associations, of rubbing elbows. Hence a formidable growth of the syndical movement. Federations which counted thirty, forty or fifty thousand members, passed suddenly to two hundred, three hundred, four hundred thousand members. In the great manufacturing basins, like the Loire region, almost all the operatives were syndicated. From the beginning of the war it had been settled that if the soldiers, by reason of duty, could not go on strike, they might at least retain membership in their syndical organizations. We are persuaded that this liberty accounts in large part for the stability and tranquillity of the spirit of labor throughout the war. Never, if this old protective rule had not been adopted, would France have been the country of no strikes that she was during the first two years of the war. It was, after a fashion, an affirmation that the government of the country in time of war relied upon the material sentiment of the working class. Moreover, when extensive movements broke out, the syndicates served constantly as organs of regulation and order.

STRIKES DEVELOP

But it was fated, as will be seen, that movements should break out. Inevitably, one day or another, important strikes were bound to

develop. The first was caused by agitation on the subject of wages, in Paris, at the end of September, 1917. It was quieted by the establishment of an indemnity for the high cost of living and by a rise in wages. But several days later a movement broke out in the Loire. A foreman had been arrested as the result of an ill-considered action on the part of the military administration; immediately the whole basin struck. When the foreman was liberated, work was resumed with discipline.

The fact was, that in addition to discontent another cause sometimes animated and excited the workers' minds. The French workers had become aware, during the war, of the capital rôle that they were playing in the national defense. They said to themselves, and with reason, that if in the industrial effort the initiative of the manufacturers counted, their effort and their capacity counted no less. Hence a revolution in ideas which developed during the war. The workingmen demanded their share in the management, in the administration of enterprises. The sentiment was formulated in two essential demands; the first is that for shop delegates negotiating from day to day with the owner, regulating with the directors and the overseers the daily questions concerning the work; the second is that for a National Economic Council, and for national councils in which workers and owners shall suggest to the government the great measures to be taken.

LABOR'S AMBITIONS UNSATISFIED


By a circular of August, 1917, the Minister of Armament had established shop delegates under a form, it is true, which did not completely correspond to the labor conception. The institution is still extant in certain establishments, but the ambitions of the working world remain unsatisfied. They may be traced, evidently, in the great movements which have occurred since, in particular in the month of May of the year 1918, or in those which followed the armistice. It might sometimes be supposed that this movement, in which revolutionary tentatives appeared, was more or less of foreign inspiration. The coincidence might be noted of certain activities,

whether with the great German offensive of May, 1918, or with the deciding circumstances of certain negotiations. We have no hesitation in saying that nothing justifies such a suspicion, and that even in its most excitable elements the French working class has never given cause for any suspicion whatever. But the essential fact resulting from the war is: labor is conscious of the very great rôle that it can play, and of the voice that it should have in the state.

LABOR'S ACHIEVEMENTS ADMIRABLE

Thus with the aspirations of the French working class, with this idealistic effort to which it is devoting itself to-day, we conclude the survey that we have attempted of its actions during the war. The immense effort of organization which our country has made in the face of the enemy will not be without fruit. Not merely has the material organization of war manufactures made over industrial equipment, not merely has it implanted in the

country new rational methods of work, but it has called greater numbers of operatives to the factory, it has called women, it has supplemented by perfection of technique the inadequacy of the national labor supply. It has done more: it has directed harmoniously the most diverse elements of the nation. It has made elements of the nation. It has made wages uniform, it has raised them. Finally, it has created a new mental attitude, it has given the French working class a consciousness of its eminent rôle. Certainly in a country in which there are more than a million and a half of dead to mourn, in which there are 800,000 mutilated men, and in which moral disasters, in spite of victory, are difficult to repair, one can not speak of the beneficent results of the war. Nevertheless the fact remains that, everything considered, the effort of the French working class was, under the pressure of the war, a great effort worthy of admiration, and that it will be fruitful for the economic future of the country.



'A Crowd Outside the Bank of France During the European Crisis

THE WAR SPIRIT OF FRANCE

A Description of the Moral and Political Attitude of the French People During the World Conflict, Given by an Eye Witness.

By WILLIAM MORTON FULLERTON, Paris Correspondent of The Times (London)

IN the perspectives of history no fact of the World War will stand out more characteristically than the stoic behavior of the civil population of France behind the boundaries of the flaming front. As much as her armies, it was the incorruptible soul of France that temporarily saved the world. The unflinching attitude of her people, due to the clear perception by the anonymous masses of their essential national interests, stood for five years as a bulwark against all the forces, foreign and domestic, that worked insidiously, in good faith and in bad faith, for a ravelled peace.

After the first prolonged and rigid halt of the line, following hard on the battle of the Marne, the flaming boundaries of the front slowly narrowed. The realm of outer fire seemed about to attain unto, and to englobe, the central heart of France, the sacred *Ile de France* itself. In the fifth year of the war the guns of the great offensive rattled the windows even of Paris. We listened by night with awe, but without fear, to the bombardment heralding the final offensive. French men and French women on the hither side of the incandescent wall, they of Paris as well as they of the provinces, still bore themselves with calm.

This spectacle of the splendor of the moral tonicity of France was one that no German had conceived to be possible. It immensely and magnificently surprised the majority of even the friends of France. France has ever been the victim of a legend. She has been thought of as a mercurial people, unendowed with staying power, incapable of "standing pat" for long amid adversity. This legend had become one of the commonplaces of international opinion, even one of the factors of world politics. That France would go morally to pieces under the repeated shocks of the hammer of the German Thor was one of the great illusions of Germany. It was an il-

lusion that was one of the origins of the war—and a cause of unremitting anxiety to the Allies of France.

But those who really knew France were neither surprised nor apprehensive. They knew that precautions had somehow been taken so that when the first act of hostilities occurred the French Government could be sure of counting on a mobilization untrammelled by *sabotage*; that the French Socialist Party, in spite of the *Internationale*, would march to a man, shoulder to shoulder, behind the Cabinet; that the whole of France would rise up in defense of her soil; and that for long months at least, whatever the vicissitudes of the war, political passion and party squabbling would be swallowed up in a real union of French hearts, which would stultify at the outset one of the crassest but most important calculations of the enemy.

FRANCE'S PEACEFUL INTENTION

On July 30, 1914, Europe was trembling at the edge of an abyss. M. René Viviani, Socialist Prime Minister, and Minister for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to M. Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, begging him "to bring to the knowledge of Sir Edward Grey certain information concerning French and German military preparations."

Nobody, no one in the world, could foresee at that moment what would be the attitude of England in case of an aggression on the part of Germany against France. France and England, to be sure, were bound together by an "Understanding" which had been more or less put to the test. But a close scrutiny of this Pact revealed that it contained, in reality, nothing positively constraining England to back France, in any satisfactory military fashion, if France chanced to find herself at war. Notwithstanding the useful secret collaboration of Sir Henry Wilson and General Foch

for the potential employment on the Continent of a British Expeditionary Force in case of unprovoked German aggression, there was a tragic gap in the technical preparations of such English pacifists as Lord Haldane to remove the risks of war. A large field lay open



M. Paul Cambon

The French Ambassador in London during the war.

to German intrigue. If, as a matter of fact, England had accepted from the very start the proposals of the French Government, namely an Anglo-Franco-Russian Military Alliance, publicly proclaimed throughout the world, the planet would never have been shaken by the German War.

"Although Germany," said M. Viviani, "has placed her covering troops at a few hundred meters from the frontier, along the en-

tire front from the Luxemburg to the Vosges, and although those covering troops hold at present their fighting position, we have held back our troops ten kilometers from the frontier, forbidding them to approach any nearer than that."

Now, the French plan, the strategic scheme taught by the French War School and by the General Staff, had been conceived on the basis of an offensive. This plan provided for the establishment of the French covering troops in fighting positions as near as possible to the frontier. Nevertheless, the French Government announced that it suddenly and recklessly handed over, defenseless to the sudden aggression of the enemy, a considerable band of territory!

There ensued forty-eight hours of anxious negotiations. On August 2, 1914, in the morning, the following telegram from Paris was dispatched to the French Ambassadors in London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Madrid and Constantinople: "French territory was violated this morning by German troops at Cirey and near Longwy. These troops are marching on the fort of the latter name. At the same time, the French Customs Office at Delle has received a double volley of rifle shots. Finally, German troops violated this morning the neutral territory of Luxemburg. You will lose no time in using this information in order to point out that the German Government is indulging in unprovoked acts of war against France, without moreover any declaration of war, whereas we have scrupulously respected the ten kilometer zone which, ever since the mobilization, we have maintained between our troops and the frontier."

The World War had thus broken out. And this withdrawal of the French troops was, as it were, the strategic retreat of Justice and of Right in order to secure a better start.

ALL FACTIONS UNITED

It will be to the everlasting glory of France to have taken this sublime precaution. But the point is this: this precaution changed the whole domestic political history of France during the World War. Even the ingenuity of the perfidious German sophistry has never

yet managed, in its discussion of the origins of the war, to eliminate, or to suppress, the moral consequences of this clever and grandiose decision of the French Government. It was of an extreme adroitness, on the part of the French Government, thus to emphasize, at the very opening moments of the gigantic conflict, the exact character and the fine historical rôle of the French Army. It was an army which deliberately declared to the Nations that it had rejected every combination or policy of offensive; it was an army which was thus artificially given the assurance, by the happy device invented by the civil authorities, that it had behind it and with it every French citizen. That Army knew, at the same time, that the initiative of the rulers of France would thus secure for it a world-wide prestige, and strengthen its *morale*, whatever the duration of the war, and whatever the result of the first collisions. The entire nation had become persuaded of the absolute necessity of the struggle which was about to take place. Pretexts for mutiny, rebellion, *sabotage*, were reduced to a minimum. While, abroad, beyond the Channel as well as in the New World, spectators, astounded by this quixotic decision of the French Government, were finally in a position to appreciate the real significance of the great mystic formula of the Middle Ages *Gesta Dei Per Francos*. No longer any doubt besieged any French heart. The French people to whom had just been demonstrated, as in a laboratory, its complete right to take up arms in its own defense against a monstrous criminal aggressor, was about to become the Champion of Right for the entire world. This people were to create for themselves lasting titles of glory as the defenders not only of their own firesides, but of the firesides as well of all mankind.

All the marvels and alleged "miracles" of the attitude of France and of the French people during the World War are easily to be explained by the facts thus analyzed. The world has often displayed its astonishment in presence of this moral stamina of France. But all explanations that may be adduced may be summed up in the single explanation that the serene attitude of France was due to the fact that she was on the right side; that, in a word, she was right; that she knew that

she was right; and that she knew that others knew that she was right. In the country of Descartes to be right, or rather what Descartes' compatriots call *avoir raison*, is the supremest form of luck, the supreme *lustration*. The Government of 1914 managed, with an extreme elegance, to prove to all Frenchmen, and to the various distrustful and suspicious neighbors of France, that France was not in the wrong.

It should be noted, therefore, and in fact insisted on, as one of the *leit motifs* for the comprehension of the World War, that the French Government at its outbreak adroitly succeeded in stifling every form of political opposition, in eliminating every possibility of anarchy or rebellion, and even of misconception of the motives of France.

DANGERS AVERTED

The nation-wide spirit of sacred union, normally produced by foreign aggression, was thus artificially enhanced and purified by the sage precaution of the Socialist-Radical Cabinet that governed France in 1914. That spirit subsisted for some three years. It survived every insidious intrigue of the Germans to dissolve it. It was thus the happiest good fortune for France and for the world that the moment chosen by Germany to achieve her dreams of world-domination found in charge of French affairs a Socialist-Radical Government of more or less Pacifist leanings. By the irony of events, the doctrinaire Socialists of the *Internationale*, the Pacifist Humanitarians, the Lukewarm Liberals of every shape, were thereby condemned to choose between anarchic repudiation of all the most sacred national traditions of a Fatherland whose history had been for two thousand years a record of glory, and frank patriotic acceptance of the unexpected duty of being the first to hoist the national tricolor, the very first to intone in war the strains of the *Marseillaise*. Choice obviously there was none; in the circumstances action and reaction were identical. Both meant out-and-out resistance. Whereas, if a Conservative, more or less Reactionary, Government had been in office, instantly national union would have been partially jeopardized. The Socialists and many Radicals would have had a pretext, and they would

have seized it, for hampering mobilization, for creating parliamentary opposition, perhaps seeking to make political capital out of the dread situation. The upshot was that, in a France divided by political passion, it was on stalwart Republicanism, on Socialist-Radicalism, even on many of the champions of Pacifism, that fell the whole initial moral responsibility of the defense of France. This is a fact of remarkable significance. It is a fact that largely accounts for the prolonged political tranquility of the civilian population behind the front under the overwhelming burden of the first three years of war, while steadily in the hamlets all over French soil only pale ghosts returned to the lonely hearths.

There came a time, with the terrible tension of the war, when the normal effect of this great fact was all but spent. The will-'o-the-wisp glamor of the first glory began to tarnish; the fatigue and misery of the life in the winter trenches, the growing sense of uncertainty as to the final issue of the whole terrific business, formed an atmosphere no longer impervious to German intrigue. Pacifism, political passion again began to corrode the body-politic. But, just at this moment there intervened another fact of exceptional importance, even of curious significance. This new fact helped, as it were, to tide the French soul over that period of despair which the splendid impulses of sacred union could not indefinitely postpone.

THE CRUCIAL STAGE

The new fact was a fact of quite another order, and as it has been as rarely noted as the fact already analyzed I am bound to dwell on it.

The war had lasted some three years. The end seemed as remote as ever. The front had ceased seriously to sway. Stabilized behind two jaggedly parallel lines of fortification, two hostile worlds glared at each other out of the trenches, tantalizingly deprived of the deadlock. And, as the solution of the purely military issue appeared more and more doubtful, sinister signs were multiplying in France of a certain ominous lassitude. The air of the Palais Bourbon, the French Chamber of Deputies, seemed to be becoming slightly miasmatic. Strange mushroom news-

papers sprang into existence preaching Pacifism. Rumors reached Paris of local mutinies in certain sectors. There were curious tales, as well, of compromising frequentation between so eminent a servant of the State as a Malvy—who, as the Minister of the Interior, was officially responsible for the political and even moral discipline behind the front—and a little group of anarchist adventurers



M. Briand

Prime Minister of France from October, 1915, to March, 1917.

surrounding a certain Almereyda, editor of a flagrantly pacifist sheet known as the *Bonnet Rouge*.

Evidently the old atmosphere of 1914 was being exhausted. Something mysterious was happening. Pessimistic, even panicky, reports of the warning *morale* of France began to reach the Allied Governments. Military Headquarters of the Allied Armies became apprehensive. A great French caricaturist, M. Forain, reflected the growing, anxious whisperings heard on every hand: "Will France hold out?" in a famous drawing representing two French soldiers in the trenches, one of whom said to the other: "Provided, only, we

can count on the civilians 'standing pat'." Parliamentary committees held secret meetings, and the mystery added to the growing unrest. Cabinets began to be remodeled. Worse still, governments even changed with a rapidity recalling the old-time habits of France. Intrigue and gossip and criticism became rampant. Was it discouragement due to fatigue? Or was it German money sowing discord among the Allies, and sapping in the several countries of the Entente the foundations of the State? Was it both at once? At all events it was obvious that the air was impregnated by a sort of new gas. There was a spirit abroad which I may call a spirit of *Moral Armistice*.

A keen yearning for American intervention defined more and more widely the nature of the hopes that were everywhere springing up, as being, now at last, the one certainty of victory.

THE AMERICANS ARRIVE

At 5 o'clock on October 27, 1917, American Headquarters issued the following statement, the first official *communiqué* of the American Expeditionary Force:

A few battalions of our first contingent, continuing their training with the object of serving as a nucleus for the instruction of future contingents, now hold the first-line trenches of a calm sector on the French front in conjunction with battalions of trained French troops. Our troops are supported by a few batteries of our artillery in conjunction with trained French batteries. The sector remains normal. Our men have adapted themselves perfectly to the life of the trenches.

The American boys, then, were really in line; and, as the French say, *ce n' était pas trop tôt*: It was in the nick of time. It is impossible to exaggerate the excellent impression instantly made by the publication of the first American *communiqué* with regard to the entrance of American soldiers into the trenches.

All over France, in the little villages, the population had supported with a remarkable stoicism the spectacle of the weeding-out of their district by the progress of the war. In many hamlets the result had been heartrending. France, however, had not budged. But France was now insisting on proportioning the objects of the war to her capacity of resist-

ance. She expected England and the United States to relieve her henceforth of such responsibilities as she could no longer herself support.

The Prime Minister M. Painlevé invented a scheme for the satisfaction of the demands of many professions and of the farmers in consequence of which in many a French commune the sudden arrival of members of the oldest class of French soldiers on furlough had really, no doubt, upheld the patriotic temper of the peasants. But M. Painlevé's scheme, if persisted in, would have finally resulted in a sort of chronic demobilization of the French Army. The mere fact of certain American officers being seen at Clermont-Ferrand, even if for only a few hours, had done an immense and timely good in encouraging the spirit of the entire region without the grave inconveniences entailed in the application of M. Painlevé's project. In a word, at this moment, nothing was more obvious than that in the interests of the *morale* of the French hamlets every bit of information that could possibly be given to the public as to the growing effort of the United States ought to be steadily offered it.

France was clamoring, in a word, for a government capable of governing. The French people were becoming impatient. A growing desire for quick action, it was clear, would shortly sweep the Painlevé Government off its feet. Public opinion was ripening to the conviction that perhaps M. Clemenceau was the single man able to govern at so confused a moment. He was the bistoury people were looking for.

GERMANY'S PEACE OFFENSIVES

Meanwhile, the Chancellors of the Central Powers were delivering speeches which were as dangerous as they were ingenious. They were subtly calculated to induce the United States, and the organized working classes of England and France, to consent to talk officially about peace. And talking officially about peace the average common sense of France well understood would be to aggravate the risks of the Moral Armistice which they knew to be worse than a precipitate Military Armistice. Frenchmen, as a whole, were perfectly aware that a Moral Armistice was a

sort of dry-rot of armies, and above all of the population behind the front. They realized the fact that no general, no government, no state at war had the right to experiment with the two-edged sword called "armistice," unless the object was to talk peace definitely. The French peasant, and average French public opinion, saw clearly enough the nature of the maneuvers of the Central Powers.



M. Millerand

The French Minister of War, 1918-19, and Premier in 1920.

When New Year's Day, 1918, broke, France, surrounded by shifting and even "shifty" friends and forces, found herself in a more or less critical situation. On the decision which had then to be taken were to depend not only the coming of the real Peace, but a satisfactory Peace with Victory within the year, as well as the assurance of a period of peaceful years for the world. The Entente Governments had a short lease of life—a very short one—in which to take the necessary steps to thwart the final diabolic trick of the Central Powers; to prevent, that is, the clamor of the crowd from forcing them

over the divide upon the steep sliding-scale prepared for them by the subtle Hertling and Kühlmann, and by the candid Czernin, along which, if they ventured, they would be precipitated into the bottomless pit of the Moral Armistice which the good sense and the sure intuition of Frenchmen so rightly dreaded.

Happily, now and then, during this period an American *communiqué*, revealing the steadily growing *real presence* of the United States, helped to fortify the spirit of Frenchmen, mystified by the strange unrest in the world about them and by the rumors of peace—and happily there was now at the helm a new pilot. Frenchmen had temporarily weaned themselves of their fear of a "man."

THE MORAL ARMISTICE

M. Clemenceau, in fact, had hardly taken office when he sent for the Editors-in-Chief of the majority of the Paris newspapers for a private talk at the War Office. He told these gentlemen that, in view of the present situation, they would do well to prepare public opinion for a long war. He assured them that, contrary to what had taken place under his predecessors, there would be no longer any effort to suppress in France information as to the real facts of the situation throughout the world and on the front; that, almost complete freedom would be given the press for the publication of bitter truths, for the statement of facts as they were. His policy, indeed, would be exactly the opposite of the gilded-pill policy of M. Briand. He wanted no more of those puerile exercises consisting in blowing into the air pretty iridescent soap-bubbles of optimism. He thought it better for the great French public, in the hamlets as well as in the cities, to make up their minds that there would be no hope of peace until the Germans were beaten. While personally he thought that events would bring peace before too long, he urged the Paris editors to prepare their readers for a peace only in 1919.

What the great good sense of Frenchmen saw no less clearly than M. Clemenceau was that, owing to the elasticity of certain formulas in recent peace proposals made by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George, the Central Powers were once again decided to make a final dash in order to divide the Powers of

the Entente. They were claiming the right to negotiate for several peaces with each individual Power. But, above all, they counted on so flattering the personal ambition of President Wilson and the national pride of the United States as to induce the President to seek to put himself at the head of Europe—of a Europe tired out, and eager to be extricated from the complicated horrors of the hour—and to constrain London and Paris and Rome to become “reasonable.” France, as a whole, remained calm, for she saw that the success of this trick—consolidating arbitrary government everywhere—would stultify all the aims and dreams of the Entente Powers. It would seal the fate of democracy throughout the world. It would be the end of France; the destruction of the British Empire; the explosion into star-dust of the small, independent nations; the surrender of the Russian wilderness to Pangerman expansion and exploitation; the restoration within five years of the whilom alliance between Italy and the Central Powers. There would remain in the world only three Great Powers—Germany, the United States and Japan. The United States would leap into an hegemony wider and more exalted than America had ever dreamed of. But France did not believe that that was what the United States was “out for”: it would be the most colossal treason of history.

All would have been well if the United States had signed the Pact of London of September 5, 1914, in which the Allies reciprocally bound themselves not to make a separate peace. If the United States had signed that Pact, the military dictators of Germany could not have used their Chancellor and their Austro-Hungarian Ally to try to gull the world, and notably Washington, with hypocritical pretences as to their readiness to negotiate a Wilsonian peace. But the deplorable mid-air conversations—diplomatic wireless telegraphic hallooes—between Washington, Berlin, London, Paris, Rome and Tokio still continued, and were constantly aggravating the state of Moral Armistice.

For the first time it was possible to chronicle grave anxiety everywhere, the beginnings of a disquieting diminution of the *morale* of France, for Frenchmen felt that these ma-

chinations were rapidly confusing issues. They fired Germany with a new hope. They exalted the spirit of the German Army, by suggesting that England and France were weakening. The nerves and the patience of Frenchmen were put to a severe test during this period of the war by what they felt to be the stubborn *cavalier-seul* method of America in political and diplomatic matters. This attitude and this method facilitated the *divide et impera* peace-policy of Germany which had come to be Germany's last resort and sole hope.

PERILS OF PACIFIST PROPAGANDA

During an entire year, while the diabolic German plot for the disintegration of Russia had been logically working itself out, there had been but one very serious peril besetting the Western Powers. That peril had been not military but moral. It had been the risks of Bolshevik contagion and of inoculation by similar forms of gangrenous pacifism. The body-politic of France, as has been seen, had remained fairly sane. But the ravages were not entirely invisible. Ending the war by negotiation; letting bygones as to origins of the war be bygones; and repudiation of every form of rancor; making, exhausted as the world was, a clean slate where the people need tot up no items of annexations and indemnities; rejection of alleged worn out devices, such as “Balance of Power,” and the preparation of a Happy Family of Nations in the interests of Everlasting Justice and Humanity: these had been for many months some of the characteristic ideas insidiously circulated in the world by the Germans, ideas which the Germans thought particularly useful for their enemies, and ideas, all of them, which happily had had no grip on the soldiers in the trenches. While disseminating these ideas throughout the world, however, Germany and Austria had in no wise relaxed the pursuit of their Pangermanic war aims, seeking at high speed to manufacture a grandiose war-map, susceptible of curtailment by bargaining round the green-table, whenever the Western Powers had been sufficiently ripened into candid confidence in German sincerity.

Now, the willingness of Mr. Wilson and of British statesmen to converse with the

chief bandits beyond the Rhine, to converse by messages and speeches, in the serene hope of converting the followers of these bandits to a remorseful sense of their crime, had been a necessary condition of the experiment undertaken by the Germans. That experiment was to supplement, just in the nick of time, what they knew to be a futile military offensive by a more effective political diplomatic offensive. That, the Germans had come to believe, was probably the only way to empty the trenches where two worlds had been blocked for the last three years. So long as the Western Powers still kept on talking of peace-aims every German could go on hoping; and, in the working out of this experiment, the Germans had found allies, not only where they had not expected it—though they had hoped against hope—namely, among the responsible Anglo-Saxon statesmen just mentioned, but also where they had naturally counted on finding them—that is, among certain political parties honeycombed by the Marxism of the *Internationale*, the Socialists and the Labor Unions of France and England. It looked for a time as if the selfish and heedless excesses of party spirit among the parliamentary Socialists in those two countries might perhaps demoralize unintentionally the power of national resistance behind the trenches.

PRESIDENT WILSON'S DIPLOMACY

In spite of the inconvenient and even grave consequences of Mr. Wilson's method of carrying on interminable international conversations, which could only facilitate German projects, this method had had, and was continuing to have, at the same time, one paramount and admirable, not to say indispensable result. It was some time in March, 1918, that one of the leading statesmen of the Entente Powers said to me wittily, if disrespectfully: "The Socialists and Syndicalists of the world have plunged like so many cattle into the immense vacuum of the Wilsonian thought; and, without knowing what they were up to, nor what had befallen them, they opened their eyes to find themselves in a sort of blind alley, like some early Christian catacomb, but in the most distinguished company." The picturesqueness of this image should not

prevent us from noting that certain statesmen quickly perceived the essential reality of the fact thus humorously characterized, and lost no time in using it in the interests of the *morale* of Europe. They shut the bars down behind the Socialists hermetically sealed up within the enclosure in question. The masses became the prisoners, for the time being, of the several governments, who were thus free to carry on the war in spite of certain palaverings. This is an all-important and happy fact—that the radiant influence of Mr. Wilson disciplined for a time Socialist thought all over the world, canalised that thought, gave



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German Peace Envoys Crossing the French Lines

The cars bearing the German peace mission reached this point at 9.30 P. M. on Nov. 7, 1918.

it a special stamp. The Socialists met in a kind of Oecumenical Council in London and translated into their own idioms the messages of President Wilson. The hands of the Socialists were tied by their Declaration of London. For the moment—and Europe owed that great good fortune to Mr. Wilson, *malgré lui*—the Entente Powers were guaranteed against Bolshevism. They possessed thus a sort of magic square for the exorcising of one whole class of perils.



From a painting by Georges Scott in L'Illustration

Reunion

After an exile of forty years, the spirit of France overthrows the German boundaries and enters the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine.

FACTORS OF UNITY

Three main factors had thus coöperated, independently of the science of her generals and the prowess of her soldiers, in making the political and social life of France during the World War less superficially eventful than that of any of her Allies. In the other Powers the war scattered the seeds of revolution. In France the war merely accelerated the normal movement of reform, which was in being before the war. This, however, is another chapter. What I am insisting on now is that the people of France, preeminently among the peoples of the nations that were the victims of Germany, displayed, in their unflinching fortitude, no serious sign of a craving that the war should end before the enemy lay prone in the dust.

That France should have resisted in so sublime a temper for five years, thwarting every intrigue for her undoing on the part of certain of her politicians at home, and of her enemies, as well as of her misguided friends abroad, is explicable not merely by the fact that she was fighting for her very life; it was due as well:

First, to the happy accident that when the war burst a Socialist-Radical Government in office, which no Frenchman could suspect of imperialism and bellicose intent, had thrust upon it the dread honor of assuming the national defense; and that that government so ingenuously maneuvered as to be able to prove plastically, not only to all French citizens, but to the world, that the hands of France at all events were clean, that in the balance in which history would one day weigh the several responsibilities for the war, not one ounce thereof would be French.

Secondly, the unflinching resistance of France was due to the curious consequences of the evangelic word of the Great Mediator,

Mr. Wilson, in his multiple messages, from the one containing the slogan "Peace without Victory" down to the one formulating the notorious Fourteen Points and the theme of the League of Nations; consequences characterized by the wonderful fact that, just at the moment when the ignorant idealistic masses and working classes of Europe were lying in wait for a leader who would help them to save their face and to fight on in hope amid the travail of the war, the Gospel from beyond the Ocean temporarily disciplined and duped these masses as with a Circe potion—and thus secured for the French Government a welcome lease of life in which to make war rather than to play politics.

Thirdly, and finally, the unflinching resistance of France was due to the fact that, just at the critical moment when, thanks to the interplay of German intrigue and Wilsonian ideology, a period of Moral Armistice began, the French Nation had, providentially, as it were, at its disposal a savior in the shape of an Old Man, a Frenchman of the French, M. Clemenceau, whose independence of character, and whose patriotic concentration suffered him to play a part that was to place him on a level of glory and public service, not only with the *Girl of Lorraine*, who had saved France centuries before, but with the *Richelieu* of the Third Republic. M. Delcassé, who, silently sapping during seven years the foundations of the work of Bismarck, had, almost alone among Frenchmen, made it possible for a Joffre and a Foch and a Clemenceau to accomplish their sublime task.

Really, in presence of the spectacle of the interlocked vicissitudes of the History of the Third Republic, culminating in the downfall of Germany, one may well wonder if, after all, the method and form of historical writing chosen by Bossuet are not the only form and method that are approximately scientific.

[THE END.]



